











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
The political economy of opera: 
a study of the relationship between artistic value and financial value 
in the current era 
Sally LK Garden 
PhD 
The University of Edinburgh 
1999 
ABSTRACT 
This study has been made necessary by the lack of an adequate political economy of 
opera, and related philosophical constructs, to take opera successfully into the twenty-
first century. Despite a history of crises and failure within the UK subsidized opera 
sector, scant attention has been paid to the theory of value in opera: a situation not 
aided by the scarcity and inconsistency of available data pertaining to the financial 
performance of opera companies and the sector as a whole. 
The study provides a fresh theoretical approach which will allow those parties with an 
interest in the artistic value and financial value issues posed by opera to find a common 
forum. The influence of relevant factors in the environment are discussed, including the 
trend towards accountability, and the emergence of communitarianist thought in the 
political agenda. The concept of the transformation of value as the characteristic 
process of opera is introduced. It is also shown that artistic value is the outcome of 
transactions between buyers and sellers; that it is irrevocably a market concept. In the 
context of a democratic market economy there is need, therefore, to widen 
participation in the artistic value agenda by incorporating the general public within an 
inclusive artistic value franchise. 
The history and theory of value is examined with reference to current aesthetic thought 
(Adorno's version of commodity fetishism, and postmodernism), the economic 
writings of Marx and Smith, and current explicit and implicit models of value (including 
the Baumol and Bowen productivity lag model, the Keynesian powerhouse model, 
public service provision, and the merit good theory). 
A methodology to gather consistent and reliable data from the mandatory annual 
financial reports of individual opera companies was developed. The difficulties 
associated with construction of the resultant data set revealed a lack of accountability 
within the sector. A long-run parametric study of the UK subsidized opera sector 
(1976-95) was then conducted. 
Results reveal an inexorable rise in the real cost of opera, and demonstrate, for the first 
time, the poor long-run performance of the UK subsidized opera sector. Results also 
confirm the existence of inequities (distributive injustices) in current subsidy policy, the 
presence of a controlling partial interest within the artistic value franchise (an 
artocracy), and treatment of artistic value as an exogenous given. 
It is concluded that these results are an inevitable outcome of the current opera 
infrastructure, and that there has been inadequate examination and consideration of 
alternative operational and infrastructural models, some of which are discussed here. 
Overall, it is concluded that the current, static, opera infrastructure precludes 
substantive artistic innovation, and that the museum element in the artform resides not 
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All artistic value, in the current era, is created within the context of a money economy. 
This is an inescapable fact. 
Indeed, no matter its form, or commercial status, all artistic production impinges upon 
a world of political and economic relations. Even the proverbial garret-bound artist 
who chooses to produce art for her own private consumption, and not for sale or 
trade, must possess the means, specifically, the financial means to support her work. 
Her isolation from the environment can never be complete, her art can never be 
autonomous. 
Taken to its logical extreme, no art is without cost and, therefore, no art is without 
value. This must be so in a money economy, since all costs may be understood as 
values, and all values, as costs. The critical and interesting question, however, concerns 
the nature of the relationship which pertains between these two elements; between cost 
and value in art. 
What, then, is artistic value? What is its nature, how is it created, who controls its 
creation, and what, most importantly, is its relationship to financial value? Neither 
philosophy nor aesthetics can help us directly here, for these are essentially practical 
questions; questions which demand answers based on observation of the real world; 
questions which demand practical analysis, and which carry political, economic, and 
indeed, moral implications for society as a whole. 
To this extent, then, we are all members of an artistic value franchise1• If the concept of 
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artistic value is to have any meaning, any value for the society which bears the cost of its 
production (via public subsidy), it must not merely be imposed in the name of the 
public interest, but should be actively directed by franchisees. The artistic value agenda 
should, indeed, reflect the will of franchise; and in the context of modern democratic 
market society, nothing less, it seems, may logically suffice. 
In this introductory chapter, then, we set the context for our study of the relationship 
between artistic value·andfinandal value in opera. We begin by describing the problem for 
study, and demonstrating the need for a political economy of opera. We then outline 
those changes in the political and economic environment which have a direct bearing 
upon the future of opera. In so doing, we place opera and artistic value firmly within the 
context of the market economy of the current era. 
The need far a political economy of opera 
There exists a range of parties including artists, arts administrators, musicologists, 
aestheticians, cultural economists, politicians, public arts agencies, sponsor companies, 
trusts, private donors, audiences, friends' organisations, the taxpaying public, critics, and 
the media, who each concern themselves in some way with the particular artistic value 
and jinandal value issues presented by opera. Each of these parties has developed its own 
set of models pertaining to value in opera. These models, which can be explicit or 
implicit, function either as a form of internal definition of opera for the party 
concerned (e.g. the commodification arguments of modernist and postmodernist 
aesthetic theory) or as a means by which the party concerned can put forward one 
particular case for the public subsidization of opera (e.g. the public senice provision model 
used by government agencies responsible for distributing subsidy, and by opera 
companies seeking subsidization). 
However, these models, whilst embedded in current thinking about opera, often 
conflict with each other either in assumptions or aims. Some models, as we shall 
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demonstrate, stress financial value outcomes whilst holding artistic value constant (e.g. 
productivity lag model, public service provision model), whilst others stress artistic value 
outcomes either without regard for financial value issues or with an antagonistic view of 
the relationship between the two types of value (e.g. Adorne's modernist aesthetics, 
and postmodernist philosophy). Some models, particularly those designed to assist in 
the setting of arts policy criteria, are based on democratic principles (e.g. the egalitarian 
assumptions of the merit good model); others are based on what we might term artocratic 
principles (e.g. those aesthetic schema which legitimise only cognitive or knowledge 
based approaches to artistic value judgement and which discount public opinion as 
uninformed and therefore invalid). 
Also, current models pertaining to value in opera tend, in the majority of cases, to be 
predicated on the assumption of a static environment. With the notable exception of 
Adorne's commodification argument (discussed in chapter 4), most models treat opera 
in isolation to changes which may be occurring in the environment, and within the 
artform itself. Such static models are, as we shall demonstrate, inadequate in the context 
of a changing or dynamic environment, not only because they ignore the political and 
economic forces which are currently acting upon opera, but because they impede 
substantive artistic innovation in the artform itself. 
In order to set the context for our study, then, we begin by conducting a brief survey 
of the environment. 
S aUy LK Garden 3 
1. Introduction 
1.2 The changing environment of opera 
... the traditional economic, soda/ and political construct of support by the 
government for the cultural sector in Europe is coming to an end. .. 
(Abruzzo (AT I<ierney Inc.) 1997:30). 
The sources and implications of change 
The political and economic climate in which opera exists is changing in a fundamental 
way. This change is being driven by two factors: in Europe and America by the trend 
towards lower tax regimes, and especially in the UK, by an increasing emphasis on 
accountability in the provision of services. These factors are together exerting pressure 
on both levels and utility of public spending. 
Put in historical context, these changes can be viewed, at least in part, as a function of 
the increasing globalization of trade. Briefly, the more markets become international in 
nature, the less national economies can be controlled in isolation. 
With the abolition of foreign exchange controls in the UK in 1979, for instance, the 
UK economy became particularly vulnerable to external economic influences and 
competitive swings. The need to control productivity and inflationary differentials vis a 
vis trading partners became at once more important and more difficult. 
Over the last twenty years, the need to raise productivity as a way of controlling cost-
push inflation (which can be imported via raw materials price increases) has spurred the 
development of supply-side measures in public sector management. Supply-side 
measures are based on the central assumption that tax cuts promote economic growth, 
and that because there is growth, overall tax revenues will nevertheless increase (for 
discussion see Stockman 1986). 
Now supply-side economic policy, developed in the USA in the early 1980s (hence 
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Reaganomics), has, to a certain extent, been adopted by the present Clinton 
administration (DRN 01-97). Today, and particularly in Europe, however, the term has 
come to be used in a general sense to refer to any set of measures which aim to make 
the supply of factors in an economy (e.g. labour) less constrained (see e.g. West 
1987:87). Thus, examples of supply-side measures include: cutting taxation, cutting or 
controlling the growth of public spending, privatization programmes, and managerial 
initiatives designed to shift power from producers to consumers (thus aiming to 
increase the efficiency, quality and accountability of public services). 
In terms of opera, it is important to view these changes not solely as the product of 
political ideology (it is not sufficient to claim that political ideology is always at the root 
of an artform's demise), but as the result of necessary economic policy responses to 
international financial pressures. This is important because failure to understand the 
causes or sources of observable change, impairs our ability to make reliable predictions 
about change and the implications of change in the future: we become reactive rather 
than proactive. 
Moreover, it is important to understand that change in the environment is not 
significant in itself. We cannot say that a changing political and economic climate is 
necessarily good or necessarily bad for opera. In order to understand the implications 
of such change, we need to understand the relationship between opera and its 
environment: an issue which is explored in depth in the research chapters of this study. 
For the moment, let us begin by characterising in more detail, those changes in the 
political and economic environment which affect, or are likely to affect opera. 
The opera economies 
In broad overview, government spending as a proportion of national income has been 
increasing steadily throughout the industrialised countries of the world. Figures 1-1 and 
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1-2 illustrate the rising trend of government spending as a percentage of GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) in continental Europe (Figure 1-1) and other selected major 
economies (Figure 1-2). However, looking at the total average for all seventeen 
countries in the sample, the trendline can be seen to flatten from 1980 until the last 
data point at 1996. This is because many European governments have reduced public 
spending in order to satisfy the fiscal policy criterion specified for membership of 
Economic Monetary Union (discussed below). In some countries, pressure to reduce 
taxes in order to avoid structural deficits (i.e. persistently spending more than citizens 
can be persuaded to pay in taxes) has also acted to slow the trend (for discussion see E 
20-09-97:11). 
This is important, for of all the countries in the sample, only Norway has a net public 
sector asset as opposed to net debt. In fact, the net indebtedness of governments in 
most OECD2 countries has increased since 1992. The situation is particularly pointed in 
both Belgium and Italy, where net public debt is larger than respective national income 
(E 02-97:139). 
Given the above factors, it is unlikely that government spending in the opera 
economies will continue to rise at historical rates. For the arts, as a non-essential service 
or non-essential component of this spending, the prognosis is therefore bad. 
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1913 1937 1996 
1870 (1900} 1920 1960 1980 1990 
~ Austria ~ Belgium ~ France 
DJ Germany [ill . Italy I Netherlands 
[] Spain ~ Switzerland I W arid average 
Source: Economist (20-09-97:11) /International Monetary Fund 
Figure 1-1 : Government spending as% of GDP (Co11ti11ental Europe) 
Now in Europe, pressure to meet the objectives of Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU, launched January 1999) has forced participant countries (the Euro-11, including 
France, Germany, Italy, Finland and Spain) and potential participant countries (the UK, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Greece) to reduce public deficits as a share of Gross Domestic 
Product:3. In this context, privatization programmes, because they act to reduce public 
deficits have been a feature of the UK, French and Italian economies (EM 1997a) as 
well as East European economies such as Poland and the Czech Republic. In Italy, this 
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has had a direct effect on opera: partial privatization of the 13 ente-lirici. or state run 
opera companies (totalling 6000 employees) began in 1995 with emergency deficit 
grants to Rome Opera and La Scala, and with the submission of proposals to 
parliament for the rationalisation of state intervention in the performing arts (se E 08-
95:82, Degenhardt 1996a:23 and 1998). 
Moreover, the need for fiscal discipline in EMU member, and potential EMU member 
states, will continue as the European Central Bank (which from 1999 must impose a 
unified monetary policy) attempts to optimize policy across potentially divergent 
economies. Slow growth in France, for instance, and in also in Germany (due to the 
aftershock of incorporating the inefficient command economy of former East 
Germany) is hampering this convergence process. Interestingly, Germany, given ongoing 
financial malaise in its opera sector, continues to debate the idea of opera company 
mergers as a way of reducing inefficiency (see, for instance Assmann 1999:5). 
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Figure 1-2: Government spending as% of GDP (Rest of World) 
The Scandinavian countries (with the exception of Norway, a non European Union 
state enjoying oil resource driven growth) are also not immune from the pressures of 
international financial markets. Sweden, traditionally a high public spending economy 
must conform to the Maastricht-related goal of limiting the public deficit share of GDP 
to within 3% should it wish to join EMU at a later date. Although it has used taxation 
revenue to build up an extensive social welfare system, Sweden now aims at an overall 
reduction of state costs in GDP, so that social spending has come under significant 
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pressure (EIU 1996-97a:11). Often regarded as a model of cultural enlightenment, 
Sweden has now begun to cut arts funding (Abruzzo 1997:30). Moreover, in Denmark, 
a climate of uncertainty has prevailed over state funding for the arts in recent years (see, 
for instance, Reiss 1996b:30). 
Indeed throughout Europe public deficit reduction strategies have introduced 
fundamental change in the socio-political environment of individual nation states. The 
traditional priority given in many European countries to core public services such as 
welfare programmes, public pension schemes and healthcare is no longer axiomatic. 
There have been many cuts and alterations: Sweden (unemployment benefit, new 
restrictive policy after 1998), Greece (closure of state companies which otherwise 
require heavy capital investment), Denmark (cuts to public pensions and healthcare), 
Italy (public pension restrictions), Germany (deferral of pension expenditure by raising 
the retirement age for women), Spain (industry privatisations, new healthcare charges), 
and France (public pension restrictions, healthcare cuts) (for background see E 09-
96:44). In the UK, planned major reform of the pension system was announced in 1997 
by the former Conservative government. Although not instituted, it is significant that 
the current Labour administration has introduced some reforms of its own. 
In East Europe, Hungary has limited the scope of its state funding for the arts 
(following radical austerity measures introduced in 1995 to reduce a budget deficit). 
Although the Hungarian National Opera House and Ballet still receives state funds, 
there are plans to introduce efficiency measures. Specifically, it is thought that a 
reduction of labour overhead will be instituted: the Hungarian National Opera House 
and Ballet employs approximately 1350 people and maintains two house orchestras 
(Thorogood 1996:11). Indeed, Hungary, still adjusting to a market economy, shows 
evidence of applying supply-side economic measures to the arts (e.g. plans to put the 
administration function of the Bartok /New Music Festival out to tender; ibid 
Thorogood 1996)4. 
It is also worth noting that countries intending to apply for European Union (EU) 
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membership are required to conform to a number of political and economic entry 
criteria (as set by the European Union Copenhagen Summit in 1993). These criteria 
include: guarantees of democracy (which has implications for the operation of 
government in an open and accountable way), a functioning market economy, the 
capacity to cope with the Single Market (which requires implementation of a sales tax 
or Value Added Tax system) and acceptance of the goal of Economic Monetary Union, 
which, as we have seen, requires the exercise of fiscal restraint to control inflation and 
the level of public spending (for background see E 07-97:35). It is significant that the 
list of intending applicants to the EU includes central and eastern European states such 
as Estonia and Bulgaria, states which currently provide the opera sector in the UK with 
a source of low cost artistic input (principally singers). Interestingly, given continued 
enlargement of the EU, this source will effectively disappear once countries such as 
these, as well as the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary, begin to conform 
to European Union tax laws. This may have interesting consequences for native talent 
in the UK. 
In the USA, during the 1990s, there has been major debate at Congress level over 
government funding of the arts. Zeroing out (i.e. phasing out) all government funding of 
the arts has been considered by conservative members of the legislature, for instance 
(Gattuso 1996:13). In addition, government agencies as well as private foundations have 
increasingly begun to hypothecate funds i.e. to restrict their grants for specific purposes 
and to redirect funding away from general revenue support (Scheff and Kotler 
1996:28). Federal funding via the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), for 
instance, was cut by approximately 40% from US$162.4 million in 1995 to US$99.5 
million in 1996 and although plans to phase it out completely by 1997 /98 have been 
dropped, the 1998 and 1999 NEA budget figures have remained frozen at US$98.6 
million (approximately £66 million) (see Reiss 1995:42, and Brookes 1999:7). This 
comes in line with an overall aim to reduce the federal fiscal deficit to around 0.5% by 
the year 2003 (Barrell, Morgan and Pain 1996), so the pressure on public funding of the 
arts by state and local administrations will continue in the long-term, not least because 
all state arts councils rely on NEA funding to supplement legislative appropriations 
S aUy LK Garden 11 
1. I ntrod11ction 
(Reiss 1996a:54). 
Public sector reforms, following the UK paradigm, have also been taking place within 
Australia and New Zealand (for discussion see Walsh 1995:64). In Australia, for 
instance, the merger of Australian Opera with Victorian State Opera in 1997 (to create 
Opera Australia) was carried out to remove inefficiency in the public provision of 
opera. The merger was designed to alleviate the problem of overprovision, since the 
two original companies haq operated in overlapping geographical markets; both with 
box office losses (IAM 11-96:4 and IAM 02-97c:34). This action is again symptomatic 
of supply-side economic policy. 
In East Asia, where Western opera has been imported alongside the industrial 
technologies used by the West, there is increasing cosmopolitanism of culture. In 
Singapore, for instance, a major performing arts centre project includes a lyric theatre 
of 2000 seat capacity (Cutts 1994:45). There is also interest in opera in Seoul, South 
Korea (Laurie 1994:11) and in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, where 
renovations to two opera houses are currently underway (IAM 10-97:29, and Murray 
1999). 
However, as the economies of East Asia mature and growth tends to slow, there will be 
need for structural reforms including significant readjustments to monetary and fiscal 
policy in like manner to the West (for discussion see E 03-97:18). Indeed, these 
economies are no less immune, no less open, to the economic downturns of global 
trade and financial markets, as the Asian crisis of 1998/99 has recently proved. Japan, 
for instance, has already experienced a serious deterioration in public finances since 
1992. Like many countries in the West, Japan has had to deal with the problem of a 
deficit in its general government budget balance, as well as the burden of an ageing 
population in its long-term welfare provision (E 09-96:44). It remains to be seen, 
however, what effect these problems in the Japanese economy will have on the recently 
completed opera house within Tokyo's New National Theatre complex (which opened 
1997; see Tumbull 1998:39). 
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It is likely, following the model of its post-war industrial development, that East Asia 
will move away from the wholesale import of opera (receiving touring productions and 
singers from the West) and establish its own opera sector. Many East Asian singers, 
orchestral musicians and conductors currently have established international careers on 
the Western circuit. It is simply a question of putting this artistic human resource and 
developing infrastructure together. It will, however, be interesting to monitor the 
development of funding structures for opera in the various East Asian economies, 
some of which have a grea~er tradition of state intervention than others (e.g. South 
Korea). In Taipei, Taiwan, for instance, the main arts centre (which hosts western 
opera), the National Chiang Kai Shek (CKS) Cultural Centre, has already undergone a 
form of semi-privatization. If proposals go ahead, the centre will receive a major one-
off endowment from the state, and will thereafter be expected to look after its own 
finances and revenue generation (Farish 1996:39). Innovative funding solutions such as 
this must inevitably be of great interest to the West, especially given the fact that in 
countries such as Taiwan, greater reliance on private sector funding is seen as 
synonymous with cultural and political autonomy. In the West, reliance on private 
sector support is seen, rather, as a source of disautonomy (there is a fear that sponsors 
will increasingly dictate repertoire programming). 
In this context, it should be noted that in Russia, the move to a market economy has 
had a destabilising effect on opera provision. The Kirov Opera (Marinsky Theatre) has 
in recent years experienced cuts to, and irregular payment of, government subsidies 
(Meisner 1997:39). In Moscow itself the Bolshoi Theatre has been surpassed, in terms 
of its operatic reputation, by Novaya Opera (a small city government subsidized 
company) and Helikon Opera (a very small company founded in the 1990s) (E 07-
97:110). Arguably the Bolshoi Opera, as a result, has lost its political role as Soviet icon 
and thus, lost its real raison d'etre (see E 07-97). 
South Africa is also a special case. Here, the encouragement of private sector funding 
and capital initiatives in the arts e.g. Spiers Winery Opera House project, Cape Town 
(Brookes 1996:25) is related more to internal political forces, and the need to stimulate 
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socio-economic regeneration on equitable grounds, than to the globalization of finance 
and trade. 
The trend towards increasing accountabilify 
In the UK, in the aftermath of a wave of industry privatisations under the former 
Conservative government, s~cietal values have moved towards increasing accountability 
in the provision of services e.g. the British Rail passenger charter, the National Health 
Service patient charter, the privatization of water debate, new environmental legislation, 
and recycling initiatives (for healthcare background, see CMND 3425/1996 and DOH 
NHSE 1996). In the early 1990s this led to the creation of a Charter for the Arts, 
following which the Arts Council of England announced a new openness initiative (ACE 
1994a:4). More specifically, the Scottish Arts Council now cites as one of its aims the 
need to be.fiexi,ble, open and accountable (SAC 1997a). 
The emphasis of all these initiatives is to shift power from producers to consumers in 
order to encourage efficiency and optimal use of economic resources (again, a supply-
side strategy). Now the philosophy of accountability manifests itself in the bolstering of 
systems of complaint and redress for consumers. The National Lottery Pilot 
Stabilisation Programme, introduced by the Arts Council of England in 1997, is 
designed to operate in line with this same shift in the locus of power (see DNH 
021/1997). Conditions of the programme include: the provision of information for the 
National Audit Office (an independent body appointed to assess Value For Money 
issues in post-privatized industries), and, more specifically, the ability to demonstrate 
the value in retum that may be expected from an investment of stabilisation funds (ACE 
1996a). (We explore the concepts of value and retum in detail in chapter 2). 
Indeed, the very existence of the National Lottery Pilot Stabilisation Programme 
provides evidence that the UK subsidized opera sector is beginning to find itself subject 
to market economics in a way wholly foreign to its traditional funding culture. 
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Government,s interest in accountability is a significant factor in the environment. 
The trend towards accountability is not unique to the UK public sector. In the USA, in 
the mid 1990s, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) announced its intention 
to become a more responsive and accountable agenry (Alexander 1996:210). Perceived as an 
elitist institution, the NEA had been termed the Endowment of ATTOgance by the 
Baltimore Sun (cited in Reiss 1995:42). 
Now, in a key paper on arts funding, Scheff and Kotler (1996:28) set out the specific 
implications of accountability for American arts organizations. The parallels with the 
European subsidized opera sector are strong : 
... what the arts face today in the midst of spiralling costs, funding cuts, and greater competition 
for audi,ences is not a terminal crisis, but what Peter Drucker [management academic 
and contributor to Harvard Business Review] calls 'the challenge of accountability: In 
the past, arts organizations have successfal/y looked to others for solutions to their problems. 
When the arts [in the USA] et!Joyed rapid/y growing audiences and readi/y available funding 
sources, arts managers had the luxury to operate a less than professional managerial 
environment. But cries for financial help and inejfective/y targeted and positioned appeals to 
prospective audi,ences are no longer answered as readi,/y. Pointing a finger of blame at the public 
for a decreasing interest in performing arts offerings and at the funders for changing priorities 
will not help to solve the problems. Rather, arts organizations must become more accountable 
for their actions and inactions. Thry must be proactive by planning, listening, and continuing to 
create and recreate, rather than to be reactive. Holding on to what has worked in the past then 
reacting on/y when a situation has become critical is no longer defensible (Scheff and Kotler 
1996:28). 
Scheff and Kotler go on to characterise what they see as the twofold nature of the 
challenge of accountability. Firstly, the need to make art understandable and accessible 
to potential audiences, and secondly, the need to professionalise arts management and 
marketing (ibid. Scheff and Kotler 1996:28). 
There are other formats or explanations of accountability which are even more 
comprehensive, and discussions of the subject, along with strategies for dealing with 
accountability problems have appeared in the standard texts of public sector 
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management (e.g. Walsh 1995, Lawton and Rose 1994). For the sake of clarity, Table 1-
1, based on a typology of accountability developed by Loughlin (1992) sets out the 
various forms and institutional mechanisms of accountability : 
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To ensure public policy decisions 
are made in the public interest (by 
testing the responsiveness or 
merits of a decision rather than the 
process by which it was taken). 
To ensure compliance with relevant 
statutory requirements and to 
improve economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness via value for money 
(VFM) analysis. 
To ensure compliance with the 
principles of natural justice via 
adequate systems of complaint and 
redress. 
To ensure professional competence 
by defining standards of services 
and performance in as precise a 
way as possible. 
Tab/,e 1-1: Typolo!!J of accountabili!J 
Now whilst Loughlin stresses that the various forms of accountability cannot be treated 
as rigidly distinct from each other, the typology nevertheless provides a useful overview. 
Most importantly, it enables us to see the way in which issues of efficiency (relating 
inputs to outputs), economy (relating costs to inputs) and effectiveness (relating 
outputs to outcomes) all impinge upon the concept of value. We discuss this in depth 
in chapters 6 and 7. 
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outputs to outcomes) all impinge upon the concept of value. We discuss this in depth 
in chapters 6 and 7. 
The question of accountability, then, is of central importance at the level of the 
individual opera company. In an environment of increasing resource constraint, the 
type of boom and bust behaviour exhibited by publicly funded opera companies such as 
Scottish Opera (we demonstrate this in chapter 7) becomes indefensible. Indeed, in the 
mid-1990s the DNH5 already stressed that its spending plans should operate in such a 
way as to ensure that the Government's committment to keep public expenditure under tight control 
is fal!Y honoured by achieving savings through efficienry measures (D NH 363/1996). Suffice it to 
say that a company in financial crisis needs to do more in such a climate than simply 
reach for the begging bowl. That is, evidence needs to be provided that funds will be 
utilized efficiently over the long-term and not merely squandered on unsustainable 
artistic gain in the short-term. In a democratic state, the public (the artistic value 
franchise) is entitled to know what steps the opera company has taken and is taking to 
avoid future or continued financial crisis. Indeed, only if the opera company is open 
and accountable can funders, and those representing the taxpayer interest, make proper 
objective judgements as to whether any crisis which has occurred was or was not 
avoidable, and whether therefore, future funding is justifiable. 
There is also a wider issue here. It might be asked, for instance, why some sectors of 
the UK economy (such as the arts) should be artificially shielded (via public subsidy) 
from the economic constraints which are being experienced by the country as a whole. 
The UK economy has been bitten by recession, its manufacturing base is weak, the 
population is ageing (as it is indeed throughout Europe and in Japan and the USA (for 
discussion see Johnson 1990), and the proportion of value earners is thus decreasing 
(see chapter 5). These factors combined will continue to put pressure on the operation 
of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR), for instance. Therefore, it is hard 
to see how continued expenditure on the arts can be justified without public 
accountability. As an example of what has already taken place in broadcasting (a closely 
related sector in the UK, since like the arts, it is one of the responsibilities of the 
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Department for Culture, Media and Sport6), we consider the case of the state run 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 
Accountability : an example case 
The BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), a public service traditionally based on 
moral, educational, and community values, has undergone significant reform in recent 
years in response to the demand for openness and accountability. In particular, the 
need for responsiveness (to consumers) has struck at the very foundational values of 
the organization. 
Lord Reith, founder of the BBC, saw broadcasting as a vehicle for national leadership 
as well as the setting and keeping of public standards e.g. standards of pronunciation of 
the English language, the upholding of the Sabbath (Smith 1995:82). Specifically, he 
believed that the education and moral improvement of the public was the 
organisation's real purpose, and to this end he maintained that the BBC should actively 
shape and direct public taste: 
In the ear!J days it was said that the Broadcasting Compat!J ought to take showmen and 
super-showmen into its service because thV' know what the public wanted. .. Did the public 
know what it wanted? Look at the cinema, what it gave and what the public took from it. 
Those responsible for the control of broadcasting set themselves the task of being a little ahead 
of the public. ThV' were criticized for it, told thV' were dictators, and accused of things which 
were far from their intention ... (Reith, speech to Manchester Luncheon Club, 
November 1927; cited in Mcintyre 1993:159). 
It was in the context of this paternalistic inheritance that, in the mid 1990s, the move 
towards an ethos of resource optimisation and of accountability (responding to rather 
than determining public needs and wants) was made. According to Tus~ former 
managing director of the BBC World Service, it brought about major and painful 
cultural change: 
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Of those sectors of which I have some personal experience, broadcasting moved into the era of 
change rather earlier than most; the arts are foll01vingfast, while the academic world is still in 
parts deep!J unaware of what exact!J lies i11 store for it. These 11ew disciplines were on!J those 
that the private sector had used for years. That in no wqy diminished the sense of shock when 
thry 1vere introduced i11to the public sector (Tusa 15-06-94). 
With the appointment of Sir Christopher Bland as Chairman of the BBC Governors in 
April 1996, the need for an emphasis on private sector disciplines and on accountability 
was made manifestly clear. The letter of appointment from the National Heritage 
Secretary stated: 
As Chairman, your task will be ... to approve clear objectives for BBC services and to monitor 
the Corporation's performance against them. This you do on the public's beha!f, and there is a 
public expectation that the 11ew!J-created mechanisms of accou11tabiliry should be ful!J 
developed. This will i11volve buildi11g on rece11t 1vork to e11hance co11sultation 1vith the public as 
viewers and listeners, in order to e11sure that their interests a11d concems are ful!J reflected in 
the BBC's output. 
It is of central importa11ce that the 11e1v Stateme11ts of Pledges should be specific a11d 
challenging, and that you and your colleagues should assess performa11ce agai11st them with 
ngour. 
... Final!J, there is the tremendous reputatio11 of the BBC World Service ... I11tematio11al!J the 
BBC helps define the UK's image and reputation. There are opportu11ities for i11creased 
ejficienry and for the introductio11 of private fina11ce, which I k11ow you will want to pursue. 
(DNH 102/1996). 
Now, specifically, the mechanisms of accountabili(y which the BBC have developed in 
recent years include: 
• 1) An annual statement of promises to viewers and listeners. First published 1996, this 
statement committs the BBC to the provision of qualiry services and high standards 
for viewers and listeners in exchange for the lice11ce fee (BBC NR22 05-11-96). The five 
key promises for the first statement for the year ahead included a promise to be 
accountable and respo11sive. The first statement was also developed in such a way as 
to ensure consistency with the principles of the Citizens' Charter (ibid. BBC 
S af!y LK Garden 19 
1. Introduction 
NR22 05-11-96) i.e. with an emphasis on accountability as a mechanism of 
democracy. 
• 2) The separation of commissioning and scheduling from production in order 
to improve cost effectiveness (BBC NR23 06-11-96). This results in greater 
transparency via the process of formal bidding for contracts. 
• 3) The creation of an in~ernal resources market to increase efficiency (BBC 
1993a) via, for instance, the creation of independently priced resource teams. 
• 4) The establishment of an Audit Committee to review the annual accounts and 
the auditor's report in order to verify the effectiveness of the BBC's internal 
controls and to ensure that the response of management to internal control 
issues is appropriate (ibid. BBC 1993a). 
• 5) Definition of trusteeship (the role of the Board of Governors) around jive 
distinct responsibi/i.ties: a) to stay closely in touch with public opinion; b) to ensure 
that the BBC's overall strategy reflects the public's needs and interests; c) to 
monitor and review performance against agreed objectives; d) to ensure 
compliance with statutory requirements and BBC guidelines e.g. compliance 
with the standards of regulatory bodies such as the Office of Fair Trading; e) to 
guarantee regular reporting to the licence payer and to Parliament (ibid. BBC 
1993a). 
• 6) The introduction of an Annual Performance Review in order to identify 
major issues, agree a revised three year strategy and set objectives for the year 
ahead, and to measure performance against the BBC's goal to be an efficient, 
effective and accountable organization, making distinctive programmes of high qua/i.ry (ibid. 
BBC 1993a). 
• 7) The development of an agreed set of performance indicators to measure 
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quality, value for money, efficiency and effectiveness, not necessarily in a 
definitive way, but in a way which facilitates ongoing reporting to the general 
public (via publication of trend data and comparative data vis a vis competitor 
broadcasters and service providers) (BBC 1993a), 
• 8) Reform of the existing advisory system of BBC Councils and Committees to 
reflect a new focus on the views and concerns of audiences. In addition to reform of 
formal advisory provisi~ns (e.g. the General Advisory Council new working 
practices invites expert as well as public opinion on topics of special public 
interest and publishes relevant proceedings) the BBC claims to have established 
the most comprehensive consultation process involving viewers and listeners ever undertaken. 
This latter reform involves a rolling programme of direct contact with licence 
fee payers in order to permit regular feedback on strategic issues, and, 
significantly, the cultivation of an i1iformed sense of the needs of the public (BBC 
1993a). 
• 9) Monitoring of policy compliance with e.g. health and safety regulations, 
transmission reach and coverage policy, and policy regarding distribution of 
programme production (BBC 1993a). 
• 10) Reform of the systems of complaint and redress in order to allow viewers 
and listeners to write to named officials within the BBC, to ensure impartial 
investigation of serious complaints, to provide appropriate redress, and to make 
the system transparent via the publication of a regular Programme Complaints 
Bulletin (BBC 1993a). 
• 11) Review of the Annual Report and Accounts to ensure reporting which is 
more detailed, more focussed and more informative so as to be clearer about the objectives of 
the BBC and candid about how far th~ have been met. Specifically, the inclusion of an 
important innovation in the Annual Accounts: the Director-General's Report 
on BBC performance noting shortcomings as well as successes and an assessment of 
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future requirements (BBC 1993a). 
Four important criteria for accountability emerge from this list. That is, an organization 
cannot claim to be accountable if: a) it does not make an objective report of its 
financial and service delivery performance (i.e. tells of its successes whilst glossing over 
its failures); b) it does not make regular account of its aims and its performance 
regularly available to the public (i.e. it reviews its performance but holds resultant 
reports within its internal archiv~s, hidden from public view); c) it fails to cultivate an 
informed sense of public needs and wants (i.e. it maintains preconceived ideas of what 
the public wants or what is in the public interest); and d) it does not allow public 
opinion to influence the aims and performance of the organization (i.e. it does not 
listen to the opinion of those who use its services). A related problem (particularly a 
feature of healthcare in the UK) is the development of inappropriate performance 
indicators (i.e. indicators which either measure the wrong variables, resulting in 
meaningless comparisons, or which measure efficiency whilst purporting to measure 
quality, or indicators which measure quality in absolute terms when a relative measure 
would be more appropriate). 
From our point of view, the interesting issue is whether or not the opera sector will be 
pressured to develop such an extensive range of accountability mechanisms. If not, we 
must conclude that opera is not regarded with the same degree of national importance 
by government as essential services such as healthcare, and other cultural services (or 
creative industries) such as broadcasting. 
Capital versus revenue funding of opera 
The National Lottery in the UK was launched in 1994, in effect, as a tool of macro-
economic policy. Since most of the original 28p per £1 :00 which was directed towards 
the arts, sports, charities, heritage, and Millennium Fund (via the National Lottery 
Distribution Fund) was directed towards capital projects, most of the initial benefit of 
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the Lottery was designed as a spur to the construction industry. In effect, the Lottery 
acted initially as a tool for shifting government expenditure from consumption to 
investment (see, for instance EBA-NL cl 997). 
There are two ways of looking at this shift from consumption to investment. First, 
because the Lottery spurs capital investment, it can be seen as part of an overall 
economic strategy to stimulate output and economic growth. In this respect, it may also 
be seen to lift the burden of current consumption on future taxpayers, albeit in a small 
way. Second, the shift to investment may be seen as simple, short-term political 
expediency. 
Capital projects, for instance, are attractive to government (politically expedient) 
because they yield politically measurable results and involve a relatively short-term draw 
on taxation. Thus, an opera venue can be built in a fixed period to a fixed and 
controllable budget (all things being equal) and result in a tangible asset which visibly 
signals government's beneficence and continued committment to the nation's cultural 
life and heritage (e.g. Bastille Opera, Paris; a Mitterand grand projet for the French 
capital). Revenue funding, however, is unattractive for precisely the opposite reasons: in 
the case of opera, it commits government to long-term, potentially unbounded 
expenditure, the results of which are difficult to measure. 
In political terms, then, it is more productive to build a brand new opera venue or 
completely refurbish an existing one (with the expectation of short-term political 
benefits and future efficiency savings) than it is to maintain the status quo. Indeed, the 
revenue funding of opera, which, in the UK, has consisted of both regular grant-in-aid 
and emergency deficit funding, is not only burdensome in the long-term, but in terms 
of efficiency and equity, always remains open to political attack. 
Thus, whilst there is evidence, in the mid 1990s, of a global trend towards capital 
investment in opera, revenue funding, vital for the actual production of opera, 
nevertheless remains problematic. This is an important point. In Sweden, for instance, 
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the new Gothenberg Opera House (built by the City of Gothenberg in the mid 1990s) 
experienced immediate difficulty, upon completion, in attracting the 25% of budgeted 
revenue which it was required to raise from private sector sources (IAM 01-95:26). 
Now recent arguments about the future of English National Opera (ENO) bring a 
curious twist to the political expediency of this shift from consumption to investment. 
The Arts Council of England, by allowing its opera clients to treat venue feasibility 
study costs as capital expenditure, have in effect encouraged opera companies to seek 
capital investment solutions to revenue funding problems. ENO, for instance, was 
saved in the early 1990s from the threat of eviction from its London Coliseum premises 
when it received state funds totalling £12 million to purchase the Coliseum freehold 
(see also chapter 7). Using National Lottery funds (counted as capital expenditure), the 
company subsequently commissioned a £1.4 million feasibility study, the conclusions of 
which recommended not refurbishment of the existing Coliseum premises, but 
investment in a purpose-built venue. The Department of National Heritage reportedly, 
and not surprisingly, looked upon this study as a breach off aith (IAM 02-97a:4). The 
outcome here is that the Coliseum, far from representing a valuable icon of 
government beneficence, in fact, has come to represent investment in an unproductive 
asset. 
It remains questionable whether the theatre should have been bought by ENO in the 
first place, since it immediately faced an estimated £ 4.5 million repair bill in order to 
comply with Health and Safety regulations. In the private sector, businesses do not 
receive assistance to comply with Health and Safety regulations, so it is a fact that 
ENO, if it were to have acted responsibly and accountably, should have included this 
future cost in its revenue forecasts prior to purchase of the Coliseum. Compliance with 
Health and Safety regulations, whilst it may involve a capital investment decision, is 
nevertheless a revenue issue. It should have been made clear, in the interests of public 
accountability, that the company had insufficient revenue earning capability to cover 
this cost in the future (for additional background see IAM 04-94). 
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Thus, the economic and political arguments for redirecting public subsidy of opera 
towards capital investment are problematic. Not only does capital investment in opera 
distract us from the, arguably, more critical issue of revenue funding, but it has shown 
itself open to misuse. 
Thus, it is precisely because capital investment in opera offers a politically expedient 
alternative to revenue funding that the current emphasis on the building and 
refurbishment of venues for opera in the UK cannot be taken as a sign of vigour in the 
sector; a problem which has been noted by the UK lobby group, the National 
Campaign for the Arts (IAM 02-97b:16). 
It is also worth noting that even although the focus of the National Lottery 
Distribution Fund (NLDF) has, since November 1996, shifted away from purely capital 
projects, disbursement of funds for revenue purposes is nevertheless constrained. 
Indeed, this shift (which applies only to a portion of the NLD F) was specifically 
coupled, by the previous Conservative administration, to a new emphasis on the arts as 
a kry element in social regeneration, and the role the arts must play in building communities 
and community values (DNH 357 /1996). This aim or emphasis, moreover, has not 
been substantially altered by the current Labour administration; now the key concepts 
are neighbourhood renewal and the new deal for communities (see, for instance, foreword from 
the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport in DCMS PAT 1999). 
S hefting the responsibili!J for opera to the private sector 
For the opera sector, the current shift towards greater private sector responsibility for 
the arts means a less certain future characterised by increasing competition for revenue 
resources. In the UK there is now an emphasis on plural funding: arts organizations are 
encouraged to seek funding not only from central and local government but from 
private sources as well as from box office receipts (see, for instance DNH 027 /1996). 
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Set up in 1984, the Arts and Business Pairing Scheme7, for instance, is designed 
specifically to lever funds from the private sector. During the 1990s the rules of this 
scheme have been changed several times in order to encourage yet wider private sector 
support of the arts. Under the previous Conservative administration, for instance, the 
rules were amended in order to foster sponsorships of a longer-term nature than had 
been typical (DNH 027 /1996). Then, in 1998, the Labour administration changed the 
scheme rules in order to spread funds more wide!J and to encourage businesses and arts 
organisations to develop more meaningfal li.nks (DCMS 25/1998). These rule changes have the 
effect of shifting the responsibility for opera further to the private sector. 
However, overall demand for private sector funds is itself increasing. With the 
introduction of the National Lottery in the UK (again with an emphasis on partnership 
funding from the private sector) total demand for sponsorship has effectively 
increased8• As a result, the arts must now compete directly with the sports sector and to 
some extent, with charities, for the same private sector funds. With the recent ban on 
tobacco advertising and sponsorship, for instance, the sports sector has lost one of its 
traditional sources of sponsorship revenue, thus compounding the problem (see, for 
instance DCMS 308/1998). 
Continued emphasis on the role of private sector funding, then, will intensify 
intersectoral competition for sponsorship. This must inevitably put the UK subsidized 
and non-subsidized opera sectors under further pressure to expand and professionalise 
their fundraising efforts. Indeed evidence suggests that, since the mid-1990s, the major 
UK opera companies have already committed themselves to this process e.g. the 
creation of development departments with representation at senior management level, 
closer linking of marketing and fundraising functions, use of information technology to 
aid precision in the design and assessment of fundraising campaigns, and adaptation of 
private sector relationship marketing techniques to encourage funder and donor loyalty 
(see, for instance, IAM 02-98). 
There is a further problem. Because private sector sponsorship has a relatively short 
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history in the UK, it is difficult to estimate the total potential supply of corporate 
funding. Simple comparisons with other countries do not help in this respect since 
private sector funding is not homogenous at international level. In the USA, for 
instance, the majority of private funding is undertaken by individuals, whereas in 
Europe, it is largely undertaken by trusts, foundations and companies (for discussion, 
see Mcllroy 1996:43). Equally, tax laws and legal dispositions vary considerably across 
national boundaries, and the effects of changes in these laws and dispositions are 
difficult to predict. Thus, the shift from public to private sector funding is, from the 
point of view of the individual opera company, a highly uncertain prospect. 
Realistic assessment of private sector fundraising potential may also be compounded by 
a tendency to overstate the growth of sponsorship in the UK. There are two aspects to 
this: first, the focus on long-run growth in business sponsorship of the arts since the 
foundation of Arts and Business (formerly the Association for Business Sponsorship of 
the Arts) in 1976; and second, the use of nominal or current price data which does not 
take account of erosion in the purchasing power of the pound. 
Reference is often made in the arts management press and in arts management texts to 
the fact that the annual Arts and Business spend (i.e. the total annual business 
sponsorship of the arts by Arts and Business members) has risen from a mere £600,000 
in 1976 to around £80 million in the mid-1990s (e.g. Morris 1997:18, Hill et al. 
1995:169, and for earlier example, Waters 1989:113). See Figure 1-3: 
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NOMINAL VALUE OF UK ARTS SPONSORSHIP 
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Figure 1-3 : Nominal value of business sponsorship of the arts in the UK 
However, in taking this generalized view, the most important fact is missed, namely: 
that through the 1990s real growth in the annual Arts and Business spend has slowed 
significantly. This is demonstrated in Figure 1-4, which shows a comparison between 
the real and nominal growth of the Arts and Business spend since 1991. 
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REAL AND NOMNAL GROWTH IN UK ARTS SPONSORSHIP 
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Figure 1-4: Business sponsorship of the arts in the UK (real and nominal growth) 
The first plot series in Figure 1-4 shows the apparent growth rate in business 
sponsorship of the arts in the UK based on current or nominal prices (i.e. those usually 
quoted by Arts and Business, and arts management academics). However, such trend 
data is misleading unless normalised (adjusted for changes in the purchasing power of 
the pound). This is done in the second plot series in the standard way, using a Retail 
Price Index (GSS 1997). It immediately gives us a more realistic picture of the value of 
sponsorship in the UK. As can be seen, a simple plot of nominal spend figures 
overstates the growth rate by just over 30%, which computes to a significant amount in 
real terms (i.e. real growth on 1991 is overstated by approximately £20 million). 
Reliance on nominal growth data is misleading, then, insofar as it encourages an 
unfounded optimism about the growth of sponsorship in the future. 
It is also an interesting feature of our comparative plot that it reveals a real decline in 
growth in the year ending 1993 i.e. growth can be seen to fall below 100%. This means 
that in real terms, the value of business sponsorship of the arts in 1993 fell below that 
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of 1991. Expressed in terms of nominal growth or current prices, however, this decline 
is not apparent: the overall growth trend appears unchecked (never falling below 
100%). 
A related problem is that the year on year figures can be distorted by capital spending 
on one-off projects: capital project spending dropped in 1995-96, for instance (Corr. 
1997a). Thus the component structure of the Arts and Business spend is also an 
important factor in assessing sponsorship growth and impact; and it is one which needs 
to be given more attention (for reasons we discussed earlier). 
There are also significant regional differentials in the distribution of sponsorship in the 
UK. Total business support of the arts in 1995-96, for instance, was heavily biased 
towards the south: England received over 80% of total business sponsorship, whilst 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, taken together, accounted for only 13% of the 
spend. Moreover, within England, London derived the greatest benefit: the capital 
receiving 65% of all sponsorship in England (ABSA 1996a). The uneven distribution of 
this spend, as might be expected, reflects the geographical concentration of business 
activity in the south-east of the UK, a fact which may have significant consequences for 
opera. Should government withdraw its support from the national and regional opera 
companies, for instance, a wholly different geographical distribution for UK opera, 
positing cultural vibrancy in the south and underdevelopment in the north, might be 
expected to emerge. 
A communitarian perspective? 
Under the leadership of Tony Blair the current UK Labour administration has taken up 
a communitarianist perspective in its policy making. By aiming to temper laissez-faire 
capitalism with social justice and the restriction of special interests, it has adopted a 
policy stance based on communitarianist principles, which is usually referred to as the 
Third Wqy. 
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Briefly, communitarianism (a theory of ethics) emerged in the 1980s, in the USA, as a 
challenge to the ideals of individualist liberalism and political conservatism. The central 
idea of communitarianism is that the general good (the good of the community) must 
not be subordinated to that of individual self-interest, and that individual rights must be 
balanced with responsibilities (see Etzioni 1996). 
Communitarianists such as Bellah (Bellah et al. 1985) believe that one of the key ways in 
which this re-emphasis of value can be achieved in society, is by means of bolstering 
the voluntary sector (which embodies various forms of community such as charities, 
youth organizations, and other community service organizations). Comm unitarians 
believe that this third sector, which in the loosest sense of the term, mediates between 
government and individual, is thus an essential element of the democratic life of a state. 
A particular feature of communitarianism is the committment to the principle of 
community development. This is the idea that public funds be provided direct to 
voluntary organisations, and not via local government (see Etzioni 1996a). But the 
ethical framework which underpins this is interesting, for whilst the community 
provides a place for moral dialogue, it is not to be regarded as the ultimate moral arbitrator 
(ibid Etzioni 1996a:35). In other words, devolvement is not complete; the move away 
from an ethos of welfare paternalism, in its broadest sense, towards individual and 
community empowerment is a partial project. At some point there must exist 
universalisable ethical criteria, not least to enable government to deal with those 
communities which do not appear to act in the public interest9 e.g. extreme right wing 
or racist organisations. Applied to the arts, this implies the continued need for arts 
policy at a national level. 
Nevertheless, the more communitarian ethics are adopted and articulated at the level of 
social institutions, the more we may expect to see an explicit underlining of the role of 
voluntary effort in the arts (a bolstering of the third secto!). There is already discussion in 
the arts management press about the increasing importance of volunteer effort (at all 
levels of the arts organization). Volunteer effort, it is thought, should increasingly be 
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managed in genuine partnership with the organization. Moreover, its value to the 
organisation is now seen in terms of the potential long-term contribution it can make 
to such factors as: understanding and interfacing with audiences; defining the image of 
the organization; and determining the effectiveness of the organisation (for background 
see Brookes 1997). 
The issue of communitarianism, as it affects the relationship between community and 
culture in terms of arts policy and funding, is worthy of future research. In the UK, 
Prime Minister Blair is known to be particularly sympathetic to the ideas of 
communitarianism and has met with Arnitai Etzioni, one of its key proponents (E 03-
95:31). Moreover, Blair, in his New Britain (1996) strongly emphasises what he sees as 
the potential role of voluntary organizations in society (Bellah>s third secto!), stressing 
that as yet they remain undervalued in terms of potential contribution to economic life. 
Future research would most usefully ask to what extent voluntary effort, in the context 
of the arts, will be promoted by government as a resource in tandem with public 
subsidy; and to what extent community devolvement will affect the arts? It is extremely 
important that the opera sector prepare itself for the potential consequences of any 
extension of communitarian ethics into the cultural sphere. 
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1.3 Summary 
We have identified and discussed the various political and economic forces which are 
currently acting upon opera in the UK. Beginning with a brief survey of the main opera 
economies, we saw that the globalization of trade and, in Europe, pressure to conform 
to Economic Monetary Union criteria were causing many governments to restrict 
public spending. In the context of the UK, we saw that the trend towards increasing 
accountability is now a major force in the public sphere. Other factors in the 
environment included a trend towards capital rather than revenue funding of opera, 
and a shifting of funding responsibility towards the private sector. Communitarian 
ethics were identified as a major new factor in the political sphere. 
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2. THE TRANSACTION MODEL OF OPERA 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we develop a transaction model of opera comprising three main 
components: opera, value, and the environment. The purpose of this model is to explain 
the behaviour of two variables (artistic value and financial value) and to show how the 
opera company is systematically linked to its environment via transactions, or the 
trading of artistic value and financial value, with external parties. In particular, we are 
interested in the role of government, the influence of our artistic value franchise (which 
we introduced in chapter 1), and perception as the key determinant of value. 
The process of producing opera is treated as a process of transforming a complex of 
financial value and artistic value inputs (monetary and artistic resources) into a complex of 
financial value and artistic value outputs (an asset/liability structure and performances of 
opera) 1• Our key point is that although value is added in the course of transforming 
inputs into outputs (the process of producing opera), it is not realised until a 
transaction occurs. Value is therefore a subjective matter; it is what parties in the 
environment believe it to be, and its measurement is therefore a question of the 
measurement of perception. Thus, in our model, added-value is not equivalent to 
realised value. 
We can now begin to specify and describe in more detail the behaviour of our model. 
Since it is quantifiable in objective terms and is conceptually easier to understand, we 
will begin with financial value. The time period of the model represents one financial year 
in the productive life of an opera company (or sector). 
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2.2 Behaviour of financial value 
In financial accounting (as opposed to management accounting) the accounting or 
reporting of the financial transactions of an organisation is a macro scale rather than 
micro scale or operational level activity. This means that the organisation, here the 
opera company, is treated as an entity which interacts or makes transactions with 
external parties in the environment (this entity is represented in our model below by 
the transformation process and associated assets, see Figure 2-1). The objective of such 
accounting, which is rule-bound and therefore consistent and testable, is to allow 
external parties or stakeholders to monitor the performance of the organization, most 
often on an annual or financial year basis. We therefore use the term financial value, in 
this study, because we are using financial accounting reports as our source of raw data 
in the research chapters of this thesis. 
In addition, the term financial in this context is also suitably neutral i.e. does not imply 
surplus value or profit, which would be misleading since in this thesis we will be dealing 
primarily with a non-profit sector. In the research chapters of this study we also 
develop a measure of financial intensity which is based on turnover and therefore 
includes both labour and capital costs. For this reason we avoid use of the term capital 
which in economic theory is often used to denote a factor of production which is 
distinct from labour (hence capital intensity as distinct from labour intensity). Most 
importantly, whether it is measured as a quantity of income or expenditure (i.e. as a 
type of financial flow), as a quantity of assets or liabilities (i.e. as a type of financial 
store), or by an accounting ratio such as current ratio (current assets less current 
liabilities),financial value can be negative as well as positive e.g. a deficit is a negative 
quantity of financial value. 
The following model (Figure 2-1) describes the behaviour of financial value, setting artistic 
value aside. In this model we show a single transformational stage, together with a single 
feedback loop and a single input driver (in this case, government subsidy). Although 
highly simplified, it represents all the behavioural elements we wish to describe. Key to 
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this model is the planning operatorwhich allows us to model opera company policy and 
planning decisions as a single factor - the relation of budget to available resources. Note 
also that the transformational assets component allows us to modelfinancial value 
storage both in its simple form as financial investment/ debt and as physical and 







(production of opera) 
TRANSFORMATIONAL 
ASSETS 




The given amount of government subsidy for the financial year ahead. 
This is realised by a transaction (not represented in the model) between 
government and the opera company. 
Net income from operations and any release of stored Ji11a11cial value (i.e. 
assets) which appears on the income and expenditure sheet at the 
financial year end, and which is therefore available for consumption in 
the following financial year. This income is realised via transactions (not 
represented in the model) between the artistic value franchise and the 
opera company. Note, fv(o) may be negative (current deficit) as well as 
positive (current surplus) depending on the relation of costs to income. 
y That portion of net income, fv( o ), which in a private sector, commercial 
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opera operation, is removed from the system as profit or shareholder 
dividend. 
That portion of net income, fv(o), which is available for consumption in 
the production of opera in the following financial year. In the case of 
the UK subsidized opera sector (a non-profit, charitable sector), y=O, 
therefore x=fv(o). 
The total financial input, consisting of government subsidy for the year 
ahead, plus previous year's net income from operations and the release 
of (transformational) assets, G+x, which is available for consumption in 
the financial year ahead. Note in the case of a non-profit company 
fv(i)=G+fv( o ). 
Coefficient, part of planning operator representing management's 
decision as to the proportion of available income, fv(i)*k, it wishes to 
apply to the production of opera in the financial year ahead; where k is 
the ratio of planned costs to available income, fv(i). 
Management control 
If we apply this model to the UK subsidized opera sector, three planned management 
control outcomes are possible. These outcomes represent the financial value choices 
(management control decisions) which must in real life be made by management at the 
outset of the financial year. Management may aim to keep the opera company's 
finances in equilibrium by the year end (no net surplus or deficit), or it may choose to 
aim for a surplus at the year end, or indeed, a deficit. Thus, to make this explicit, we 
may use the coefficient, k (>or <1) which reveals the planned outcome: 
Aim for equilibrium, fv( o) =O 
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Aim for surplus, fv( o) >O 
Aim for deficit, fv(o)<O 
fv(i)*k, where k<l (i.e. planned costs are less than 
available income) 
fv(i)*k, where k>l (i.e. planned costs are greater than 
available income) 
This is to a certain extent an oversimplification, since management must also take into 
account forecast income which will be earned from operations and the release of assets 
during the financial year for which it is budgeting and planning (e.g. box office income, 
sponsorship, the sale of an asset, or release of reserves). Nevertheless, since historically, 
companies in the UK subsidized sector have relied on public sources (i.e. government) 
typically for 50% to 70% of their annual income2 (see research chapters 7 and 8), and 
because sponsorship income is largely known in advance, this fact is not significant in 
our model. 
An interesting exception, as we will show in chapter 7, is Glyndebourne Productions 
which relies almost solely upon private source income (i.e. G is approximately zero), 
thus making its management control decisions all the more sensitive and difficult in 
terms of risk and uncertainty i.e. fv(i) is a lot more difficult to predict where fv( o) rather 
than G is the major contributor to annual available income. Glyndebourne Productions 
is thus a private sector exception which proves the rule that in achieving year end 
management control orjinandal value objectives in the subsidized sector, forecasting of 
operational and other income for the financial year ahead is not a critical success factor. 
Turning this round, it implies that budgeting and planning in the subsidized opera 
sector is a far less problematic affair than in the private sector, precisely because of 
reduced uncertainty (available income is largely a parametric or known issue). Budgeting 
from a known starting point is a considerably easier exercise than budgeting in 
conditions of uncertainty and change. We would therefore expect to see better 
management control outcomes (fewer and smaller deficits) in the subsidized sector 
when compared with Glyndebourne Productions, our private sector representative in 
this study. In the research chapters of this study, however, we find quite the opposite 
effect: that management control in the UK subsidized sector is not only poor, but 
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produces long-term instability in the sector. Our model simplifies the issue for us: 
either the planning control, k, is set poorly (by design, or by incompetence), or the day 
to day management of the transformation process (production) is below the standard 
achieved by Glyndebourne (i.e. less efficient). 
Now in this context, since it is dynamic in nature, the model shows that a company 
which returns a deficit in two or more successive years, either through choice or 
through poor management, will begin to show an accumulated deficit on its balance 
sheet. In financial accounting the accumulated surplus/ deficit situation is a measure of 
solvency3 and as such provides a very succinct or summative measure of financi.al value. A 
deepening accumulated deficit may result where G, fv( o) or both G and fv( o) are 
decreasing. Note fv(o) may decrease as the result of, for instance, consistently poor 
budgeting skills (inability to set realistic budgets or overspending), lack of prudence in 
forecasting income, failure to qualify risk in planning operations for the year ahead, or 
sudden unforeseeable change in the environment which provides a shock to the system 
which is not beneficial (e.g. unmanageable risk such as a currency revaluation which 
causes a sustained drop in overseas tourist ticket sales). Apportioning blame for a 
deepening accumulated deficit is a question of identifying which elements in the model 
are changing: is it the fault of government for reducing the real value of subsidy; is it 
the fault of the opera company for poor management control skills; or is it the result of 
some change in the environment over which no party has any real control? Study of 
the political and economic environment of opera, and study of the qualitative data 
which accompanies the annual financial accounts of individual opera companies will 
enable us, in the research chapters of this thesis, to test the model and develop an 
understanding of the causal factors involved in the accumulation and reduction of 
deficit (our key measure of jinanci.al value). 
Furthermore, the issue of management control is particularly interesting because a 
company which is accumulating deficit (negative financi.al value), if left to its own devices 
(i.e. government subsidy is withdrawn) would naturally be expected to fail in the short-
term (1-2 years). The model predicts this will occur because, over time, annual income 
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available for consumption in the production of opera will tend to zero: 
fv(i) ~ 0 
But there are two cases in which an ailing company such as this may survive. The first is 
by a change (real increase) in the value of government subsidy, G, which is awarded to 
the company at the beginning of each successive year (the increases have to be year on 
year since fv(i) is tending to zero). The second case is the periodic, unplanned injection 
into the system of emergency public funding: additional or supplementary injections of 
G which the model does not predict, but which occur in practice as we shall show in 
chapters 7 and 8. Typically, however, such increases in G and/ or unplanned injections 
of G will distort the short-term financial position of the company and will disguise the 
fact that fv(i) is still tending to zero (creditors may get paid today, but not necessarily 
tomorrow). In both cases, the company becomes ever more reliant upon government 
to sustain its operations and to bail it out of ever recurring crises. Here the model 
predicts that the pursuit of short-term stability in the company's financial value will 
induce long-term instability (manifest in poor control of deficits). Indeed, as long as 
government does bail out the opera company, there is little motivation for the 
company to improve its management control in the long-term. Seeking rescue in the 
short-term is easier than pursuing long-term improvements in financial efficiency, 
especially if historically, government shows itself easily pulled into a pattern of repeated 
emergency deficit funding (which is evident in the case of Scottish Opera in particular, 
see chapter 8). Long-term instability may indeed be a plus for producers as long as it 
provides a mechanism by which to lock government in to ever increasing funding. 
Again, we look for evidence of this in the qualitative data which accompanies opera 
company financial accounts. We also seek evidence of poor management control in our 
sample companies by studying historical patterns in company accumulated deficits and 
searching for features such as volatility and response to disturbances such as emergency 
funding. Specifically, the model allows us to ask about the degree to which k>l (aiming 
for current deficit) is a deliberate policy or is accidental; an important public policy 
issue. 
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The role of transformational assets 
Distinction is made in the model between the transformation process (actual 
operations, or the production of opera) and transformational assets (the fixed 
establishment of the opera company). This distinction is important because it 
represents a qualitative difference in the treatment of financial value. Whereas the 
transformation process represents the flow of operational income and expenditure i.e. 
that portion of fv which varies with activity (e.g. sale of tickets, sponsorship and 
fundraising income, expenditure on materials, guest artist fees, travel and subsistence, 
income released on the sale of assets) the transformational assets component in the 
model represents that portion of financial value which is locked or invested in 
establishment assets and liabilities (e.g. ownership of theatre premisses, contracted 
personnel, stage equipment, vehicles, subsidiary trading companies, computers, paper 
assets such as special reserves and endowment funds). In any organisation there is a 
dynamic relationship between the flow of financial value and the store of financial value; 
what makes this important in the context of UK subsidized opera, as we shall show in 
the research chapters of this study, is the degree to which investment in 
transformational assets (storage of financial value), and therefore incurrence of liability4, 
has been increasing in historical terms. 
Now, in our model, the transformational assets component acts in analogous way to a 
dam: as a store and smooth of value. However, whereas a dam will release stored value 
(water) on demand, many opera company assets exhibit poor liquidity (i.e. are not easily 
realisable in cash terms) therefore introducing a degree of stickiness or friction into the 
system. From the point of view of the subsidized opera company this poor liquidity is a 
useful feature insofar as it permits the making of political capital out of any financial 
crisis situation. 
A subsidized opera company facing bankruptcy (where fv(i) is tending to zero or, 
where fv(o) is negative, and where deficit is accumulating over time), for instance, is a 
political embarrassment to government. If, because of persistent financial instability for 
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instance, it was decided necessary either to wind up the Royal Opera or sell it as a going 
concern, and therefore find a private buyer for the newly refurbished Covent Garden 
theatre complex, how long would this financial value realisation process take? What 
political damage might this cause after several months keeping the venue on the market, 
fending off overtures from inappropriate prospective buyers, or the embarrassment of 
adding a redundant, highly skilled staff to unemployment figures? This is quite apart 
from the public debate which would inevitably take place about why public money was 
sunk into the theatre in the first place if its financial viability was known by government 
to be uncertain? The longer the duration of the transaction (assuming a potential buyer 
was found) the greater the scope for public debate; and all the while the costs of 
maintaining the venue would have to be met (an analogous case at the time of writing is 
the Millennium Dome, Greenwich). 
As we shall show, the building up of transformational assets, which amounts to 
increasing the degree of establishment and therefore security of an opera company, 
forms an important and persistent feature within the UK subsidized sector. The model 
suggests, then, that an appropriate methodology for examining the true cost of opera is 
one which focusses not on direct cost, but on total cost (i.e. financial flows plus 
financial stores). In the research chapters of this study we use annual turnover as a 
proxy measure of total cost precisely so that we can take into account the role of 
overhead, or what we term establishment costs, in the production of opera. 
What the model does not explain, however, is in what way the building up of 
transformational assets, the further establishment of the company, is believed by 
producers to add value for members of the artistic value franchise. Who benefits from 
these assets? Certainly sponsors need private front of house function facilities, but what 
do ordinary audience members gain from a company's ownership of its own theatre? 
What is the effect on the financial efficiency of the opera company and on 
management control? Indeed is value added or lost through investment in fixed assets 
and increasing technical elaboration; how, if at all, is it realised in transactions with 
external parties; and what value would we be talking about,jinancial or artistic, or indeed, 
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can we meaningfully separate the two when we are talking about the asset/liability 
structure of an opera company? 
Now, by added-value in this context, we mean the value which is added in the process 
of transforming inputs into outputs in the production of opera. In artistic value terms, 
when six principal singers are brought together to form the sextet in Act III of 
Mozart's Le nozze di Figaro, for instance, the individual inputs (singers) are valued for the 
sum of their efforts - the sextet. To an individual who enjoys the craft and the subtlety 
of Mozart's writing, as well as the balance and blend of the ensemble itself, however, 
the whole may be perceived to be greater than the sum of its parts. If this perception 
were shared by a majority of audience members, we might know this by the intensity of 
audience opinion e.g. enthusiastic applause. This is a trivial example, but it serves to 
illustrate that value added in the transformation process (here, the adding together of 
inputs to produce a new output) is not equivalent to value realised through perception 
(the whole sextet is perceived to be greater than the sum of the singers) i.e. there are 
subjective factors at work. 
The same applies in financial value terms, where we take changes in total assets as our 
measure of thefinancial value which is added in production5 i.e. how much has been 
added to the value of the opera company in the form of assets in order to make the 
establishment bigger in financial terms. Now an opera company's total asset value has 
meaning only when these assets are realised in the context of: a) going concern, orb) 
liquidation. In both cases the company's total asset value as a measure of jinancial value is 
qualified by subjective factors. The monetary value of an asset, where the opera 
company is treated as a going concern, will be based on an estimate of future earnings 
(e.g. the value of a theatre when box office income is still expected in the future; this 
can be seen in Scottish Opera financial reports). The monetary value of an asset for 
disposal, when the opera company is put into liquidation, will be based on market 
factors such as scarcity and demand (e.g. is the theatre in marketable condition, and 
what is the likely demand for such a resource or alternately, for the site?). 
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The adding of financi.al value (in the form of transformational assets) is visible to us in 
opera company financial accounts. But its value to the artistic value franchise and to 
producers themselves is a matter of debate. In this study, we look at total costs 
precisely in order to ask the question, what is the true cost of subsidized opera, and 
what is the importance of storedfinanci.al value in artistic value terms? Who benefits, and 
can we see the difference, in terms of financial efficiency between a company which 
owns its own theatre (e.g. Scottish Opera), and one which does not (e.g. Opera North)? 
We address these issues in chapter 8. 
ROie and i11plicatio11s of transactions 
In its specific legal sense, a transaction implies an exchange of property rights i.e. the 
exclusive rights to use, transform and transfer particular assets, goods and services 
(Newman 1998). In our model, consistent with this definition, it is the exchange of 
property rights (which we can characterise as a trade of values) which distinguishes 
sponsorship from philanthropy, for instance. Whereas the sponsor expects value in 
return for his monetary or in-kind support, the philanthropist gives his support as a 
gift, without the expectation of value in return. It is precisely the two-way flow of value 
between the opera company and a given party within the environment which 
characterizes the transaction and which, in our model, provides the driving mechanism 
for the production of opera. 
The important point is this: that although value is added in the transformation process 
(the production of opera) it is not realised or perceived until a transaction between the 
opera company and an external party occurs. An individual, for instance, who buys a 
ticket (gives up property rights on a quantity of money,financi.al value) in turn gains right 
of access (property right) to a performance (expected artistic value). Whether the 
performance has artistic value or not is a question for that individual. If he perceives it to 
have value, then it has value for him. He may of course ask the opinion of others, but 
value is still a matter of his own perception. 
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Whereas the transformation process causes the change of inputs into outputs, and 
thereby provides the mechanism by which value is added, the transaction (or strictly the 
aggregate of transactions which occur in the company's financial year) governs the 
quantity and quality of inputs and, because the transformation process or production of 
opera is a reproducing cycle6, determines to some extent the nature and role of outputs 
i.e. the starting and end conditions for the adding of value. 
Repeatability of transactions is therefore an important factor to the opera company. 
Because historically, government subsidy, G, shows little volatility, its repeatability from 
year to year is largely a null issue. Sudden and complete withdrawal of subsidy amongst 
the major players in the UK subsidized opera sector is the exception rather than the 
rule e.g Kent Opera in the 1980s is an isolated example. In the case of sponsorship, 
however, repeatability is a major issue. A sponsor company wishing to cut costs 
because for instance there is a downturn in the economy, or because shareholders are 
not seeing sufficient dividends, may decide against sponsoring the opera company for a 
second year, even although it may have valued the exercise in the first. This is why 
sponsorship income, though it is often known ahead of the financial year and therefore 
behaves in practice as a parameter in our model, is not truly parametric since its very 
existence cannot be assumed as given from year to year. Sponsorship therefore appears 
in our model as part of fv(o). 
Now, since companies within the UK subsidized sector must seek income from both 
private as well as public sources (G is not the sole driver of the transformation 
process), the typical subsidized opera company is aji11a11cial value input omnivore. Its 
diet of transactions is very mixed: there is a single high value subsidy transaction with 
government in which the company pledges to deliver on certain agreed cultural policy 
goals in return for the major part of its financial input needs; there are perhaps four or 
five transactions with major sponsors in which the company pledges to deliver a new 
production, corporate promotion and corporate event facilities in return for the major 
part of the budget needs of its planned new production; and at the other end of the 
spectrum there are the thousands of transactions with individual audience members in 
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which the company pledges, in each single case, access to a single performance in 
return for an almost infinitesimally small amount of its annual financial value input needs. 
Clearly, from the point of view of the opera company, the most efficient way to seek 
financial value input from the environment is to increase the value of individual 
transactions whilst decreasing their volume. One classic way in which this can be 
achieved is to maximize subscription ticket scheme sales. Instead of trying to market 
and sell, say six performances on an individual basis to one or more people ( 6 relatively 
small value transactions), a subscription scheme enables the company to sell those 6 
performances as a package to one single individual (1 relatively high value transaction). 
But whilst this benefits the producer in the short-term, by improving advance sales and 
thereby reducing uncertainty, it may result in a narrowing of the audience base, which, 
in the long-term will introduce instability (i.e. unpredictable change in the pattern of 
box office income). 
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2.3 Behaviour of artistic value 
Artistic value is clearly not objectively quantifiable. The question of how many popular 
works exist in the current international standard repertory, for instance, is a subjective 
one and one that varies across different locales e.g. what is popular in Vienna will not 
necessarily equate to what is popular in Milan or in Glasgow. 
In systems theory, however, non-measurability is a common problem: not all variables 
are linear, continuous or even well-defined e.g. in an industrial process where noise acts 
as a control variable. Noise, which is a sum of unknown frequencies, and change in 
noise (a change in the mix of frequencies) whilst not mathematically simple to 
determine, may be described as a change in colour. Engineers refer to pink, red, white 
and black noise, using colour (which is itself a spectrum of frequencies) to describe 
noise in qualitative, discrete terms. 
In like manner, we can regard artistic value as a spectrum of opinions (realised in 
transactions which give access to performances). Developing our analogy, we will tend 
in our system, as is true in industrial processes, not to get white noise, which is an 
infinite spectrum of opinions (frequencies) as our result, but rather, groupings of 
opinion - a particular colour or colours. Overall, aggregate audience opinion will tend to 
be favourable or unfavourable, for instance. Indeed, audience response to 
contemporary and difficult repertoire, might produce a bi-modal response where one 
audience group loves the work, and another more traditional group says that it is simply 
not opera. A statistically negligible number of responses may be found between these 
two. 
We may develop our analogy further still, whereby the degree of coherence of opinions 
(in our artistic value franchise) may be taken to reflect intensity of artistic value. Our 
analogy between noise as a sum of unknown frequencies and audience opinion as a sum 
(or ~egate) of unknown opinions is therefore strong and consistent. 
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Opinion, then, is the yardstick by which we measure artistic value in our transaction 
model. Now it is theoretically, and to a certain extent, practically possible to measure 
opinion (via polls or direct referenda; see for instance Frey and Pommerehne 1995, and 
Wagschal 1997) but within the model, what matters is not so much the nature of 
opinion as its controlling ability, its ability to influence the production of opera in the 
medium- to long-term. We are interested in opinion, in the same way as the process 
control engineer is interested in noise i.e. in the extent to which it acts to modify the 
behaviour of the system and its output. How much does the opinion of the artistic value 
franchise actually matter in the real world; to what extent does it influence the opera 
company, and are some opinions Qike frequencies in the control of noise) excluded or 
filtered out? 
In the following model (Figure 2-2) we describe the behaviour of artistic value, setting 
financial value aside. In this model our single input driver is represented as government 
policy (cultural strategy and policy goals for opera). The planning operator, as in Figure 2-
1, above, allows us to model opera company policy and planning decisions as a single 
factor - in this case, the relation of producer opinion to consumer (artistic value 
franchise) opinion. The transformational assets component in the context of artistic 
value here represents the intellectual property associated with stored productions (sets 
and costumes) and contracts with artists. 
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ABOUT ARTISTIC OUTPUT 
Figure 2-2 : Behaviour of artistic value 
Government cultural strategy and policy goals for the subsidized opera 
sector as set out by the Arts Council of Great Britain. 
The aggregate of artistic value franchise opinion on the output of the 
company (or sector) over the financial year. This franchise comprises, in 
the case of the UK, all UK citizens whether taxpayers or non-taxpayers. 
Principal parties in the franchise are audiences and sponsors (opera 
consumers) as well as producers themselves. 
The sum of influences on the artistic value goals of the opera company. 
This comprises government cultural strategy and policy goals for 
subsidized opera plus the aggregate of artistic value franchise opinion on 
the output of the company (or sector) over the financial year, G+av(o). 
Filter, part of planning operator representing management's decision as 
to the degree and extent of artistic value franchise opinion (which 
includes producer opinion), av(i)*o, it wishes to acknowledge and act 
upon in the production of opera in the financial year ahead. 
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R.ole of govemment 
In this model, government cultural strategy and policy goals for opera act as a 
parameter. Because of the arm's length principle which governs state intervention in the 
arts in the UK, government cannot form an opinion, av( o ), about the artistic value of the 
UK subsidized opera sector. By forming an opinion, government would allow itself to 
be represented in the franchise it represents, and thus permit itself a direct, interfering 
influence on the operational decisions and activities of the opera sector7• This would 
immediately contravene the arm's length principle (which we discuss in more detail in 
chapter 3). Government therefore sets out its artistic value requirements (which it 
demands in return for subsidy, fv) in the form of broad cultural strategy and policy 
goals for opera which leave companies free to experiment, which are given in advance 
of production, and which, on the output side, often involve proxy measures (i.e. not 
opinions) of artistic value such as degree of outreach or degree of innovation. These 
broad criteria are therefore another, and important facet of artistic value, but remain 
distinct from franchise opinion, av(o), which is formed via direct consumption of, or 
. . 8 
interest m, opera . 
Now every franchise consists, in theory, of an active and an inactive element. In the 
context of our artistic value franchise of all UK citizens, there will be those, at any given 
time, who are actively interested in the artistic output of the UK subsidized opera 
sector (e.g. audience members, sponsors, friends, associations and producers 
themselves) and those who are not at all interested in the artform in its subsidized 
form. A key factor determining the vitality of such a franchise (measured by the 
proportion of active franchisees) is the degree to which franchisees have, or perceive 
themselves to have, influence over the agenda in question; here the artistic policy of 
individual subsidized opera companies and of the subsidized sector as a whole. To what 
extent does opinion count? 
The degree to which franchisees can participate in shaping the artistic value agenda of the 
UK subsidized opera sector (e.g. influencing its repertoire, resource base, infrastructure 
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and general modus operandi) will not only have a strong influence on the vitality of the 
franchise, but will ensure that the artform itself is able to evolve around the needs of its 
franchise, and so grow in artistic strength. As it becomes enabled by a stronger, more 
active franchise, an artform grows in cultural significance. But for this to happen 
producers must permit change in the artform through the influence of the franchise. 
To what degree, then, does the franchise have influence? This we can test to a certain 
extent by examining the financial reports of companies from the point of view of 
degree of accountability and transparency. 
What the model predicts here, however, is that amongst those currently active in the 
franchise, producers, who are able to weight and filter opinion, av(i)*o, have ultimate 
say about the artistic policy of the sector. This producer power is unchecked by 
government, G, because government cannot itself be represented in the franchise, 
av(o), without contravening the arm's length principle of arts funding which governs its 
intervention in the sector. This suggests that there is little opportunity for the artform 
to evolve in response to the opinions of current consumers, let alone those potentially 
interested consumers and producers of opera who, either because they cannot 
influence the artistic value agenda of the sector, or because they are simply not interested 
in opera in its existing form, are currently inactive within the franchise i.e. as current 
non-consumers or non-producers are not contributing to av(o). This potentially 
interested but currently inactive component of the artistic value franchise can attempt to 
influence subsidy policy, G, by making its opinions known to the Arts Council (as 
government agent), but since government chooses to disqualify itself from making 
artistic value judgments, av(o), such opinion will simply be referred back to existing 
producers, who will have final say. The model suggests, therefore, that it is difficult to 
vote out (by weight of opinion) current opera managements and infrastructural 
arrangements because producers possess, in effect, ultimate and unchallengeable 
authority about the artistic value input requirements of the subsidized sector. We will 
examine this issue again in chapter 3, when we discuss the problematic role of market 
signals and of paternalism in the context of the merit good model of value. For the 
moment, in order to pursue the issue of franchise influence, we need to refine our 
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transaction model by considering the behaviour of artistic value and financial value 
together. 
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2.4 Behaviour of financial value and artistic value in the system comprising 
opera, value, and the environment 
In the transactions which take place between the opera company and parties in the 
environment (which include not only its consumers, but its resource suppliers also) 
artistic value and financial value exhibit inseparability. By this we mean that no single 
transaction can occur without that transaction, or trade of values, in some way 
involving artistic value and financial value issues. This inseparability can manifest itself in 
obvious ways e.g. government subsidy is not unconditional, but carries with it certain 
artistic obligations, such as providing professional standard performances (artistic value) 
at reasonable ticket prices (financial value) to an audience which may be dispersed across 
a wide geographical area and therefore require the company to plan and budget for 
mainscale touring (artistic value and financial value). 
This subsidy transaction, in tum, will influence, to a certain degree, the transactions 
which the opera company makes with its suppliers and its personnel in order to meet 
these, albeit broad, subsidy conditions e.g. overtime, and travel and subsistence costs 
(financial value flows) associated with mainscale touring will be unavoidable as long as 
there exists an (artistic value) mandate to tour and to undertake outreach work. 
Equally, the decision to accept an overseas tour date (involving a transaction with an 
overseas local government, for instance) which the company may feel has artistic value 
benefits such as enhancement of its international reputation and access to new 
audiences, will necessarily involve some alteration to its domestic season (see for 
instance, English National Opera results chapter 8). It will, for instance, either have to 
cut short its domestic season (output) in order to travel abroad (an artistic value issue for 
home audiences and for government since access and opportunity will be reduced), or 
it will have to alter production budgets and schedules (financial value issues for 
management and suppliers, artistic value issues for the company) in order to 
accommodate the special opportunity afforded by the overseas visit. (Note, in practice 
companies tend to showcase only specific repertoire or special productions overseas). 
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By studying company financial reports, we can gain some insight into the nature of the 
trade-offs between artistic value and financial value which are the result of this 
inseparability. In particular, we can test for constraints on artistic value choices, av(i), 
which are the result of financial value decisions e.g the effect of theatre acquisition on 
audience development and repertoire choice. 
Inseparability can also manifest itself in more subtle ways and in ways which are 
experienced by individuals and groups within the environment. The concept of 
opportunity cost, the cost of not investing in some alternative opportunity, illustrates 
this. Whether or not an individual pays for a ticket or receives a complimentary ticket, 
attending a performance, in the context of a money economy, will necessarily involve 
some cost to the individual. This cost is not simply the cost of an opera ticket, but the 
cost of not spending the ticket money on some alternative activity or the cost of not 
saving the money for future contingencies, or if the ticket is free, the cost of the 
individual's time and travel. Note, for the purposes of our model, the transaction or 
trade of values does not always need to involve an immediate or direct exchange of 
property rights. Receipt of a complimentary ticket still involves a trade of values insofar 
as the company values the presence of the ticket holder, and the ticket holder still has 
access to the performance (i.e. access to artistic value). This is a transaction in the sense 
used in marketing: the ticket holder gives up his or her time, which in a money 
economy, has a cost e.g. cost of travel, baby-sitter, or the cost of not attending some 
other event on the same night, and the opera company forgoes a portion of its 
immediate box office income with the hope of generating some future financial value in 
return. Ultimately, the company will still seek financial value from a transaction such as 
this, but will do so indirectly e.g. the complimentary ticket given to the critic whom it 
hopes will give a good review and so boost ticket sales. 
The point about inseparability in this latter sense is that it can affect the repeatability of 
transactions made between the opera company and parties in the environment. The 
repeatability of emergency deficit funding transactions with government is a prime 
example here. Why should government come to the rescue of an ailing opera company 
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again and again, when other, essential public services could benefit from the same 
investment? Whatever artistic or social value might arise from saving the opera 
company, has to be weighed in terms of opportunity cost. 
In the following model (Figure 2-3) we now describe the behaviour of both artistic value 
and financial value as the two key variables within in our system comprising opera, value 
and the environment. Again, the model shows a single transformational stage, together 
with a single feedback loop and a single input driver (in this case, government subsidy 
plus government policy goals for opera). The planning operator, which allows us to model 
opera company policy and planning decisions as a single factor, now combines the 
relation of budget to available resources and the relation of producer opinion to 








(production of opera) 
TRANSFORMATIONAL 
ASSETS 
Figure 2-3 : Behaviour of artistic value and financial value 
The given amount of government subsidy together with government 
cultural strategy and policy goals for the opera sector, as set out by the 
Arts Council of Great Britain, for the financial year ahead. 
The superset of all financial value and artistic value inputs. This represents 
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afv(o) 
[o.k] 
the total income, consisting of government subsidy for the year ahead, 
plus previous year's net income from operations and the release of 
(transformational) assets, G+fv(o), which is available for consumption 
in the financial year ahead, together with the sum of potential influences 
(government policy plus artistic value franchise opinion about output, 
G+av(o)) on the artistic value goals of the company. 
The superset of all financial value and artistic value outputs. This represents 
net income from operations and any release of stored financial value (i.e. 
assets) from the previous financial year, fv(o), together with the 
aggregate of artistic value franchise opinion about the output of the 
company over the financial year, av(o). 
Planning operator (consisting of coefficient, k, and filter, o) representing 
management's decision as to the proportion of available income, fv(i)*k, 
it wishes to apply to the production of opera, together with its decision 
concerning the degree and extent of artistic value franchise opinion, 
av(i)*o, it wishes to acknowledge and act upon in the production of 
opera in the financial year ahead. 
Inseparability of artistic value and financial value, and franchise influence 
In our model, transactions are important insofar as they determine the start and end 
conditions for the adding of value in the transformation process. The model suggests 
that there is a mutual, reciprocal and balanced trade of values: that because franchise 
members in buying tickets or in sponsoring productions supply the opera company 
with financial value input, fv(i), that in the medium- to long-term, the opera company will 
attempt to deliver artistic value according to franchise tastes and preferences (opinion), 
av(o). The model suggests that it is in the interests of producers to respond to audience 
and sponsor (franchise) opinion, since it relies upon the repeatability of its transactions 
with franchise members such as these for a portion of its future financial value needs. 
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However, because the opera company's diet of transactions varies in terms of volume, 
value and ease of repeatability (certainty), the level of influence of different franchise 
groups will also be expected to vary. To this extent, the model predicts that sponsors 
(with whom the opera company has a low volume of high value transactions) will have 
greater influence than audience members (with whom the opera company has a high 
volume of low value transactions). This predicted difference in responsiveness can be 
tested by seeking evidence in the qualitative data which accompanies company financial 
accounts, and by looking for evidence of accountability and transparency in the 
reporting, as a whole, as an indicator of openness and responsiveness. A franchise 
which cannot gain adequate insight into the artistic and financial decision making of its 
public service provider is an unempowered franchise: one which cannot influence the 
agenda (here artistic and financial policy) in which it has an interest. 
Interestingly, what the model does not predict, but can explain, is the role or influence 
of external parties (e.g. private, wealthy individuals, and public sector body 
representatives) who enter into transactions with the opera company, but who also 
enjoy privileged access to the opera company's transformation process i.e. whose 
transactions are internal to the organisation and are therefore not visible or transparent 
to the rest of the artistic value franchise. As we show in the research chapters of this 
study, board members who also fund an opera company (i.e. have a directorial interest 
in its operational affairs and are part of the planning operator, o) are a significant 
feature. 
The determinants of value 
Value is not determined within our transaction model on an objective basis. Although 
financial value in isolation may be measured objectively via audited financial accounts, 
value is realised in the transactions which take place between individuals and groups 
within the environment. For instance, although financial accounts provide objective 
measurement of financial value, individuals can still qualify these measures according to 
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subjective criteria. A financial loss, whilst objectively stating the relationship between 
income and expenditure, can be regarded with varying degrees of significance according 
to context, sensitivity of the individual or group to losses, risk assessment, forecast of 
future earnings and predictability of the environment etc. Because we regard value as a 
subjective matter, as a matter of perception, we do not draw upon cost-of production 
theories of value such as the labour theory of value (in any of its interpretations) since 
such theory attempts to determine value as an objective quality of the process of 
production e.g. as the value (e.g. cost) of labour expended in production. We have 
already shown that the adding of value in the transformation process (crudely, the 
summing of input values) is not equivalent to its realisation in the transaction9• 
This is important, for whilst the quantity of labour expended on opera production is of 
significant interest, its role as a determinant of value is both complex and non-linear. 
Indeed, the role of artistic and other labour in the process of producing opera is itself a 
function of perception: how many people does it take to produce an opera; are there any 
limits; do more people (with relevant skills and expertise) necessarily mean more value? 
We might appear to be adding value, but is it realisable? Do franchisees and 
govemmen t get more artistic value for money? Could the same value be achieved at 
lower cost; and who determines this, producers or consumers? 
Specifically, we are interested not in the absolute quantity of labour required to produce 
opera in the long-term, but in changes in the relative quantity of labour required over 
time both within and between companies. Since opera production involves both long 
lead times and a relatively small quantity of finished output or performances per year or 
season, we can measure labour intensity in person years rather than hours. These 
changes are of particular interest to us precisely because the output of the UK 
subsidized sector shows, in historical terms, a relative fixity - it is both static in terms of 
quantity of output (number of performances) and relatively fixed in terms of repertory 
(although new works are constantly entering the international standard repertory, 
because of the fixed nature of the opera infrastructure (we show this for the UK) these 
new works tend to demand or utilize the same types and levels of artistic resources (e.g. 
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an orchestra in a pit, a cast of principal singers, and a chorus of perhaps 30 to 60 
people). 
The idea of productivity (improving factor efficiency in producing substitutable units of 
output) is not a meaningful concept in the context of UK subsidized opera. Firstly, 
opera is non-standardizable: whilst we measure output in terms of number of 
performances, a performance is not a unit (no two performances are identical and 
therefore do not exhibit substitutability). Secondly, government's objective in 
subsidizing opera is not to create more output at lower cost (profit and market 
penetration are null issues here), but to maintain value in an artform which has been 
developed over several hundred years and in which the fundamental artistic resource 
requirements (necessary factor inputs and technology of production) have shown little 
appreciable change. 
The technology of production (in terms of factor inputs) is to a large extent determined 
by the composer's score, and since the international standard repertory of opera still 
consists of a large proportion of eighteenth and nineteenth century works, inter-factor 
comparisons as measures of intensity and ultimately productivity are largely irrelevant. 
We are not interested in the substitution of capital for labour (relative capital intensity) 
or in labour for capital (relative labour intensity) since conventional measures of 
intensity such as these imply fundamental changes in technology and by implication, 
productivity. 
For this reason, we adopt two measures of factor intensity which permit not inter-
industry comparisons, but measures of the way in which producers believe value is or 
can be added in the production of opera. In the context of this study, labour intensity 
is therefore a measure of technical elaboration (i.e. adding to the quantity and/ or 
sophistication of artistic and financial inputs in such a way as to increase the complexity 
of the production process e.g. computerised lighting which requires added technical 
support); and financial intensity is therefore a measure of the total financial resources, 
in terms of financial flows (income and expenditure) and financial stores (assets and 
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liabilities) applied in the production of a single performance. 
Our measures invite important questions. Why, for instance, is it necessary to devote 
more and more financial resources to opera production, when output remains relatively 
static in historical terms? Is it the result of change in the environment (e.g. inflation) or 
of change in the way opera is produced; and what does this mean for financial 
efficiency and for issues of equity - is it fair on the franchise; is more value necessarily 
added when we simply consume more financial value input, fv(i), and engage more and 
more labour in order to produce the same or similar repertoire as we did twenty, thirty, 
or even one hundred years before? The model does not predict that significantly more 
labour should be required over time in the production of opera precisely because 
although new works are constantly entering the standard repertory, required resources 
are to a large extent similar i.e. determined by the fixed infrastructure of UK subsidized 
opera. It is not within the power of a composer, commissioned by a major subsidized 
opera company, to change these resource variables in any significant way e.g. scoring 
for an ensemble of six players when the salaries of an inhouse orchestra still have to be 
paid and justified (recovered). 
Value is what individuals and groups within the environment believe it to be. The 
measurement of value is therefore a question of the measurement of perception. 
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2.5 Summary 
Our fundamental concern in the transaction model is with the ability of real individuals 
and groups within the environment to influence the transformation process of the 
individual opera company (or sector as a whole). Our concern is with political economy 
and the distribution of power in the context of democratic market economy. By 
focussing on transactions as the mechanism through which value is realised and by 
which the transformation process, and therefore future output of the individual opera 
company, may be influenced or modified, we concern ourselves with power structures 
and with questions of equity (inclusiveness of the artistic value franchise) and with 
questions of efficiency (maximizing value to an inclusive artistic value franchise). 
In the following chapter we discuss those models and theories pertaining to value in 
opera which currently exist, either explicitly or implicitly, within the environment. This 
enables us to examine the nature of the transaction or trade of values which occurs 
between the subsidized opera sector and government (as its mainstay source of 
funding). Our discussion focusses on the UK. 
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3. EXISTING MODELS PERTAINING TO VALUE IN OPERA 
3.1 The powerhouse model 
The UK Arts Council was founded in 1945 by John Maynard Keynes (Lord Keynes), 
under whose chairmanship it adopted an interventionist approach. The thrust of this 
approach was that maintenance of the best (by state support) improves the whole (for 
background see Pick 1986). 
In 1940s Britain, government strategy consisted of a range of Keynesian demand 
management measures: continual pump-priming through public spending increases and 
tax cuts. Now the key tenet of Keynesian theory is that competitive equilibrium is a 
logical impossibility; that a market economy cannot reach an optimal outcome of its 
own accord (for discussion of optimality see section 3.4). Crudely, we can summarize 
this to mean that without state intervention, opera, and the arts in general, were 
believed unlikely to make their way in the market, not least because of uncertainty in 
the future. Keynes saw government's role as a counter to the short-termist nature of 
private sector (particularly stock market) investment. To Keynes, the state was better 
able to calculate the value of investJ'IJent on long vie11ls and to take on an ever greater responsibility 
for direct!J organising investJ'IJent (Keynes 1936:164). This is the backdrop to development of 
what we may term the powerhouse model: 
The Arts Council believes ... that the first claiJ'IJ upon its attention and assistance is that of 
maintaining in London and the larger cities effective powerhouses of opera, J'IJusic and drama; 
for unless those quality institutions can be J'IJaintained the arts are bound to decline into 
mediocrity. (ACGB 1956a). 
The first such powerhouse for opera was created in 1946 with the establishment of the 
Covent Garden Opera House (which became the Royal Opera House in 1950) as a 
national institution (Pick 1986:47). It was to be assisted by central government via the 
fledgling Arts Council (ibid Pick 1986:49) and headed what was, in effect, a nascent 
subsidized opera sector (Sadler's Wells Opera, active at that time, became English 
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National Opera in 1974, and Welsh National Opera and Drama company was founded 
1946)1• 
The powerhouse model can be characterised as a form of direct intervention by central 
government. It is designed to distort the opera infrastructure in a specific way and does 
so by means of a deliberate bias in the disbursement of public subsidy towards a 
nominated powerhouse company. This powerhouse is designed to act as a kind of engine; its 
purpose, to drive artistic value through the opera sector as a whole. Inevitably this 
produces a hierarchy (viz national and regional companies) and suggests that the ideal 
opera infrastructure is one characterised by a core powerhouse which sets and drives 
artistic value standards through a cohort of satellite or follower companies. Since this is a 
mechanistic model of value, we will find the driverfollower model, used in mechanical 
engineering to describe the relationship between gear wheels, a simple and helpful 
analogue2• 
Historically, the powerhouse model, as developed in the UK, can be viewed as a response 
to a discontinuity in the socio-economic environment. In the austerity years 
immediately following the Second World War, without a public intervention 
mechanism to support the production of live opera, it was thought unlikely that opera 
production would arise spontaneously, let alone flourish. The pattern of private 
patronage of opera, typical of the pre-war years, was not expected to restore itself in 
such an economic climate. 
The years between 1945 and 1951, however, saw the establishment of the majority of 
the UK's nationalized industries (for background see Pappas et. al. 1983), and it is in 
this historical context that Covent Garden was set up as a national institution i.e. the 
powerhouse model was the natural outcome during a period in which public ownership of 
major assets was perceived as expedient. Because these nationalized industries were 
designed to operate within a framework of commercial and non-commercial or social 
objectives, it was believed that they would automatically act in the public interest. But, 
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whilst the need for these industries to act in the public interest was often cited at the time, 
the means by which this was to be achieved was not defined in operational terms (ibid. 
Pappas et. al. 1983:499). This left scope for considerable ambiguity and financial 
inefficiency in the operation of publicly owned assets in general. 
Despite an isolated government White Paper in 1961 which aimed to tighten up the 
financial and economic obligations of the nationalized industries (CMND 1337 /1961) a spirit 
of minimal and vague performance guidelines continued into the late 1960s (Pappas et. 
al. 1983:502). It is in this climate of relative operational autonomy that we must view 
the establishment of Covent Garden as the Royal Opera in 1950. During its nascent 
years, the powerhouse model was not subject to close economic scrutiny: it was possible 
to talk of artistic value without ~e overt requirement to tie this into measurements of 
financial value. The transaction between government and the powerhouse opera company 
was thus loosely defined; government did not place strict conditions on the type of 
return expected, and neither was there a perceived need for accountability. 
The creation of the Royal Opera as a national institution, and powerhouse of opera, 
although designed as an act of beneficence by the post-war government, could not at 
the same time be said to represent the public interest in any obvious sense. Indeed, 
since the majority of the populace of Britain at that time did not travel, possessed on 
average relatively little disposable income, and did not have leisure time as we 
understand today, this national institution could only have been accessed by a London or 
Home Counties audience i.e. a relatively small minority. The powerhouse model, then, was 
not established on the basis of any clear egalitarian goals such as we see in the case of 
public service provision (see section 3.2). 
The powerhouse model, then, presents something of an anachronism in the context of a 
democratic society. In choosing to intervene directly to stimulate production of live 
opera in Britain, the post-war government did not seek value in the form of access or 
outreach (the kind of proxy measures of artistic value with which we are today familiar) 
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but something more intangible. Indeed it might be argued that the government of the 
time sought less a national institution than a national icon. 
The powerhouse model shows the following characteristics: 
• 1) Assumes a direct relationship betJJJeen artistic value and financial value: The powerhouse 
is designed as the engine which drives artistic value through the opera 
infrastructure. As the engine, it receives the greatest share of public subsidy. 
This is a mechanistic approach i.e. it is assumed that the engine receives the fuel 
(financial value input) and that the more fuel the engine has, the greater its output 
(here artistic value). The model, however, does not imply any measure of 
efficiency (measures of efficiency relate inputs to outputs). It is quite possible 
for the engine to work at less than optimal efficiency (e.g. producing artistic value 
at a greater financial cost than is necessary) and in the long-run, to bum itself 
out. The powerhouse model thus assumes, but does not test for, technical 
efficiency. It also reflects the belief that the more generously the powerhouse is 
supported (fuelled) the greater its value driving ability. 
• 2) S e!f fu!filfingfunding stmcture: Artistic value is equated with reputation or position 
in the powerhouse hierarchy and funding patterns become self-fulfilling e.g. 
subsidy is awarded on the basis of reputation, and reputation is gained on the 
basis of past subsidization. This funding structure, once established, tends to 
impede formal innovation (except on a small scale, or by major private sector 
entrepreneurs e.g. Raymond Gubbay Earl's Court opera productions). New 
ventures have to fight against established interests (the powerhouse and its 
followers) as well as government confidence in the infrastructural stability which 
the model produces. In political terms, supporting a new and risky venture at 
the cost of letting an existing inefficient one fail is not attractive. Undoubtedly, 
it also calls into question the validity of the powerhouse concept itself: if the 
powerhouse model is valid, there should be no need to seek artistic value 
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alternatives. 
• 3) Creates a hierarchical iefrastructure-. This distorts the basis of competition and 
sets up the myth that the company receiving the greatest amount of subsidy, 
the powerhouse, must represent the pinnacle of artistic value. A more fragmented 
infrastructure would produce a different expression of competency amongst 
players e.g. the labels international, national and regional (funding culture terms 
which are largely arbitrary) might cease to have meaning under a different 
model. In the powerhouse model, the definition of artistic value is predetermined 
by market structure, and artistic value becomes equated with institutions: the 
infrastructure determines the artistic value agenda of the opera sector and not 
vice versa. The value produced, then, becomes a function of the infrastructure 
rather than the infrastructure a function of the value produced. 
• 4) Creates an oligopolistic market structure: The powerhouse opera company and its 
closest followers, in terms of subsidy award (see chapters 6 and 7), will tend to 
exercise disproportionate control of the artistic value agenda since collectively 
they will account for a major proportion of the public subsidy awarded to the 
sector in any one year. The powerhouse and its closest followers will enjoy the 
strongest purchasing power within the sector, will be able to buy in star 
directors and singers, and will thus define opera and the artistic value paradigms 
which determine its quality standards (see chapter 6). This creates unfair 
competition: small companies such as Opera East (now dissolved, see chapter 
5) cannot hope to compete on a budget for budget basis. The powerhouse and its 
followers will also tend to share artistic and management personnel (key decision 
makers) thus homogenising the sector and the artform itself e.g. artistic 
directors take their style to the opera company; the opera company does not 
impose its style on them. This leads to lack of differentiation. At best, 
companies will differentiate on the basis of incremental differences e.g. opera in 
local language versus opera in original language, but issues of repertoire will 
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depend on artistic directors who constantly move round the circuit every few 
years. The powerhouse-driven opera market will therefore tend to be an 
oligopolistic one, dominated by a few major companies. In this scenario, 
competition for resources, one means by which artistic standards may be raised, 
or driven through the infrastructure, may be neg;ated. 
• 5) May promote inejficienry: The powerhouse effectively maintains a monopoly on 
resources (since it receives the greatest subsidy). This may breed complacency 
amongst powerhouse management as income seems secure and the environment 
stable i.e. the cost to government of letting the powerhouse fail will be high unless 
the political moment for its demise is perceived to have arrived. Management 
may begin to expect that government will at all times provide a safety net so 
that it can afford to prioritise artistic value without equal reg-a.rd to financial value 
(i.e. treat artistic value and financial value as separable). Ultimately, the powerhouse 
may become acculturated to emergency grants and subsidies as a perceived 
natural privilege i.e. the powerhouse can predict a relatively secure income and so 
can afford inefficiencies in its conversion process (this is discussed in chapters 6 
to 8). 
By direct/y organising investment (ibid Keynes 1936) through public ownership of 
assets, industries, and here, the arts, opera may effectively be protected from 
uncertainty (short-termism in the financial market) and competition (exposure 
to which implies the need for financial and technical efficiency). But by isolating 
industries and the arts in this way, the ability of these industries to respond to 
external factors such as increasing cost of imported factors of production, is 
reduced. Because the industry is effectively isolated from the real economy in 
this way, its response is not to resist, but to absorb imported cost inflation (this 
is discussed in chapter 6). 
• 6) Creates inequity in the distribution of public subsidy: Unless the powerhouse opera 
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company is permanently on tour, the artistic value it creates cannot be shared 
equally among taxpayers (i.e. audiences are not mobile, and art tourism is not a 
relevant factor here). A Verdi festival at the Royal Opera House will not be seen 
in Glasgow, and certainly not in the Outer Hebrides: its value can only be 
perceived indirectly. The only way artistic value can be driven through the opera 
infrastructure, and therefore reach all taxpayers, is by means of intangible 
factors e.g. the influence of scholarship, style, interpretation and so forth, on 
powerhouse fa/lowers. Much depends upon the ability and interest of producers 
(these fa/lower companies) to take up the artistic value agenda defined by the 
powerhouse. However, because of distortion in the distribution of subsidy (the 
basis of the model),fallowers must either use less costly resources, or work at 
greater efficiency than the powerhouse. This will be true if we assume linearity in 
the relationship between artistic value and financial value. Alternatively, if we 
assume non-linearity (i.e. artistic value does not rise proportionately with 
increases in financial input) then followers may produce different artistic value 
agendas of their own. If this is true, it suggests that the powerhouse driverfollower 
model, at the very least, does not work as intended. 
It is also interesting to note that the p01verhouse model in the UK is something of an 
historical accident. It provides a practical illustration of the way in which opera, value and 
the environment are systematically linked. Indeed, had the UK (then, Great Britain) 
adopted the American post-war fiscal stance, which involved rigid economy in public 
expenditure, the opportunity to re-open the Covent Garden opera house as a national 
institution and powerhouse of opera might never have presented itself. As Galbraith points 
out, in the years immediately following World War II there was, in the USA, a 
remarkable attack on the notion of expanding and improvingpublic services (Galbraith 1958:202). 
This is in part an explanator of why the Metropolitan Opera House, which receives 
only 2% of its income via public subsidy, has not evolved according to the powerhouse 
model. Thus, it may be a cultural icon, but it is not a national institution in the same 
sense as the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. Where there is historical obligation 
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to the public funding of the Royal Opera House (a sense that it must not be allowed to 
fail), there is no such perceivable obligation in the USA towards the Metropolitan 
Opera House. Arguably, the two houses have come to be valued in different ways. This 
we would predict because the transactional environments of the two houses are 
themselves radically different. 
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3.2 The public service provision model 
The government 1965 White Paper on the arts (CMND 2601/1965) established the 
idea that the arts should be regarded as a social service alongside health and education. 
This led to creation of a new government post, albeit at junior level, of Minister for the 
Arts (see Waters 1989:73). Arguably, therefore, 1965 marks the historical point of 
establishment of what we may term, the public service provision model, in the context of 
the arts. 
In the public service provision model, opera is provided to the public as part of a wide 
ranging, government funded arts or cultural service. It depends upon a devolved, arm's 
length principle of government intervention; the kind of indirect intervention which can 
be achieved when government chooses to distance itself from the day-to-day 
disbursement of subsidy, via the filter of specially appointed agents (here, the UK arts 
councils; for background see ACE 1996a). 
Perhaps because the public service provision model in the context of the arts evolved in a 
pre-oil crisis, mass market environment (see chapter 5), it assumes universal demand i.e. 
that demand for opera, in proportionate terms, will be as strong in Shetland as in 
metropolitan London, given availability of supply (for discussion of 1960s mass markets 
see Kotler (1984) and chapters 4 and 5). Operation of the model is thus underpinned 
by the concept of sujficient supply. geographical regions are either sujficientfy or insujficientfy 
supplied with opera (see SAC 1988a:9). 
The public service provision model in the context of the arts shows the following general 
characteristics: 
• 1) Predicated on an egalitarian ideaf. The model is predicated on issues of equity (the 
egalitarian ideal of access for all). Issues of efficiency are entirely secondary to 
this ideal. The model depends upon the idea of citizenship i.e. the right to 
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individuals as citizens to participation in society and the benefits of collective 
resources. It assumes the need for redistribution of resources as the necessary 
means by which to control equity or fairness (normative concepts) i.e. the 
greater the desired degree of equality of living standards, the greater the 
redistribution of income and wealth through transfer payments and taxation 
(for discussion see Bailey 1995:52). Specifically, the model equates provision of 
opera for citizens (i.e. access to opera) but not necessarily consumption of 
opera by citizens with equality of living standards. 
• 2) Measurement of artistic value by pro~: The public senJice provision model inevitably 
creates an obligation to meet distributive goals (access and outreach) as a matter 
of priority. A government which elects to provide a public service must ensure 
that provision is made to all citizens on a per capita basis. Distribution of 
resources will therefore be driven by geographical factors (according to 
population densities for instance) and will create the need for a devolved 
structure capable of delivering the service to rural as well as metropolitan areas. 
Questions of artistic value and of adaptation or localisation of opera to particular 
markets are entirely secondary to this distributive goal. 
The measure of value implied in this context is quantitative (access and 
outreach measured in terms of audience reach). This measure of provision 
(quantity) acts as a proxy for the measurement of artistic value (quality) which, 
apart from being qualitative in nature, is not measurable by government without 
implying political intervention (i.e. violation of the arm's length principle). In the 
context of democratic market society, government cannot be seen to be the 
judge of individual tastes and preferences in matters of art and culture. In public 
senice provision in the context of the arts, then, distributive goals supervene 
quality goals: the emphasis is primarily on delivery or provision rather than 
service quality per se. Thus quantity of opera provided and accessed is, in effect, 
equated with quality of opera delivered: quantified measures of provision as a 
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proxy measure of quality. 
• 3) Assumes equality of demand: because the model assumes that citizens throughout 
the UK will share the same tastes and preferences in opera, there is a distinct 
possibility of vertical inequity i.e low-income groups funding a service to which 
they may have access, but no interest or use, an outcome which benefits high-
income groups (for background see Bailey 1995:220). Socio-economic 
stratification of consumption may increase this over time e.g. opera may 
become identified with a particular socio-economic grouping of consumers, an 
identification which may become self-fulfilling. Because the model assumes 
equality of demand or need, for opera there is a danger of paternalism. The 
model therefore has to be run in the context of a portfolio of alternatives (i.e. 
public choice across different artforms) in order to cater for differing tastes and 
preferences. Nevertheless, because subsidy decisions are left to professionals 
within the various UK arts councils, in an as yet closed decision process, the 
model is still inherently paternalistic. Although the Scottish Arts Council, for 
instance, plans to hold its first open meetings in January 2000, it is not at all 
clear whether public discussion of funding applications (currently regarded as 
confidential) will or will not be invited (see for instance SAC 1999:6). In 
practice this makes the defence, that subsidy in the merit good model is not 
simply distributed by high-minded mandan'ns claiming to kno1v what is best for a 
population, seem less than convincing; a defence which was made, notably, over 
twenty years ago by Netzer in his classic study of US public support for the arts 
(Netzer 1978: 166). 
The public seroi.ce provision model, then, is provision- and measurement-led. In the same 
way as Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) in the UK are required to distribute funds 
to assist the business community, so the arts councils must disburse funds without 
saving significant proportions of these funds or budgets from year to year. This 
requires the creation of schemes which possess easily measurable success criteria 
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(otherwise funds could not easily be awarded or distributed). ALEC may choose to 
support a particular industry sector in one financial year, but in order to allow sufficient 
businesses to qualify for support, may need to set arbitrary qualification variables (e.g. 
whereas, it may be more efficacious to provide capital input, a LEC may feel that the 
effectiveness of such support is too difficult to measure, and therefore may set up 
marketing or promotion schemes, which in reality may have only a marginal benefit to 
individual businesses or to the particular industry sector as a whole). Thus it is not 
always customer wants or needs which drive the public service provision model, but ease of 
service provision measurement. It is also more difficult, when funding decisions are so 
devolved, to operate a strategic policy. 
Outcomes thus tend to be tactical rather than strategic. Arguably, this also builds in a 
degree of inefficiency as the system may become self-fulfilling. Because the model 
normalises the qualification criteria (e.g. all opera companies may apply for funds for 
new commissions) organisations seeking funds will start to build in a conditioned 
response: a search for innovation will produce a response to find innovation, whether 
or not this is appropriate for the individual organisation or the sector as a whole. 
As we have seen, the primary assumption underlying the public service provision model, 
then, is that opera should be provided in the same way as, for instance, a library service 
i.e. according to relative population densities (for an example of this type of approach 
see AC-OSG 1985). But such fixed segmentation of the opera market (i.e. using 
demographic criteria) takes no account of the fitness of the opera products for those 
markets i.e. it does not accommodate changing tastes and preferences but treats opera 
as a generic. Indeed, the model calls to mind the idea of cultural missi01f used in the 
context of arts subsidy debate in the USA in the 1960s (Rockefeller Panel Report, cited 
in Salem 1973:65). Here, the emphasis is on value as defined by producers, and not 
consumers: demographics do not answer the question of perceived need. Interestingly, 
we may note here that in the USA, the value of demographic audience research has 
already been questioned (e.g. Schreiber 1985:40). This is because demographic data 
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does not inform us about the perception of value by audiences, it does not inform us 
about tastes and preferences in the context of opera. 
The homogeneity of supply resulting from this assumption of universal demand (see 
above) may create problems for small touring outfits such as Scottish Opera's Opera 
Go Round, which may be perceived as high value in some venues and not in others 
depending on the particular potential audience. What is suitable for a village hall may 
not be equally suitable for a growing county town theatre where the opera offering 
suffers comparison against alternative theatrical offerings, and where there exists an 
audience of growing sophistication. 
This is not to say, however, that the public service provision model cannot be adapted to 
different transactional environments or market segments (this is discussed in chapter 8). 
This emphasis on provision over artistic value is not structural and can be overcome by 
the use of different devolvement structures. Sub-contract, licensing, and other market 
mechanisms, for instance, raise the potential for variety and greater product 
localisation, not least through the lowering of barriers to new and or local entrants. 
Potentially, there are many ways of modifying the idea of seroice provision for different 
environments, but in its current form, the structural defect of the public service provision 
model is that it tends to promote measurement of artistic value by proxy. 
S aUy LK Garden 74 
3. Existing, models pertaining, to value i11 opera 
3.3 The productivity lag or cost disease model 
The notion that live performing arts (such as opera) suffer a fatal productivity lag vis a vis 
other sectors of the economy, thus causing them to face a situation of ever rising unit 
costs, forms a central if disputed idea of cultural economics. Indeed, the idea, first 
explored by Baumol and Bowen (1966) is summarised and presented as an established 
fact in Heilbrun and Gray's standard text, The economics of art and culture (1993), which 
represents one of the first such texts on the subject and which is addressed not only to 
students of economics but to prospective arts managers also. We include it here not 
because it is a model of value per se (it is no longer employed as a justification for 
government support of the arts) but because it is still considered a powerful explanator 
of rising costs in the arts, and, significantly, because it attempts to do this by treating 
artistic value as an exogenous given. From our point of view, the productivity lag or cost 
disease model is important because any explanation of costs in the arts must, according 
to our transaction model, also constitute an explanation of value (see again chapter 2). 
Heilbrun and Gray summarize the productivity lag argument as follows: costs in the live 
performing arts wiU rise relative to costs in the economy as a whole because wage increases in the arts 
have to keep up with those in the general economy even though productivity improvements in the arts lag 
behind (ibid. Heilbrun and Gray 1993:126). However, we do need to examine the 
assumptions and workings of the model more thoroughly in order to assess its validity 
as an explanator of the real world. 
The model is concerned with two general relationships: a) that between productivity 
(output per man-hour) and costs; and b) that between costs and income. The model is 
predicated upon three main observations: 
Observation one : The observation that the technology of performance is stagnant, 
thereby causing the productivity (output per man hour) of the performing arts 
to lag behind that of other sectors in the economy: 
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Though there have been improvements in lightingfacilities, in the methods used to shift scenery 
and in a few other peripheral areas, the basic character of performance itse!f has stayed much 
the same. The playing of an instmment or the acting of a role remains todqy large!J what it 
has been for centuries... Whereas the amount of labour necessary to produce a rypical 
manefactured product has constant!J declined since the beginning of the industn"al revolution ... 
no one has yet succeeded in decreasing the human effort expended at a live performance of a 4 5 
minute Schubert quartet much below a total of three man-hours. (Baumol and Bowen 
1966:164). 
Thus, observation 1 : productivity in the live performing arts lags behind that of 
other sectors in the economy. 
Obseroation two: The observation that: a) in order to avoid erosion of relative 
incomes, wages in the live performing arts will rise in line with those in the 
wider economy; and b) because of the productiviry lag, such wage pressure will 
cause unit costs in the live performing arts to rise. To be clear, a standard 
measure of productivity is the total cost of labour required to produce one unit 
of output. Productivity is important because a rise in compensation or wages 
may be offset by a faster rise in productivity, thus leading to a potential drop in 
unit labour costs e.g. where wages (per hour) rise by 2.9% and productivity 
(output per hour) rises by 3.2%, unit labour costs will drop by 0.3%. If as the 
result of productivity bargaining (negotiating wage increases on the basis of 
such productivity increases) the manufacturing workers in the above example 
can secure a wage rise each year, the standard of living of our string players, 
assuming a fixed remuneration, will fall behind. Now the assumption in the 
producti.viry lag model is that wage increases in one sector (here manufacturing) 
will be emulated by other sectors (as here, the live performing arts) even though 
these other sectors lag behind in terms of productivity. In other words, we can 
expect the wages of our string players to rise in line with average earnings but, 
because of the producti.viry lag, that this wage pressure will result in an upward 
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pressure on unit costs. Moreover, even if wages in the live performing arts do 
not in practice keep up with average earnings (for evidence see Towse 1993) 
any increase, no matter how small, will still increase unit costs because of the 
productivity lag. 
If the earnings ef[our] stringplayers increase by 4% per year 1vhi/e their productivity remains 
unchanged, it follows that the direct labour cost per unit of their output must also rise by 4%, 
since cost per unit is equal to total cost divided by the number of units of output. If in a forfY 
hour week the string player provides just as many performances as he did the previous year 
[because he cannot improve productivity], but his wage is 4% higher, the cost of 
performance must have risen comspondingjy [in contrast with the manufacturing sector 
in which productivity increases will have offset such cost pressure]. Moreover, 
there is nothing in the nature ef this situation to prevent the cost ef performance from rising 
indefinite/y at a compound rate [hence cost disease] (Baumol and Bowen 1966:169). 
Thus, observation 2 : Rising total labour costs combined with a productivity lag 
will result in ever rising unit costs in the live performing arts. 
Obseroation three : The observation that because of a largely unavoidable lag in 
the rate of increase in ticket prices (relative to the rising costs posited above), 
earned income in the live performing arts will be unable to keep up with costs, 
thus causing an income gap. For the reasons given below, Baumol and Bowen 
also consider this pricing lag (our term) to exhibit certain elements which may 
be considered structural and therefore not the fault of management. According 
to Baumol and Bowen three basic influences can be expected to restrict the rate 
of increase in ticket prices (1966: 172): 
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3. The forces of competition 
Thus, observation 3: Ticket prices rise, unavoidably, at a slower rate than 
inevitably rising costs, thus causing an income gap in the live performing arts 
which is not the fault of management. 
Thus, Baumol and Bowen put forward the thesis that there is a tendency for costs to 
rise and ticket prices to lag in the live performing arts which is neither a matter of bad luck 
nor mismanagement (1966:162). In other words, that the income gap brought about by 
productivity limitations (and pricing limitations) in the live performing arts is a chronic 
(i.e. structural) phenomenon. For the sake of clarity we can summarise the model and 
its outcome as follows: 
The income gap which characterises the live performing arts is the result of: 
a) productivity limitations, which make it inevitable that unit costs will rise, and 
b) pricing limitations, which, because they may be regarded as unavoidable, 
cause ticket price rises to rise at a slower rate than unit costs, thereby 
c) making it impossible for organizations in the live performing arts sector to 
operate on a viable basis without the cushion of necessary subsidy. 
Significantly, this is not a moral, but an economic argument in favour of public 
subsidization of the live performing arts. 
Now, there is an important consequence here: for by treating the productivi"!) lag so 
described as an empirically defined structural problem or special feature of the live 
performing arts, the question of public subsidy justification becomes easier to address. 
In short it allows us to argue that arts organizations such as opera companies will 
inevitably face unremittingfinancial pressure (Heilbrun and Gray 1993: 133) and will do so 
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not by fault of their own but because of the effect of purely external factors over 
which, individually and as a sector, they cannot possibly have control (hence cost disease 
e.g. Mokre 1996). In this way, the justification of public subsidy, here based on an 
economic argument, comes to underwrite or endorse a more simplified moral 
argument: opera is expensive and cannot help being so, therefore if we value it as part of our heritage 
or as part of our ongoing artistic traditions, then we must subsidize it i.e. not to do so would amount to 
wi!ful neglect of our own culture since opera would, as a result, either decline in qualify or die. (e.g. 
Milnes 1993:635). 
However, the seeming internal consistency of the productivify lag model is beguiling and 
it is all too easy to become seduced by the elegant mechanics upon which it relies. 
Whilst the idea of increasing productivity in order to overcome rising unit labour costs 
is extremely important in principle, it is only relevant in situations where direct labour 
costs form a significant proportion of total costs (we will discuss the issue of cost 
components below). We will demonstrate that it is in this area (cost components) and 
in the area of value and pricing that the model, which was developed in 1966, betrays its 
outdatedness. Some thirty years have elapsed since the first statement of the productivify 
lag model, and whilst Baumol and Bowen, as its authors, cannot be expected to have 
foreseen the changes which have occurred in opera and the environment in that time, 
later commentators and those such as Heilbrun and Gray (1993) writing standard texts 
should at this point have re-evaluated the model in the light of new evidence and 
understanding. Instead, we find the model still being used as a criterion of policy 
analysis e.g. in Austrian lyric and dramatic theatre (see Mokre 1996 and Corr. 1997b). 
Moreover, in his discussion of aesthetics and economics, Mossetto (1993) refers to the 
productivify lag model as Baumol's productivify law for artistic markets (Mossetto 1993:205). 
In the light of new evidence and understanding, then, we can lay out our objections to 
the productivify lag model as follows: 
• Objection 1 : The observation that productivity improvements are difficult to 
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achieve in the live performing arts is based solely on the technology of 
performance (a direct labour cost orientation) and ignores the increasing 
importance of what we may term establishment costs (e.g. rent, utilities, marketing, 
finance, administration) and development of production costs ( e.g rehearsals, set 
design and build, wardrobe). 
Briefly, a direct cost is one which can be allocated directly as a whole item to a 
cost centre or a cost unit (Sizer 1985:72)4. Direct costs in the context of opera 
are those which can be specifically identified with an individual performance 
(i.e. the performance of a production, where the production itself represents an 
investment in future performance activity). 
Now the main problem with the productiviry lag or cost disease model is that it 
focusses solely on direct costs i.e. those costs which vary directly with each unit 
of output. As we saw above, the productivi.ry lag model fails to account for 
establishment costs such as administration, marketing and development of 
production costs which constitute an investment in future performance activity. 
As we will demonstrate, the ratio of the main cost components has been 
changing over time since the productivi.ry lag model was first stated (see chapter 
6). Indeed, Baumol and Bowens' data contain portents of these changing 
trends: 
The general conclusion to which the ... evidence leads is that rising costs of performance can 
certainty not be laid to increases in performers' wage levels alone. Cost increases have been 
peroasive and have affected almost all categories of expenditure. (Baumol and Bowen 
1966:217). 
The miscellaneous category of production costs [in the context of Broadway theatre 
data] has also risen sharpty since 1928. At that time it was made up entirety of props and 
electrical and sound equipment, but more recentty managerial expenses, press agent salaries 
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and legal auditingfees have also become items to be reckoned with. (Baumol and Bowen 
1966:214). 
Thus Baumol and Bowen posit only economies of scale (i.e. lengthening 
production runs) as a productivity improvement option, whereas, in fact, many 
of the options they dismiss (as do Heilbrun and Gray) have now become 
relevant. 
Thus our first objection to the productiviry lag model is that it fails to take 
account of changes in the components of total cost. 
• Objection 2: The productivity model assumes linearity in the relationship 
between artistic value and.financial value (by equating quantity of financial value input 
with quality or artistic value output). Towse, whilst making the point that today 
there are in fact a variety of ways in which direct labour productivity 
improvements can be made, touches upon this very issue: 
The type of technical constrrint usual!y mentioned in connection with the Baumol and Bowen 
thesis is that 'Aida' cannot be performed without an 'Aida' and a Beethoven quartet cannot 
be performed with on!y three players, these being examples, albeit overdone ones of increased 
labour productiviry. While this is patent!y true, there are labour-saving changes that can be, 
and have been, made. For one thing, 'Aida' is not the on!y opera and others requiringfewer 
singers can be substituted instead if 'Aida' is too expensive;furthennore it can be peiformed 
with fifty choristers rather than a hundred. The issue, then, is whether technical constraints 
allow far any substitutabiliry. Substitution could take place at two levels - the work itse!f and 
the number of peiformers that are needed to peiform it. There is some limited possibility of 
jlexi.biliry in respect of the numbers needed to peiform some works; there have been some 
notable examples of cut-down versions of operas - Peter Brook's production of 'Carmen' had 
fewer principal singers than usual and no chorus. Nearer home, the smaller opera companies in 
Britain - Opera 80, Travelling Opera. Pavilion Opera, Opera East, Scottish Opera Go 
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Round -pl.qy reduced versions of operas, saving on singers and musicians ... Furthermore, there 
is a large repertoire of small-scale works to choose from ... But substituting different works 
needs audience approval.. However, tastes do change. The swing to historicalfy aware 
performance ... the taste for Earfy music, and other such changes in taste have resulted in 
reductions in the number of players needed to perform even standard works ... Clearfy, technical 
constraints do exist in music and opera but there is scope, at least in the long mn,for changes 
that save on labour costs by one kind of substitution or another. .. although there is alwt[js the 
risk of reducing quality (Towse 1993:108-111). 
Note Towse is still concerned with productivity improvements in the 
technology of performance. She does not discuss those that may be applied in 
the area of establishment and development of production costs (which as we 
shall demonstrate in chapters 6 and 7, are equally important). 
Baumol and Bowen state the assumption clearly: 
Performing arts organizations can also reduce the rate of increase in their unit costs by 
permitting the quality of their product to deteriorate, through fewer rehearsals, the use of less 
well trained performers, shoddy costumes and scenery ... But such a course is never popular with 
organizations dedicated to quality ... (Baumol and Bowen 1966: 17 5). 
• Objection 3 : The assumption that organizations in the live performing arts are 
active cost minimizers is not necessarily applicable. A new significant factor in 
the environment is the trend known as deindustrialisation (for discussion see 
Rowthom and Ramaswamy 1997). Deindustrialisation is characterised by the 
relative decline of manufacturing's share of total employment and total GDP 
and is a feature of the advanced economies such as USA, Japan, Europe and 
more recently, South East Asia (notably Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan). The trend is an outcome of the very productivity differential (that 
between manufacturing and various service sectors) that Baumol and Bowen 
S af!y LK Gorden 82 
3. Existing models pertaining to value in opera 
describe in their 1966 study. One potential outcome of deindustrialisation is 
that as manufacturing continues to become proportionately less significant in an 
economy, overall growth will become dependent on the creation of 
productivity improvements in services. Arguably, the assumption that 
organizations in the live performing arts actively pursue productivity 
improvements and efficiency measures may only now, in the light of 
deindustrialisation, be valid. 
Indeed many of the productivity improvements which Baumol and Bowen, and 
Heilbrun and Gray, dismiss as unachievable in the live performing arts may be 
realisable with the onset of such predicted productivity pressure in the services 
sector. Indeed, the drive towards accountability (as outlined in section 1.2) 
brings with it pressures and responses which by default tend to result in 
improvements in productivity (viz. efficiency measures, of which productivity is 
a category). A recent report on the financial affairs of the Royal Opera House, 
Covent Garden, underlines this very point. In the report summary which refers 
to the need for more accountability (an irony not lost on this researcher since 
the full version of the report has not been made available to the general public) 
mention is made of unnecessary duplication of effort and for the need for 
closer ties between repertoire planning and (resource) budgeting: 
... the ROH 's [Royal Opera House] budgeting should not divorce repertoire programming 
from resources, as has been the case in the past ... the new regime is committed to altering both 
procedures and culture in this respect. Managers of the artistic activities 1vill be required to 
take responsibility and [be] held accountable. In the light of his conversations with them, Mr 
Walker-Arnott believes that the new regime at the ROH: 
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- recognises that the financial management and systems of the ROH need to be 
improved 
- is genuine!J committed to reforming the ROH 's culture, procedures and systems; 
and 
- has the knowledge and experience to do so (ACE/ROH 1997a:3). 
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Had this report, not been commissioned, the potential for these measures 
(which imply immediate efficiency improvements) might have gone 
unrecognized i.e. in the absence of accountability there would be no apparent 
motivation to pursue them. That such basic house-keeping (i.e. ensuring proper 
budgeting control of individual productions) has been shown to be inadequate 
at the Royal Opera House is disturbing and merely underlines our point that 
opera companies in the subsidized sector cannot be assumed to be active cost 
minimizers. This leaves us with a question as to the applicability of the 
productivity lag model in the context of the UK subsidized opera sector. 
The model assumes that management in the live performing arts actively seeks 
to reduce unit costs, but without the forces of competition within the subsidized 
sector this assumption is questionable. Indeed were subsidized arts 
organizations to succeed in controlling costs and thus reducing deficits, it is 
entirely possible that they might effectively be penalized for successfully 
squeezing the income gap. Since the award of subsidy is predicated on past, 
current and future need, this is entirely plausible. Indeed, we might argue that in 
the subsidized opera sector it pays to maintain rather than to eliminate deficits 
(this is demonstrated in chapters 6 and 7). 
• Objection 4: Productivity comparisons imply standardized units of output (such 
as printed circuit boards, compact discs, and cars, for instance). However, no 
two opera performances are the same (see chapter 2). In fact, it is difficult to 
define the output of services (including the live performing arts). 
There are two issues: a) the confusion of standard with non-standard units of 
output; and b) the confusion of productive capacity with production output. 
Indeed, Heilbrun and Gray offer us a confused picture of precisely what they 
take the output of a live performing arts organization to be i.e. of what it is 
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relevant to measure. In one example (1993:130) they take number of admissions 
per hour as the output of a symphony orchestra, and in another, they take the 
actual performance of a Beethoven quartet: ... there is reaf!y no wqy to increase output 
per hour. It takes four musicians as much playing time to perform a Beethoven stn'ng quartet 
todqy as it di,d when it was first published in 1800 (1993:127). 
Not only is this example simplistic, but any musicologist will demonstrate that 
because of debate about Beethoven's metronome markings and tempi 
indications, changes in interpretative canons, changes in the techniques and 
aesthetics of string playing, that we never have and never will have a standard 
duration for a given string quartet. So the very idea that a single performance 
represents a substitutable unit of output is completely inappropriate in the 
context of the live performing arts. 
Moreover, the idea that output can be measured in terms of admissions per 
work hour (e.g. Heilbrun and Gray 1993:130) is no stronger. The number of 
admissions per hour for any live performance held indoors, is a measure not of 
productivity, but of capacity. In any concert hall or opera house, there is a 
physical constraint on the size of audience which can, under proper Health and 
Safety regulations, be seated. In a factory producing printed circuit boards, the 
square footage or number of lines which can be devoted to production places 
like limit on the capacity of that plant. Note capacity is defined as the maximum 
available amount of the transformation process over some specified duration 
(Meredith 1987:120). An increase in capacity utilisation is not the same as an 
increase in productivity, albeit both are measures of efficiency. Indeed, it is 
quite possible to have one without the other, or for an indirect relationship to 
pertain between the two e.g. working above normal capacity might increase 
capacity utilisation but reduce productivity if proportionately more extra staff 
were required. 
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• Oljection 5 : In general, comparisons of productivity cannot be made over the 
long-run because product forms and service forms change. Note, long-run 
comparisons of productivity were a key element in the methodology adopted by 
Baumol and Bowen. But long-run comparisons of productivity in the arts 
require that artistic value be treated as a constant; it requires that we ignore the 
possibility that the service form may have changed over time (an objection 
which is consistent with objection 1 above i.e. changes in opera company cost 
components represent changes in input and therefore changes in the way in 
which value is added; see also chapters 6 and 7). 
Economists also encounter the same type of comparability problem in trying to 
determine long-run comparisons of consumers' wellbeing via consumer price 
indices. Traditionally, consumer price indices are formed by comparing the cost 
of a basket of consumer purchases today with the cost (at normalised prices) of 
the same basket yesterday. The problem lies with the content of the basket. 
yesterday's basket cannot reflect today's innovations. For instance, a telephone 
today is not the same as a telephone twenty years ago. Indeed, the very concept 
of the telephone has changed: today it can be mobile, can take messages, may 
be used as a fax, comes with add-on digital services and, with the use of a 
modem, can be incorporated into a complete home or office 
telecommunications system involving the ability to send email and search the 
Internet. In other words, the product form of the telephone has changed 
through innovation (here technological). This innovation, in tum, has changed 
the way in which users relate to the telephone and thus perceive its value. The 
intangible benefits associated with the telephone have grown, such that now we 
buy a service with the option of multiple telephone points and multiple 
numbers per line instead of renting a single physical line (intangibility is 
discussed in chapter 4). Moreover, we have choice: telecommunications was 
long regarded as a natural monopoly, but with deregulation, many providers 
now compete on price and value, providing an ever increasing range of 
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additional services and benefits (such as itemised billing, frequent number 
discounts, handsets with special features, handsets for those with impaired 
hearing etc.). 
Thus economists recognise that it is very difficult to make meaningful long-run 
comparisons involving cost-benefit relations (such as Baumol and Bowen 
undertake in their study of ticket prices in the live performing arts), precisely 
because: a) product forms and service forms contained within the basket may 
change radically (changing perceived use-value(s) over time); and because b) 
such innovation may alter the relative position of items in the basket vis a vis 
other products and services e.g. the item may move into new markets where 
new or different substitutes will be encountered. 
In the case of opera (which we explicitly define as a service in chapter 4), many 
innovations have occurred: front of house facilities have been extensively 
developed to include bars, information points, telephone enquiry and booking 
services, and corporate hospitality suites; within the auditorium, surtitles have 
been introduced and lighting design as an artistic element has developed in 
importance and sophistication with the advent of computerisation. Such 
innovation inevitably means that audiences have changed also e.g. the choice to 
see an opera with or without surtitles or to see it in translation produces new 
types of audience groupings. Even in terms of individual works themselves, the 
same applies: the audience for a Handel opera today does not necessarily follow 
the logic of ornamentation in the da capo aria form with the same ease and 
expectations as an audience in eighteenth century London. 
Specifically, productivity improvement (increasing the volume of output per 
hour) is not the only appropriate response to a rise in unit labour costs (the 
producti.vity lag or cost disease problem); it is also appropriate to change the value of 
the output (specifically, to add value, and thus to alter the price; see Ohmae 
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1983). It is because the productiviry lag model fails to accommodate this second 
option in a satisfactory way that it betrays a major weakness. Let us be clear, in 
order to keep apace with rising unit labour costs, a manufacturing company or 
an opera company, for instance, must: 
a) Increase the volume of output per work hour (productivity increase); or 
b) Change the value of the output by adding value and thus increasing price; this 
will involve not only a change in the product or service form, but is likely to 
have an impact on volume of output also. In generalized terms, and in the 
context of consumer markets, adding value and lowering volume constitutes a 
move upmarket, whilst lowering price (but not necessarily changing value) and 
increasing volume constitutes a move downmarket. 
In the context of our study, the productiviry lag model presents opera as a kind of hapless 
victim of wider economic forces i.e. as a victim which deserves the unquestioning 
support of taxpayers. But the arguments behind the productiviry lag or cost disease model, 
as we have demonstrated, do not bear close scrutiny and, arguably, divert attention 
away from the real issues (i.e. of value and the relationship between inputs and 
outputs). Arguably, this cuts opera off from the vital driving forces of market demand 
and changing tastes, so that innovation and market development are severely 
hampered. 
The main problem underlying economic models such as that developed by Baumol and 
Bowen is summarized in the following extract which is taken from a standard text of 
the Chartered Institute of Marketing: 
Economic theory has little to sqy about product poliry because the theory of consumer 
behaviour treats the products themselves rather than the benefits or characteristics thf!Y possess 
as the direct objects of utiliry. Under such an assumption little can be said about the kf!Y 
questions of how one product competes with another or how one can develop a superior product. 
Recent!J economists have tried to fill this gap by developing a new theory of consumer behaviour 
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which defines a product as a bundle ef characteristics which are the ultimate goal ef the bl!Jer. .. 
this opens the possibiliry ef a much more f ruiiful set ef insights into consumer behaviour 
(Doyle 1991:278). 
S aUy LK Garden 89 
3. Existing models pertaining, to value in opera 
3.4 The merit good model 
It is thought that merit good considerations have probabfy been the most significant single 
explanation of government involvement in the arts (Throsby and Withers 1979:192). 
In the merit goods scheme of things it is held that certain activities, such as the arts, are 
intrinsically valuable and meritorious, and that to support them is in the public interest 
(Mulcahy and Swaim 1982:60). Education and healthcare are classic examples of such 
merit goods. 
Now whilst this is a useful starting point, it is also an oversimplification. In traditional 
economics, the merit good theory provides an argument for government intervention or 
support where it is thought that the market for that good will otherwise fail (Bailey 
1995:28). Government intervention is only justified by market failure i.e. where the 
market produces a non-optimal outcome in terms of distribution of that good. Market 
failure can be understood to occur, in the merit goods case, either as the result of 
inefficiency (a non-normative argument), or as the result of inequity or social injustice 
(a normative argument). That is, the merit value of the men'tgood is predicated both on 
issues of what is fair or right in principle (what should be supplied and demanded), and 
on straightforward optimality arguments (how supply and demand should be managed 
to optimize distribution). This mix of normative and non-normative criteria concerning 
the economic welfare of producers and consumers is a source of ambiguity and 
confusion (particularly with public good theory and the concept of externalities). Quite 
what is meant by market failure in the merit good theory as it applies to the arts is, as we 
shall see, a major question. 
Thus, men't goods can be defined as goods which it is benejidal that all partake adequate!J in, but 
which individuals are likefy, left to themselves, to undemse (Walsh 1995:10). 
More strictly, the term merit good was first introduced by Musgrave (Musgrave 1959) to 
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describe any goods which government has decided it would be desirable to provide, at 
zero or subsidized price, in some quantity greater than consumers would wish or be 
able to buy at market prices. Note, government's decision to supply the arts on a merit 
goods basis involves the imposition of taste and preference: government must decide 
what it is in the public interest to supply. A subsidy is introduced to increase the 
quantity of the good which it has been decided should be supplied (e.g. live 
performances of opera). Merit good arguments therefore form the basis of the public 
service provision model. 
There is a strong circularity here: government has no objective basis upon which to 
decide what should be supplied as a merit good (i.e. what kind of art, or what range of 
artforms). Because it assumes market failure, it cannot take signals from the market about 
consumer tastes and preferences in the arts - it has assumed that these signals (e.g. 
existing purchasing patterns of consumers) are misleading and not truly representative. 
More strictly, it makes the assumption either that some aspect of supply is missing, or 
that consumers simply do not know what is best for them (i.e. do not behave rationally 
and buy the kind of art which is best for their welfare). This is heavily paternalistic. 
Whilst on the face of it, the merit good theory appears to provide a moral justification for 
government intervention, it is not straightforwardly consequentialist. Simply because a 
good is recognised as possessing some social value (a moral property) does not mean 
that the good as possessor of that moral property should automatically be promoted. 
In moral theory, the consequentialist view says that if something possesses a certain 
moral property (value or goodness) it ought to be promoted and it is right to do so. 
This, however, is not a sufficient explanation of how the merit good theory operates. 
Strictly, the arts as a type of generic merit good are funded, not because it is morally right 
to do so, but because it is thought that if left to its own, the market for the arts will not 
operate in an efficient way i.e. that inefficiency leads to inequity. This is a subtle but 
interesting point. 
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Now, this situation of allocative inefficiency or market failure typically occurs, in the merit 
good case, because: 
• 1) Individuals mC[J undervalue the good : Individuals may undervalue the personal 
benefits derived from consumption of a good i.e. they attribute insufficient 
merit to the good (Bailey 1995:28). This may occur because individuals lack 
sufficient information to enable effective consumer choice because of 
' 
consumer irrationality, or because consumer sovereignty is not attainable (in 
cases where consumers do not wish to make decisions) (Walsh 1995:10). 
Applied to opera, this means that individuals may be thought to undervalue the 
personal benefits of attending live performances of opera because: they lack 
information or knowledge about opera; their behaviour or attitude towards 
opera appears to vary unpredictably (i.e. by not always supporting opera and 
the.refore apparently not always maximizing their own welfare); or because they 
can evoke little response from producers about the type of opera they would 
most like to see Qow involvement in or influence on the transformation 
process). 
• 2) Individuals mC[J disregard the wider social benefits (extemalities) of the good: Individuals 
will tend to disregard the wider social benefits (positive externalities) of the 
good since it is assumed they will aim to maximize their own personal welfare 
(Bailey 1995:34). That is, market failure will occur where the social valuation (the 
costs and benefits to society) of the good is not included in the private cost 
functions of producers and consumers (Bailey 1995:40). 
Applied to opera this means that individuals may fail to support their local 
opera company, and so fail to support a young composer, for instance, whose 
work might benefit national prestige. This may occur because the individual fails 
to perceive or consider any connection between the externality (the benefit to 
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national prestige) and his own personal welfare (i.e. it will not figure in the 
transaction or trade of values he makes with the opera company when buying a 
ticket, if indeed, he buys a ticket). 
• 3) Individuals mqy lack access or opportuni!J to consume the good : The private sector 
may restrict access to, or participation in, the good (Walsh 1995:10). This is 
really a variation of the second type of market failure above. In short, it reflects 
the problem that producers may face in pricing the good i.e. they cannot 
include the social costs and benefits (which may be external to the market) in 
their own cost functions. An insurance company offering private health 
insurance cannot reflect the benefits of health insurance to society as a whole in 
its individual market. Consumers may therefore face a disincentive to buy 
because producer prices are perceived as high relative to the perceived personal 
benefits of consumption of the good. 
Applied to opera this means that individuals may, for instance, fail to support 
their local opera company because the ticket price seems too high relative to 
the perceived personal benefits of attending a live performance of opera by the 
company. 
In short, market failure, in the merit goods case, occurs where individuals can be said not to 
be the best judges of their own welfare (Bailey 1995:28) or the best judges of their own 
welfare and the public interest (Walsh 1995:10). It is a strongly paternalistic argument. 
Whilst the market failure argument makes sense in the case of essential services such as 
education and healthcare it does not, however, easily apply to the arts. It can be 
expected that an adequately educated, adequately healthy workforce will make a better 
contribution to a nation's Gross Domestic Product (one measure of economic welfare) 
than will an inadequately educated, inadequately healthy workforce. But is there an 
adequate level of access to or participation in the arts; one at which a net contribution 
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to Gross Domestic Product can be observed? Conversely, could it be demonstrated 
that an inadequate level of participation in the arts leads to a deleterious effect on 
Gross Domestic Product? Strictly, do the arts have a demonstrable social value in the 
same way as other, classic merit goods? That is to say, the merit of the arts as merit goods 
must be measurable by financial value, not by artistic value. So the normative basis of the 
merit good theory, as it applies to the arts, does not appear to be fully worked out. 
Note, the arts are often treated as public goods i.e. goods which exhibit non-excludability 
in consumption. As long as the arts are treated in a generic sense, this argument can 
pass without obvious difficulty (examples cited usually include architectural heritage, or 
visual arts in public galleries). But, in the context of the performing arts, this is simply 
not sufficient. Consumption of a live performance of opera does exhibit excludability; 
there is an obvious capacity limit in opera. When one individual buys a ticket to the 
opera, he excludes the possibility of any other individual sitting in that seat for the same 
performance. This is classic excludability and changes the whole basis of any argument 
concerning externalities in the arts. It is a profoundly important point. If we are to 
entertain the possibility of positive externalities in the arts, then we need address the 
issue with considerably more intellectual honesty. 
As a justification for the public subsidization of the arts, then, the merit good theory is 
not without its problems. One of the main arguments against the merit goods view is the 
potential misuse of the theory of market failure. In the context of the arts, it has been 
argued that government can use the market failure concept as scientific pretence to impose its 
own preferences on individuals and communities (Bailey 1995:39). This is brought about because 
the difficulties of quantifying and valuing men·t good and social value characteristics may 
facilitate political manipulation of a nation's electorate. Bailey argues that government 
may, if it wishes, exaggerate the personal and social benefits derived from the arts ... in order to jus"lify 
levels of service greater than would be protided by pn·vate markets without financial assistance from the 
government (Bailey 1995:40). This creates the possibility that taxpayers are required to pay 
for services they may not wish to use, and leads us back to the idea that artforms, such 
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as opera, may be elitist (see again public seroice provision model): 
If low-income groups are pqying taxes in support of seroices used by higher income groups, then 
the outcome mqy be deemed inequitable. Inequiry mqy be compounded if those higher-income 
groups possess more political power than do low-income groups (Bailey 1995:40). 
In terms of value, then, the idea of the merit good requires us to accept that artforms 
such as opera, and therefore whole cultural sectors, have some kind of intrinsic or 
absolute value, that they are good-in-themselves, and also that they posses some moral 
value (meri~ to society. In other words, that we are to treat artworks as intrinsically 
beneficial in the same way as merit goods such as private personal pensions and private 
health insurances i.e. that there are positive externalities to the subsidization of opera. 
Interestingly, David Hume's essay Of the delicary of taste and passion (Hume 1777a) 
amounts to an argument about the positive externalities of artistic activity within 
society. He claims, for instance, that a cultivated taste for the polite arts promotes love and 
fn.'endship Hume 1777a:12) i.e. that it promotes the common good via better relations 
between men. Hume also claims in another essay (Of refinements in the arts, Hume 1777c) 
that artistic activity within a society aids the common good because: a) it promotes 
action and pleasure (ibid. Hume 1777c:168); b) it promotes rationaliry and greater humanity 
(ibid. Hume 1777c:169); and c) it benefits good government by stimulating an increase in 
consumption of commodities (ibid. Hume 1777c:170). These are, in effect, arguments about 
the social value, the positive externalities of art. As benefits, they are, however, 
intangible and largely untestable, except perhaps for the last e.g. spin-off benefits to 
local restaurants near the opera house. 
As we saw above, according to economic theory, where it is thought that individuals 
undervalue the personal benefits derived from consumption of merit goods, allocative 
inefftcienry may occur (Bailey 1995:28). That is, the intrinsic benefits which the merit goods 
are attributed as possessing are not efficiently allocated across the population of 
potential consumers. One of the mechanisms by which such inefficiency may be 
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removed is by means of public subsidy. Specifically, the idea of subsidy in this context 
is to encourage optimal personal levels of consumption of the merit good in question, by using 
subsidy to reduce the price paid by consumers (Bailey 1995:28). In short, stimulating 
consumption by reduction of price to the consumer. This brings a curious twist in the 
case of the artwork as merit good since it suggests that artworks as merit goods are 
intrinsically and equally beneficial to aff individuals (again an assumption of universal 
demand). Not only is this paternalistic, but it assumes that reductions in ticket prices 
necessarily increase the consumption of live opera. But this is to confuse access with 
increased utility (perceived value), and there is a profound difference. 
Moreover, the merit good theory does not accommodate the problem of propagandistic 
art. Artistic value judgements do not conform to the merit good theory under autocratic 
political regimes, for instance. The whole concept of Nazi art demonstrates this 
problem: artworks, unlike healthcare services, are not meritorious to all of the people all 
of the time. Moreover, the merit good theory does not accommodate differences 
between individuals in terms of tastes and preferences. Only by considering the arts as a 
generic service can this be overcome. Government cannot respond to tastes and 
preferences because these can only be expressed through the market mechanism i.e. 
ticket purchase. This requires that government make an assumption about the value of 
the good (the arts, generically, or opera, specifically) to its citizens. This is not 
equivalent to the idea of an artistic value franchise where franchisees have a right to set 
and change the artistic value agenda, because here, it is government which sets the 
agenda. It also encourages treatment of artistic value as an exogenous given, and this 
introduces an unhelpful recursivity in the practical application of the theory. 
The merit good theory then, is heavily paternalistic in its assumptions and does not 
provide us with value criteria which relate to the perception of value by real individuals 
and groups within the environment. It does not sit easily with the idea of art and 
culture as the expression of creative individuals, as a thing which owes its genesis to 
individual creative effort. Rather, it imposes art as a collective ideal. Inevitably, it 
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politicizes art. 
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3.5 The socio-economic contribution model 
The idea that public subsidization of the arts can be justified on the basis of the 
potential, measurable contribution of the arts to the socio-economic environment has 
gained considerable ground in the UK in recent years. Its genesis can be traced to arts 
advocacy and economic impact studies in the US in the 1970s (for background see 
Heilbrun and Gray 1993). 
In the UK, there is evidence of an increasing emphasis on the idea of what we may 
term, the socio-economic contribution of art. Under the previous Conservative 
administration, during the Major years (see chapter 5), there were two main ways in 
which this contribution was sought: first, the contribution to cultural tourism and economic 
development (DNH 309/1996, DNH 373/1996); and second, the contribution to social 
regeneration (DNH 357 /1996, DNH 363/1996). 
Interestingly, the Labour Government under Prime Minister Blair has picked up on the 
general theme of socio-economic contribution and private sector initiative with the setting up 
(in 1997) of the Inter-Departmental Creative Industries Task Force. This Task Force 
comprises industry leaders who have themselves a track record of financial success (and 
therefore socio-economic contribution) in the arts5 (DCMS 178/1997). 
The nature of the socio-economic contribution the UK Labour Government expects the arts 
to make were outlined by Chris Smith immediately following his appointment as 
National Heritage Secretary (now the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport): 
The arts and cultural industries alone turnover more than £ 12 billion a year, and return a 
substantial positive balance on our tradi,ng account. Cultural activitJ, therefore, has an 
important role to plqy in working towards our goal of high and sustainable levels of 
employment. This is why I am particular!J anxious for the cultural sector to plqy a full part in 
our proposed welfare to work programme, helpingyoungpeople particular!J to come off benefit 
and into work or high qualitJ training. The creative industries have a kf!Y role to plqy as part 
of that endeatJOur (DNH 126/1997). 
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This has since been developed to include the concepts of neighbourhood renewal and the 
new deal for communities (see section 1.2). 
Whilst the merit good theory (discussed earlier) does not attempt to explain the 
externalities associated with art and cultural activities (indeed, it assumes that art and 
culture is an externality or wider social benefit in itself), in the socio-economic contribution 
model, the idea that art and culture has some intrinsic value is laid aside. 
Under the socio-economic contribution model, then, the arts are certainly not regarded as an 
end in themselves. The emphasis is on instrumental value. Specifically, on the net 
contribution which arts organizations such as opera companies, can be seen to make to 
either the local or national economy. 
Whilst economists may argue that the model we identify here, because of its emphasis 
on positive externalities (wider social benefits), is merely a sub-set of the merit good 
model, there is a philosophical distinction between the two. From the point of view of 
the opera community, and indeed the arts community as a whole, the difference carries 
major implications. Whereas the merit good theory, as we saw, includes a normative case 
for the subsidisation of art (i.e. art is intrinsically worthwhile), the socio-economic 
contribution model presents an entirely non-normative case. It makes no judgement as to 
the value of art itself, but considers it worthwhile only insofar as it pays its way in 
socio-economic terms. Indeed, the model invites us to regard opera, and the arts in 
general, as substitutable goods i.e. substitutable by other sectors or industn'es (viz 
Creative Industries Task Force) which may be able to provide greater social and 
economic contribution to the environment (note the interesting, implied stress on the 
inseparability of artistic value and financial value here). 
Whilst the model has the virtue of linking the arts to their environment, it also invites 
quantification of the contribution (i.e. estimation of the financial value the arts create in 
the economy, either directly or through spin-off activities). Once the value of the arts 
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or a specific arts organisation is quantified (i.e. measured by proxy) it is easily judged in 
comparison with quite different types of service or economic activity. The opportunity 
cost of funding the arts or an arts organisation (i.e. the cost of not putting that funding 
to the best possible alternative use) becomes at once more apparent because value has 
been given commensurability (units of financial value, money). 
Now, whilst quantification of value is no bad thing in itself (we have already shown the 
inseparability of artistic value and financial value, for instance), it has to be done well to be 
meaningful. Indeed, there is danger here for both government and opera community 
either through undervaluing opera by virtue of poor methodology, or poor 
interpretation of results (for discussion see Heilbrun and Gray 1993). 
Arguably, the merit good model and the socio-economic contribution model both encourage 
debate about the externalities of opera to be conducted in terms of total utiliry. Now in 
utility theory, the satisfaction a consumer receives from consuming commodities is 
called utili!J (Lipsey 1983:164). We have already introduced the concept of utility in our 
discussion of use value in chapter 2. However, in utility theory there is an important 
distinction. Whereas total utility refers to the total satisfaction gained from consuming a 
commodity, marginal utility refers to the change in satisfaction resulting from 
consuming some small increment more or less of a given commodity (ibid. Lipsey 
1983:164). 
Now, it is tempting, when discussing substitutes for opera (i.e. products or services 
which compete in some way with opera, or as here, offer as many social benefits or 
externalities as opera) to present potential substitution in terms of total utiliry. For 
instance, Baumol and Bowen (1966) (see productivity lag model) introduce the idea that 
opera on television forms a close substitute for live performance; that the consumer 
will be little motivated to attend an evening at the opera (given the associated costs of 
the ticket and travel etc.) when the opera can be seen without cost in the informality of 
the home. This is an implicit comparison of total utility: the idea of either all A or all B. 
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Translated into a wider context, this means that the merit good model and the soci.o-
economic contribution model, because of their respective focus on the potential positive 
externalities of opera, tend to encourage the opera community to argue from an overall 
moral standpoint. That is, it is easier to argue that subsidisation of opera is a good 
thing; that when asked, people will support the idea of subsidisation in principle. These 
are arguments about total utility. The argument that the Royal Opera House, Covent 
Garden should receive emergency funds in addition to its annual subsidy and National 
Lottery award is an argument about marginal utility (i.e. how much more is the taxpayer 
willing to subsidize opera before the increment of value (possible perceived 
externalities) begins to diminish in his mind. The two arguments are fundamentally 
different. The first is easily employed as a kind of arts advocacy argument, as evidence 
of public support for opera; but the answer is predictable, usually favourable, and 
carries little information (in general, people like to see themselves as tolerant and 
culturally enlightened). The second argument when put to the test, however, may yield 
much less predictable results and whilst less predictable results are more interesting and 
increase knowledge, it would be unlikely to have advocacy value. This is perhaps a 
minor, but nonetheless interesting point. 
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3.6 Other models pertaining to value in opera 
The artistic resource-base model 
This informal model is based on the idea that we need to maintain an opera sector in 
the UK if we are to provide suitable professional career opportunities for young, native 
talent. 
Unlike the socio-economic contribution model discussed above, the artistic resource-base model 
sets up a framework for the justification of public subsidisation of the arts not on the 
basis of immediate social and economic benefits (which may be directly measurable), 
but on the basis of what we may term quasi-moral criteria and long-run social and 
economic benefits. Briefly, we may characterise the criteria framework as follows: 
We should not waste living resources because: 
a) to do so is to neglect the potential contribution of a group of individual 
citizens and is therefore; 
b) to deprive such individuals of full and active participation in society which is 
therefore; 
c) to deprive society of the potential social and economic benefits (e.g. to 
national prestige or to invisible earnings) that such individuals may be able to 
make in the long-run. 
The implication here is that we have a moral duty to foster the talent of citizens 
for the good of the UK as a whole, and that if we are lucky enough to possess 
indigenous talent (an artistic resource-base), we should exploit it and not leave it 
open to other countries to benefit from it (e.g. via careers pursued abroad). 
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In sum, this means that the existence of artistic talent (i.e. singers, conductors, 
composers, designers, producers and so forth) within the UK represents a resource 
which morally and economically we ought to value and utilise i.e. their very existence 
constitutes a sufficient criterion of their funding. Such an argument is applicable in the 
context of any politically or culturally bounded area or region. With the current shift 
towards greater decentralization of government in the UK, for instance, the artistic 
resource-base model may well come to the fore in the argument for continued 
subsidisation of Scottish Opera (i.e. as a more explicit means for promoting Scottish 
talent). 
The implication of the artistic resource-base model is that the existence, continued 
maintenance and development of a sound opera infrastructure can be argued on 
instrumental grounds. That is, that a sound opera infrastructure exhibits an 
instrumental value insofar as it facilitates the utilization of living artistic resources 
(composers, conductors etc.) which in tum, yields future moral, social and economic 
benefits. 
The above arguments, as we have stressed, are of an implicit and informal nature. 
Nevertheless, taken together, they all resolve into what we have termed a resource-base 
approach to public subsidy justification in the context of the arts. Now whilst there is 
no formal exposition of such a model in the arts, recent developments in the emerging 
field of ecological economics provide us with a suitable analogy for further 
characterization of this model and its implications for artistic value and financial value in 
opera. We would do well therefore to examine current thinking in ecological economics 
precisely because it represents a field in which a resource-base approach to value has been 
more thoroughly and critically developed. 
In a key paper in which the term ecological economics is defined, Dasgupta (Dasgupta 
1996) argues that the entironmental resource-base should be regarded as a form of capital 
stock (comprising animal, bird, and fish populations, water, soil, forest cover, 
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atmosphere and so forth). Dasgupta argues that treatment of this natural capital base as 
a free good is bad economics because nowhere does the environmental resource-base exist in 
unlimited supply. 
Now, by analogy, the same could be said of the artistic resources required in the 
production of opera: that talented singers, conductors, directors and so forth do not 
exist in unlimited supply. Indeed, in economic terms, we could regard such artistic 
living labour as a form of renewable but nevertheless depletable stock. We expect a 
certain number of British singers to graduate from music conservatories each year; 
reducing study and professional debut opportunities reduces this stock of young 
professional talent. 
Arguably, there is even an element of non-renewability contained within this stock: the 
transfer of skills from one generation of artists to another exhibits perishability. As an 
example, the loss of one bel canto expert to a conservatory overseas can mean the 
disruption of a long line of oral and aural tradition. Equally, any discontinuity in the 
informal apprenticeship approach to the training of young opera coaches can mean the 
loss of an entire skill set, which may have taken many generations to develop. For 
example, a senior coach may have worked with a great many experienced singers of a 
previous generation, picking up technical and interpretational knowledge of particular 
roles in the process. Now this professional knowledge is not, and possibly cannot be, 
written down, so if a young coach does not have the benefit of working under the 
guidance of a senior coach, but enters the opera company fresh from the conservatory, 
he or she will have little to offer the young singer who wishes to work on a new role. 
Thus, through a complex of interrelated factors, tradition, experience and technical 
skills are lost, and the stock of singers capable of tackling specific areas of the opera 
repertoire (in a traditional and perhaps authentic manner) is diminished and cannot be 
renewed. 
So we have established the basis of our analogy with ecological economics. If then we 
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are to regard artistic living labour and the opera infrastructure which supports it as a 
form of capital stock i.e. as a resource-base, then how are we to provide objective means 
by which to measure its social and economic value. 
Dasgupta begins discussion of the problems faced by ecological economics by 
focussing on the way in which we price and value natural resources. The first problem 
Dasgupta points to is that we consistently underprice such resources and indeed often 
place no price on them at all, taking resources such as forest cover simply as givens, and 
unlikely, because they are not deemed scarce now, to become scarce in the long-run. 
But Dasgupta goes on to question the wisdom of this underpricing by putting forward 
the thesis that increases in societal wellbeing (such as measured by per capita Gross 
National Product (GNP), for instance) might not occur at the expense of the 
envi.ronmental resource-base of a given country. Indeed, Dasgupta proposes a new aggregate 
measure of societal wellbeing that captures not only the current standard of living, but 
also the effect of changes in the composition of a country's natural capital on her future 
standard of living. This measure Dasgupta calls Net National Product (NNP). 
Now, placing the above argument in the context of the arts, it is quite possible for the 
opera sector, for instance, to argue that current measures of artistic value (such as those 
posed by the socio-economic contribution model discussed above) increase at the expense of 
the artistic resource-base e.g. through the loss of talent abroad, or increased entertainment 
value of popular repertoire at the expense of what may be regarded in some cases as 
less popular experimental repertoire produced by young British composers. It would 
seem that the artistic resource-base model provides a plausible objective framework for 
such arguments, particularly so if we develop our analogy with Dasgupta's scheme of 
resource valuation a little further. 
Now Dasgupta reiterates the general observation that prices in a decentralised 
economic environment often do not reflect social scarcities (scarcity value) of goods and 
services; that a project's private profitability cannot be regarded as an adequate 
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indicator of its social value. Translated into an arts context, this also seems to make 
sense: the profitability of a West End musical, for instance, is not generally taken, by 
the classical music community at least, as a sign of its artistic value (assuming we can 
equate artistic value with social worthiness or value, which is another question). In 
response to this observation about natural resources, Dasgupta proposes we utilise 
what are termed accounting prices (which are notional) rather than market prices 
(which are real) as a criterion of public policy in this respect. In other words, that we 
try to estimate, quantitatively, but notionally, the scarcity value of natural resources such 
as irrigation water, timber, fisheries and so forth. Now without going into technicalities 
about what constitutes scarcity value in each case and in general, let us consider the 
important refinement which Dasgupta introduces to the argument at this point. It 
concerns the two ways in which accounting prices may be estimated. We outline these 
and Dasgupta's argument below: 
• 1) Accounting prices can be estimated from market prices (use value). This, 
Dasgupta says, may capture the direct use value of a resource (use value is 
discussed in depth in chapter 4) but will fail to capture any additional values 
which may be embodied in that resource. Dasgupta cites the intrinsic worth of 
living resources as a prime example of such additional value, and aesthetic value as 
another possibility. Dasgupta makes two qualifications here: 1) that intrinsic 
worth is not quantifiable and therefore can be used only in effect as a measure 
of last resort. A blue whale, according to Dasgupta, appears to us to have an 
intrinsic worth as a living thing, but because it is unquantifiable, we can call 
upon this measure of value only where the threat of extinction is posed; 2) that 
accounting prices based solely on use value (market prices) because they are biased 
estimates may nevertheless provide useful information. Dasgupta here cites a 
study in which conservation of blue whales was recommended solely on 
commercial grounds i.e. using use value (market price criteria) (see Spence 1974). 
The fact that we could add intrinsic worth to this analysis merely reinforces the 
outcome which was in favour of preservation and which was achieved by means 
S ai!J LK Garden 106 
3. Existing. models pertaining. to value in opera 
of accounting prices based on use value. In other words, Dasgupta argues here 
that use value, despite the constraints, provides a useful basis for calculating the 
value of scarce (environmental) resources. 
• 2) Accounting prices can be estimated on the basis of option value. Now here 
Dasgupta defines the option value of resources as comprising two properties: a) 
uncertainty in their future use values; and b) irreversibility in their use. Dasgupta 
cites genetic material in tropical forests as a prime example of a resource which 
displays both uncertainty and irreversibility. Dasgupta's argument here is that 
the twin presence of these properties implies that preservation of such stock 
has an additional value - the value of extending society's set of future options. 
Moreover, future options, according to Dasgupta, have an additional worth 
because, over time, more information is expected to be forthcoming about the 
resource's use value. It is this additional worth which is called an opti.on value. 
• 3) Now, on the basis of these two refinements, Dasgupta argues that the 
accounting price of a resource is, at the very least, the sum of its use value and its 
option value (for further discussion see Arrow and Fischer 1974). In this way, we 
are less likely to underprice a resource and more likely to construct an index of 
societal wellbeing which does successfully capture the effect of changes in a 
country's emironmental resource-base or natural capital (what has popularly been 
termed green NNP). Translated into the context of the arts this would give us an 
hypothetical artistic Net National Product (artistic NNP) as an index of what we 
might term societal-artistic wellbeing. 
Now this index would share the same property as that of green NNP, namely: small 
policy changes (including small investment projects) that improve the index are at once 
those that increase social wellbeing (for discussion of this property see Dasgupta and 
Heal 1979). In this way we could envisage the production of national accounts which 
include the artisti.c resource-base as an integral element. 
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Attractive though this would be, it nevertheless leaves us with a number of major 
problems. Firstly, we would have to define what constitutes the entire artistic capital 
base of the UK. We would need to do this if we were to measure any potential erosion 
or depreciation of that capital with any success. Immediately this begs the question, 
what constitutes an artistic resource? Whilst we can recognise environmental resources 
with ease, definition of artistic resources would in many cases involve considerable debate. 
Towse (1993), for instance, encountered difficulties in establishing an estimate of the 
total population of professional singers in the UK, as many were found to work on a 
semi-professional basis and could not easily be identified. 
The idea of an artistic NNP based on accounting prices of artistic resources also leaves 
unaddressed the problem of what Dasgupta terms additional values such as intrinsic worth 
and aesthetic value. Since neither of these is quantifiable, we could only use them, in 
effect, as values of last resort i.e. we could not incorporate them into our artistic NNP 
which is quantitatively derived. 
So it seems we come full circle: we might argue in favour of subsidising a particular set 
of opera companies on the grounds that not to do so would be to allow our artistic 
capital to depreciate in value, but we would still be left with the question of what 
precisely (and legitimately, perhaps) constitutes that artistic resource-base or capital at any 
one time. 
At a political level it also poses a danger. By focussing on the value of a country's or a 
specific region's artistic resource-base, there is every likelihood that attention will be overly 
focussed on the ethnic origins of living artistic labour. There is every danger that an 
artistic resource-base once measured and established, could become a form of political 
capital in itself. Interestingly, this fails to break down our analogy with ecological 
economics, for, as Dasgupta points out, that which constitutes an environmental 
benefit for one country may constitute an environmental cost for another. Moreover, 
there are certain resources which cannot be owned locally but represent a kind of 
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global common good (such as the atmosphere). The same may be said of artistic traditions; 
indeed, could we differentiate between those artistic resources which belong properly to a 
specific nation, and those which are held in common by all Europeans or Americans 
and so forth? 
There is, however, one virtue in the artistic resource-base model. It is that which provides 
the implicit starting point of Dasgupta's paper; it is that which Marx understood 
explicitly, and it is that which any professional marketer will understand intuitively, 
namely: that price does not equate to value. This we will discuss in some detail in 
chapter 4. 
The information good model 
The theory of the artwork as information good treats the artwork as an idea, as a message 
or set of messages, transmitted to and received by the public. The means of such 
message transmission, according to the theory, can be material, such as a stone 
sculpture, or immaterial, such as a live symphony concert (e.g. Brosio 1994). 
The virtue of this theory is an ontological one: it recognises the live performance of 
opera as an immaterial good, providing in other words, a recognition of its intangibility 
(an issue we discuss in depth in chapter 4). 
It is also based on the idea that transactions made, in our case, between opera 
producers and consumers (i.e. the opera company and parties in the environment) do 
not occur in conditions of perfect knowledge, and do not occur without cost in 
themselves; that there exist information asymmetries between producers and consumers. 
A specific instance of the information good idea can be found in the economic theory 
developed by Mossetto (1993). Here, Mossetto takes a Kantian approach to the 
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question of artistic value-. it is the basis upon which Mossetto builds the idea of art 
markets as involving typical ieformation asymmetries. Thus,following Kant ... the aesthetic 
assumption can also be considered as a specific feature of the ieformation process (ibid. Mossetto 
1993:75). This is the assumption that utili.ty, although it can be added to beauty can never 
participate to constitute it (ibid. Mossetto 1993:74). By this Mossetto means that: on!J 
when the beautiful and functional beauty (utili.D') coincide - that is in the case theorized by Hume and 
others of the identification of the useful 1vith the good and the beautiful - can this increase of information 
be appreciated by the market (ibid. Mossetto 1993:75). 
According to Mossetto, then, where creativity (production) and interpretation 
(consumption) fail to coincide, that is, the two main aesthetic processes [which] must both be 
examined as information processes or as part of them ... the market fails to evaluate the aesthetic 
experience cornct!J either on the demand or on the supp/y side, thus resulting in ieformation 
asymmetries (ibid. Mossetto 1993:72-5). Specifically such ieformation asymmetries can lead to 
an increase in information on reali.ty either for the artist of for the interpreter (asymmetrical!J) or for 
both of them (ibid. Mossetto 1993:75). Thus: 
... the asymmetry in the agent's quali.ty, and specifical!J the consumer's lack of 'interpretation' 
in the presence of producer's aesthetic 'creativity', is a basic reason for subsidhj.ng art ... 
(Mossetto 1993:78). 
Mossetto's analysis of the role of the culture industry has an interesting outcome from the 
point of view of our political economy of opera. Whereas, Adorno (as we shall see in 
chapter 4) considers himself an independent observer of the culture industry, one who is 
able to offer a critique of its aims and activities, Mossetto's theory, in effect, treats 
Adorno as internal to the industry, and his aesthetic theory an integral part of its 
information certification process. As an academic and music theorist, Adorno equates to 
a certifier in Mossetto 's analysis (ibid Mossetto 1993: 153-64): 
Culture has ejfective!J been a monopo/y from the most ancient times. Egyptian priests, 
medieval monastic orders, Renaissance arts and crefts guilds, modern and contemporary 
professonal associations, and in ma'!Y countn:es Universities, act as monopoli.sts. (Mossetto 
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1993:153). 
Mossetto goes on to define cultural supply in the following terms: a good can be defined as 
'cultural' if its 'quali"(y' is certified by cultural institutions, either because it was produced by them or 
because it has been ascribed by them to 'culture' after hating been produced .... two other attributes 
qualify cultural supp!J: se!f-certijication and a priori untestabili"(y (Mossetto 1993: 154). All this 
has important consequences according to Mossetto: 
Information arymmetry is stressed as a consequence of all this. Consumer information on 
quali"(y is specijical/y penalized. Consumers have to resort to culture in search of information 
[on} quali"(y. Th~ need someone to trust in, to certify a priori the quali"(y of the good th~ 
consume. Culture is a 'service industry' or a 'broker' between consumers and the truth with 
reference to quali"(y. Consumers are reac!J to pqy for this 'service' with in-ki.nd or monetary 
transfers (in andent times offers to the Temple, contemporary grants, and donation to cultural 
institutions) (Mossetto 1993: 154). 
Mossetto's analysis, however, implies a one-way information flow from producer 
(creator) to consumer (audience). In the context of the live performing arts, where 
there is direct feedback between performers (producers) and audiences (consumers), 
this leaves the role of audiences as influencers of creativity (artistic production) entirely 
unexplained. Mossetto's analysis reminds us of Collingwood's complaint about 
gramophone music: that it leaves performers and audience out of touch, reducing the 
function of the audience from that of collaboration to overhearing (Collingwood 1938). 
There is then, a fundamental difficulty with Mossetto's idea of biformation arymmetry in 
the market for the arts. Either Mossetto wants us to understand: a) that there is indeed 
a correct evaluation of aesthetic experience, or artistic value, and therefore, that information 
asymmetry is the result of a failure of perception (a failure of good taste on the part of 
consumers); orb) that consumers are free to perceive artistic value in whatever way they 
so choose, but that it is the culture industry, from its monopoly position regarding the 
certification of value, which is able to declare consumers as informed or uninformed i.e. that it 
is the culture industry which deliberately and artificially cultivates biformation asymmetry. 
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If (a) is true, then Mossetto's analysis is idealistic and fails to account for the critical role 
of feedback in the realisation of value (see chapter 2). This means that Mossetto, like 
Adorno, places boundary conditions on the perception of value (see chapter 4) so that, 
in the context of our political economy of opera, consumers are denied full and free 
participation in what we have termed the artistic value franchise. That is to say, opera 
must be subsidized because consumers do not properly understand or appreciate it (i.e. 
undervalue it). 
If, however, Mossetto's analysis is not to be read as an apologetic for the culture industry, 
if (b) is true, then Mossetto's analysis fails to account for the possibility that consumers 
may perceive artistic value in ways which producers themselves have not discovered, but 
would value (see, for example, interview with Thomas Ades6 in E 06-99:128). In which 
case, we cannot be dealing with misinterpretation (failure of perception) but with some 
kind of information surplus, a rather odd and unworkable idea which returns us to the 
dangerous territory that music must JJJean something in some traditional, measurable 
sense (see e.g. Monelle 1979). 
The added-creative-value good JJJodel 
A more market orientated theory of the value of artworks is that of the artwork as 
added-creative-value good (Owen 1986). In the theory upon which this model is based, it is 
held that artistic value is not different in concept from other forms of social worth; that, 
in the context of market society, artistic value is not, in effect, a special case. Thus, in the 
added-creative-value good model, a collection of art in a museum, for instance, can be 
viewed as analogous to an ordinary consumer good: a consumer good being the 
product of the values added by several companies in the process of its manufacturing and 
distribution. 
An artwork, such as an opera, then, according to this theory would be seen as the 
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product of the added-creative-value of several artists or individuals working within an opera 
company. 
The limitation of this theory, as developed by Owen, is that it relies upon innovation as 
the unit of value. This is a self-referential concept, presupposing that an artwork has 
value because it is new, original, breaks or develops artistic conventions in some way. 
Though this approach has the virtue of objectivity (since it is in theory, empirically 
possible to measure degree of innovation) from an intuitive point of view, it measures 
an arbitrary variable. We do not value artworks solely because of their real or perceived 
innovativeness. The originality (i.e. innovativeness) of an opera production may contribute 
to our perception of value, but only if we have seen the work on some previous 
occasion. In reality, there are no boundary conditions on our perception of value, and 
whilst value is indeed added in the transformation process of opera (see chapter 2), there 
are no limits (other than the limits imposed by our own senses and experience) to the 
nature of the value we may perceive in opera (hence, for some, its transcendent nature; 
see Monelle 1979). 
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3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we discuss those models pertaining to value in opera which currently 
exist, either explicitly or implicitly, within the environment. Our discussion focussed on 
the UK. 
We began by introducing the powerhouse model, an implicit, mechanistic model which 
involves deliberate distortion of the opera infrastructure in order to drive artistic value 
through the opera sector as a whole. It was also seen to assume linearity between 
financial value and artistic value. 
The publi.c sector provision model was seen to be based on an egalitarian ideal (access for 
all) and to involve the measurement of artistic value by proxy. Because of the emphasis 
on production, measurable outcomes, and the idea of universal demand which it entails, 
the publi.c senice provision model was also seen to result in homogeneity of supply i.e. the 
treatment of opera as a generic service (for classic example of this see Currie and 
Hobart 1994). 
We next introduced the productivity lag or cost disease model, which was developed by 
Baumol and Bowen in the 1960s, and which is still considered a powerful explanator of 
rising costs in the arts. We introduced and discussed the assumptions and arguments of 
the productivity lag argument, and stated five main objections to its applicability in the 
1990s. 
The merit good model and the theory upon which it is based was introduced as probably 
the most significant single explanation of government involvement in the arts. With its 
emphasis on market failure, and the need to seek optimality of supply and demand in the 
market for the arts, the model was seen to combine normative criteria (decisions about 
the meritoriousness of supply) and non-normative criteria (decisions about the 
efficiency of supply). In this respect, the model was seen to be heavily paternalistic, 
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permitting decisions about what ought to be supplied to be made in isolation to 
feedback from the market i.e. because the model assumes that consumers are not the 
best judges of their own welfare and the welfare of society as a whole, the market is 
considered to have failed. 
The socio-economic contribution model was introduced as a more recent development, and 
was seen to stress the idea of the potential, measurable contribution which the arts, or 
sectors of the arts, may make to the socio-economic environment. Because it emphasises the 
potential financial contribution of artforms, such as opera, to the economy at both a 
national and local level (an emphasis on the instrumental value of the arts), the model 
was seen to invite analysis in terms of substitutability and opportunity cost. Although 
its virtue was to recognise the inseparability of artistic value and financial value, promoting 
the quantitative measurement of value, the results of such measurement were seen to 
be open to misinterpretation and, in terms of political and arts advocacy argument, to 
outright misuse. 
Other models pertaining to value in opera were also discussed. These included the 
artistic resource-base model, an implicit, informal model based on the idea that 
government needs to maintain an opera sector in order to provide career opportunities 
for young, native talent (we developed this model by drawing analogy with ecological 
economics). The ieformation good model (based on the idea of iefo11J1atio11 a.rymmetry in the 
market for the arts) and the added-creative-value model (based on the idea of innovation as a 
measure of value) were also introduced and discussed in brief. 
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4. REFINING THE TRANSACTION MODEL OF OPERA 
4.1 Introduction 
Democratic nations ... cultivate the arts that seroe to render life eary in preference to 
those whose object is to adorn it. Thry will habitual!J prefer the useful to the 
beautiful, and thry will require that the beautiful be useful (de Tocqueville 1835-
40:48). 
Aesthetic theory has not traditionally concerned itself with the relationship between 
music and its economic environment. It is significant, therefore, that in the twentieth 
century both modernist and postmodernist aesthetic theory have aimed to explain 
artistic value explicitly in terms of the constructs of classical economics (viz Smith's use 
value and exchange value), and Marx's concept of commodity fetishism. This chapter is 
therefore devoted to an analysis of the key argument of the modernist and 
postmodernist programmes: the argument that music (including opera), because it 
exists in a market environment, will tend to become commodified and therefore 
debased, or stripped of artistic value. 
Modernist and postmodernist aesthetic theory both situate art within a world of 
exchange relations (i.e. transactions in the market economy); both grapple with what 
we understand as the inseparability of artistic value and financial value. Yet, whilst 
modernism offers an aesthetic programme which attempts to resist the inevitability of 
music's systematic connectedness to the economic environment, by contemplating the 
utopia of music's possible autonomy within that environment, postmodernism accepts 
and exploits the fate of music's market existence (for an extended critique of 
postmodernism see Jameson 1991). 
Perhaps the most succinct characterisation of these two aesthetic programmes is 
offered by Eagleton: 
Modernism is among other things a strategy wheref?y the work of art resists commodijication, 
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holds out by the skin of its teeth against those soci.al farces which would degrade it to an 
exchangeable objea. To this extent, modernist works are in contradiction with their own 
material status, se!f-divided phenomena which de1!J in their discursive farms their own shabby 
economic realiry. To fend ojf such reduction to commodiry status, the modernist work brackets 
ojf the referent or real historical world, thickens its textures and deranges its farms to forestall 
instant consumabiliry, and draws its own language protective!J around it to become a 
mysterious!J autotelic object,free of all contaminating truck with the real Brooding self 
reflexive!J on its own being, it distances itse!f through iro'!Y from the shame of being no more 
than a brute, se!f-identical thing. But the most devastating iro'!Y of all is that in doing this the 
modernist work escapes from one farm of commodijication on!J to fall prey to another. If it 
avoids the humiliation of becoming an abstract, serialized, instant!J exchangeable thing, it does 
so on!J by virtue of reproduci.ng that other side of the commodiry which is its fetishism. The 
autonomous, se!f-regarding, impenetrable modernist artefact, in all its isolated splendour, is the 
commodiry as fetish resisting the commodiry as exchange, its solution to reification part of that 
very problem. (Eagleton 1985:96) 
... Postmodernism, confronted with this situation, will then take the other way out. If the work 
of art real!J is a commodiry then it might as well admit it, with all the 'sangfroid' it can 
muster. Rather than languish in some intolerable c01ifli.ct between its material realiry and its 
aesthetic structure, it can always collapse that coefli.ct on one side, becoming aestheticaf!y what 
it is economical!J. The modernist reification - the work as isolated fetish - is therefore 
exchanged far the reification of everydqy life in the capitalist marketplace. The commodiry as 
mechanical!J reproduci.ble exchange ousts the commodiry as magical aura. In a sardonic 
commentary on the avant-garde work, postmodernist culture will dissolve its own boundaries 
and become coextensive with ordinary commodijied life itse!f, whose ceaseless exchanges and 
mutations in a'!Y case recognize no formal frontiers which are not constant!J transgressed. If all 
artefacts can be appropriated by the ruling order, then better impudent!J to pre-empt this fate 
than suffer it unwilling!J; on!J that which is alreacJy a commodiry can resist commodification. 
(Eagleton 1985:97). 
In this chapter, then, we aim to refine the theoretical basis of our transaction model by 
examining the key argument which underpins the modernist and postmodernist stance 
(the commodification of music argument) and briefly discuss its consequences for state 
support of the arts, and for the creation of artistic value in opera. 
Specifically, we show that the commodification argument, as an existing explanation of 
the relationship between artistic value and jinanci.al value is not valid in the context of the 
current era. We also develop the concepts of intangibility and perceived value as they apply 
to our model and demonstrate the need to understand opera as a service and not as a 
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product. 
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4.2 The com.modification argument 
Adorno, exchange value and commodity fetishism in music 
In chapter 2 we introduced the idea of the exchange value and use value of commodities. 
We saw that these ideas, developed by Adam Smith, were taken up by Marx. Of 
particular concern in this context are the views of the German philosopher, sociologist 
and music theorist, Theodor Adorno (1903-69), who develops the Marxist analysis of 
use and exchange values, and for whom all contemporary musical life is dominated by the 
commodi!J form (Adorno 1938:33). 
It is precisely because Adorno sees the commodification of artworks as a process of de-
artification (Paddison 1993:104) that we need to consider his views. His argument 
amounts essentially to a denigration of the role of economic value in the realm of the arts. 
In Adorne's scheme of things this means that music, in the twentieth century, has 
come to have no other social function (use value) than that of an abstract unit of exchange on 
the market (Paddison 1993:98). That is to say, music is no more than pure exchange value. 
Even music of the past is viewed by Adorno as powerless to prevent itse!f being absorbed and 
manipulated by the culture industry (Paddison 1993:104). 
Opera, commodi!J fetishism and exchange value 
In order to explain the commodification of artworks as a process of de-arttjication (ibid. 
Paddison 1993), Adorno draws upon Marx's concept of commodity fetishism. Adorno 
applies this concept directly to the arts in order to portray the problem of the 
commodification of music, its de-artijication, specifically as the problem of musical fetishism 
(Adorno 1938). In the following passage Adorno attempts to use Marx's definition of 
the fetish character of the commodity as a justification for what he sees as the focal 
role of exchange value in the realm of music: 
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Marx deji~es the fetish character of the commodity as the veneration of the thing made by 
onese!f which, as exchange value, simultaneous/y alienates itse!f from producer to consumer -
'human beings'. ~ commodity is therefore a mysterious thing,, simp/y because in it the social 
character of men's labour appears to them as an oijective character stamped upon the produa 
of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is 
presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the 
products of their labour 1'. This is the real secret of success. It is the mere reflection of what 
one Pt!JS in the market for the product. The consumer is real/y worshipping the monf!Y that he 
himse!f has paid for the ticket to the Toscanini concert. (Adorno 1938:34). 
Since a fetish, by definition, is an object of worship (COD 1976) we may take Adorno 
to mean that because the ticket money is the object of worship, it is the ticket money, 
and not the concert or the music in the concert, which is the fetish. But to describe the 
consumer as really worshipping the ticket monf!Y he has paid (i.e. the exchange value of the 
concert, which Adorno here mistakenly equates with price; see chapter 2) represents a 
distortion of Marx's definition of commodity fetishism. 
According to Marx's definition of commodity fetishism (Marx 1887:77), it is precisely 
the oijective character of the commodity which comprises its fetish aspect. Now Marx 
characterizes the objective character of the commodity as an abstract expression of human 
labour power, such that the labour spent on the production of a useful article, the commodity, becomes 
expressed as one of the oijective qualities of that article i.e. as its value (Marx 1887:67). This is 
where Adorno begins to depart from Marx's model, for by value in this context, Marx 
does not mean price but exchange value. Marx in fact emphasizes that price is not 
(exchange) value because price ... is distinguished from value not on/y as the nominal from the real,· 
not on/y by Wt!J of denomination in gold and silver, but because the latter appears as the law of motions 
which the former runs through, and because the two are constant/y different and never balance out 
(Marx 1858:137). Thus the fetish aspect of a commodity has no necessary connection 
with its price or monetary value in the market: the ticket money cannot be the fetish 
object. (For similar confusion, see Jarvis's introduction to Adorno; Jarvis 1998:117-9). 
Let us be clear, therefore, that Adorno's opening sentence, with its reference to 
exchange value, comprises no more than a gloss on Marx's definition of commodity 
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fetishism. Marx's definition, which actually appears in the second sentence makes no 
implied or direct reference to price. This is why Adorno's use of the concept of 
commodity fetishism in music represents a distortion of Marx's economic theory. 
Thus we reject Adorno's first attempt to debase what we have termed the transactional 
process which underlies artworks such as opera, on the grounds that the identification 
of price with exchange value, and therefore the identification of price with the fetish 
aspect of the commodity, has no basis in the theory upon which it depends. 
Opera as pure exchange value or capital 
There is, however, one special situation in which the fetish aspect of a commodity can 
come to be associated with price or monetary value; that is, when the commodity 
ceases to be an ordinary commodity and becomes the monry commodity or capital instead. 
Now the money commodity, as pure exchange value has no use value. Thus, by stripping 
out use value, and by claiming that music has come to be valued on the basis of its 
exchange value alone (ibid. Adorno 1938:34, ibid. Paddison 1993:98), Adorno comes to 
equate the function of music with that of money or capital. To see the absurdity of this 
proposition, we need only replace the word gold, with the word opera (as representative 
of an artwork as commodity) in Marx's characterisation of the money commodity: 
Commodities, first of all, enter into the process of exchange just as thry are. The process then 
differentiates them into commodities and monry, and thus produces an external opposition 
comsponding to the internal opposition inherent in them, as being at once use-values and 
values. Commodities as use-values now stand opposed to monry as exchange-value. On the 
other hand, both opposing sides are commodities, unities of use-value and value. But this unity 
of differences manifests itse!f at two opposite poles, and at each pole in an opposi.te way. Being 
poles thry are as necessari!J opposite as thry are connected On the one side of the equation we 
have an ordinary commodity, which is in reality a use-value. Its value is expressed on!J ideaf!Y 
in its price, by which it is equated to its opponent, the gold, as to the real embodiment of its 
value. On the other hand, the gold [opera]. .. ranks as the embodiment of value, as monry. 
Gold, as gold [opera as opera] is exchange-value itse!f. As to its use-value, that has on!J an 
ideal existence, represented by the series of expressi.ons of relative value in which it stands face 
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to face with all other commodities (Marx 1887: 107). 
If Adorno wants us to accept, then, that music or, more specifically, an opera 
performance is not an ordinary commodiry (which is in reali!J a use value) then this means that 
attending a live performance of opera must be, by definition, an essentially useless 
activity (one which possesses exchange value only). It would also mean, in the absence of 
use value, that making the effort to go to the theatre in the first place must, therefore, 
have nothing whatsoever to do with the satisfaction of wants; that going to the opera is 
about nothing other than the circulation of the money commodity in question: 
The simple circulati.on of commodities - selling in order to blfJ is a means of carrying out a 
purpose unconnected with ci.rculation, name!J, the appropriati.on of use values, the sati.sfacti.on 
of wants. The ci.rculation of monry as capital is, on the contrary, an end in itse!f,for the 
expansion of value takes place on!J within this constant!J renewed movement ... Use values 
must never therefore be looked upon as the real aim of the capitalist .... The restless never-
endingprocess of profit-making alone is what he aims at. This boundless greed after riches, 
this passionate chase after exchange value, is con1n1on to the capitalist and the miser. .. The 
never-ending augmentation of exchange value, which the miser strives after, by seeking to save 
his monry from circulation, is attained by the more acute capitalist, by constant!J throwing it 
afresh into circulation (Marx 1887:151). 
Effectively this means that we go to the theatre merely for the sake of a passionate chase 
after exchange value. By taking Adorno's argument to its logical endpoint in this way, we 
make manifest the absurdity of its premises. What we see, in fact, is a further distortion 
of Marx's economic theory because it posits opera as a medium of exchange, a 
commodity whose only value lies in its potential purchasing power over other 
commodities i.e. as something worth hoarding or investing. Marx only posits one 
medium of exchange, and that is money (and in the context of the nineteenth century, 
that meant gold). 
We need also to be aware of the propagandistic element in Adomo's argument, the 
implication that there is something insidiously corrupt or debasing about the use-
exchange value relation, or, when we apply the medium of money, the transaction we 
effect when we pay for our ticket to an evening at the opera. Now, there are two ways 
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in which this can be read: either we worship the ticket money, or we regard opera itself 
as capital. Adorno 's normative argument falls over completely in the first instance if we 
change the currency, the denomination of the exchange value represented by the ticket. 
For example, if we were to pay for our ticket in a currency of boiled eggs, by Adorno's 
logic, we would in effect be worshipping the boiled eggs and by this means be trading our 
opera performances as a way of augmenting our boiled egg reserves, i.e. our boiled eggs 
as pure exchange value or capital. Even if we were to take Adorno to mean that we were 
trading the opera performance itself as a form of money commodity, we cannot escape 
the absurdity. Indeed, it is impossible to say what this would mean or how it would be 
done. 
The only practical and logical way in which an opera performance can be used as the 
focus for an augmentation of exchange value, for the circulation of monry as capital (ibid. Marx 
1887:151) is by means of ticket touting. This provides the only context in which 
Adorno's argument can be successfully applied. The ticket tout at a Pavarotti concert, 
for instance, only sells his ticket for the sake of profit: he has no use value for the 
concert per se; artistic value is of no interest to him. His only interest in the concert is as 
a focus for his trading activity, for the augmentation of exchange value, as he speculates on 
the face value of the ticket he sells. The important point here is that the tradable item 
(what we understand as the commodity) is not the concert, not the artwork, but the 
ticket alone. 
Thus we reject Adorno's second attempt to debase the transactional process which 
underlies artworks such as opera, on the grounds that identification of the artwork with 
the money commodity again distorts the economic value theory upon which this very 
identification is based. 
Fetishism, Freudi.anism, and the debasement of the use-exchange value transaction 
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We find, then, that Adorno tries to equate the abstract character of exchange value with 
price, and so equate price or monetary value with the ol?Jective qualities of the commodi'!J 
(ibid. Marx 1887:77). He does this precisely in order to elaborate upon thefeeangs, the 
p.rychological aspects and the ersatz satisfaction which he claims the process of consumption 
involves: 
The couple out driving who spend their time identifying every passing car and being happy if 
thry recognize the trademarks speedi.ng by, the girl whose satisfaction consists solefy in the fact 
that she and her boyfriend 'look good', the expertise of the jazz enthusiast who legitimizes 
himse!f by having kn02vledge about 2vhat is in a?!J case inescapable: all this operates according 
to the same command Before the theological caprices of commodities, the consumers become 
temple slaves. (Adorno 1938:35). 
Adorno uses the above analogies specifically within the context of his discussion of the 
fetish character in music. So we must take Adorno to mean, by means of these 
parallels, that before the theological caprices of music commodi.ties (such as opera, for instance) 
the music consumers become temple slaves. Now this is a very emotive argument: that 
musical fetishism creates enslavement; that it enslaves those who consume it. 
Adorno achieves this by utilising the post-Freudian connotations of the word fetish, 
which are primarily pejorative (see Freud 1966-74(13)). But Marx defined the fetish 
aspect of the commodity in a pre-Freudian context, that is, according to the original, 
now strict, meaning of the word fetish as: an inanimate ol?Ject worshipped by primitive peoples for 
its supposed inherent magical powers or as being inhabited by a spirit (COD 1976). The idea of 
the fetish as an abnormal stimulus or object of sexual desire is a later development. 
This observation brings us to our next point: that Marx nowhere uses or implies the 
concept of consumption slavery or enslavement of consumers in the small chapter in 
Das Kapital (Marx 1887) which he devotes to a definition and characterisation of 
commodity fetishism. When Marx states that to [producers] their own sod.al action takes the 
form of the action of objects, which rule the producers instead of being ruled by them (Marx 1887:79) 
he is characterising the role o~ fetishism in the mediation of social relations between 
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producers in the bourgeois economy. He is not characterising the relations between 
commodity and consumer. It must be remembered that Marx is writing from the point 
of view of production relations, whereas Adorno is writing from his historical 
standpoint at the appearance of the first mass markets and first evidence of mass 
consumption (for background see, for instance, Dibb et al. 1997, and Kotler 1984). 
These two perspectives are largely incompatible. We can see this because Marx 
characterizes compulsory labour (slavery) by the very absence of commodity fetishism: 
for the very reason that personal dependence forms the groundwork of society, there is no necessity for 
labour and its products to assume a fantastic form (i.e. a fetish aspect) different from their reality 
(Marx 1887:81). 
To see the extent to which Adorno relies upon Freudian metaphor, let us try to 
restore some of his sentences to their strict statement, as they might appear in the 
context of Marx's theory: 
The fetish character of music produces its own camouflage through the identification of the 
listener with the fetish. (Adorno 1938:42). 
becomes: 
The objective character of music as a commodity produces its own camouflage 
through the identification of the performer with the objective character of the 
music (i.e. the labour spent on its production). 
or: 
At its most passionate, musical fetishism takes possession of the public valuation of singing 
voices. (Adorno 1938:32). 
becomes: 
At its most passionate, veneration of the objective character of music as a 
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and: 
commodity (i.e. the labour spent on its production) rules the performers' 
valuation of singing voices. 
Before the theological capn·ces [fetish aspects] of commoditi.es, the consumers become temple 
slaves. (Adorno 1938:35). 
becomes: 
Before the objective character of commodities, the producers [not consumers] 
see that thei,r own soda/ action takes the form of the acti.on of objects, which mle the 
producers instead of being mled by them (Marx 1887:79). 
Adorno's sentences thus changed do not stand scrutiny: their logic is disrupted. We are 
left with a series of disconnected assertions, the last of which, in particular, has no 
connection with the act of consumption. 
By stripping out the Freudian metaphor we see that Adomo's system of thought bears 
no relation to Marx's theory; and therefore, no relation to the theory on which it is 
premissed. In the absence of this Freudian overlay, the doctrinal nature of Adorno's 
system of thought thus becomes clear. We can see that its basis is a priori, for Adorno 
offers us no evidence, no practical demonstration of the phenomenon of musical 
fetishism. Indeed, it is precisely because there is a complete absence of testable 
observation in Adomo's argument, that we can describe it as an attempt to build a 
doctrine of the fetish aspect of music. 
We therefore reject Adomo's attempt to debase the transactional process which 
underlies artworks such as opera, on the grounds that a) a Freudian interpretation of 
commodity fetishism which centres on consumer enslavement distorts the theory upon 
which it is premissed; and b) that the concept of musical fetishism, as propounded by 
Adorno, exhibits logical dependency upon a priori principles, is untestable, and 
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therefore amounts to dogmatic conjecture. 
Misuse of the term, commodity 
Adorno also equates the term commodity in a pejorative way with the standardized good; 
he sees the listener as hemmed in by standardized musical goods (Adorno 1938:26). Now, 
briefly, this leads Adorno to infer that because classical musical goods are standardized 
( commodified) their familiarity becomes a suTTOgate far the quality ascribed to them (Adorno 
1938:26). Adorno would like the listener to listen accurately, to demystify the work as 
commodity in order to understand the musical work as an objective!J structured thing, 
meaningful in itse!f (Paddison 1993:106). What Adorne's argument here represents, then, 
is not a discussion about the role of economic value in the context of music, but the 
defence of his own normative artistic value system against the competing system which is 
posed by what he perceives as the standardization of musical goods. 
Again it is important to recognise Adorne's historical standpoint; that unlike Marx, he 
is writing in the context of mass production and mass markets. By commodity then, in 
the context of music, Adorno means a work of classical music that, via the 
standardization process of early twentieth century concert programming and 
promotion, is aimed at a mass market; that is selected for its effectiveness as a 
consumption good and as such becomes an instrument of a masochistic mass culture (Adorno 
1938:35). In other words, this is a propagandistic argument against the role of the 
transaction in the realm of the arts: any music which is marketable (Adorno 1948:21) by 
the culture industry (Adorno 1948:5) and suffers the ubiquity of commercialism (Adorno 
1948:19) is commodified. 
Now to use the term commodiry in this pejorative way does not accord with Marx's use 
of the term. We must be careful here, since there are now several ways in which the 
word commodity can be used; some meanings are more precise than others. For 
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instance, Marx uses the term dispassionately to mean any useful article which has been 
produced as the result of human labour (Marx 1887:54), whereas the economist today 
may use it more specifically to mean either: a good that is tangible and can be transported (as 
opposed to a senice), or in terms of commerce, as a raw material that is traded on international 
commodiry markets such as wheat or tin (Stiegeler 1986; see also Hussain 1987). Now, 
although these definitions vary in their scope, they nevertheless all remain consistent 
with the original sense in which the term was used (i.e. useful article). It is thus by means 
of etymological analysis of the word commodity, that we will find evidence to support 
our view that Adorno's pejorative use of the term is untenable in the context in which 
he applies it. 
In its original sense, the term commodity was used to designate a quality or condition of 
things in relation to the needs of men. Hence, a thing could have the quality of being 
commodious, fitting or of having utility. Now, with the development of mercantile trade 
in the fifteenth century, the term came to take on its two-fold nature as a thing of 
commodiry, a thing of use or advantage to mankind; and as a kind of thing produced for use or sale 
(OED 1989). So the commodity in its original, economic, sense combines utility and 
tradability, but the necessary condition remains utility or use value. 
Since the seventeenth century, however, the word commodiry has also come to be used in 
a figurative sense to mean a1!Jthing that one trades or deals in (OED 1989). Here, the 
emphasis is upon trade and profit in the pejorative sense, as opposed to utility, 
usefulness, or commodiousness in the original sense of advantage to mankind. Hence we 
even find an instance, from this time, in which the term is used to refer to the whore as 
commodity (OED 1989). This has the effect of turning the intended sense of advantage 
to mankind on its head (we might generally agree that this represents a negative 
externality). Thus begins the subversion of the very concept of commodity itself: the 
original definition is overturned such that tradability, not utility, becomes the necessary 
and sufficient condition for a commodity. 
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It is in this subversive, rhetorical sense that Adorno comes to use the term commodity. 
He talks of the transfer of the use value of consumption goods to their exchange value (Adorno 
1938:34), that is, a shifting of the emphasis from utility to tradability. For Adorno, the 
term commodi"(y has, it seems, come to signify a thing of disutility. Thus Adorno allows a 
fatal error in his application of Marx's theory of commodity fetishism: that is, the use of 
the term commodi"(y in a rhetorical sense, when it is the original economic sense only that 
is proper to the context of Marx's theory. 
This mistaken, or at best, ambiguous, use of the term commodi"(y features in the writings 
of Marcuse, like Adorno, a member of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. 
Consider Marcuse's version of commodity fetishism: 
The so-called consumer econon!J and the politics of coporate capitalism have created a second 
nature of man which ties him libidinal/y and aggressive/y to the commodi"(y form. The need for 
possessing,, consuming,, handling,, and constant/y renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, 
engines, offered to and imposed upon the people, far using these wares even at the danger of 
one's own destruction, has become a 'biological' need (Marcuse 1969:20). 
That Marcuse intends the word commodiry to be read in a rhetorical, and here, 
specifically Freudian sense is clear. What is not clear is whether Marcuse would include 
the arts amongst his list of wares? But we can answer this by examining what Marcuse 
proposes when he talks of the new sensibiliry and the role of the aesthetic. 
Throughout the centun'es, the ana/ysis of the aesthetic dimension facussed on the idea of the 
beautiful.. For the artist, the beautiful is mastery of the opposites 'without tension, so that 
violence is no longer needed. .. ' The beautiful has the 'biological value' of that which is 'useful, 
beneficial, enhancing life' (Marcuse 1969:34). 
This bears remarkable correspondence to the original definition of the commodi"(y : utility 
is the key concept here. However, Marcuse (who is here quoting Nietzsche) seems to 
be going in circles. What is the difference between a thing which is useful, beneficial, and 
enhancing life (the Marcuse-Nietzsche concept of beauty) and a thing of use and advantage to 
mankind (the commodity)? Marcuse goes on: 
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By virtue of these qualities [usefulness, beneficialness, enhancement of life, viz. the 
qualities of commodities], the aesthetic dimension can serve as a sort of gauge for a free 
sociery. A universe of human relationships no longer mediated by the market, no longer based 
on competitive exploitation or terror. .. (Marcuse 1969:35). 
Marcuse then, like Adorno, uses the term commodity in the context of the arts, in a 
rhetorical sense. What makes this use inappropriate is the fact that in both cases it is 
being used in the context of Marx's economic theory; and we have already seen that 
Marx uses the term in its original, economic, sense. It is not sufficient to argue that 
Adorno and Marcuse are not so much applying as developing Marx's theory, thereby 
excusing their subversion of the term commodity. We argue that this is not a sufficient 
justification because to use an exaggerated, histrionic sense of the term in the context 
of Marx's economic theory results in the intrusion of dependent judgement into a an 
objective system based on independent scientific observation (for background see Marx 
1888, Marx and Engels 1846, and Engels 1878, 1886). It is to forget the empirical 
footing of Marx: 
[Marx] is primari!J a theoretician busied with the ana!Jsis of economic phenomena and their 
organization into a consistent and faithful system of scienttjic knowledge; but he is, at the same 
time, consistent!J and tenacious!J alert to the bearing which each step in the progress of his 
theoretical work has upon the propaganda. His work has, therefore, an air of bias, such as 
belongs to an advocate's argument; but it is not, therefore, to be assumed, nor indeed to be 
credited, that his propagandist aims have in a1!J substantial WC!J deflected his inquiry or his 
speculations from the f aithfal pursuit of scientific truth ... There is no rystem of economic 
thought more logical than that of Marx (Veblen 1906:276). 
Thus we reject the attempt to build a doctrine of the fetish aspect of artworks such as 
opera, on the grounds that the usage of the term commodity, in its rhetorical and 
Freudian sense, within the context of Marx's economic theory results in the intrusion 
of a second, incompatible frame of reference within that very theory; that it destroys 
the very basis of its justification. 
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Invalid use of the term commodi!J, the role of intangibili!J 
We can also object to Adorno's use of the term commodi!J on the grounds that the term 
does not adequately account for the nature of the transactional process which underlies 
music artforms such as opera. We will demonstrate the invalidity of the commodi!J 
descriptor specifically in the context of opera by showing that the perceived use value of 
opera (its artistic value), in live performance, broadcast or recorded form, involves a high 
degree of intangibility. We will show that because of this intangibility, opera must be 
regarded as a senice-, and that the definitional criteria of the service are mutually 
exclusive with those of the commodiry. 
We have already demonstrated that Adorno equates music as a commodi!J with the 
standardized good (ibid. Adorno 1938:26); that is, with the mass produced or mass 
marketed product. Now, in terms of modern economic and marketing theory, such 
mass market products are defined as undifferentiated (Kotler 1984:267). By 
undifferentiated or mass marketing is meant the process of offering a single product to 
the broadest number of buyers (the whole potential market for that product). 
The classic example of an undifferentiated product is the model T Ford, originally 
produced with a black paint finish only. Differentiation of this product began with the 
introduction of an alternative, grey paint finish i.e. with the deliberate introduction of 
choice. Until this point, the model T Ford was a single, standardized product (for 
background see Dibb et al. 1997). Adorno, in effect, is asking us to equate opera with 
the idea of the undifferentiated good. But if opera is undifferentiated, how might we 
explain the rich variety of opera forms that have developed in the course of operatic 
history e.g. opera seria, opera beffa, tragedie !Jrique, ballad opera, rescue opera, verismo, chamber 
opera and so forth. Historically, opera does not appear to be standardized; on the 
contrary, it appears to be very highly differentiated. This is our first point. 
Let us be clear, dijf erentiation begins when the total potential market for a product or 
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service is segmented or analysed out into different component parts, such that the 
product or service can be varied to suit each of those component parts (Kotler 
1984:269). Now there are many ways of segmenting markets; by geographical factors, 
by buyer preference, by age, social grouping and so forth. But, since this is not a study 
in marketing, we need not detain ourselves, here, with the mechanics of market 
segmentation. 
Suffice it to say, that in the history of opera itself we can cite good examples of what is 
meant by the process of product or service differentiation. For instance, the quarrel or 
guerre des bot!lfons which developed in 1752 between two groups of Parisian music and 
opera enthusiasts, represents exactly the kind of competitive pressure which can lead to 
product or service differentiation. In this case, the competition, between supporters of 
the incoming Italian opera bujfa and the established French opera led to a competitive 
response by French opera composers. The response of these composers was to take up 
the concept of the opera bujfa and tailor it specifically to suit a particular, definable 
segment of the Parisian market for opera. This differentiated form was known as 
comedi.e melee d'ariettes. Examples of this nature demonstrate that opera is not a 
standardized, mass market good i.e. it is not a commodity in the Adomian sense of 
undifferentiated good. 
The second point we wish to make is that Adorno, in his use of the term commodity, 
fails to take account of the role of intangibility and the way in which use value is 
perceived. 
In terms of modem market and economic theory, the key criterion which is used in the 
test for a commodity is that of tangibility i.e. the quality of being perceptible by touch. 
We recall that a commodity is either: a good that is tangible and can be transported (as opposed 
to a service), or a raw material that is traded on internati.onal commodity markets (ibid Stiegeler 
1986). 
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Most importantly, this means that a product or service is defined according to the way 
in which it is perceived (and therefore, that its value is derived from the way in which it is 
perceived). This test, for degree of tangibility, can be expressed in the form of the 
product-service continuum (see Figure 4-1). In the product-service continuum, a pure 
product can be seen to possess tangible factors alone, and a pure service, as its 






































Figure 4-1: The product-service continuum (adaptedfrom Shostack 1977:77) 
Now, the possibility of the pure product and the pure service is largely theoretical. A 
live lecture, for instance, which involves the communication of ideas, can be 
understood as almost wholly intangible (see again Figure 4-1). This means that the 
service element in the live lecture is strong. However, there is always the possibility that 
the lecturer may distribute a printed summary, or handout, thereby introducing a 
tangible element into that service. 
This is a simple example. In a more complex context, the product-service continuum 
demonstrates the importance of the role of tangible and intangible factors in the 
perception of value. For instance, although we have placed cars (in the generic sense) 
almost midway along the continuum (Figure 4-1), this does not reflect the complexity 
and degree of differentiation in the car market as it operates in practice. 
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An off-road, four-wheel drive vehicle, for example, may be bought by a farmer on the 
basis of its functional qualities: its ability to solve a variety of transport problems such 
as transporting equipment, hauling livestock trailers across rough terrain, as well as its 
ability to function as a family car; in other words, as a more adaptable version of the 
traditional pickup truck. Intangible factors connected with image may, in this case, play 
a very insignificant role in the purchase decision. The purchase decision of the 
individual who lives and works in an urban environment, however, may exhibit the 
reverse relation i.e. the decision may be driven almost solely by intangible factors and 
not by function (anecdotally, it is thought that most four-wheel vehicles bought in the 
UK are in fact never taken off-road). Differentiation across the available range of four-
wheel drive vehicles, in the context of this urban market, may be made largely on the 
basis of styling features, such as chrome, metallic paint, and customising options such 
as leather seats, all of which are designed to convey messages about the image or social 
status of the owner. But such features, though tangible in themselves, serve collectively 
to add intangibility (i.e. to add perceived value); they do not in any way alter the 
functional qualities of the vehicle or product itself. 
The role of intangibility in the perception of value is not restricted to obvious 
consumer goods such as cars. It is a feature of the market for quality stringed 
instruments, for instance, that named old master instruments such as those by 
Stradivarius, Guarnerius, and so forth exhibit a higher auction value and greater player 
demand than do the master instruments of modem prize-winning luthiers (Aston 
1979:365, Lewin 1979:594). 
Although it is argued that there is no perceivable difference in the playing quality of 
old master and modem master instruments (the latter once played-in), overall, players 
retain a preference for the old instruments. Now this preference has nothing to do with 
the value of these older instruments as authentic instruments (whether or not they have 
been modernized or restored is largely moot). Rather, this situation can be explained by 
the role of intangible factors in the player purchase decision. An old instrument may 
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exhibit a patina created by years of handling, it may carry with it an interesting history 
of ownership, and the beauty or perceived sound-enhancing qualities of its varnish may 
be attributed to a unique or secret recipe. All these factors may combine together to 
create in the player's mind the sense that he is handling a living thing which cannot be 
replaced by a modern instrument, no matter how good. Indeed, the whole question of 
unique or secret varnish recipes is much vexed, and may be based on a fiction 
(Campbell 1983:736). This is interesting, because it demonstrates the power of 
intangibility in the context of the perception of value; that is, the difference between 
an old and a modern master instrument may be the result of different perception of 
intangible factors. Interestingly, we must assume that the player believes these 
intangible factors will also have a bearing upon the artistic value of his or her 
performance. 
Now, the live performance of opera presents us with an interesting problem. We 
cannot describe the degree of intangibility which the live performance of opera exhibits 
without first deciding what constitutes the performance. We can understand the 
combination of music and scenic effect as a combination of intangible elements; we 
cannot touch the performance. In this sense, opera is heavily intangible; more service 
than product orientated. But a visit to the opera, may involve a whole range of adjunct 
tangible elements, such as an interval drink, the programme booklet itself, a 
comfortable or uncomfortable seat. So it depends to what extent our definition of the 
live performance of opera is inclusive of these elements as to how we will express the 
degree of intangibility of the performance on the product-service continuum. 
The type of intangibility involved in an opera compact disc is different, but nonetheless 
significant. For instance, a collector of recordings or hi-fi enthusiast might deem the 
value of digital sampling very significant in his or her purchase of a compact disc. Such 
individuals may claim to perceive the advantage of such productional technology in the 
resultant recording, even though an engineer may regard such differences as non-
demonstrable. The professional musician, however, may disregard the productional 
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qualities of the disc altogether, and concentrate on the interpretation or performance 
itself. But in every case, intangible factors provide the basis of the use value which the 
individual perceives, and therefore the price he is willing to pay. 
Now this connection with price (financial value) is significant. In the context of services, 
for instance, it is often the tangible and intangible factors surrounding the core service 
which serve to differentiate it and alter the way in which its use value is perceived. 
Airlines and opera companies alike operate differential seat pricing policies precisely on 
this basis. 
An airline, for instance, may price a club class seat on the basis of better food, more 
drinks, more space (tangible factors) and increased flight attendance, baggage priority, 
or added comfort (intangible factors). Now these factors are not central to the core 
service, the flight itself, but any one, or a combination of these factors may be of key 
importance to the individual passenger's perception of use value. Where these perceived 
use value factors are of sufficient importance to the passenger, he or she will then be 
prepared to accept a higher price for the seat. Resident opera companies price seats on 
precisely the same basis (although not with the same degree of sophistication). For 
instance, a dress circle seat may be offered on the basis of social mix (intangible), 
access to dedicated bars (tangible), as well as good sight line (tangible). If our definition 
of the live performance of opera does not include these surrounding perceived use value 
factors, we will be unable to explain why some audience members are prepared to pay 
higher ticket prices than others. 
This is not to say that the perceived use value of a product or service cannot be derived 
solely from the core element of that product or service. In the same way as the airline 
Easyjet came to the market with a basic service, stripped of all supplementary tangibles 
and intangibles (e.g. no in-flight service, no differential seat pricing), so too, it is 
possible to value live opera in isolation to, or abstracted from, the conditions or 
situation of its performance. But we have shown (because of differential seat pricing) 
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that in practice it is not generally valued in this way. 
Historical examples also confirm this. The purpose of spacious foyers in eighteenth 
century Italian opera houses, for instance, was to provide a venue for gambling, and 
quite often the opera house would be granted a monopoly concession on games of 
chance. It was also true that gambling promotion provided an entry for potential opera 
impresari to the running of opera seasons (Rosselli 1984:28), thus underlining the close 
connection between the tangibility of gambling paraphernalia, the intangibility of a 
gambling atmosphere, and the opera performance itself. Moreover, audience members 
could even go so far as to make the opera performance the adjunct of their own private 
entertainment: at La Scala, Milan, up until the early nineteenth century, it was possible 
to draw the curtains of each box, in order to make a self-contained drawing-room 
within which to continue chatting, eating, gambling, or visiting friends undistracted 
(Rosselli 1984:10); and much the same applied in seventeenth century Venice (see 
Kimbell 1991:120, and Bianconi and Walker 1984). Such things, we have to admit, have 
historically formed an important part of the perceived use value of opera. Artistic value is 
therefore a very broad concept when viewed in this light. 
Moreover, there is strong historical justification for regarding the live performance of 
opera not as an end in itself, but as part of the means of an overall service package, 
which, when taken as a whole makes the experience of art a very full and wide ranging 
one; if not, as Stendhal would have us understand, also a very fragile one: 
... an opera may inspire the most disproportionate havoc of enjoyment one night, and three 
nights later, occasion nothing more than an infinite weariness of boredom or an infuriating 
irritation of the nerves. The causes of this revolution may be insignificant - a shriU-toned, 
yappingfemale voice in a near-by box; or over-heating in the auditorium ... indeed, the 
enjoyment of music is in so large measure pure!J physica~ that, as the reader wi,U have 
observed, it may depend upon the presence or absence of phenomena which, in description, seem 
unbelievab!J trivial 
As often as not, an evening which promises the exquisite delights of Madame Pasta, and the 
added luxury of a conifbrtable box, may be complete!J 'ruined' by the hateful intrusion of.Just 
some such ignoble triviality. One might ransack one's brain far hours on end, exploring the 
Sally LK Garden 137 
4. Refining the transaction model o[opera 
most de~cate int~cacies of metaphysics, or the subtlest niceties of literary criticism, to explain 
why 'Elisabetta seemed sudden!J so unpalatable, whereas the real reason is simp!J that the 
auditorium was too hot and that, as a result, one was feeling thorough!J uncomfortable ... the 
Theatre Louvois' [Paris, home of the Opera Bouffe] is unrivalled in providing draw-
backs of this character, and general!J in obstructing the enjoyment of music; and whenever such 
an obstruction arises, one stops listening 'natural!J' and starts listening 'academical!J~ .. 
(Stendhal 1824:15). 
Perception, then, plays a fundamental role in the transaction or trade of values. Even in 
the case of a true commodity such as salt (see again Figure 4-1), there is potential for 
the addition of intangible factors. Salt from the Alps, for instance, has been marketed 
as particularly pure (e.g. S axo mountain source rock salt, S axo natural!J evaporated sea salt). 
This is an attempt not only to add intangibility in order to augment perceived use value 
to the potential buyer, but it is an attempt to transform the salt from its commodity 
status, in order to seek a premium on its price (financial value); such premium as we have 
already encountered in the example of differential seat pricing for opera. Since salt is 
salt (sodium chloride, excepting impurities) regardless of its origin, this demonstrates 
again, the extent to which value is a function of perception. Hence, in theory: there is no 
such thing as a commodiry. All goods and senices are di.fferentiable (Levitt 1981). 
To be clear, in marketing and economics, the branch of theory which deals with the 
intangibility, differentiability and perceived value of products and services is known as 
brand theory (for background see Doyle 1991a). It is a powerful theory, not only as an 
explanator of consumer behaviour, but as an explanator of the way in which value can 
be added to products and services in a variety of special ways. Specifically, when value is 
added to a product or service by means of differentiation from competing products or 
services, and is given a special trade name (brand name), it is said to be a branded 
product or service (e.g. Anadi.n, which is a branded version of the generic drugs asprin 
and paracetamol). Now, although we do not need to concern ourselves with the details 
of brand theory and brand valuation, suffice it to say that the process of branding a 
product or service, by means of building in intangibility, leads to a profound effect on 
the price of that product or service. Consumers, because they trust the brand, may well 
pay more for Anadin than its generic equivalents. Conceptually, then, there is a great 
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distance between a brand and a commodity. 
Our concern with Adorno's usage of the word commodity now begins to make sense. To 




commodity porterage in an 
e.g. tin undeveloped 
economy] 
may be branded may be branded 
e.g. opera e.g. opera 
compact disc company 
Tab/,e 4-1: Product-service differentiation matrix 
The live performance of opera, or indeed, of any music artform, is not a commodity 
primarily because it exhibits a high degree of intangibility (is a service), but also because 
it can be differentiated. Specifically, products are distinguished from services according 
to five commonly used criteria: intangibility, inseparability, heterogeneity, perishability, and 
ownership (for background see Cowell 1991). Arguably, the most important of these is 
degree of intangibility: 
Services are essential!J intangible. It is often not possible to taste, feel, see, hear or smeU 
services before thry are purchased Opinions and attitudes mt!J be sought beforehand, a repeat 
purchase mqy re/y upon previous experience, the customer mt!J be given something "tangible to 
represent the service, but ultimate/y the purchase of a service is the purchase of something 
in"tangible (Cowell 1991:457). 
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So, Adorne's ticket is merely one tangible element (along with the programme booklet 
we assume his temple slaves will buy) which represents the live opera performance as 
service. Though even here there is an interesting complication: the programme booklet 
itself, as a tangible element in the live performance of opera, can exhibit a degree of 
intangibility. Opera North indeed augmented a production of The love of three oranges in 
the mid 1990s with a scratch and sniff programme. Whether individual members of the 
audience perceived value as a result this intangibility is an interesting question: to some it 
might have added to the spirit of an evening in the theatre, and act to complement the 
spirit of the opera, to others it might have acted as an irritating distraction. We simply 
cannot predict what would maximize consumer welfare in this instance. 
In the following table, in order to make it absolutely clear why opera is not a product, 
and certainly not a commodity, we will test the live performance of opera against the 
five characteristics of a service referred to above: 








>. Since services are essentially Opinions and attitudes may be sought :!::::: - intangible, opinions and attitudes may via promotional material, books, :.c 
a> be sought before purchase. published reviews and word of mouth in 
c [Commodities are tangible] order to reduce uncertainty (and ro 
therefore perceived risk) . ...... c 
~ Repeat purchases depend upon Repeat purchases (of the same or a 
previous experience. different production, at the same or a 
different theatre) depend upon previous 
experience of factors including 
composer, genre, performers, and 
venue. Hence the role of familiarity (cf 
Adorno). 
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0 IMPLICATIONS LIVE OPERA i= 




Tangible (as well as intangible) Tangibles, such as programme booklets, 
elements may be built around the bars, a theatre shop, and intangibles 
service as a means of augmenting such as priority booking, subscription 
overall perceived use value. deals, opportunities to meet the 
performers, friends groups, pre-
performance talks, private function room 
hire, may all be employed by resident 
opera companies or opera receiving 
houses. 
~ Services often cannot be separated The creation of the performance and its :!: 
:0 from the person of the producer. That consumption comprises one event. ro is, the creation and performance (or Opera performances are sold before the ~ 
ro consumption) of the service may point of consumption and require the 0. 
Q) comprise a single event e.g. medical presence of the producer (here, the en 
treatment. This means that services opera company). This means that c 
N 
are usually sold, produced and relations between the audience as 
consumed, whereas products are consumers and performers as producers 
usually produced (or purchased), sold are direct (viz. Adorno's concept of 
and consumed. Also, it implies the mediated relations which disregards the 
presence of the producer i.e. critical role of performers and non-stage 
unmediated relations between buyer personnel in the production of music; 
and seller. [Commodities as tangible see Adorno 1948:8). 
items are separable from the 
producer]. 
~ It is often difficult to achieve Performances of opera cannot be ...... ·a; standardization in the output of certain standardized; no musical phrase can be c 
Q) services. The standard of a service in played the same way twice (except 
C> terms of its conformity to what may be when reproduced by means of a 0 
~ 
prescribed by the seller may depend recording). Production runs often require Q) ...... 
on who provides the service and when double casting, creating variability Q) 
:r: it is provided. From the point of view according to which cast member is 
(1:) of the potential buyer, then, it is often singing on which night. The potential 
difficult to judge quality in advance of buyer cannot judge the quality of a 
purchase. [Commodities as produced, performance in advance, especially as 
tangible items can be standardized]. cast members may fall ill. 
~ Services are perishable and, unlike Individual opera performances cannot :!: - commodities, cannot be stored. Empty be stored. That is, productions can be :0 
ro seats on a flight, for instance, cannot stored, but individual performances are 
.!::. 
be stored for future sale. Empty perishable. Empty seats in the theatre en 
·c hospital beds represent lost capacity in represent lost capacity. Q) 
a.. the same way. 
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Demand fluctuations may aggravate Low box office sales, due to bad 
the perishability of the service. This reviews, unpopular cast replacements, 
places emphasis on the role of competing events, or poor tourist 
marketing decisions in countering seasons, for instance may lead to the 
such fluctuations e.g. differential cancellation of current or planned future 
pricing and special promotions. productions. Anticipated low demand for 
productions which are perceived as 
difficult or experimental (and therefore 
unfamiliar i.e. no previous experience 
possible) may be countered by means of 
special ticket promotions. Subscription 
income plays a vital role in smoothing 
demand in this way. 
a. Lack of ownership is a basic difference An opera performance cannot be owned; :c 
CJ) between a product and a service. a ticket buys access to the performance, 
L.-
Whereas a product can be owned, a and use of the venue facilities e.g. bars. Q) 
c service cannot. In the case of a The programme booklet, as tangible ~ 
0 service, the customer buys access to, supplement to the performance, can, 
..0 or use of the service only e.g. hotel 
rooms, car hire. 
however, be owned . 
Table 4-2 : Opera as a service 
We note here that the application of the above theory to the arts is not new. It has 
been applied in the context of the arts as a generic service i.e. the arts in general as 
opposed to individual artforms as services (see Hill et al. 1995:101). However, the 
analysis developed by Hill et al., which uses only four characteristics, is flawed because 
it confuses inseparabiliry with ownership. It is important to note that these two 
characteristics of a service carry quite different marketing implications i.e. inseparability 
implies buyer risk which needs to be lessened or overcome, whereas lack of ownership 
provides the raison d'etre for adjunct tangibles (such as programme booklets) which can 
be owned and can thus serve to augment the perceived use value of an evening at the 
opera. It is particularly important that we are clear about this difference, especially in 
the context of our analysis of Adorno's argument about the commodification of music. 
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be owned and can thus serve to augment the perceived use value of an evening at the 
opera. It is particularly important that we are clear about this difference, especially in 
the context of our analysis of Adorno's argument about the commodification of music. 
Inseparability, as we have seen, implies the presence of the producer at point of 
consumption. This means that the performance must be sold before it is produced and 
consumed. From the point of view of the potential audience member, this introduces 
an element of risk into the purchase of a ticket. Specifically, it places emphasis on the 
role of marketing i.e. it is through good marketing and promotion that the potential 
buyer may be converted into an actual buyer; that is, because of uncertainty (see 
chapter 2) the potential buyer has to be convinced that the evening is going to prove a 
worthwhile experience. 
Now, if that potential buyer happens to be inexperienced, or new to opera, the 
marketing message may be of critical importance in his decision to purchase or not to 
purchase. It is this process, the process of developing new audiences, that Adorno can 
be seen, in effect, to have difficulty accepting. He rejects the use of labels such as 
classical in the context of music promotion (Adorno 1938:27). But, because opera 
exhibits inseparability, we can see the vital role of even basic marketing communication 
in overcoming perceived risk. By denial of the value of the marketing process in this 
way, Adorno, in effect, denies the opera company the opportunity to cultivate new 
audiences. This, as we have seen, would also result in aggravating the perishabili.!J of 
opera by cutting the opera company off from future box office income (i.e. a source of 
financial value input in the environment). 
We must also note the importance of lack of ownership in the context of our case against 
Adorno. Since, unlike a tangible commodity, opera cannot be owned, the question 
arises as to what exactly Adorno's temple slaves might be worshipping in the context of 
opera: the use of or access to a service? There is little logic in the idea that the 
producers of opera might be worshipped by the temple slaves for the particular service 
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they offer. Indeed it is a contradiction in terms that a slave can ever be served. 
Interestingly, Marx also defines commodities as: social things whose qualities are at the same 
time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses (Marx 1887:77). Now by imperceptibility Marx 
means the observation that there exists a complex set of factors which surround the 
commodiry and which govern the process he calls the satisfaction of wants, the appropriation of 
use values. From our point of view, the importance of Marx's use of the word 
imperceptible is the identification that value is as much perceived as real2• 
We reject Adorno's use of the term commodity in the context of music, specifically in 
the context of opera, because: opera exhibits a high degree of intangibility, is 
differentiatable (unlike the commodity, which is undifferentiatable), and conforms to 
the definitional criteria of a service (criteria which are mutually exclusive with those of 
the commodity). 
The use-exchange value relation disrupted 
For Adorno, the commodification of music, its de-artification (ibid Paddison 1993), 
involves the loss of function or use value of music, such that its use value comes to be 
replaced by exchange value: 
If the commodiry in general combines exchange value and use value, then the pure use value, 
whose illusion the cultural goods must preseroe in a complete!J capitalist sociery, must be 
replaced by pure exchange value, which precise!J in its capacify as exchange value deceptive!J 
takes over the function of use value. The specific fetish character of music lies in this 'quid pro 
quo'. (Adorno 1938:34). 
The change in the function of music involves the basic conditions of the relation between art 
and sociefy. The more inexorab!Y the principal of exchange value destroys use values for 
human beings, the more deep!J does exchange value disguise itse!f as the object of enjoyment 
(Adorno 1938:34). 
Now this amounts to a negation of what Marx specifically describes as a relation 
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between use value and exchange value : 
All commodities are non-use values for their owners, and use-values for their non-owners. 
Consequent!J, thry must all change hands. But this change of hands is what constitutes thei.r 
exchange, and the latter puts them in relation with each other as values, and realises them as 
values. Hence commodities must be realised as values before thry can be realised as use values. 
(Marx 1887:89) . 
... the use value of the commodity is a given presupposition - the maten'al basis in which a 
specific economic relation [i.e. exchange value in relation to other commodities] presents 
itself. (Marx 1858:881). 
Thus in the ordinary commodity, according to Marx, not only do use value and exchange 
value come to form the two elements of a relation, but they can only be realised as values 
by means of exchange, that is, by means of a transaction. We simply cannot have 
exchange value without use value. A commodity without advantage to mankind, that is to say, 
a useless commodity cannot have a price. It is an impossible condition; we cannot find 
example of this other than the money commodity itself, which Marx defines as pure 
exchange value. But we have already seen that to describe opera as money or capital, is a 
metaphysical argument, one which cannot be given practical demonstration. 
Adomo's negation of the use-exchange value relation is thus not only an attempt to debase 
the transactional process which underlies artworks such as opera, but constitutes an 
attempt to set into contradiction the two elements of a relation. That is to say, an 
attempt to break the use-exchange value relation in order to present use value and exchange 
value as part of a dialectical process. This simply confounds the very theory upon which 
Adomo's whole argument about the fetish aspect of music rests. 
We thus reject the further attempt to debase the transactional process which underlies 
artworks such as opera, on the grounds that Adamo's doctrine of the fetish aspect of 
music attempts to set into contradiction, two elements (use value and exchange value) 
which operate as two terms of a relation. 
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a dependency of logic such that his whole argument amounts to a shibboleth. We 
summarize the stages in the formation of this shibboleth in Table 4-3 below: 
Stages in Adorno's argument Logic 
1 The process of commodification Cannot be true. We have demonstrated that it is 
(of music) represents a process not possible to commodity the live performance of 
of de-artification (Paddison music. 
1993) whereby use value is 
replaced by exchange value 
(Adorno 1938:34). 
2 Commodified music creates Cannot be true. If music cannot be commodified, 
passive music consumers music consumers cannot be enslaved, since, 
(hence Adamo's temple-slaves) according to Adorno, they are enslaved precisely 
who share a personality by music in its commodified form. 
deformation called 
concreteness-of-thinking and 
whose anti-artistic attitude 
verges on sickness (Adorno 
1948:454). 
3 Passive music consumers no Cannot be true, at least within Adamo's model. 
longer know how to listen to Since music consumers cannot be enslaved by 
music (hence Adamo's listener music which cannot be commodified, they cannot 
typologies; for which see Adorno be assumed to be passive; therefore to say that 
1962, Paddison 1993, and they no longer know how to listen to music 
Dasilva et al. 1984) because they are passive and enslaved is mere 
assertion. 
4 Because music consumers no This is the outcome of stages 1 - 3 and therefore 
longer know how to listen to of a priori thinking, of assertion upon assertion. 
music their taste is degenerate Based in this way upon dependent judgement 
(Adorno 1962:146). (which is untestable), rather than independent 
scientific observation (which is testable), this 
outcome represents a doctrinaire and therefore 
methodologically invalid approach to the question 
of artistic value. 
Tab/,e 4-3: Summary of stages in Adamo's commodiflcation argument 
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4.3 Consequences of the commodification argument 
Adorno and the degenerary of public opinion 
In his Introduction to the sociology of music (1962), Adorno devotes a whole chapter to the 
issue of public opinion or taste in music. In this chapter and in the context of his views 
about the commodification of music, Adorno sees what he terms the democratic potential 
of public opinion not, as we might expect, as a constructive or valid form of artistic value 
judgement, but, rather, as a form of artistic value judgement which degenerates into the 
pressure of a collective retarded consciousness (Adorno 1962:146). In Adorno's view, the 
democratic potential of public opinion serves only to threaten artistic freedom (Adorno 1962: 146), 
therefore, rendering that democratic potential in effect, invalid. 
Adorno's argument here follows two strands: a) that, according to Rousseau, it is both 
a general and persistent feature of democracy that collective opinion often misses the 
truth; and b) a variant of (a), that not all individuals are equally qualified to make valid 
or legitimate judgements about artistic value (so that collective opinion, because it 
contains a proportion of invalid judgement, again misses the truth). Whilst the first 
strand of Adorno's argument relies upon Rousseau and concerns the imperfectibility of 
the democratic principle in practice, the second strand is wholly based on Adorno's 
own ideas about the slave-like nature of those who consume and make judgements 
about commodified music. 
Now these two strands are combined in Adorno's argument to form, in effect, a 
serious attack on what has been termed Aristotle's defence of the wisdom of coUective 
judgements (translator's insertion, Aristotle Pol. 1281a39-1282b13): that provided the mass of 
the people is not too slave-like, each individual will indeed be a worse judge than the experts, but 
coUective!J thry will be better, or at any rate no worse (Aristotle Pol. 1282a14). Now this we can 
equate to what Adorno terms the democratic potential of public opinion (ibid. Adorno 
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1962:146). If there is truth to be found (viz. Adorne's demystification of the music 
commodity), then according to Aristotle, it is more likely to be found via collective 
rather than individual judgement. However, Adorno effectively rejects the principle of 
the wisdom of collective judgements as it might pertain to public opinion about music: it does 
not accord with Adorne's view of public opinion in music as a form of retarded 
consciousness. 
Let us look at the two strands of Adorne's argument more closely. 
Adorno grounds this effective rejection of the wisdom of collective judgements, in the first 
instance, on the basis of his reading of Rousseau: 
The problematics of public opinion showed in an aporia that ivas topical for Rousseau in 
particular: that the average value of individual opinions, which democrary cannot do without, 
frequent!J deviates from the truth of the thing itself This has been exacerbated in the course of 
total social evolution, also in public opinion about music (Adorno 1962:145). 
Since Adorno gives us no further indication, we must assume that he is here basing his 
case upon the chapter in The social contract in which Rousseau discusses the particular 
difficulties of building a system of legislature (Rousseau 1762:75): 
The people, of itse!f, alwqys wants the good, but does not, of itse!f, alwqys see it. The general 
will is alwqys in the right, but the judgement grounding it is not alwqys enlightened. The 
general will needs to be shown things as th~ are, and sometimes as th~ ought to appear, to be 
taught which path is the right one for it to follow, to be preseroed from the seductiveness of 
particular wills, to have comparisons of times and places made for it, and be told of those 
remote and hidden dangers which counterbalance the attractions of visible, present advantages. 
Individuals can see the good and reject it; the public desires the good and cannot see it. All 
equal!J need guides. The one side must be obliged to shape their wills to their reason, the other 
must be taught the knowledge of what it wants. It is then that, from public enlightenment, 
comes the union of understanding and will in the social body; the parts are then in precise 
concordance, which results in the greater strength of the whole. This is why it is necessary to 
have a legislator (Rousseau 1762:75). 
This is a subtle passage, however, it is not a rejection but precisely an affirmation of the 
wisdom of coUectivejudgements (Aristotle Pol. 1281a-1282b13). Rousseau never gives up his 
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belief in the value of the general will. Indeed Rousseau sees the general will (what 
Adorno calls the average value of individual opinions) as that which tends alwqys to the 
conservation and wellbeing of the whole (Rousseau 1755:7). Rousseau's text here is certainly no 
aporia or statement of doubt. 
The logic of Rousseau's argument is clear. Since the people as a whole always wants the 
best for the whole (general nil~ but does not have full information ( enlightenmen~, the 
case in question needs to be presented objectively: a) in order to avoid bias (the 
influence of particular wills or power-groups); and b) in order to encourage the long-
term view (dangers which counterbalance present advantages). In this latter respect there is 
correspondence with the merit good argument which we discussed earlier (viz. the 
possibility of information asymmetries and undervaluation of goods and services by 
individuals because they cannot, individually, take account of the wider social benefits 
or externalities of art, and therefore require guidance or incentive e.g. information or 
subsidy). 
According to Rousseau, then, by means of such objective presentation of the particular 
case in question, the general will can be brought to a point of informed decision-
making (precise concordance of understanding and wi,l~. 
In this way, no one individual or power-group can exert undue influence upon the 
process oflaw-making (the topic of Rousseau's discussion here). It is this last point 
which is critical: Rousseau is here discussing the special problem of how a system of 
legislature (a whole oijec~ may be defined, whilst ensuring that the general will, and body 
politic (Rousseau 1762:73) remains undivided (the whole people) . 
... when the whole people makes a rulingfor the whole people it is concerned wi,th itself alone, 
and the relationship, if created, is between the whole oiject from one point of view and the 
whole oiject from another, the whole remaining undivided. Then the matter on which the ruling 
is made is genera~ as is the wi,U that makes it. It is this act that I caU a law. (Rousseau 
1762:74). 
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We can see also, since the fan; combines universaliry in its object with universaliry of will, that 
anything ordained l?J a man on his own account, whatever his position, is not a law 
(Rousseau 1762:74). 
We are dealing with a very special case here: the building of a society's very conditions of 
association (Rousseau 1762:75), not with a particular object or event such as an opera 
performance or with a particular school of composition. Thus, when Rousseau 
describes the judgement grounding the general will as not always enlightened (ibid. 
Rousseau) he does so in the context of the latge and difficult enterprise (Rousseau 1762:75) 
which is faced by the whole people, in the very specific instance of building a system of 
legislation, precisely for the whole people. It is not sufficient, therefore, to portray the 
problem Rousseau discusses here as a general and persistent feature of democracy when 
Rousseau's discussion pertains to a specific and exceptional instance. This amounts to a 
distortion or misrepresentation of Rousseau's political theory. 
Now, Adorno goes on to make a second effective attack on the wisdom of collective 
Judgements and the constitutional principle that in a democracy the mass of the people ought to 
be sovereign, rather than the best but few (Aristotle Pol. 1281a39). This second attack can be 
understood as a denial of the individual's right to participate in democratic society i.e. 
on the individual's right to make legitimate artistic value judgements. 
This might not at first seem obvious. Indeed Adorno purports to defend the democratic 
potential of public opinion in his reference to Habermas's study of the intellectual!J emancipated 
boutgeois or notables : 
This element [the notables] material!J qualifying [possessing knowledge of art] but at 
the same time restrictive!J elitist and thus undemocratic, has been lost l?J the concept of the 
public in modern democracies, with a balancing oijective removal of the social inequalities to 
which that concept used 'sans gene' to confess (Adorno 1962:145). 
Adorno here notes the evolution of democracy away from the direct and exclusive 
democracy of the classical model (exclusive because slaves as non-property holders and 
therefore non-citizens held no right to participate) and towards the representative, 
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inclusive concept of democracy of modern society. Adorno seems, on the face of it, to 
celebrate the obsolescence of the property / citizenship qualification as a prerequisite 
of participation in what we have termed, the artistic value franchise (see chapter 1). 
But Adorne's defence of democracy is by no means consistent: 
Formaljy, the possibiliry of opportuniry for everyone to hear music and to judge it is superior to 
the privilege of segregated circles [such as the notables]. It might lead b~ond the 
narrowness of a taste where social narrowness was often aestheticaljy restrictive as welL In fact, 
however, that broadening, that extension of freedom of opinion and its use to people who under 
the circumstances can scarcejy have an opinion, counteracts their material committment and 
ultimate!J undermines their chance to form an opinion at all (Adorno 1962: 145). 
Whilst even Rousseau admits the imperfectibility of democracy (there is no such thing as a 
true democrary-, Rousseau 1762:140), he does not go as far as to deny the legitimacy of 
individual opinion. Adorno, however, blames the very extension of what we have 
termed the artistic value franchise (that extension of freedom of opinion) for the practical 
imperfection of democracy. 
Adorno seems to be saying that those who can scarce!J have an opinion about music 
cannot legitimately do so because they do not possess the requisite knowledge about 
music. This makes knowledge about music effectively a property / citizenship 
qualification, so we return to exclusive democracy (a contradiction in terms in the 
context of modern political theory). Moreover, Adorno goes further so that even if 
individuals do possess a little property or knowledge (their material committmen~ this will 
still not suffice to allow them to participate in a legitimate way in what amounts to the 
artistic value state. Indeed, if we interpret Adorno aright, even a little knowledge (matenal 
committmen~ will be of no benefit to music consumers since it ultimately undermines their 
chance to form valid opinion at all (ibid. Adorno 1962). 
Let us be clear, the greater the property qualification (i.e. the higher its threshold), the 
fewer the citizens (or smaller the artistic value franchise). Now, Aristotle defines citizens 
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in the fullest sense as those who have a share in the honours (i.e. the stattis or privilege 
accorded by sharing in the offices of the state) (Aristotle Pol. 1278a34). In other words, 
not slaves. This is important, for it is by means of the enslavement concept, that 
Adorno is able to reject the principle of the 1visdom of collective judgements in the first place. 
That is, Adorno believes that the mass of the people, the public which consumes 
commodified music, is indeed slave-like (viz. Adorno's temple slaves) and therefore 
Aristotle's logic will not apply. 
Thus, by sleight of hand, Adorno whilst purporting to defend or profess faith in the 
democratic potential of public opinion, is in fact arguing for the existence of an 
oligarchic elite or sole artistic value legislator (such as himself as aesthetic theorist): 
In order to discover which rules of sociery suit nations best, a mind of a superior kind would be 
required, able to see all human emotions, while feeling none; without relationship to our 
nature, but knowing it to its depths ... a mind, in sum, which while preparing distant glory for 
itself in the fullness of time, could carry out its work in one century and e1!f0.J its achievement 
in another. It is gods that are needed to give laws to men (From t11e chapter on the role 
of the legislator, Rousseau 1762:76). 
If, like Rousseau, Adorno were merely concerned to guide public opinion to help it 
arrive at a point of enlightenment for the common good (a kind of merit good argument) 
then the consequences of his commodification argument might be construed consistent 
with the principle of democracy. However, although Adorno's argument is couched in 
the language of democracy, what he advocates is really oligarchy or tyranny. Whilst 
referring to a knowledgeable elite as profoundly undemocratic in one paragraph, in the 
paragraph which follows he reveals a nostalgia for just such an exclusive, property-
based constitution. Adorno has in effect merely replaced what he sees as the tyranny of 
commodified music with the tyranny of the expert listener (viz. Adorno 1938, 1962:5, 
Paddison 1993, Dasilva 1984:67). (For corollary development of this theme see Sessions 
1976, Dahlhaus 1967a and 1970, and Copland 1952). 
The idea of slavery and non-participation (non-citizenship) is central to the success of 
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Adorne's aesthetic programme. Without a body of enslaved consumers, Adorne's 
theory has no function: in order to liberate his temple-slaves Adorno must first enchain 
them. It is not even a question of elitism, it is a question of tyranny, of an artistic value 
fascism. Adorno replaces the tyranny of the commodity form with tyranny of another 
form: the tyranny of the aesthetician; of the aesthetic value legislator. This is a strategy 
consistent with fascism. It is therefore not a good reason why we should reject public 
opinion as a criterion of public subsidy decision-making: 
Fascism's call for the regeneration of the national communiry through a heroic struggle against 
its aUeged enemies and the forces undermining it involves the radical rejection of liberalism ... 
The important proviso to this aspect of fascist movements is that, though thry oppose 
parliamentary democra'!)' and their policies would in practice inevitab!J lead to its destruction, 
thry may well choose to operate tactical!J as democratic, electoral parties. Indeed, thry may go 
to considerable lengths to camoeflage the extent of their hostiliry to liberalism through 
euphemism and dishonesry, reservi.ng their rhetoric of destruction of the 'system' and of 
revolution for the initiated (Griffin 1995:4). 
In the light of the above, it is not inconceivable that Adorno, as the author of an 
explicitly anti-fascist text, The authoritarian personaliry (1950) might not also in other 
aspects of his work, display a tendency towards a kind of aesthetic or artistic value 
fascism. Because of the ambiguous attitude adopted by the fascist thinker vis a vis the 
democratic potential (ibid. Adorno) it cannot be said that elements of fascist thinking are 
incommensurable with an anti-fascist stance. 
Now, we in no way question Adorne's fight against the rise of German Nazism and his 
continued concern with the question of fascism after the Second World War3, indeed 
that purely socio-political aspect of his writing is not our concern. We do, however, 
point to the correspondence between the above definitional aspect of fascism and the 
logical outcome of Adorne's modernist aesthetic programme, which, it is important to 
note, is intended as praxis (world-changing activity) and not as mere intellectual 
speculation (for background see Adorno 1963a, and Adorno and Horkheimer 1969). 
Indeed, it is hard to dismiss our conclusion entirely out of court given Adorne's 
continued insistence on a dialectical view of reality. If we adopt Adorne's dialectical 
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world view, then we must admit of contradictions in everything, whether subject or 
object. Arguably, Adorno, has unwittingly invited us to draw the conclusion that his 
own aesthetic motives are themselves contradictory. 
Artistic value and the value of valuelessness 
In the context of the twentieth century, Adorno both attributes a function to music 
(saying what it seems to be for) and prescribes a function (saying what it ought to be 
for). It is in the contradiction which arises between these two perspectives about 
function or use value that the substance of Adorno's historical dialectical view of music 
lies. That is, between music's ideological character and its cognitive character (Paddison 
1993: 111); between music as entertai.nment and effect (the alluring guises which according 
to Adorno constitute its fetish charactery and music's truth or social content (which, he 
says, is contained not within effect, but within the very structure of a musical work). 
Adorno wants us to understand each musical work as a complex of meaning in which is 
sedimented history and society (the social conditions of its production). This is the 
function or use value he prescribes; to miss this cognitive character of music would be, in 
Adorno's view, to be mistaken about music's use value. Interestingly, from the point of 
view of our transaction model (chapter 2), Adorno cannot separate artistic value and 
financial value in its sedimented form, since any reflection of the social conditions of a 
work's production, according to our transaction model, must reflect exchange relations 
i.e. transactions, or the trade of values made between parties in the environment (see 
again discussion of inseparability in chapter 2). 
Now this leads us to a key and consistent theme within Adorno's commodification 
argument: the connection between autonomy and artistic value (what we shall term, the 
value of valuelessness). That is to say, the value which lies in music's ability to withdraw 
from the market and function, unhindered, as social critique. The idea is that by 
becoming unmarketable, by resisting the possibility of ideological consumption, music will 
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lose its exchange value (its commodity form) and develop pure use value as social critique. 
By this means we are to be liberated from the logic of the business world and the marketplace 
mentalify (Adorno 1948:5) and, if we are to understand Adorno aright, we are to be 
liberated entirely from our attachment to democratic market economy. 
But there is a difficulty. Adorno uses the term autonomy in both a literal and a 
metaphorical sense (as confirmed by his student, Dahlhaus) to mean: 
A) in its literal sense : music which is free from the market 
Music is autonomous if it is free from the influence of a patron or 
commissioning body (Adorno 1948:21); that is, if it has beenfree!J 
conceived and executed with no influence on the part of a patron or purchaser as 
regards its content or external form (Dahlhaus 1967b:109). 
B) in its metaphorical sense : music as social cntique 
Music is autonomous if it functions not as entertainment but as critique, 
thereby becoming incommensurable with social reality i.e. unmarketable, 
non-commodified4 and devoid of exchange value (Adorno 1948:113); so 
that as critique, it thus points out the ills of society rather than 
sublimating those ills into a deceptive humanitarianism which would pretend that 
humanitarianism had already been achieved in the present (Adorno 1948:131). 
These, in effect, are Adorne's conditions for autonomy. It is not clear, however, how 
Adorne's second condition, the one most consistently stressed in his work, is to be 
achieved. How is music to function in the full sense of condition B (music as critique, 
pure use value) when, in a money economy, condition A (freedom from the market, 
freedom from exchange value) cannot be met. An artwork, such as an opera, cannot be 
free!J conceived and executed unless in the context of a feudal society. As we discussed 
earlier, every action an individual makes (such as writing an opera) even where money 
does not exchange hands, involves an opportunity cost. To the composer, this might 
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be the opportunity cost of not undertaking a potentially lucrative filmscore 
commission, for instance. Even if the composer is of independent means, even if he 
never worked, there can be no complete freedom, no complete autonomy from the 
market (either he must enjoy inherited capital or social welfare). Here we return to the 
fact that artistic value and financial value are inseparable (see again section 1.1 and chapter 
2). 
Even if we thought that Adorne's concept of autonomy was intended to apply to the 
consumption of works, rather than the conditions of their production, we would 
encounter difficulties. The only musical work which could possibly achieve autonomy 
in both literal and metaphorical sense (in the context of consumption relations) is what 
we may term the score-in-the-drawer. That is, a score which has been written by the 
composer for the composer (or an ideal audience) and which has not been 
commissioned (and not therefore purchased) and which has not been performed, or in 
any way exposed to the market (i.e. has no exchange value). But the value in valuelessness 
of the score will remain locked in the drawer, as it were; it must remain unheard to 
remain autonomous. 
This is interesting because Adorno argues that music which has not been heard falls into empty 
space like an impotent bullet (Adorno 1948:133). Now, this is only true if, like Rodolfo's 
manuscript in Puccini's La Boheme, the score (our score-in-the-drawery is burnt the moment 
it is completed, so that it can never participate in the market (e.g. be taken from the 
drawer and sold, thus losing its autonomy) at any time in the future. This makes 
Adorne's claim that modem music seeks absolute oblivion as its goa~ that it is the surviting 
message of despair from the shipwrecked (Adorno 1948:133) problematic precisely because the 
message may be heard; which means exposure to the market in the future. Indeed, the 
score can only realise its value in valuelessness, far us, through some future use value (e.g. 
first performance in a retrospective festival of twentieth century music) which means 
exposure to the market (realisation as exchange value) since its performance must 
somehow be funded. Either the composer, his next of kin, or some future publisher 
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will retain the IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) on the work. 
Thus, in reality, because scores do hold an asset value and are therefore not 
autonomous, Adorno's fast message of despair from the shipwrecked represents, ironically, a 
copyright symbol (a symbol of asset value, and therefore of potential use value) stamped 
upon the score-in-the-drawer. 
So music may come to be valued as music which had no value, which was thought 
valueless within its original market setting, and whose cognitive value lies in the 
appreciation of this very valuelessness. However, if we did not perceive this absence of 
value, and found instead an alternative use value (function), forgetting to exercise our 
cognitive faculties in appreciation of the works, Adorno would accuse us of ideological 
consumption (e.g. merely consuming it for entertainment, for curiosity value, for instance, 
or worse, using it as a filmscore). So we are faced with a conundrum: there seems to be 
no way into autonomy, and neither any way out. 
In setting out the premises of his commodification argument, then, Adorno leaves a 
contradiction unresolved: if patrons and purchasers are indeed so restricting, if public 
bodies and sponsors commission works only out of a sense of cultural obligation (this is 
Adorno's rather weak explanation of institutional commissioning; see Adorno 1948:21), 
and if any participation in the market destroys music's artistic value, how then does 
music function as critique, how does the modernist programme begin in the context of 
a money economy? Adorno makes it clear his distaste for composers such as 
Hindemith and Britten who have, in his terms, sold out to the market by permitting 
conciliation to the listener, eliminating from their work everything which is musicaf!y 
uncomfortable, and merely pretending at moderni!J (Adorno 1948:6). It seems then that 
Adorno permits no gentle transition to autonomy; if autonomy is to be understood as a 
necessary condition of artistic value, then it would appear that only complete (literal and 
metaphorical) autonomy will suffice. This is ironic since, arguably, Britten's Albert 
Herring could be said to function, in the best Mozartian tradition, as social critique 
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(here, of the English class system); and yet Adorno would have it that Britten's work is 
not sufficiently autonomous for this to be achieved, but that it suffers an immaturity 
which masks as enlightenment (Adorno 1948:6) i.e. it will not truly enlighten us about our 
own oppression (for exposition of this theme see Marcuse 1968). The point here is that 
perception of value is linked to real individuals and groups within the environment: 
some of us will perceive social critique in Herring, some of us will not; some of us will 
agree with Adorne's verdict of Adorno, some of us will not. What matters is the fact 
that we come face to face with an aesthetic theory which attempts to alter our 
perception of artistic value by, in effect, claiming to enlighten us about the nature of the 
relationship between artistic value and financial value; and the concepts of autonomy and 
commodifiability are key to this. 
We have to question, therefore, the value of Adorne's usage of economic theory. By 
introducing the concept of autonomy or non-commodification (with its implicit link to 
exchange value), yet not fully working it through, Adorno at once reveals and undermines 
the normative, propagandistic nature of his project. Adorno presents us, then, with an 
aesthetic theory which is strong in its surface appearance (because it employs powerful 
economic concepts), but which, logically, is less than coherent. 
Modernism, postmodernism, and market failure 
What then are the consequences of the commodification argument in the context of 
our study? Briefly, we may summarize and contrast the respective aesthetic strategies of 
modernism and postmodernism as follows: 
a) The modernist aesthetic strategy: Requires music's complete autonomy (literal and 
metaphorical withdrawal from the market) in order that it rid itself entirely of 
exchange value (its commodity status). Once rendered valueless in this way, music 
is to cultivate itself as pure use value (its function as social critique). But because 
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it must cultivate autonomy by ridding itself of exchange value (i~e. cultivate its own 
non-marketability) music's fate is to atrophy in the name of its cause (i.e. fail to 
realise its use value as critique because it is unacceptable to the market; see also 
Adorno 1970) 
Consequences : The only way to create artistic value is to (attempt to) cultivate the 
separability of artistic value and financial value. 
b) The postmodernist aesthetic strategy: Requires that music accept the impossibility 
of autonomy i.e. accept the inevitability of its absorption into the market, and 
therefore its commodification. By accepting its fate as a commodity, music may 
exploit, through irony, the contradictions of its own market existence. Music's 
use value as critique must therefore be posited on a pessimistic acceptance of its 
inevitable realisation through exchange value (viz Marx). (See also Bourdieu 1979 
and Lyotard 1985). 
Consequences : The only way to create artistic value is to accept and exploit the 
inseparability of artistic value and financial value. 
Modernism and postmodernism, then, rely to a very great extent upon the idea of the 
commodifiability of music; both cultivate a profound distaste for the market. 
From our point of view, however, both modernism and postmodernism can be 
understood as presenting classic market failure arguments (see again chapter 3). Both rely 
upon the idea that consumers undervalue non-commodified music, music which serves 
as critique, either through lack of information (i.e. ignorance of their own oppression, or 
poor listening skills), or through inability to take account of the wider social benefits or 
externalities resulting from consumption (i.e. failure to see that they may liberate 
themselves and their fellow citizens from the inhumanity of market society). Yet neither 
advocates state intervention, which to the economist, is the logical solution to market 
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failure. Adornian modernism seems to seek market failure-. the idea of opera for all, if not 
complete anathema to the modernist, at the very least presents him with grave 
difficulties; whereas to the postmodernist it presents opportunities for exploitation. An 
interesting portent of the postmodernist approach to what we have here identified as a 
market failure problem, is seen in Adorne's critique of Stravinsky: 
His compositions are pieced together out of scraps of commercial goods [e.g. jazz ]just as ma'!Y 
pictures or sculptures of the same time were composed of hair, razor blades, and tinfoil This 
defines its difference in 'niveau'from commercial trash. At the same time, his jazzpastiches 
appear to absorb the threatening attraction of that which has been abandoned to the masses, 
enchaining the danger thereof by giving in to it. Compared to these practices, every other 
interest of composers in jazz was a modest effort to gain an audience - a simple matter of 
selling-out. Stravinsky, however, thorough!Y ritualized the selling-out itse!f, indeed even the 
relationship to consumer goods. He peifom1s a 'danse macabre' around its fetish character 
(Adorno 1948:171). 
An interesting parallel here is Kramer's description of Ravel as a proto-postmodernist, as a 
composer in whom the nexus of music, consumerism, and exoticism comes close to being a 
deliberate aesthetic programme (Kramer 1995:205). Kramer sees Ravel's Daphnis and Chloe, in 
particular, as beautiful because its beaury has a job to do. By effecting a translation of conspicuous 
consumption from the sphere of commerce to the sphere of art (ibid Kramer 1995:204), by 
commodifying ... fin-de siecle aestheticism, and by embodying the cultural suprema01 by which 
Europe subsumes and organises the non-European world, Kramer claims that Ravel's Daphnis 
and Chloe effectively re-enacts the technical and administrative mastery that brought the exotic to 
Europe in the first place (Kramer 1995:212). Kramer's claim is, in effect, that Ravel was 
fully conscious of the situatedness of his art within a world of political and economic 
relations, and moreover, that his music effectively exploits (Kramer prefers the term 
encapsulates) the contradictions of music's existence within the dream world of mass 
consumption (ibid Kramer 1995:225). 
From our perspective, then, the important point to note is that both modernist and 
postmodernist aesthetic strategies rely upon crude models of the economic 
environment, and a misuse of the concepts of classical economics (viz use value and 
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exchange value). Both cultivate an idealist view of artistic value, and both assume the 
existence of one homogenous mass market; a single monstrous sea of exchange 
relations, in which music either participates or it does not. The central idea common to 
both is that artistic value cannot be maximized in a market context: an idea which leaves 
the artistic achievements of Glyndebourne Festival Opera (an almost purely private 
sector market enterprise) largely unexplained (see chapter 7). Indeed, both modernism 
and postmodernism would ask us to disregard Glyndebourne as another, perhaps 
ironic, example of selling-out; of the craj(y naivete of the culture industry which has adjusted to 
mass culture by means of calculated feeble-mindedness (Adorno 1948:6, 16). 
Interestingly, by their very nature, market failure arguments tend also to assume the 
existence of mass markets i.e. markets in which products or services are substitutable, 
and in which need (demand, if the market did not fail) is evenly spread throughout the 
population. Primary healthcare provides an example here (General Practitioners are 
technically substitutable, and need for their services is universal). But whilst this mass 
market concept is true at a generic level, in reality the market for healthcare is highly 
segmented. Product ranges in the OTC pharmaceuticals5 market (though not itself a 
failed market) are, for instance, differentiated according to the perceived needs of 
specific groups including: travellers, nursing mothers, the elderly, and various lifestyle 
groups such as sports enthusiasts. That is, innovation and value is predicated on 
individual segments; on real individuals and groups within society. Now, hypothetically, 
the same may be true of opera (i.e. the market for live opera may well be segmentable), 
but models pertaining to value in opera which assume the existence of a mass market, 
concern themselves only with the possibility of opera and indeed, the arts as a whole, as 
a generic service (see for instance Hill et al. 1995). This leads us straight back to the idea 
of commodification in the Adomian sense of standardized goods and mass 
consumption. 
Our real point, then, is that modernism and postmodemism do not relate value to real 
individuals and groups within the environment (see again chapter 2). Rather, they posit 
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an idealized or abstracted concept of the consumer as an enslaved or oppressed 
individual who is also a poor judge of his or her own welfare (in the widest sense). But 
in doing so, these aesthetic programmes overlook the possibility of future alternative use 
values for their works. Modernism, in its cultivation of what we have termed the value 
of valueless works (valueless because they are non-marketable and therefore devoid of 
exchange value) assumes that consumer tastes and preferences are fixed. But we may well 
come to value modernist works precisely because of their former perceived 
valuelessness. Our point, here, is that both modernist and postmodernist works may 
enjoy potential market segments of their own e.g. other composers and music 
professionals, or members of, for instance, the Scottish Opera audience who prefer 
new and experimental productions (see chapter 7). This meaning that modernist and 
postmodernist works themselves may not be participating in (or resisting) a mass 
market at all. A case in point is the performance of Adorno's own lieder at a recent 
musicology conference in the UK6• 
Now this demonstrates again that artistic value is a function of perception and cannot be 
separated from real individuals and groups within the environment (see chapter 2). 
Turned around, this suggests that an artform is likely to flourish when, and only when, 
it is exposed to those market segments in which its value is perceived. Moreover, 
assuming some degree of consumer sovereignty within these hypothetical segments, it 
suggests the possibility of substantive artistic innovation. That is, formal innovation in 
the artform itself as producers seek to differentiate their services and predicate value 
around distinct market segments (see chapter 8). 
However, our main point is this: is it sufficient for cultural economists to leave the 
question of artistic value to experts in aesthetics; to treat artistic value as an exogenous 
variable? Modernism and postmodernism have already demonstrated that aesthetic 
theory is capable of developing apparently sophisticated and therefore persuasive 
programmes on the basis of the misuse and distortion of economic theory: a point 
which has also been noted by Connerton in the context of a study of Frankfurt School 
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Critical Theory: 
The 'basic economic structure' which is appealed to, in the programmatic statement, as the 
ground for the unchanging substance of the theory, is never the object of a sophisticated and 
detailed inquiry by those whose work is supposed!J justified by that programmatic statement. 
Presumab!J a'!Y differentiated stut!J of that basic economic structure, understood in Marxist 
categories, would have to proceed by showing how specifical!J the labour theory of value could 
be applied in explaining the operation of that economic structure under contemporary 
conditions. But although the main exponents of critical theory continued to cite the categories of 
the labour theory of value [i.e. exchange value, use value], thry did not suf?ject those categories 
to sustained explanation as economic categories, and thry sometimes Jailed even to name them 
explicit!J. Thus it becomes difficult to avoid the growing suspicion that by constant!J drawing 
attention to its own historiciry, critical theory is loosening rather than reinforcing its links wi,th 
Marx's materialist critique (Connerton 1980:40). 
Now this underlines, again, the point we made in chapter 1: that there is urgent need 
for inter-party communication and for an adequate political economy of opera. There 
seems little purpose in discussing opera, or indeed the arts as a whole, in terms of 
potential positive externalities (its wider social benefits), for instance, when 
fundamental disagreement about the consequences of the inseparability of artistic value 
and financial value may pertain. Even if cultural economists and public policy experts 
were to discover strong evidence of positive externalities associated with opera e.g. if 
real evidence of social regeneration, or neighbourhood renewal (see chapters 1 and 2) were 
found, the aesthetic theorist of modernist or postmodernist persuasion might seek to 
subvert any conclusions which may be drawn - presenting possible benefits as, in effect, 
negative externalities, as mere features of oppression and the total domination of 
society by exchange relations. 
Ultimately, our inter-party communication problem comes back to the question of the 
connection between human flourishing and the flourishing of art. Indeed, is the 
maximization of consumers' welfare ever commensurable with the maximization of 
artistic value? It is difficult to see how cultural economics and aesthetic theory can 
disregard this question in the face of the inseparability of artistic value and financial value. 
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4.4 Summary 
We showed that Adorne's commodification argument involves the creation of a 
shibboleth, briefly: that the process of commodification represents a process of artistic 
devaluation, and that it creates passive music consumers, and that passive consumers 
no longer know how to listen to music, and that because they no longer know, their 
taste is degenerate. 
We also showed that opera conforms to the definitional characteristics of the service 
(that it is neither a product nor a commodiry). In addition, we introduced and discussed 
the concept of intangibiliry, showing the importance of perception in the context of 
artistic value (we equated artistic value with perceived use value). 
Most importantly, we underlined the need for informed inter-party debate by 
discussing the consequences of the commodification argument in the context of 
modernism and postmodernism. Specifically, we showed that whilst cultural economics 
tends to treat artistic value as exogenous, aesthetic theory has proved itself interested, in 
a propagandistic sense, in the value of economic theory as a justification for attempting 
to alter our perception of artistic value. The problem we demonstrated, was that the 
application of economic theory in this context, was less than logically coherent. 




We have established the transactional nature of opera: that the production of live opera 
occurs as the result of transactions between effective buyers and sellers of artistic value 
(e.g. public funders and opera company, sponsors and opera company, audiences and 
opera company etc) and that because these transactions occur, today, within the 
context of a money economy, that artistic value and financial value therefore operate in an 
inseparable fashion. 
This means that any meaningful discussion of value in opera must be conducted with 
reference to artistic value and financial value, and to the interdependent relationship which 
pertains between them. 
In the theory chapters of this study we constructed a simple model to describe the 
transformation of financial value and artistic value inputs into theoretically possible financial 
value and artistic value outputs. This allowed us to demonstrate the inseparable nature of 
financial value and artistic value. However, since we cannot give a full description of the 
transformation process itself, which is highly complex, meaningful investigation of 
value in opera must be conducted by other means. 
From the aggregate data which results from this activity, we go on to develop a 
taxonomy of opera which explains, in qualitative terms, the differences between opera 
companies resulting from their description in purely quantitative terms. From the 
taxonomy we can discover what kinds of transactional model are at work in the opera 
sector. In addition, we can observe the reaction of the individual opera company to its 
environment over time. 
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5.2 Aims and methodology 
Aims 
Since we cannot give a full description of the transformation process by which means 
artistic value and financial value inputs are transformed by the opera company into artistic 
value and.financial value outputs (this being a highly complex process) a parametric study 
was conducted in order to yield.a rigourous partial description. That is, whilst we 
cannot measure or record the transformation process itself (a process internal to the 
company and therefore only partially observable) we can observe the financial value 
inputs and outputs (in the form of published accounts). We can also observe the 
delivery of artistic value (in the form of performance data) which is important since it 
provides the primary rationale for funding opera. 
The purpose of the study was to measure changes in those parameters which were 
observable and reliable, and would therefore tell us more about the transformation 
process. By this means, the study yielded objective measures of transformation 
(introduced below). Study of changes in these measures over time revealed the effect of 
policy decisions and the reaction of individual opera companies to the environment 
(description of the environment is discussed below). This enabled observation not only 
of changes within one company, but between companies themselves. We therefore 
selected those parameters which were the most reliable and consistent across the 
spread of companies in our sample. The parameters thus elected (turnover in year, 
employees in year, and performances in year) provided quantitative measures. 
Whilst it is possible to use qualitative parameters in a parametric study, there are no 
reliable qualitative parameters which can be used in the current context. Audience 
survey data and expert opinion about artistic value, for instance, is subjective. Also, 
although companies can be categorised according to whether or not they own a theatre 
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or possess an inhouse orchestra, these qualitative parameters have no agreed 
significance in themselves. Although evidence suggests that an establishment model is 
preferred by companies (i.e. ownership of venue and or workshops), it is difficult to 
extract meaning from this in isolation, especially in the context of a small sample. 
Another possible qualitative parameter is repertoire choice or mix, but classification of 
such is again highly subjective (e.g. repertoire which is popular in one context or 
market, may not be so in another). The potential here is to argue over exceptions 
rather than the norm. 
However, all of these qualitative parameters carry financial value implications and it is 
these that we must examine if we are to identify the constraints which hamper free 
artistic value choice in the opera production process. These constraints, or limits, are 
indeed more informative than the artistic value choices themselves since, depending on 
how tightly they act, they may compel a degree of artistic value homogeneity across 
companies. Indeed, because no real examination of these financial value constrain ts has 
been made, it is entirely possible that there are alternative operational models or financial 
value - artistic value mixes which have not been considered by public funders or by the 
opera community itself. 
Lastly, from observation of similarities and differences in the resultant aggregate data, 
certain groupings of companies emerged. This suggested the development of a 
taxonomy by which means the qualitative similarities and differences between 
companies, resulting from their description in purely quantitative terms, could be 
expressed. 
One further and important aim was to test the utility of the principal raw data sources 
used to construct the taxonomy (the published annual accounts and reports) as a 
mechanism for public sector body accountability (see chapter 2). 
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Methodology 
Work was carried out in two phases. An initial period of primary research was 
conducted at Scottish Opera. The purpose of this work was, firstly, to survey available 
internal data pertaining to the financial management and marketing of the company; 
and secondly, to gain an insight into the administrative function of a major subsidized 
opera company. Whilst access was granted to available archives, it was discovered that 
much material had been lost with the departure of previous administrative staff. 
Archive material which did remain was of a random nature, uncatalogued and difficult 
to locate. Nevertheless, an insight into budgeting practice and other internal 
administrative workings was gained. 
For phase two, the main part of this study, the published financial statements (annual 
reports and accounts) of seven opera companies (including those of Scottish Opera 
from 1970) were obtained from Companies House. By employing this source of 
secondary data it was possible to make objective comparison between companies and 
to examine issues of accountability because: a) all observations would be made using 
only data available in the public domain; and b) the filing of annual accounts at 
Companies House provides the only mandatory mechanism of accountability which 
permits not only intercompany comparison, but comparison of publicly subsidized 
companies against private sector practice. 
Reliabili'f) of data: Although filing of annual financial statements at Companies House is 
mandatory for all registered companies, legislation allows for considerable variation in 
reporting formats. However, all annual accounts must be prepared by independent 
professionals acting as auditors. It is the duty of auditors to check compliance against 
current legislation for financial probity. Auditors work by a system of accounting 
standards such as SSAPs (Statement of Standard Accounting Practice) and SORPs 
(Standard of Reporting Practice), and the various Companies Acts (e.g. Companies Act 
1985), and Charities Commission codes of practice regarding corporate governance 
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(e.g. Cadbury Commission). Available data from Companies House reflects the fact 
that filing of full income and expenditure account data has only been required since the 
mid 1970s. 
Construction of sample frame: The sample frame of seven opera companies comprises : a) 
main representatives of the UK subsidized opera sector (Royal Opera House - Covent 
Garden, English National Opera, Welsh National Opera, Scottish Opera, and Opera 
North), hereafter referred to as ROH, ENO, WNO, SO, and ON respectively; b) a 
comparator, largely private sector operation (Glyndebourne Productions, comprising 
two companies - Glyndebourne Festival Opera plus Glyndebourne Touring Opera), 
hereafter referred to as GP or G FO+GTO; c) a comparator, small company (Opera 
Restor'd), hereafter referred to as OR. Companies which could not be included in the 
sample frame were : English Touring Opera (short data run), Opera East (in 
liquidation), Travelling Opera (in liquidation), and Raymond Gubbay Ltd (non-utilisable 
reporting format - i.e. opera production activity non-separable from general concert 
promotion activity). 
Selection of taxonomy parameters : Three parameters were used to construct the taxonomy : 
1) total performances in year; 2) total turnover in year; and 3) total employees in year. 
In each case, the published financial reports filed at Companies House provided the 
data source. Where performance data was not stated, this was computed from Opera 
magazine (OC 1972-96) which provides the primary listing vehicle in the UK. These 
parameters were then used to provide two key ratios : a) turnover per performance 
(financial intensity); and b) employees per performance 0abour intensity). In the 
absence of sufficient data, turnover per performance was used as a proxy measure of 
expenditure, since in a closed non-profit organisation, in the long-run, turnover 
generally follows expenditure levels closely. Employee figures are stated as per the 
published accounts and therefore represent average full-time equivalents (AVG FfE). 
In order to eliminate the effects of inflation, turnover was expressed in constant prices. 
The reasoning behind the choice of these parameters is discussed in more detail in 
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section 5.2. 
Ensuring equivalence of turnover data : In order to ensure that comparison of companies was 
carried out on an equivalent basis, turnover figures, wherever possible, were computed 
from first principles. That is to say, individual income items were traced from the 
income and expenditure account, the balance sheet (where required), the report of the 
board of directors (or equivalent), and the notes to the accounts. Note, the stated total 
income figure or turnover figure in the accounts (whichever is reported) cannot be 
relied upon because of interconwany and intracompany (year on year) variation in 
reporting format. Typical variations include: a) treatment of income as exceptional or 
below-the-line i.e. stated after the current surplus / deficit calculation; b) change of 
aggregation basis without explanation in the notes section of the accounts e.g. a 
turnover figure might include grants in one year but not the next; c) change of 
reporting of items between gross basis and net contribution basis; d) non-consolidation 
or the option not to report income generated by subsidiary companies where the 
directors have opted not to provide full data e.g. WNO (Services) 1987-88. Turnover 
calculations for all sample frame companies are presented in Appendices 7-1 to 7-14. 
Correction for aUowable activiry : In order to ensure the meaningful comparison of 
companies with different operational bases, certain corrections to performance, 
turnover and employees data were required. Allowable activity was defined as : all UK 
mainscale opera performances. In the case of ROH, however, which operates a group 
structure (comprising Royal Opera, Royal Ballet and Sadlers Wells Royal Ballet I 
Birmingham Royal Ballet until 1997, hereafter referred to as: RO, RB and 
SWRB/BRB), it was necessary to include as allowable activity, RB performances given 
at the home venue (Covent Garden). Due to the complex nature of the ROH group 
operation and because of certain economies of scale (e.g. a house orchestra shared 
between two of the companies) it was neither possible nor meaningful to subtract out 
all RB income from the turnover calculation. A summary table of corrections for 
allowable activity is given in Appendix 7-3 and details of the corrections to ROH 
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turnover can be seen in Appendix 7-4. 
Description of the environment: Quantitative description of the environment was carried 
out using standard published macroeconomic data for the UK. Descriptors were 
chosen to reflect those factors in the environment most likely to have an impact on the 
opera sector. These indicators, which are introduced below, were: gross domestic 
product or GDP; annual rate of inflation; personal saving ratio and index of real 
personal disposable income; unemployment rate; the Sterling exchange rate against the 
US Dollar; and central govemm.ent expenditure on recreational and cultural affairs. 
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5.3 Context setting : description of the environment 
Interpretation of the results of the parametric study need to be set in context. Brief 
description of the environment in gross terms, using standard macroeconomic data is 
sufficient. The description below therefore does not present a comprehensive 
economic history of the UK. Rather, the aim is to develop an outline chronology of 
significant political and economic events and the consequences of those events. Our 
primary interest is in the factors in the environment which may affect demand for 
opera (e.g. purchasing power an.cl consumer behaviour) and funding (e.g. trade cycles, 
inflation rate, and factor import costs). 
The description has two parts: presentation of macroeconomic data followed by a brief 
chronology of environment events. 
1) Macroeconomic data 
The following five Figures show the behaviour of the environment in terms of standard 
macroeconomic data: gross domestic product or GDP (a general indicator of whole 
economy performance, where increase represents growth in the economy); annual 
inflation rate; unemployment rate (as a measure of recessionary cycles in the wider 
economy); personal saving ratio and disposable income index (indicating in crude 
terms, consumer behaviour as willingness to bear debt, and the theoretical purchasing 
power, or ability of consumers to spend on non-essential services such as opera); the 
Sterling-Dollar exchange rate (which, since the US Dollar is a favoured currency for 
trading purposes, affects not only the underlying strength or weakness of the economy 
via export-import performance, but affects, also, the cost curve of the individual opera 
company which may be purchasing or performing overseas e.g. where a weakening 
pound increases import costs for those opera companies sourcing overseas or electing 
to pay artists fees in US Dollars); and central government expenditure on recreational 
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and cultural affairs (a crude indicator of cultural spending, since sportand leisure 
spending is included, giving an indication of changing priorities and opportunity cost 
decisions). Figures are discussed in the chronology. 
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ANNUAL CHANGE IN UK GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT [GDP] 
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Figure J-1: Annual change in UK GDP 
UK ANNUAL INFLATION RATE 
~.o~~~-----~--~-------------~----~------. 

















~ 5.0+-r----...-.----------------~~"--~--=--,_ __ _._..,---------1 
::> z 
~ 
1966 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
YEAR 
Figure J-2: UK annual inflation rate 
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Figure J-3: UK unemployment rate 
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P.lgure J-4 : UK personal sating ratio and disposable income index 
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Figure J-6: Sterling exchange rate against the US Dollar 




2) Chronolo!!J of events 
• 1964-70 : The first Wilson years [Labour] [Oct-64 to Jun-70] 
1965 Prices and Incomes Board established. Incomes policy measures are introduced 
shortly after establishment of the Board e.g. statutory prices and incomes 
standstill in 1966 (Butler and Butler 1986:376). These measures aim to limit 
price and wage increases as a way of controlling inflation. As a result 
consumers, real disposa?le income grows relatively slowly (Figure 5-4). 
1966 Sterling cn'sis. Loss of confidence in the pound leads to an increase in the cost of 
borrowing, to tax increases, and to credit restraints (Butler and Butler 
1986:376). In order to obtain greater exchange rate stability, the pound is 
devalued from US$2:80 to US$2:40 in 1967 (Figure 5-6). The cost of imports to 
the UK thus show an immediate and significant rise. 
1968 Deflationary budget. The Labour government achieves a tightening of fiscal policy 
via government expenditure cuts. Its aim is to curb domestic demand and 
improve the Balance of Payments (see West 1987). The reduction in aggregate 
demand affects business confidence, a downturn is experienced, and economic 
growth, as measured by GDP, is reversed (Figure 5-1). 
• 1970-74 : The Heath years [Conservative] IJun-70 to Mar-74] 
1971 Dollar-gold convertibiliry ends. The ending of convertibility brings the Bretton-
Woods era to a close (see West 1987). The pound is floated and begins to 
depreciate against the dollar. This further raises the cost of imported goods and 
services to the UK. 
1972 Prices Commission and Pqy Board established. A statutory pay freeze is introduced 
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(1972-73) as part of an inflation control programme (incomes policy). Whilst 
the economy is growing (Figure 5-1) inflation is showing sings of accelerating 
(Figure 5-2). Since consumers' real disposable income is more than keeping 
apace with this accelerating inflation (Figure 5-4) the economy shows signs of 
imbalance. 
1973 Introduction ef VAT. The UK joins the EEC (European Economic Community) 
and the Value Added Tax system (an indirect tax system) is introduced in 
accordance with memb~rship criteria. In the UK, VAT replaces selective 
employment tax and purchase tax, causing a major discontinuity in the tax 
system as producers adapt to new requirements. 
1973 Outbreak ef Middle East War and first oil shock. Due to disruption of supplies and 
the operation of the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
cartel, oil prices quadruple (West 1987:326). UK producer costs increase and a 
sharp acceleration in the annual rate of inflation results (Figure 5-2). The shock 
to the economy begins a period of recession which is spurred, in addition, by 
the Miners' overtime ban and industry 3-day week: GDP falls dramatically 
(Figure 5-1). The unemployment rate rises (Figure 5-3) and consumers' real 
disposable income begins to fall (Figure 5-4). Individuals retiring during the 
Heath years experience an immediate and significant erosion of the purchasing 
power of their savings. 
• 1974-76 : The second Wilson years [Labour] [Mar-7 4 to Apr-7 6] 
1975 First landing efNorth Sea OiL This benefits the Balance of Payments as 
investment in the new oil industry begins. GDP is boosted in a relatively small 
but sustained way as production increases (see West 1987). 
1975 Government White Paper: The attack on i?iflation'. This introduces a universal pay 
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rise limit as an inflation control measure. Consumers' real disposable income 
falls (Figure 5-4). In this year, the annual rate of inflation reaches approximately 
25% (Figure 5-2). This makes a significant impact on the cost of living and 
producer prices soar. 
1976 Introduction of cash limits in government expenditure. Prior to this innovation, 
government departments which overspent could be assisted by means of an 
upwards adjustment in budget. Cash limits, however, provide a new disincentive 
to overspending by lin~ng budgets to an inflation assumption for the year 
ahead. Combined with real cuts in government expenditure in the late 1970s 
(Figure 5-5), this marks a fundamental change in public spending policy. 
1976 Sterlingfalls below the US$2:00 threshold for first time. Depreciation of the pound 
benefits exporters but continues to increase the cost of imports to the UK 
(Figure 5-6). 
• 1976-79 : The Callaghan years [Labour] [Apr-76 to May-79] 
1976 IMF crisis. By the mid 1970s UK government expenditure is growing faster than 
underlying economic growth. The economy is weak and an approach is 
therefore made to the IMF (International Monetary Fund) for stand-by credit. 
In accordance with the terms of the IMF agreement, government expenditure 
is cut. At the same time, trade union pressure for wage rises and resistence to 
change in working practices is argued to act as a contributory factor to rising 
unemployment (Figure 5-3) (West 1987:145). But, in addition, the Minimum 
Lending Rate reaches 15% (Butler and Butler 1986:377). This increases the cost 
of borrowing and acts as a disincentive to industry investment: GDP falls 
(Figure 5-1) and jobs are lost. In the face of continued high inflation, 
consumers experience a fall in real disposable income and begin to save less 
(Figure 5-4). 
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1977 Voluntary incomes poliry. The Labour government continues to seek a voluntary 
10% limit on earnings increases (Butler and Butler 1986:377). Although the 
annual rate of inflation is falling, taxes are high and consumers, ability to save is 
still constrained (Figure 5-4). The economy experiences a downturn (Figure 5-
1). 
1979 Second oil shock. Oil prices double. This forces industry restructuring and a 
squeeze on real wages. At the same time, North Sea oil exports double in value, 
causing speculative interest in the pound to increase. This fuels the appreciation 
of Sterling (Figure 5-6) so that UK manufacturing sector exports continue to 
become less competitive in world markets. 
• 1979-85 : The early Thatcher years [Conservative] [from May-79] 
1979 Tax realignment. The Conservative government cuts income tax from 33% to 
30% and raises VAT from 8% to 15% (Butler and Butler 1986:377). The 
primary purpose of this tax realignment is to remove disincentives to work. 
However, since the economy is still in deep recession (Figure 5-1), job losses 
continue to rise (Figure 5-3), and the benefits of real increases in disposable 
income (brought about by the tax realignment) are not experienced equally 
throughout the adult population. 
1979 Abolition of exchange rate controls. These are abolished with the intention of 
increasing the supply of Sterling. The aim is to reduce the scarcity value of the 
Pound to speculators and thereby stem its appreciation against the Dollar. 
However, the reverse outcome is obtained: Sterling rises even further due to an 
avalanche of buying (Figure 5-6) (Hutton 1995:63). The abolition of exchange 
rate controls also marks a significant step in the rolling-back of the state (i.e. the 
gradual disengagement of government in the operation of markets). 
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1980 Announcement of Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). A supply-side strategy, 
the aim of the MTFS is to reduce inflation via control of the money supply. 
Committed to Monetarist policies, the Conservative government seeks to 
reduce the PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement) as a percentage of 
GDP. Cuts in government expenditure thereby follow (Figure 5-5). In addition, 
interest rates are set high to deter lending and inflation of the money supply. 
However, through 1979-80 this leads to a rush on Sterling, which, as a petro-
currency, offers speculators good tradability and high interest returns (Figure 5-
6). Priced out of export .markets by the appreciation of Sterling, the UK 
manufacturing sector becomes increasingly less competitive (See Hill 1985). The 
recession deepens (Figure 5-1), the annual rate of inflation and the 
unemployment rate both accelerate, and consumers' experience an erosion of 
real disposable income (Figures 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4). 
1982 Hire purchase controls abolished. These controls are abolished as part of a wider 
Monetarist programme of financial deregulation designed to stimulate the 
economy (Hutton 1995:72). This promotes a consumer boom (focussed 
primarily on the property market). As real disposable income begins to rise on 
the back of this boom (Figure 5-4), consumers' become increasingly confident 
to take on extra debts (see 1980s personal saving ratio in Figure 5-4). 
Consumers begin to enjoy a period of conspicuous consumption. 
1983 The UK becomes a net importer of manufactured goods. For the first time since the 
Industrial Revolution, the UK exports less manufactured goods (by value) than 
it imports (Butler and Butler 1986:377). With its manufacturing base eroded, the 
UK is now explicitly a service-based economy. 
• 1985-90 : The late Thatcher years [Conservative] [to Nov-90] 
1985 Foreign exchange intervention. Whilst following Monetarist principles and allowing 
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market forces to determine the exchange rate since 1979, the Conservative 
government now adopts an interventionist policy. In an attempt to stabilize 
Sterling (which, in 1985, has sunk to an historical low), the Pound is maintained 
by government intervention or dirry floating (see West 1987). By this means 
control is gained over imported inflation. However, Sterling becomes 
overvalued relative to the underlying performance of the economy, fuelling 
import substitution of manufactured goods. In world markets, UK 
manufacturing exports become less competitive whilst concurrently, world 
productive capacity in n:anufacturing increases. This creates immense 
competitive pressures (see Hill 1985). Jobs are lost as firms automate, 
restructure, or fail altogether. Unemployment therefore continues to rise 
(Figure 5-3). 
1986 L.ondon Stock Exchange Big Bang. London Stock Exchange opens to international 
financial institutions. These institutions, as new members, make markets in 
stocks and shares, further opening the UK economy to global capital flows. 
Investors' demand for high returns puts pressure on industry to maintain the 
growth of profits and dividends. This emphasis on maximization of shareholder 
value in the short-term contributes to an increase in the use of part-time and 
casual labour (which gives firms greater flexibility whilst also reducing 
overheads). Average job tenure therefore decreases as those in employment 
experience reduced job security (see Hutton 1995). However, the new flexible 
labour market benefits women, who, through greater participation in the 
workforce, enjoy increased incomes and spending power (Hutton 1995:179). 
1987 Black Mondt[y share price correction. Monday October 19th panic selling on the New 
York Stock Exchange affects equity markets worldwide. The share price 
correction is experienced as a crash and investors turn increasingly to cash as a 
safer option. In the UK, companies seeking investment capital find it difficult, 
for a time, to raise funds via share issues on the London Stock Exchange 
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markets. 
1988 Peak of the 1980s credit boom. A reduction in top tax rates to 40% particularly 
benefits high earners in the south-east of England, where property values soar. 
Strong differentials in the value of property between one area of the UK and 
another emerge. This contributes to regional as well as social inequality (see 
Hutton 1995). Feeding on the back of this property boom, however, consumer 
confidence is high and the personal saving ratio sinks to a record low as high 
income households, in particular, continue to take on mortgages, refurbish 
homes and spend on non-essentials (Figure 5-4). 
1990 UK joins the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERlvf). ERM membership is thought by 
the Conservative government to provide a way of gaining control over the 
money supply. But control of interest rates is lost altogether as Germany raises 
its interest rates in order to constrain the inflationary pressure of re-unification. 
The UK financial services market, which had mushroomed during the 1980s 
credit boom, now retrenches and jobs are lost. Confidence in the property 
market collapses and homeowners experience negative equity as the value of 
property falls. Private households now hold £114 of debt for every £100 of 
disposable income - double the 1980 level (Hutton 1995:71). Lenders and 
borrowers alike lose confidence and the boom, which had been feeding on 
itself, comes to an end. A period of credit crunch, reflected in the personal 
saving ratio (Figure 5-4) now acts to correct the credit expansion of the 1980s 
(Figure 5-4). The public sector, in surplus in 1990, slides into the biggest deficit 
in peacetime history (Hutton 1995:76). The economy sinks into recession 
(Figure 5-1). 
• 1990-97 : The Major years [Conservative] [Nov-90 to May-97] 
1990 Maastricht Treaty on European Union. The European Economic Community 
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(EEC) becomes the European Community (EC) and a common accord is 
adopted to achieve political, economic and monetary union. In accordance with 
Article 103, UK economic policies, along with those of other Member States, 
become a matter of common concern to be coordinated within the Council of the 
EU. 
1992 Completion of the Single European Market (SEM). With the removal of trade barriers 
between Member States, along with a process of harmonization of legislation, 
the UK becomes further integrated into a European common market. Whilst 
initially, some sectors of industry bear the cost of adjustment to changes in 
legislation, other sectors experience immediate benefits through greater access 
to markets in continental Europe. 
1993 Post ERM budget cuts. In order to cope with the post-ERM budget deficit, public 
spending is cut and taxes raised. This adds to the problems of those consumers 
already burdened by debt from the 1980s credit boom. Government 
expenditure is severely curtailed as Major sticks to the anti-Keynesian policies of 
the Thatcher years (Figure 5-5). This means that government does not attempt 
to spend its way out of recession. The unemployment rate exceeds 10% for the 
second year running (Figure 5-3). 
1994 Cash for questions affair. Ministers Tim Smith and Neil Hamilton resign amid 
allegations that they had asked questions in Parliament in return for personal 
favours. The sleaze factor in public life now a becomes a central issue and 
pressure for accountability increases. 
1995 Emergence of the 'new magistragl. Government by quango (i.e. Executive Non-
departmental Public Bodies or NDPBs) becomes a significant force. It is 
estimated that 70,000 public appointments can now be made by government 
ministers and that these appointments (including non-political business 
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appointments) show a political bias in favour of a private oligarchy of unelected 
Conservatives dischargingpublic duties (See Hutton 1995:39). This further fuels the 
accountability debate. 
1995 First Nolan Committee report on standards in public life. The first report of the Nolan 
Committee is published and recommendations are made to safeguard the seven 
principles of public life: se!flessness, integriry, objectiviry, accountabiliry, openness, honesry and 
leadership (CSPL 1995). These recommendations address the expected behaviour 
of ministers, civil servan~s, as well as those serving on quangos. The pursuit of 
accountability in public life becomes an explicit goal. 
1995 First National Lottery awards distributed. The five good causes identified in The 
National Lottery Act 1993 begin to receive funding. These five good causes 
include the Arts, and awards are made to a wide range of arts organisations for 
the purposes of capital projects such as theatre refurbishment. 
• 1997-ongoing : The Blair years [Labour] [from May-97] 
Latest available data for the parametric study pertains to 1996. Summary of the 
Blair years is therefore not provided although reference to key events within 
this, the current era, are made in the results and discussion section which 
follow. 
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6. LONG-RUN BEHAVIOUR OF THE UK SUBSIDIZED SECTOR 
[1976-95] 
1 : A rising historical trend in the real cost of opera 
Figure 6-1 shows the relationship between our chosen measures of transformation for 
the main companies of the UK subsidized sector. These measures represent: real 
turnover (finandal value input), employees (a complex input representing both finandal 
and artistic value input, and best understood as expressing labour intensity), and 
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Figure 6-1: Transformational measures: UK subsidized sector (mai-11 conpanies) 
From Figure 6-1 we can see that the real costs of opera (here represented by proxy as 
real turnover) have more than doubled in the twenty year period from the mid 1970s to 
the mid 1990s. At the same time, the labour input required to produce one mainscale 
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opera performance has remained more or less steady (±10%), as has the total annual 
output or number of performances (±10%). Thus, by the mid 1990s, it cost over twice 
as much, in real terms, to produce one opera performance in the subsidized sector, as it 
did in the 1970s. This is a highly significant finding: significant because it tells us very 
clearly that in historical or long-run terms, the financial value input required to produce a 
given quantity of mainscale opera, in the subsidized sector, has been rising year on year 
for the last twenty years, irrespective of downturns or recessionary cycles in the UK 
economy. This finding demands explanation. 
1 a : No single compa'!Y exceptions to the rising cost trend 
Figure 6-2 shows the rise in real turnover in the UK subsidized sector by component 
opera company. It is immediately clear that within the sector there are no exceptions to 
the general trend: in each case real turnover is rising. Thus, within the sector, the real 
cost rise is universal. 
TRENDS IN REAL TURNOVER : UK SUBSIDIZED SECTOR· MAIN COIVPANIES [ROH, ENO, WNO, SO, 
ON] 
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Figure 6-2: Trends in real turnover: UK subsidized sector (main companies) 
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1 b : No abatement in the nsing cost trend 
As can be seen from Figure 6-2 (and Appendix 6-2) there are no two consecutive years 
of decline in turnover. The trend in real costs shows a constant climb from the 1970s 
to the 1990s. Moreover, in the absence of any significant decline, the rising cost trend 
for the sector as a whole looks set to continue into the twenty-first century. If this is 
the case, it suggests that a time will come when the UK government will simply no 
longer be able to afford opera. The question is, when, and in what manner, will this 
point arrive? 
2 : Evidence that the powerhouse driverfollower model persists in the 1990s 
Though we saw from Figure 6-2 that there is homogeneity in terms of the general 
direction of the UK subsidized sector (the rising cost trend was universally expressed), 
certain differences between member companies are apparent. For instance, ROH can 
be seen to have consolidated its position as powerhouse, in terms of total financial value 
input, whilst ENO has tended to lag, in second place, over the period. Moreover, the 
fact that WNO, SO and ON are all grouped around a tight band of turnover level 
suggests that there might be some natural level at which powerhouse benejician·es or followers 
can best function - a kind of optimal level for artistic value. 
2a : ROH is the main dn·ver of the n'se in real costs in the UK subsidized sector 
Due to the distorting effect of ROH, Figure 6-2 does not readily show, however, that 
there are still significant differences between subsidized sector members in terms of the 
relative change in turnover over the period. These turnover differentials are presented 
in Figure 6-3 below. 
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RELATNE CHANGE IN COMPANY TURNOVER : UK SUBSIDIZED SECTOR - MAIN COPIPANIES [ROH, 
ENO, WNO, SO, excluding ON] 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
1--ROH , - 0 - ·ENO --wNO " 00· '···so I 
F-lgure 6-3: Relative change in compm!J turnover: UK subsidized sector (main co?JJj>anies) 
From Figure 6-3 it is apparent that of the companies in the sector, ROH has 
maintained the greatest continuous increase in turnover since 1976, whilst SO has 
shown the least. The marked volatility of the WNO trend is also a feature. But what 
explains these differentials? 
Figure 6-4 and Table 6-1 (together with data in Appendix 6-4) shows an intercompany 
comparison of real turnover rates and components (1976-95) for those sector 
representatives for which sufficient data could be extracted from the published 
accounts (see Appendices section 7). By computing the differential rates of turnover 
rise it can be seen that ROH turnover has risen in the period proportionately more (at 
141 %) than all other sector members (rates not stated in the table are: WNO, 65%; 
and ON, from 1982, 77%). This confirms Figure 6-3 which indicates that ROH is the 
main driver of the overall sector rise in real costs: rising three times as fast as SO, for 
instance. 
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It is worth pointing out that in Figure 6-3 smooth trends generally indicate intrinsic 
behaviour and abrupt changes generally reflect changes in policy or exposure to change 
in the environment e.g. fall in sponsorship and donations income during a period of 
recession in the wider economy. This is further explored below. 
2b : Evidence of subsic!J capture by ROH suggests the existence of pre-agreed funding parities 
Despite changes in the respective public income factors for the companies compared 
between 1976 and 1995 (i.e. the proportion of income sourced from public funds), 
overall, the sharing out of subsidy between ROH, ENO and SO has not changed in 
twenty years (see Table 6-1). This is a major finding, suggesting that subsidy policy for 
opera in the UK has not been examined despite two recessionary periods (one in the 
early 1980s and one in the early 1990s) and declining growth in government 
expenditure on recreational and cultural affairs (see Figure 5-1 and 5-5 respectively). In 
addition, it also suggests that public subsidy is not awarded to opera companies on the 
basis of need, or of merit. 
SUMMARY OF INTERCOMPANY COMPARISON (1976-1995) 
CHANGE IN 1976 1995 1976 1995 
REAL TURNOVER PUBLIC INCOME PUBLIC INCOME REAL PUBLIC % REAL PUBLIC % 
ON 1976 FACTOR FACTOR INCOME SHARE INCOME SHARE 
ROH Gro1..p 141% 55% 34% 11,910,200 52% 17,613,900 53% 
ENO 83% 7(1'/o 54% 7,521,232 33% 10,630,800 32% 
so 45% 65% 62% 3,445,574 15% 4,789,238 14% 
TOTAL 22,877,006 100% 33,033,938 100% 
Sotree : See Appendix 6-4 
Table 6-1: Summary of intercompm!J comparison (1976-95) 
However, the significant turnover increase differential which exists between ROH and 
SO also raises the possibility of significant subsidy capture by ROH. To discover 
whether subsidy capture is occurring (i.e. capturing proportionately more of an available 
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pool of subsidy in such a way as to promote inequity), we need to examine the 
component parts of turnover in our intercompany comparison (sec l'igure 6-4). 
INTERCOM> ANY COM>ARISON OF TURNOVER COMPONENTS 
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Figure 6-4 : I11tercompa1!J comparison of tumover coJJ1po11e11ts 
If we look at what we may term the public income factor (i.e. public sources as a percentage 
of turnover) a term we introduced above, it can be seen that ROH is the only company 
to have reduced its reliance on public sources of income to less than 50% (achieving a 
public income factor of 34% by 1995). Whilst E 0 and SO have also reduced their 
respective public income factors over the period considered, ROI I has, in 
proportionate terms, made the largest reduction (21 percentage poin ts from 55% to 
34%)(see Table 6-1). Superficially, this suggests that ROII has become less dependent 
on public subsidy over the penod 1976-95. 
I Iowever, this does not immediately eliminate the possibility of subsidy capture. Whilst 
the ROH public income factor (the percentage income derived from public sources) 
has fallen in the period (a good result), the percentage share which ROII takes of total 
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available subsidy to the three companies has risen (a bad result). This suggests that 
public subsidy is not awarded on the basis of need. That is, although ROH appears to 
be less dependent on public subsidy by 1995, it still continues to command over 50% 
of the available subsidy to the selected group. Significantly, the po1verhouse followers, here 
ENO and SO, do not benefit from the reduction in public subsidy need exhibited by the 
powerhouse driver (ROH), but appear instead to receive subsidy on the basis of some pre-
agreed parity. 
Why is this? One obvious answer is that government cannot reward increased efficiency 
with a disincentive. That is, an opera company cannot be rewarded with a cut in subsidy 
whenever it makes an improvement in financial efficiency by means of increasing the 
funds it generates from private sector sources. Clearly, a funding system predicated on 
such a disincentive would simply encourage greater inefficiency, if not complete 
collapse. Indeed, it might be expected that companies would cease looking for private 
source income altogether. 
These results suggest, therefore, that there is a fundamental flaw in the whole public 
funding system for opera in the UK. Specifically, it suggests that government is, to 
some extent, held to ransom by gains in efficiency in the sector which it is funding. 
ROH, for instance, seems to have been allowed to capture a slightly increased 
proportion of available subsidy, despite significant improvements in its financial 
efficiency (reduced public income factor). Moreover, these results suggest that subsidy 
is awarded to sector members less on the basis of artistic value and more on the basis of 
accounting ratios (which act to maintain any effective, long-standing parity agreements 
which may exist). Indeed, evidence presented in chapter 7 strongly supports this 
finding. In the course of research for this study, for instance, it was discovered that the 
Arts Council of England (ACE) prefers to see its clients' box office income settle at 
around 40% of total annual income (SC 1998a). This means, in effect, that subsidy is 
currently awarded according to an ad hoc rule, which, because it is predicated on an 
assumption of stasis, does not indicate what the appropriate response to improvements 
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in efficiency might be. Indeed, we must ask, what exactly is the raison d'etre of Arts 
Council Incentive Funding programmes, given our findings here? (For discussion see 
ENO results, chapter 7). 
2c: Evidence of subsitfy capture by ROH audiences 
Intensification funded via increases in ticket yield permits the capture of subsidy, by 
audiences, by excluding those taxpayers who may be sensitive to real price increases. 
Evidence suggests that although ·ROH audiences appear to be paying more in real terms 
for tickets in the mid 1990s than in the mid 1970s, by the end of the survey period 
(1996) they were experiencing greater subsidy capture on a per capita basis. 
In its current manifestation, the allocation of subsidy to individual arts organisations is 
not a precise science. Whilst the thrust of public policy in this area centres on the idea 
of increasing access to the arts, and making the arts as a whole open to all, there is an 
absence of clear objectives (for discussion see Peacock 1994:170). It is perhaps this lack 
of precision which permits the possibility of inequity in subsidy distribution. Arts for all 
(see Peacock 1994:171) can, it seems, easily translate to arts for the few. 
In the context of ticket price rises, two things may occur: exclusion and capture. 
Exclusion occurs where a company's audience becomes concentrated around those 
groups who can afford to pay higher ticket prices. Capture occurs where the company's 
subsidy share is maintained despite improvements in box office income (funded via 
ticket price increases and concentration of audience groups). In this way, those 
audience members least in need of the incentive of subsidized seats (i.e. those who least 
need assistance in gaining access to the artform) effectively get more. Whilst an 
audience, concentrated around those groups less sensitive to price increases (e.g. high 
income groups) may pay higher prices than other opera audiences, it will still receive 
the benefit of subsidy when other audiences may have greater need. 
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From Appendix 7-3 we can see that ROH output (taking output corrected for allowable 
activity, since full group data is not available) has remained steady. Box office income in 
real terms, however, has increased by 141% over the same 20 year period (1976-95) 
(Table 6-1). This combined result suggests that a substantial increase in ticket yield has 
occurred (i.e. the margin made on each ticket sale). 
Note, we can discount the possibility that this real increase in ROH box office income 
is the result simply of better capacity utilisation (fuller houses) since Covent Garden 
would have to have been much more poorly attended in the 1970s for this to be true. 
Moreover, we know that these figures pertain largely to Covent Garden itself, since 
tour income is excluded. This eliminates another potential source of capacity variation 
(see Note (a) in Appendix 6-4) so we can be sure that these figures reflect a relatively 
fixed capacity. 
Since we have ruled out an increase in output as an explanator of increased box office 
income, and an increase in capacity seems very unlikely as an explanator, this means 
that ROH audiences must be paying more, in real terms, for their seats today than they 
did in the 1970s. Whilst it is not the aim of this study to investigate ticket prices, (for 
background see Waters 1989), this finding suggests that ROH audiences, although 
paying more in real terms, nevertheless receive a greater proportion of available subsidy 
than they did in the mid 1970s. Although the proportions are small (e.g. 2 percentage 
point change in share between ROH and ENO; note the 2% differential equates to 
around £6.6 million as per Table 6-1) it suggests that those taxpayers who are least 
price sensitive (i.e. most able to withstand real price increases) are also those who are 
receiving increased per capita subsidy in the 1990s. 
Notwithstanding issues of ticket price spread (it may well be that as top ticket prices 
rise, lower bands fall), the significance of the aggregate rise in ROH box office income 
does imply a concentration of the ROH audience around those groups who are not 
price sensitive i.e. those who can still access performances despite real price increases. 
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This must also have a bearing on artistic value since higher income groups, because of 
their obvious value to the opera company in these circumstances, may be able to 
promote their own artistic tastes and preferences ahead of other groups in the same 
audience. If this is true, it introduces a barrier to full and free participation in the artistic 
value franchise (for further discussion see chapter 7). 
3 : The real rise in the cost of opera reflects an active intensification which is not external!J imposed 
The most important observation we may make from the data presented thus far is that 
there is active investment within the UK subsidized opera sector. Specifically, the real 
rise in the cost of opera does not reflect an increase in output, but an intensification, a 
concentration of resources which, as we shall demonstrate, is not externally imposed. 
Now we have already seen from the data presented in Figure 6-1 and Appendix 6-2 that 
real turnover in the subsidized sector as a whole has more than doubled (showing a rise 
of 120%) between 1976 and 1995. We also saw from Figure 6-1 that output (as 
measured by total UK mainscale performances per year) has remained essentially stable 
(±10%). This combination of factors leads us to discover an underlying financial 
intensification - a steady and universal increase in real spend per performance over the 
period (see Figure 6-5). Thus, whereas in 1978, the earliest year for which we can 
compute this figure, the real average turnover or spend per performance (i.e. the 
average real investment required to produce one mainscale opera performance) was 
£63,000, by 1985 it was £85,000, and by 1995 it was £120,000: a near doubling within 
the period. Such a dramatic increase in financial intensity demands explanation in causal 
terms. 
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Figure 6-J: Trends in real turnover per performance (UK subsidized sector) 
3a: No single factor explains the overall rise in the real cost ef opera, therefore the productiviry lag 
model is not a s'!fficient explanator ef the rising cost trend 
Now, according to the Baumol and Bowen thesis (the productiviry lag or cost disease model, 
discussed in Chapter 3), the rising historical trend in the real cost of opera which we 
have found ought to be explained by the combination, particular to artistic production, 
of wage inflation plus productivity constraints. We shall demonstrate, however, that the 
productiviry lag model does not provide a sufficient explanator of the rising cost trend for 
two reasons: a) no single factor (i.e. labour costs) explains the rising cost trend; and b) 
intrinsic factors cannot be ruled out (e.g. poor management control and/or active 
investment in overheads). 
Table 6-2 shows the staff cost data for ROH (the company which exhibits the fastest 
cost rise in the sector) over the ten year period 1983-93. Whilst ROH group turnover 
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rose by some £22 million in real terms (taking this again as a proxy measure of 
expenditure), staff costs rose by just under £9 million, leaving some £13 million in 
unexplained cost rises. Even although this does not represent the total labour cost of 
the ROH operation (elements of casual labour and subcontracting may be hidden 
within other costs categories such as production) it would indicate that some other 
factor, other than that posited by the Baumol and Bowen productivi(y lag model (i.e. wage 
inflation plus productivity constraint), is responsible for the rise in the real cost of 
opera. 
CALCULATION OF STAFF COSTS IN REAL TERMS: ROYAL OPERA HOUSE, COVENT GARDEN 1983-93 
YEAR EMPLOYEES PERFORMANCES WAGE & SALARY WAGE & SALARY AVERAGE TURNOVER TURNOVER UNIT LABOUR COST 
COSTS [CURREITT] COSTS [CONSTAITT] REMUNERATION [CONSTAITT] [CONST Am] PER PERFORMANCE 
Group total RO+RB perf01TI1ances Net of Social Security Net of Social Secllity Avg remlllCration Group total (£) Corrected fOf (£] 
al Covent Garden and pension costs(£) and pension costs (£) [constant) per allowable activity 
employee(£) (£ 
1983 1043 236 11,510,000 17,955,600 17,215 29,463,720 23,994,619 72.9 
1984 1042 228 12,359,000 18,662,090 17,910 34,803,990 28,322,496 78.6 
1985 1045 259 11,712,000 16,748,160 16,027 33,949,630 27,063,751 61.9 
1986 1051 268 12,645,000 17,576,550 16,724 36,612,600 29,525,755 62.4 
1987 1044 235 15,163,000 20,166,790 19,317 40,4n,220 31,006,756 82.2 
1988 1033 256 16,170,000 20,535,900 19,880 39,~46,810 33,045,591 n.1 
1989 1073 257 18,018,000 21,081,060 19,647 41,027,220 35,026,817 76.4 
1990 1112 249 22,035,000 23,577,450 21,203 42,248,950 36,5n,918 85.2 
1991 1152 233 24,321,000 24,321,000 21,112 44, 129,000 37,135,000 90.6 
1992 1128 27,669,000 26,562,240 23,548 46,803,840 39,716,160 
1993 1096 271 28,529,000 26,817,260 24,468 51,532,680 41,657,980 90.3 
PERCENTAGE INCREASE ON 1983 49% 75% 74% 24% 
ABSCX.UTE INCREASE ON 1983 8.862 milion 22069nilion 17.663 million! 17.3 
Source: See Appendix~ 
Tab/,e 6-2: Real staff costs - ROH 1983-93 
However, if we look at the dynamics of the actual staff costs in Table 6-2, it can be seen 
that the real rise in wages and salaries which it shows has been driven by a steady 
increase in average remuneration per employee. In concise terms: over the given 
period, the same number of staff (±10%) have been paying themselves more to 
produce the same number of mainscale opera performances per annum (±10%, as per 
Figure 6-1). 
Clearly, then, ROH wages and salaries have been rising at a faster rate than inflation: a 
finding which appears to substantiate the Baumol and Bowen thesis. Indeed, in some 
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years, the rise is spectacular e.g. 16% between 1986 and 1987, and 12% between 1991 
and 1992. This suggests three possible causal factors: changes in working practices, 
changes in contract terms, or straight rises in the value of remuneration (caused by 
extrinsic forces); all of which, again, are consistent with the Baumol and Bowen thesis. 
However, for the Baumol and Bowen thesis or productiviry lag model to be true, in this 
context, these factors (applying equally to any other hidden labour costs) would need to 
count as the sole or sufficient explanators of the cost rise. 
But as we have seen, wage costs alone account for only 40%, approximately, of the 
overall cost increase between 1983 and 1993 at ROH. Even if we doubled this, to make 
allowance for possible hidden labour costs (as discussed above), a significant 
proportion of the cost increase (20%) would still remain unexplained. How then can we 
explain the overall rise in the real cost of opera? Table 6-3 presents a component 
breakdown of cost increases at ROH over the same ten year period (1983-93). 
Significantly, the table clearly shows that there is no single factor which explains the 
overall cost rise. 
Now, the breakdown in Table 6-3 follows the main cost components as reported in the 
published accounts of ROH. Note that the total £28 million rise in real costs explained 
in this table exceeds the £22 million rise in real turnover that we seek to explain in 
Table 6-2. This is because of possible double counting (the constituent parts of these 
cost components are not reported in detail and may change over time) and because of 
the fact that total expenditure figures (as per the income and expenditure account) are 
not reported in a consistent and reliable form from year to year. Nevertheless, the data 
in both tables is internally consistent. 
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EXPLANATION OF COST INCREASES IN REAL TERMS: ROYAL OPERA HOUSE, COVENT GARDEN 1983-93 
COST 1983 % 1993 % ABSOLUTE 
COMPONENT [CONSTANT] SHARE [CONSTANT] SHARE INCREASE 
£ £ 1983-93 
ROH Group (£million) 
Performance & rehearsal 13,136,760 28% 20,007,900 27% 6.871 
Production, staging & transport 7,133,880 15% 12,177,700 16% 5.044 
Administration & premises 5,311,800 11% 9,886,920 13% 4.575 
UK & overseas touring 3,160,560 7% 5,970,880 8% 2.810 
Wage & salaries 17,955,600 38% 26,817,260 36% 8.862 
(net Social Security & pensions) 
TOTAL 46,698,600 100% 74,860,660 100% 
ABSOLUTE INCREASE ON 1983 28.162 million 
Source: see Appendix 6-7 
Table 6-3: Explanation of increases in real costs - ROH 1983-9 3 
Two features, however, are significant in table 6-3. Firstly, no single factor explains the 
overall rise in the real cost of opera. For instance, even although performance 
(performance and rehearsal) and production (Production, staging and transport) costs 
are taken together, at £12 million, they still account for less than half the £28 million 
cost rise we seek to explain. Secondly, the distribution of cost remains static over the 
ten year interval, suggesting that individual departments or functions spend, 
independently, to their respective budget maximums, and that ROH budgeting policy, 
as a whole, is static. 
This second feature is particularly surprising since, in the long-term, we would expect to 
see variation in the underlying pattern of costs. Specifically, we would expect to see 
variation in the rate of growth of individual costs or cost group components (especially 
if, as the Baumol and Bowen thesis posits, an element of hidden labour is contained 
within each). In fact, in their study of Metropolitan Opera personnel costs, Baumol and 
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Bowen discovered precisely this effect; finding significant variation in the rate of 
growth of wages and salaries across different functions, so that wardrobe and scenery 
personnel costs rose, for instance, much more slowly than other department personnel 
costs (Baumol and Bowen 1966:212). 
There are many reasons for such variation. Compliance with new Health and Safety 
regulations, for instance, might mean that two technical personnel are required to 
oversee certain items of scenery equipment where formerly, one was sufficient. This 
would immediately increase the variable costs of performance at a faster rate than 
before introduction of the reguiations. The same would apply to non-labour costs: 
some materials costs, such as special paints and fabrics, might rise more quickly than 
other production costs because of external factors e.g. monopoly position of suppliers, 
exchange rate fluctuations, cost of suppliers' own Health and Safety compliance and so 
forth. 
The fact that the overall distribution of ROH costs has remained static suggests that 
budgeting policy has not been examined in ten years, and that departments or functions 
spend their respective budgets to the full, even though some may be considerably less 
cash-strapped than others. This is akin to a hospital model of funding, which works on 
the basis of allocating budgets to functions which operate in a way largely independent 
of each other e.g. orthopaedics will use the services of the radiography department, but 
each has its own budget and each, therefore, its own resource allocation to defend. 
There is no natural incentive for departments to show financial efficiency in this model 
(i.e. to deliver a full service and, where possible, return a budget surplus) since this is 
likely to incur the penalty of a reduced budget allocation in the following year. 
We may infer, then, that some departments or functions at ROH have enjoyed, or are 
enjoying, a period of feast relative to the famine of others, precisely because budgeting 
does not appear to reflect expected cost growth rate differentials. Such a situation has 
profound implications for artistic value and may explain something of the company's 
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apparent preoccupation with detail in the visual design aspects of production (such as 
authentic costumes made with real leather which have to be replaced between 
productions or even repeatedly remade within one production run of a work 
(SC1999a). Whilst this evidence is anecdotal, it does suggest that there has at least been 
room to manoeuvre within the ROH wardrobe budget in the past. 
More specifically, it is worth noting, in this context, the pattern of change in average 
remuneration shown in Table 6-2. The sudden and significant rises in 1986, 1987, and 
1992 (as described above) suggest a policy of wage rise deferral. Deferral or 
postponement of costs (such as.wages) introduces an element of instability, since cost 
behaviour becomes less predicable and cost discontinuities, in the short-run, disrupt 
management planning. So, whilst apparently discounted in the long-run, we can be sure 
that these cost differentials do indeed occur. 
Now, in addition, it is also clear that the overall cost rise in opera cannot be solely due 
to what is often termed, the star system (i.e. the increasing fees paid to a relatively small 
elite of guest artists) because real expenditure has risen on all fronts. The star system, as 
Baumol and Bowen also posit, may be a contributory factor, but it is not a sufficient 
explanator of the real cost rise in opera. It is also worth noting that reliable data on 
guest artist fees cannot be ascertained from the published annual accounts and reports 
since guest artist fees are not reported as a separable item (the same problem which 
Baumol and Bowen encountered over thirty years ago). Indeed, in the main, it is not 
possible to ascertain under what expenditure heading such fees are subsumed (i.e. as 
production costs or performance costs). This means we cannot rule out the possibility 
that the total labour costs of everyone involved in the production of opera (i.e. guest 
artists plus management, administration, technical, wardrobe and music personnel) not 
just the stars alone, constitutes the main factor driving the real rise in the cost of opera. 
To this extent, then, we cannot conclusively disprove the Baumol and Bowen thesis. 
Equally, however, the Baumol and Bowen thesis does not take account of changes in 
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investment (what we may term, technical elaboration). The implicit assumption of the 
Baumol and Bowen thesis is that arts organizations, such as opera companies, are 
technical efficiency maximizers, or at least, that they are cost minimizers: using staving-off 
procedures and cost cutting exercises to maintain viability (see, for instance, Baumol 
and Bowen 1966:156). But this does not allow for the possibility of profligacy and poor 
budgeting and purchasing management skills, a recent example of which was revealed 
by the Department of Culture Media and Sport Select Committee inquiry into the 
closure plans for ROH: 
Lord Chadlington [Chairm~ of the Board] said that the financial information available 
to the management did not reflect the wider consequences of financial decisions and was 
~nadequate in the extreme~ Sir Jeremy Isaacs [General Director] and Sir Angus Stirling 
[former Chairman of the Board] disputed this picture of financial management. 
According to the latter, a finance committee 'examined, month f?y month, the actual projected 
income against budget, and against reports f?y the management~ We requested from the Royal 
Opera House a month f?y month balance sheet to demonstrate the path of the deficit. In rep!J, 
Ms Allen [then Chief Executive] stated that ~tis not possible to let you have the 
financial information you have asked for, since the Rqyal Opera House has not in the past 
produced it. It has been a source of concern to me and to Richard Hall [then Finance 
Director] since our am·val, that we have neither month!J balance sheets nor n1onth!J profit 
and loss accounts' (DCMS SC1 1997:IV). 
Our results, then, strongly suggest that poor management control is an issue worthy of 
further consideration. 
Indeed, it is now time to question the central assumption of the Baumol and Bowen 
thesis, that: waste and mismanagement which have clear!J aggravated the financial problems of the 
arts ... are not the main culprits (Baumol and Bowen 1966:10). It is also time to test for the 
possibility of active investment. Specifically, there is need to test for passive cost creep 
versus active investment. 
Overall, the peculiarly static nature of cost behaviour we have found also suggests that 
it is worth testing a new hypothesis: that the productivity lag or cost disease rationale for 
public subsidization of opera has become self-fulfilling; that in the long-run, the 
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medicine of subsidy may fuel rather than fight cost disease, and that opera companies in 
the UK may have become acculturated to a policy of budget maximisation, knowing 
that, in effect, to spend is to receive. Interestingly, the question of budget maximization 
behaviour is also considered by Mokre (1996) in the context of a study of Austrian 
theatre funding. 
3b: The historical trend in the real cost of opera represents opera value inflation 
The real increase in the cost of opera which we have discovered is not explained by 
productiviry lag (i.e. by the Baumol and Bowen thesis), or by the effect of exposure to 
other extrinsic factors in the environment (such as recessionary cycles). This indicates 
the existence of an inflationary process and suggests that the real rise in cost is being 
driven by a range of factors intrinsic to the international opera market (i.e. intrasector 
factor pricing). In sum, we have found opera value inflation (Figure 6-6); and inflation 
which, it is likely, is imported from countries in which opera receives more generous 
public funding. 
By intrasector factor pricing, we mean the setting and controlling of factor prices 
(chiefly labour, in the form of guest artists) by, or within, the international opera 
community itsel£ The cultivation of star conductors, designers, directors and singers, 
for instance (the cultivation of a perceived elite i.e. the cultivation of scarcity value) 
creates a financial value disequilibrium: because there exists a market for such an elite, 
demand will consistently outstrip supply, all things being equal. This, in tum, will tend 
to drive costs up and the ceiling here may well be what the market can bear. Since the 
market for guest artist stars is international, those opera companies with the greatest 
purchasing power will, effectively, set the price which others must follow if they are to 
compete for the same factors. This sets an inflationary process in motion, a process 
which, because of the problem of long planning horizons and potential competitive 
bidding, may well take on the quality of a full-scale futures market. The significant point 
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here is that in the UK, this type of opera value inflation may well be imported from those 
countries in which opera receives more generous public funding, such as Austria, 
Germany and Italy, for example (see Priestley 1983 and Myerscough 1984). 
The effects of this inflationary process are likely to be felt across the whole organisation 
(i.e. across all those departments or functions of the opera company directly concerned 
with the production of opera). 
Designers and directors, it must be remembered, through the sum of their activity, 
create stylistic or artistic paradigms of what is, at any give time, considered to be of 
particular artistic value in the international opera market. The favoured stars or rising 
stars of opera stage design and direction, by virtue of their activities within an 
internationalised opera market, create prevailing fashions which opera companies 
seeking international status feel obliged to follow. It is a self-defining activity (the 
deliberate creation of scarcity nithin the opera market) which also sets the level of 
financial value required to meet the canon or artistic value standard. These fashions or style 
paradigms (e.g. minimalism, updated opera; for Wagner examples see Nattiez 1989) 
represent another cost which must be borne by the host company. Not only must the 
host company pay the guest designer's fee, for instance, it must follow, in effect, the 
investment criteria set by the designer (sets, props and possibly also wardrobe). If the 
guest designer chooses to pursue an ambitious or costly project, there is little the opera 
company can do if it wishes to build up its reputation in an international market where 
artistic value standards are set according to criteria over which it has no control. In other 
words, the company must follow the canon whatever the cost. 
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1976 19n 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1sa1 19aa 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
INDEX 0.73 0.69 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.29 1.20 1.26 1.33 1.27 1.28 1.35 1.48 1.17 1.49 1.53 1.63 1.91 
Ft''gure 6-6: Opera value ieflation 
Exposure to opera value ieflation in this way is exacerbated in the UK, at least, by the 
overall homogeneity of the opera infrastructure (see earlier findings in this chapter). 
Were a truly competitive model or infrastructure to be in place, it is likely that different 
companies would pursue different artistic strategies, and therefore different audiences, 
so that a single international market for opera stars, and therefore dominant artistic value 
paradigms (which setfl11a11cial value input levels) would not exist to the same extent. (For 
calculation of the opera value hiflation index see Appendix 6-1). 
3c: The pursuit of economies of scale by the UK subsidi.zed sector mqy indi.cate response to opera value 
ieflation 
Across the UK subsidized sector as a whole, management of the yearly production 
portfolio reveals the pursuit of certain economies of scale, specifically: a narrowing of 
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the yearly production portfolio coupled with extension of the average production run. 
We can infer that this action has been taken in response to the problem of opera value 
inflation. 
Whilst the real cost of opera has risen, output (total performances in year) has 
remained essentially flat (see again, Figure 6-1). From this we established that there has 
occurred a near doubling of real spend per performance since the 1970s (see Finding 3). 
We also established, using that cost data which was available and which was reliable, 
that actual real costs have, consistently, risen faster than inflation; and that this 
indicated the existence of opera value il!flation (see Finding 3c). 
Now the pursuit of economies of scale, which is the putative response to this 
inflationary pressure, is illustrated in Figures 6-7 and 6-8. 
Figure 6-7 confirms that very little change has occurred in the output of the UK 
subsidized sector since the 1970s (trends in output, as measured by total mainscale 
opera performances per year, have remained essentially flat), ENO is the only company 
to show significant change. 
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Figure 6-7: Calculated linear trends in output (UK subsidi,zed sector) 
However, Figure 6-7, whilst based on imperfect data for the sector as a whole (see 
Appendix 6-8) illustrates the existence of a non-random effect within the context of 
this static output, that is: a narrowing of the yearly production portfolio coupled with 
extension of the average production run. This is significant, suggesting, as we would 
expect, that investing more in a single production (as the increased real spend per 
performance here implies) necessitates a longer production run if that investment is to 
have any chance of being properly recouped. So this relationship between yearly 
productions and production runs, as demonstrated in Figure 6-8, is not accidental: it 
indicates the pursuit of economies of scale. 
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OUTPUT TRENDS : UK SUBSIDIZED SECTOR - MAIN COMAPNIES [ROH, ENO, WNO, SO, ON] 
30 ,-------------------------------T"30 
Source : .see Appendix 6-8 
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Figure 6-8: Trends in output of UK subsidized sector (by productions and production mns) 
The mechanism by which these economies of scale may result can be explained as 
follows: 
a) a narrowing of the production portfolio, all things being equal, brings about: 
a reduction in set-up costs (fewer changes of production set); possible savings 
on overall scenery and workshop costs; and overall savings in wardrobe, 
rehearsal and administration costs (e.g. marketing literature and programmes). 
b) a concomitant lengthening of the average production run increases the 
number of performances over which costs (including the aforementioned costs) 
may be recovered. 
It is also feasible that there may be savings in guest artist fees, although much depends 
on contract and remuneration packages, as well as on the need for double casting. In 
theory there ought to be savings since on a simple price-volume basis, a longer 
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production run better utilizes the guest artists contracted for that run. That is, every 
guest artist, whether conductor, designer or singer, has to learn the score, and that 
represents a set-up cost to the opera company and an opportunity cost to the guest 
artist (if he or she does not already know the work). This cost will be incurred, all 
things being equal, whether or not the production gets beyond dress rehearsal stage. In 
theory, the set-up cost to the opera company (and opportunity cost to the artist) 
represents the fixed cost element of a guest artist's contract: although it may never be 
explicitly identified as such by either the opera company or the artist's agent. The cost 
of the artist's appearances on each successive performance, or repetition, in the 
production run, represents a variable cost. Leaving technical details aside, it is clear that 
a production run lasting a single performance only is not going to utilize or spread the 
burden of the set-up cost to the same extent as a production run of, say, ten 
performances. 
In practice, however, the situation as regards guest artist fees may well be very different, 
since: a) production runs cannot be extended to an infinite degree (singers become 
exhausted and double casting therefore becomes imperative); b) longer production runs 
are not necessarily attractive to all guest artists (if demand for guest artists exceeds 
supply, artists may prefer to pick and choose among potential contracts); and c) where 
an opera company operates in a fixed geographical market, there may not be sufficient 
demand for production runs of a given work above a certain length. 
So, whilst we cannot establish with certainty the exact nature of the economies of scale 
which are likely to result from a narrowing of the yearly production portfolio, we can 
see that pursuit of such economies may have a major effect on the artistic output of the 
UK subsidized opera sector: as opera value ieflation and the existence of artisti.c value 
paradigms (which set financial value input levels) tend to drive the value of investment in 
individual productions upwards, so the need to pursue economies of scale (cutting the 
number of productions and increasing production run length) becomes imperative. 
This reduces audience choice, and unless individual audience members are prepared to 
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attend more than one performance of the same work within a season, implies a 
widening of the audience base. 
4 : A universal drive towards greater financial intensiry 
A strong drive towards greater financial intensity is exhibited by each respective 
company in the survey (excepting Opera Restor'd, for which there is insufficient data). 
Between the 1970s and the 1990s there has, as a result, occurred a universal increase in 
real spend per performance i.e. an increase which includes our private sector 
comparator, GP. This is demonstrated in Figure 6-9, the summary taxonomy plot of 
sample companies which is introduced and discussed below. 
Now movement within the taxonomy plot represents a change in intensity: a 
movement rightwards indicates an increase in financial intensity (more money spent in 
real terms per performance), whilst a movement upwards indicates an increase in labour 
intensity (more people required to produce one performance). Movement upwards also 
indicates increasing concentration - in this case an increase in the burden of overhead 
caused by wages and salaries. Overall, however, movement within the taxonomy plot is 
always the product of change in one or more of three factors or variables (turnover, 
employees, performances). This introduces complexity so that an increase in intensity 
expressing itself as a movement upwards and rightwards may be explained by more than 
one causal mechanism e.g. maintaining staff and cutting performances during periods of 
short-term financial crisis will produce the same result as employing more staff and 
spending more to produce the same number of performances. But whatever the causal 
mechanism, a movement upwards and/ or rightwards always indicates an increase in 
intensity. 
The measurement of intensity is important because it gives us an insight into the 
relationship, and the implications of the relationship, between artistic value and financial 
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value, We demonstrate this in Table 6-4 by constructing a simple Boston matrix (for 
discussion of Boston Consulting Group models, see Johnston and Scholes (1984:343-
7): 
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LOW VALUE HIGH VALUE 
HIGH SCALE HIGH SCALE 
LOW VALUE HIGH VALUE 
LOW SCALE LOW SCALE 
FINANCIAL INTENSITY 
(value put into performances) 
Tabk 6-4 : Intensiry matrix 
Now in the context of the matrix, labour intensity, or scale, equates to degree of 
establishment. That is, when a full time opera company becomes more labour intense, 
it makes, in effect, an investment in overheads (e.g. salaries) some of which may be in 
the form of fixed assets (e.g. purchase rather than lease of a theatre, purchase of 
workshops and offices). That is, the greater the investment in overhead (whether fixed 
or variable), the greater the degree of establishment. A company which does not invest 
in establishment or overhead in this way, we may term a production operation. An opera 
company conforming to the pure production model would typically work on a project 
basis, employing its labour on short-term contract and operating from a temporary 
physical base. A pure establishment company would work in the opposite way. Hence, we 
may refine our initial Boston matrix as follows (see Table 6-5): 
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LOW VALUE HIGH VALUE 
ESTABLISHMENT ESTABLISHMENT 
LOW VALUE HIGH VALUE 
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION 
FINANCIAL INTENSITY 
(value put into performances) 
Table 6-J: Establishment matrix 
The establishment matrix gives a relative measure of the cost of a powerhouse operation 
such as ROH. If we were to place GP (Glyndebourne Touring + Festival Opera) within 
the matrix, it would (because of relatively low overheads) occupy a position somewhere 
within the lower quadrants. Whereas, ROH would, as we shall see, occupy the upper 
right quadrant. 
We can now proceed to construct and interpret our taxonomy of opera. Figure 6-9 (as 
introduced above) represents the summary taxonomy plot for all the opera companies 
examined in this study. Data points on the plot represent the average taxonomic 
position for each company during the stated decade (1970s, 1980s, 1990s). 
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TAXONOMY PLOT: SUIWMRY OF COMPANIES 
Sa.roe : see Appendix 6-9 
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Figure 6-9 : Taxonomy plot : summary of companies 
.0 
Now the rightwards drift demonstrated by each of the companies in the summary 
taxonomy (Figure 6-9) reflects the real rise in turnover which we have already 
identified. But because the taxonomy expresses spend per performance, it also gives a 
clear indication of intensity. The position of Opera Restor'd, as a comparator smallscale 
company, provides a useful calibration of scale: illustrating a different type of operation 
(high labour intensity and very low investment per performance). 
Figure 6-10 shows how we can analyse this summary taxonomy plot in terms of the 
Boston matrix developed above. 
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TAXONOMY PLOT ANALYSED AS BOSTON MATRIX: SUMMARY OF COMPANIES 
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Figure 6-10 : Taxonomy plot ana!Jsed as Boston matrix : summary of companies 
The greatest overall movement is exhibited by ROH and ENO respectively. This 
confirms a degree of differentiation in terms of investment and rate of intensification 
between these and the remaining subsidized sector members. The taxonomy plot 
summary here confirms the results presented in Figure 6-8 and demonstrates, again, the 
persistence of the powerhouse model (see finding 2 and discussion in chapter 3). 
With the exception of ENO (which disaggregated its northern division in the early 
1980s) and ON (the result of that disaggregation), a universal intensification in terms of 
labour input is demonstrated in the plot. Overall, however, this labour intensification is 
insignificant compared with the increase in financial intensity or rightwards drive 
towards higher value bases of operation. 
It is difficult to establish at this stage why there should exist such a strong movement 
towards greater financial intensity and therefore greater establishment. There is indeed a 
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marked preference towards investment in overhead. Now it may be that in the context 
of scarce resources (subsidy, sponsorship, and box office income are all subject to 
volatility) that investment in establishment confirms the full-time presence of the opera 
company, thereby raising the effective cost of its failure in terms of externalities (wider 
social benefits). For instance, the more full-time employees, the greater the physical 
establishment in terms of office, workshop, storage and theatre space owned or at least 
occupied on long-term lease, the more tangible the company's existence. This increased 
sense of security, in effect, gives the opera company greater leverage on its public 
funders. The exception here is Glyndebourne Productions, which, in proportionate 
terms, receives such a small amount of public subsidy, that the investment in 
establishment, whilst it may still represent an investment in security, is likely to have 
been pursued for other reasons. 
5 : The increase in financial intensi!J ef the UK subsidi.zed sector representr a value shift which 
demonstrates the existence ef pre-agreed public funding parities 
The UK subsidized sector, when considered in aggregate, exhibits an increase in 
financial intensity between the 1980s and 1990s. Because the relative taxonomic 
positions of the companies within the sector remain unchanged during this period of 
financial intensification, the financial intensification across the sector as a whole 
expresses itself as a rightward, but not upward, value or intensity shift. This value shift 
indicates not only a high degree of homogeneity within the sector, but suggests the 
influence of a centralised and fixed infrastructure i.e. the existence of pre-agreed public 
funding parities. We can demonstrate this finding by reference to the summary 
taxonomy plot (Figure 6-9). 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the summary taxonomy plot (presented earlier 
in Figure 6-9) is the clustering of activity which can be seen in the two quadrants 
defined by the £50,000-£100,000 turnover per performance and 1-3 employees per 
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performance range. Again we might ask whether this reflects a natural or optimal level 
for operation of a powerhouse follower opera company? (see finding 2). By considering the 
companies of the subsidized sector as a whole (excluding ON as a late and not fully 
established entrant in the 1980s) we can compare the behaviour of the sector in 
aggregate in the 1980s with that of the 1990s, and so seek to explain this clustering. 
These results are presented in Figure 6-11. 
.. 
TAXONOMY PLOT : UK SUBSIDIZED SECTOR VALUE SHIFT 
Saree: see Appendix 6-9 
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Figure 6-11 : Taxonomy plot: UK subsidized sector value shift 
The first striking feature demonstrated in Figure 6-11 is that the four sector 
representatives exhibit a non-random distribution: they appear to lie on what we might 
term an intensi(Y or value curve. The curve slopes upwards and rightwards indicating that 
an increase in financial intensity is matched to some degree by an increase in labour 
intensity. The curve therefore suggests that there is an implied route to powerhouse 
position (see chapter 3 for discussion). However, only by plotting the 1990s data do we 
see the full significance of the data: the whole curve shifts rightwards over time, 
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indicating a sector-wide increase in financial intensity in which the relative positions of 
the sector members remain relatively unchanged. This confirms the existence of pre-
agreed public funding parities, although, interestingly, movement by ROH does suggest 
that the powerhouse itself has been permitted to accelerate away. 
5a : Evidence of fixed infrastructure and non-competitive behaviour suggests persistence of service-
provision model 
We can infer from the lack of significant differentiation (absence of breakout from the 
intensity or value curoe) that UK subsidized sector members are not in real competition 
with one another, which means that they cannot be in real artistic value competition. 
Indeed, the strong homogeneity of the sector suggests that sector members, in addition 
to following a powerhouse driver, are operating as part of a relatively fixed infrastructure. 
Such a fixed infrastructure would result where some degree of centralized control or 
central influence is evident. In this case, the shifting curve suggests response to a single 
influence within the environment, such as government policy (here delivered via the 
mechanism of the Arts Council of Great Britain). This non-competitive behaviour 
suggests that the sector is also operating according to the public service provision model 
(see discussion in chapter 3). Indeed, the sector behaviour observed in 6-11 is too 
unified to be explained in any other way. 
For instance, Figure 6-11 shows that the powerhouse hierarchy is maintained, but that the 
powerhouse followers, ENO, WNO and SO, have by the 1990s grown more closely 
together in terms of financial and labour intensity. This tends to suggest that the sector 
is being influenced by a centralised opera subsidy policy in which the goal of 
distributive efficiency (provision of a cultural service, with access for all; see Peacock 
1994) supervenes any value goal (creation and maximization of artistic value through 
support of artistic innovation) (for discussion see chapter 7). This must be the case, 
since any substantive artistic innovation (e.g. redefining the concept of opera) would 
Sa/Ly LK Garden 217 
6. Lont.-ron behf1Vio11r o[the UK subsidized sector [1976-9 5J 
only result from a major change in operational model i.e. breakout from the intensity or 
value curve). 
That the goal of public service provision supervenes the primary goal of the powerhouse 
model (which is to drive quality through the sector) then, may explain why the 
powerhouse has been allowed to accelerate away, and why the powerhouse followers appear to 
operate at a common level of turnover and intensity, which is to say: not so much at an 
optimal level for the creation and maximization of artistic value (see finding 2) but at an 
optimal level for the provision of an existing opera service in which artistic value is 
treated as a given (i.e. as an exogenous variable). 
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7. LONG-RUN BEHAVIOUR OF INDIVIDUAL OPERA COMPANIES 
[1976-95] 
7 .1 Introduction 
To date, no comparable long-run study of this nature has been undertaken in the 
context of opera. Presentation of results by individual company therefore affords an 
important opportunity not only to discover evidence of individual company strategies, 
but to assess management performance, and test for the influence of, or isolation from, 
the environment. 
In this section, the taxonomy plot results are presented for each sample company in 
tum (excepting Opera Restor'd which was earlier introduced for comparative purposes 
only). Interpretation of plot data is aided by reference to financial data extracted from 
the published annual reports and accounts (Appendices section 7), and from such 
supporting qualitative data as exists within these published accounts (e.g. Chairmans' 
reports, notes to the accounts). 
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7 .2 Scottish Opera 
Taxonomy plot data for SO is presented in Appendix 7-1. Supporting financial data, as 
extracted from the published accounts is presented in Appendix 7-2. 
Note, due to the adoption of minimal reporting standards by SO over the period 1969-
75, there is insufficient data to construct the taxonomy plot for these years. 
TAXONOMY PLOT: SCOTTISH OPERA 
5.0.--------r-------.-------..,----------, 
•1968 
1966 0.0 _.___,..,::;.;....i._ __ __._ _____ ___. _______ ....__ _____ __. 
TURNOVER [CONST.ANT] I PERFO~ (£000) 
Flgure 7-1 : Taxonomy plot: Scottish Opera 
1 : Evidence of an immediate post-incorporation drive towards intensification and expansion 
SO was incorporated in 1962. During the 1960s, the period of early establishment of 
SO, there is evidence of an immediate desire to change the operational basis of the 
company by increasing labour and financial intensity, and by expansion of output. 
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Whilst SO began, in terms of our taxonomy, as a low value production outfit (see 
Figure 6-10), evidence suggests that from the outset, management equated permanence 
(i.e. greater establishment of the company) with stability (viz SO ARA 1964-69 in 
particular). In the immediate post-incorporation years, the need to establish the full-
time presence of the company quickly became the overriding goal. 
Thus, whilst the start-up phase of SO can be seen to be one of relatively low intensity 
and part-time activity, it is clear that management did not believe this to provide a 
sustainable basis of operation. This is worth exploring. 
Now although the initial part-time basis of the company's activities, together with a 
strong reliance on voluntary effort in the management function, produced a low (fixed) 
overhead to variable cost ratio i.e. flexibility, this flexibility was not considered a virtue. 
There are two possible explanations. 
Firstly, in the relatively stable, mass market environment of the 1960s (see discussion in 
Chapter 5) flexibility, that is the ability to adapt in the short-term to sudden or major 
changes in the environment, was not considered a priority. It was certainly not an 
integral part of the management canon of the time (see, for instance Kotler 1984). 
Secondly, and more importantly, in the context of a non-profit organisation, all things 
being equal, it is difficult for managers themselves to equate confidence in the future 
with an uncertain salary income. Indeed, maintenance of the non-profit, low value 
production outfit (such as represented by SO in the 1960s) demands an entrepreneurial 
and tactical approach to the future. In the absence of profits and special external 
incentives, it cannot be expected that managers will forego the security of a permanent 
salaried post for the relative risk and insecurity of a part-time, flexible operation (in 
which management may be no more secure than the casual labour it employs or the 
contractors it engages). 
The question here is : should the future of opera as an artform be premised upon the 
trade-off which a few key individuals may be required to make between what is best for 
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the company and what is best for their own security? That is, the future adaptability of 
the organisation versus the personal financial security of the management function. Is it 
right that the whole operational basis of an opera company should effectively be 
decided by such a simple financial value issue? Is there perhaps a role for government at 
this delicate stage in an opera company's genesis? 
One further observation may be made here regarding the relationship between 
expansion of output and labour intensification. Although complex, there is a 
relationship between level of output (number of performances) and the need for full-
time management input. The question is, which is driving which at any one time? That 
is, does the need for increased artistic output drive the need to invest in overhead 
(management salaries) or does the need to justify management overhead (financial value) 
drive the increase in artistic output; and what are the consequences for artistic value? 
2 : Evidence of ear!J overexpansion 
Within five years of its inaugural season in 1962, SO was in financial difficulty as the 
result of overexpansion. To counter this crisis, emergency or rescue funding was 
provided from public sources (in the form of special deficit grants) in both 1967 and 
1968 (Figure 7-3). 
Now, in the context of this study, we use the term expansion to mean expansion of 
output (i.e. increase in the number of performances per annum), and overexpansion to 
mean too fast an increase in output relative to the underlying financial strength of the 
expanding organisation. 
The causal factors underlying this early overexpansion at SO are outlined in the 
Chairman's report for the year end 1966. Briefly, these can be identified as : fall in box 
office income, increase in establishment costs (i.e. fixed overheads such as salaries) and 
mismanagement of production costs (specifically, the failure to institute an adequate 
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budgeting mechanism): 
Unfortunate/y neither Falstaff nor Walkure drew capaciry audiences and box office returns 
were considerab/y lower than in 1965. The compa'!Y also ran into financial difficulties owing 
to the stage reached in developing a permanent compa'!Y with a fall time staff, and particular/y 
the expansion of our own workshop and costumes department at Stobcross House. The 
production costs of this year's new 1vorks, and particular/y of the wardrobe department, 
considerab/y exceeded the estimates, and as the difficulry emerged on/y a short interval before 
the season these costs were unavoidable ... The directors have anxious/y considered wqys of 
avoiding increasing losses while still attempting the very high artistic standards now expected of 
the company, and have approached the Corporations of Edinburgh and Glasgow and the 
Scottish Committee of the Arts Council far additional help to reduce this burden, and far an 
assurance of future grants to enable the compa'!Y to plan ahead with c01!fidence. At the same 
time steps are being taken to exercise closer control over ordering and spending and to put 
work in hand as far as practicable at a much earlier date in the year to avoid such an 
emergenry recurring (SO ARA 1966). 
The overexpansion itself (i.e. increase in output post-incorporation to the late 1960s) 
can be seen in Figure 7-2. The consequences of that overexpansion Oarger current 
deficits to 1966 and an overall increase in accumulated deficit) can be seen in 7-3. 
There are some other observations we may make regarding this overexpansion. Firstly, 
it appears to have been fuelled by an accelerating reliance on public sources of income. 
Whilst in the inaugural season (1963a) the company's public income factor was only 
22%, by 1966 it had passed the 50% threshold (at 57%) (see Appendix 7-2). 
Furthermore, there is evidence of a curious trade-off between artistic value and financial 
value (which can be seen in the 1965 balance sheet) which suggests that management 
were over optimistic. Funds which could have been invested directly into the 
transformation process itself i.e. managed in such a way as to provide a future income 
stream for the production of opera (i.e. artistic value) were instead effectively gambled 
away on a poorly timed and expensive consultancy exercise, the results of which 
showed that the company was not yet in a position to institute a successful fundraising 
campaign (and thereby secure a future income stream for the production of opera). 
The exact mechanics of this trade-off are worth exploring. 
During the financial year in question (1965), a special fund (Falcon Fund) was 
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established at a value of £1400 current prices (over £12,500 in constant terms). This 
fund (and we do not know its origin) represented 5% of turnover for the year. Now, 
instead of investing the Falcon Fund to provide future income (e.g. by creating a special 
reserve), it was used to finance a fundraising survey costing £1300, leaving a balance 
item of only £100 (all current prices). By effectively wiping out the fund in this way, not 
only was a future income stream forgone (the income stream which would have 
resulted from its designation as a reserve) but the fundraising plans themselves, in line 
with the recommendations of the survey report, were dropped. The result of this 
exercise (and we must assume there were no conditions attached to the use of the fund) 
was a net benefit of zero value to the company. In the event, an endowment fund 
(equivalent to the kind of special reserve which might have been set up) was finally 
inaugurated in 1970, some five years later. 
If we assume that no special conditions were attached to use of the fund (i.e. that it had 
not been gifted or set-up precisely for the sole purpose of conducting a fundraising 
survey) then it would have been better to have spent the funds directly on a fundraising 
campaign. Either this was not possible at the time, or management lacked appropriate 
fundraising skills. 
3 : Evidence of constraints on artistic value freedom resultingfrom investment in capacity and f txed 
asset structure 
The decision to invest in capacity (purchase of the Theatre Royal in 197 4) and 
attendant fixed asset structure (e.g. creation of an inhouse orchestra) acted to constrain 
repertoire planning at SO and thereby limit the company's artistic value freedom. This 
can be demonstrated as follows: 
The years 1976-80 are characterized by sustained intensification (Figure 7-1) coupled 
with a rapid deepening of accumulated deficit (Figure 7-3). Now, this deficit, or 
structural burden of debt, was in large part the result of special capital investment (the 
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purchase and restoration of the Theatre Royal in 1974). However, as can be seen from 
Figure 7-3, SO had been accumulating deficit from its earliest days, so the purchase of 
the theatre merely added to the problems of SO (group). This, together with continued 
pressure to maintain output or performances (at a level sufficient to properly utilize the 
new capacity afforded by the theatre) quickly precipitated a major financial crisis. 
Figure 7-2 demonstrates the beginnings of this crisis as early as 1977, when a reduction 
in performances (instituted as a cost-cutting exercise) resulted in lower utilization of the 
theatre. 
In this scenario (i.e. working at undercapacity), short-term cost-cutting results in under-
recovery of fixed overhead: effectively forcing costs to rise in the medium- to longer-
term. At this point, the financial value demands of the theatre start to set the artistic value 
agenda for the opera company : its repertoire planning becomes a function of financial 
constraint. 
By 1980 SO had arrived at this point and the resultant conflicting demands (need to 
reduce performances to cut costs in the short-term, coupled with the need to expand 
activities in order to utilize capacity) came to a head. Two contradictory actions were 
taken. Firstly, performances were cut by almost 50% relative to the first Theatre Royal 
season after restoration (1976) i.e. from 122 to 68 performances. This was done even 
though, in the previous year: ... The Theatre [Royal] despite a better than ever response to the 
Scottish Opera Subscription Season, 90% average capacity for evening peiforma11ces, and visits from 
other companies, still produced a loss in excess of £60,000 [£143,000 in constant terms] (SO 
ARA 1979). Secondly, an inhouse orchestra was formed, adding again to staffing levels 
and associated overheads (which it had already been attempted to reduce). 
Note, the creation of an inhouse orchestra adds, significantly, a fixed or semi-variable 
element to overhead (since salaries must be paid regardless of whether performances 
take place or not). This action, although it serves to further establish the opera 
company, also builds in inflexibility. In the case of SO, the creation of an inhouse band 
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at this stage, merely served to augment the financial difficulties of the company and 
thereby constrain its artistic value choices to an even greater degree (i.e. works must be 
chosen which utilize the now fixed orchestral forces of the company). In this scenario, 
there is no gain from mounting a chamber opera, or any repertoire requiring 
significantly less than the full complement of the inhouse orchestra. 
As a result, by 1980 the accumulated deficit reached its worst level in the history of the 
company (£893,000 in constant terms). In effect, all significant artistic value decisions 
taken by SO were tied to the need to manage its structural burden of debt (i.e. to 
alleviate the deficit crisis which had been precipitated by an ambitious investment in 
capacity and fixed asset structure). The complexity of the situation facing the company 
is well illustrated by the following extract from the Chairman's statement 1983: 
We continue as proud owners of the Theatre Royal, Glasgow. In spite of the fact that its 
success compares most favourab!J with theatres in other cities the privilege of ownership costs us 
some £150,000 a year [£234,000 in constant terms]. .. Havingprovided the funds and 
initiative to renovate this love!J theatre we must now obtai.n relief [financial value input] 
from this annual burden on funds given to us for the performance of opera [i.e. financial 
value input given for the production of opera, not the maintenance of a theatre] 
(SO ARA 1983). 
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Figure 7-2: Transformational JJJeasures: Scottish Opera 
4 : Change in the environment may proJJJote diseconomies of scale where investment in establishment has 
been made 
Evidence suggests that the constraints imposed by previous investment in 
establishment and orchestra overhead (i.e. fixed asset structure), inhibited the ability of 
SO to withstand changes in the environment in the early 1980s. 
The years 1980-83 were years of crisis for SO. Precipitated by the deficit crisis of 1980 
(discussed under finding 3 above) and by change in the environment (discussed below) 
the 1981and1982 crisis years, as can be seen from Figure 7-1, involved a dramatic 
attempt to retrench or de-intensify the activities of the company. The overall aim was 
to reduce the accumulated deficit and direct the company towards a more stable or 
sustainable basis of operation (viz Chairman's statements in SO ARA 1980 and 1983). 
However, at the same time, the environment was changing. During the early Thatcher 
years, and particularly as a result of the Medium Term Financial Strategy (announced 
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1980), government expenditure was cut (see Figure 5-5). Spending on recreational and 
cultural affairs fell sharply (Figure 5-5) and the impact of this was felt by SO: 
We are at present in discussion 1vith the Scottish Arts Coundl on the appropriate distribution 
and (Ype of peiformances in Scot/and for a time when the prospects of a'!Y increase in the real 
value of our grant are negligible while costs continue to rise (SO ARA 1981). 
Furthermore, the UK economy was also in deep recession (Figure 5-1) and whilst we 
do not have sufficient data (see Appendix 7-2) it is likely that a squeeze on box office 
income may also have been felt by the company at this time. 
The two years of short-term firefighting (1981 and 1982) then, were necessitated by a 
need, firstly, to control the accumulated deficit and, secondly, to respond to adverse 
changes in the environment. 
However, burdened by debt and experiencing a squeeze on income (public source 
income, if not private source also), the most logical option for SO management in the 
short-term was not only to reduce overheads, but to increase the rate of recovery of 
those overheads which would remain after any cuts were instituted. That is to say: 
reduce the spread of assets and drive those assets which remain all the harder. Evidence 
suggests that these are exactly the tactics which were followed. 
For instance, during 1981 and 1982 a small reduction in staffing was undertaken 
(involving redundancies and termination of contracts). Significantly, the newly formed 
house orchestra was almost immediately affected, although it was not axed altogether. 
In addition, these staffing reductions were coupled with a sudden increase in output 
(performances). In fact, at 1981, at 129 performances, output reached its highest level 
since incorporation of the company (see Figure 7-2). 
This dual action appears contradictory, since an increase in output would be expected 
to better justify maintenance of the orchestra at its full complement. But this is the 
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point at which certain diseconomies of scale become manifest. This is worth exploring. 
The situation in these crisis years is described in the Chairman's statement (1981) as 
placing the company on a knife edge of risk in maintaining satisfactory artistic standards. 
However, looking at the taxonomy data, it would appear that the real difficulty in these 
years was one of maintaining satisfactory overhead recovery (a financial value, not an 
artistic value issue). 
The company during these two years (1981-82) is not only at its most labour intense, 
but, because of an apparently erratic search for the optimum level of output since 
acquisition of the theatre (resulting in what appears to be a desperate attempt to 
maximize capacity utilization in 1981 and 1982) real expenditure per performance 
almost halves in the space of a year. Real turnover per performance, for instance, is 
around £93,000 in 1980 (the highest level in the company's history, not approached 
again until the mid 1990s) and by the next year, 1981, it drops 47% to £49,000. This 
outcome, this knife edge of risk threatening the artistic value standards of the company is, 
then, the result of financial value choices made by the company in previous years and 
not, as implied in the Chairman's statements (1981 and 1982) merely because of economic 
recession (SO ARA 1981) and resultant failure or restraint (SO ARA 1982) of national and 
public funders. Significantly, the Chairman's statement for 1982 reveals that the 
company's management think that there exists an appropriate normal or optimal scale of 
operations and that this normal scale is represented by the 1982 level (127 
performances). It would be interesting future work to test whether criticism during 
1981 and 1982 reflected the failure although this would not prove that audiences as a 
whole (independently of critics) perceived any erosion of artistic value. 
The finding confirms, however, that the company, and therefore its artistic value goals, 
are constrained by its fixed asset structure i.e. the burden of owning a theatre. The 
particular financial economies of scale which are introduced by the ownership of such 
an asset (e.g. the need to properly utilize the theatre) will tend to create a limited set of 
artistic value options (ways in which these financial objectives may be met). So, from the 
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point of view of producers and consumers of opera, artistic value opportunities 
themselves become constrained. Moreoever, the greater the financial intensity of the 
company, the greater the risk associated with its artistic value options. This is because the 
whole organisation itself may be lost if these critical financial economies of scale are not 
achieved. 
It is worth noting that the description of the staffing reduction undertaken, as given in 
the Chairman's statement (1981), is not reflected in the actual staffing level reported in 
the 1981 notes to the accounts. This is because numbers reflect the average full-time 
equivalents (AVG FTE) and not a headcount at the year-end. Nevertheless, since the 
total employees at 1981 are not only at their highest level since inauguration of the 
company, but only show a reduction of 6 (AVG FTE) staff by 1982 (by which time any 
real reduction during the financial year ending 1981 would be visible), it is likely that 
these cuts have been talked up in the Chairman's statements for political purposes 
(influencing or pressuring public funders). Again this seems to indicate an attempt to 
ratchet up the level of public subsidy awarded to the company (here by clothing the 
issue in moral terms). 
5 : Evidence of overtrading and long-term disequilibrium 
Despite emerging from the crisis years of the early 1980s with its accumulated deficit 
eliminated (via emergency public funding) SO was unable to maintain recovery of its 
own accord (see Figure 7-3 and Appendix 7-15). Evidence suggests that the short-run 
tactics, which had seen the company through this crisis period, did not translate into an 
adequate long-run strategy and that from 1983 a period of overtrading (operation of the 
company beyond the capacity of its working capital) and long-term disequilibrium 
ensued. 
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MANAGEMENT CONTROL : SCOTTISH OPERA 
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Figure 7-3 : Management control: Scottish Opera 
Whilst 1983 was perhaps a year of exceptional crisis for SO (delay in production of 
internal management accounts led to complete failure of the company's budgeting 
system, not aided by the precipitate departure of the financial controller who was also 
acting general administrator) the basic cost control tactics of 1981 and 1982 remained in 
place. For instance: 
Our chorus now stands at 34 full time members, our orchestra at 45. Although slight!J 
increased since last year, this does not represent the degree of restoration to full strength which 
we had promised ourselves, and still falls well short of levels in other national opera companies 
(SO ARA 1983). 
As outlined under finding 4, this has the effect of controlling the portfolio of assets (i.e. 
constraining its size or spread and its total cost or value); and, when output is increased, 
it has the effect of driving that portfolio all the harder (i.e. increasing the rate of 
recovery of its cost, thereby deriving greater benefit or utility from its contents). 
However, in the long-run, tactics such as these may have the effect, not of controlling 
costs, but merely of postponing them. Indeed, it can be seen from the above quote, 
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that it was intended by SO management to increase the size of the orchestra at some 
future point. Clearly an orchestra is a complex operational unit, there is no such thing 
as a standard orchestra and much depends on choice of repertoire. Indeed, the 
relationship between cost and artistic value utility and financial value utility (the cost -
benefit relation) in the context of an opera orchestra is probably impossible to define 
with any precision. However, it is clear that SO management felt that this asset (the 
inhouse orchestra) was not, at 45 member strength, operating in an optimal way and 
would have to be augmented. 
Aside from the issue of postponed costs, SO was, in 1983, still facing a squeeze on 
income. Again, there is insufficient data to comment on box office performance, but 
we know that public revenue funding, for instance, was still constrained. Faced with the 
need to maintain adequate capacity utilisation of the Theatre Royal and with the need 
to maintain touring committments (as required by public funders) SO now experienced 
the debilitating effects of overtrading: 
The fundamental problem facing Scottish Opera is that over the last few years the funding 
available has not been sufficient to cover the costs of achieving the number and spread of 
peiformances throughout Scotland that we and the Scottish Arts Council 1vould /i.ke; the 
balance sheet also reveals that while the overall position is underpinned by the value of the 
Theatre Royal there is a sen"ous imbalance in working capital terms and the compa'!Y has 
become substantial!J undercapitali.sed (SO ARA 1983). 
In other words, having invested in fixed assets (the Theatre Royal, the inhouse 
orchestra etc) the company, in 1983, found itself constrained by a lack of current assets 
(working capital) with which to maintain operations. Undercapitalised in this way, SO 
found itself equipped with the means to produce opera (theatre, orchestra etc) but 
without the funds to utilize these means. The situation is analogous to owning a car, but 
not being able to afford the fuel to run it. 
After 1983, then, a gradual paring away of staff numbers is evident (almost 30 
employees are shed between 1983 and 1987). At the same time, it would appear that the 
company had been forced (by cashflow troubles) to work at a level below that which it 
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considered desirable or optimal from a capacity utilization point of view (an average 96 
performances per year in the 1983-87 phase as opposed to an average 113 per year in 
the years immediately following opening of the Theatre Royal (1974-77). But it is 
evident from Figure 7-2 that cutting staff as a means of controlling overheads is not 
sufficient in the face of a capacity utilisation problem since in the long-run real costs 
(here measured by proxy as turnover) are still rising. 
Again, it must not be forgotten that these problems arise as a direct consequence of 
SO's decision to purchase the Theatre Royal in 1974. This is the underlying cause of the 
companis overtrading. The fault cannot simply be laid at the feet of public funders. 
Here we must make the important observation that the taxpayer funding the theatre-
owning opera company suffers, in effect, a double blow, since, in the face of change in 
the environment, not only does the company experience difficulty in delivering artistic 
value for money, but it may also use the problem of overtrading, which is a problem of 
its own making, to ratchet up (albeit with limited success) the real value of its public 
subsidy award. It is as though the opera company operates a moral lever: complaining 
that it cannot operate efficiently (at some desired level which best utilizes capacity) 
without a more generous grant from its public funders. 
Two questions always remain unaddressed in this scenario: a) whether there is sufficient 
demand for the installed capacity (i.e. if the desired operational level or number of 
opera performances required to best utilize the theatre is reached, will there be 
sufficient demand?); and b) whether there might not be value in changing the 
operational model i.e. renting as opposed to owning a theatre or other suitable venue? 
It is also interesting that the company's public income factor begins to change for the 
first time since the mid 1970s. This change, however, only occurs from 1985, after it 
becomes apparent that public funding cannot be ratchetted up to the necessary levels 
(despite emergency deficit funding received in 1983 and 1984). Thus, although the 
public income factor settled at a range between 65-70% from 1978 to 1984, it shifts 
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downwards, settling between 55-63% from 1985 to 1990 (see Appendix 7-2). This 
reflects a conscious effort by the company to find the working capital it desperately 
requires from alternative sources. 
6 : Evi.dence that installed capaci"(y inhibits artistic value experimentation and innovation 
There is evidence to suggest that during the years of overtrading and disequilibrium 
experienced by SO in the mid to late 1980s, attempts to innovate and to experiment 
with the company's artistic value output were inhibited by the existence of installed 
capacity (i.e. ownership of the Theatre Royal). 
After receiving substantial emergency funding in 1984 (£1.2 million in constant terms, 
in part as a special deficit grant, and in part as a grant to fund the capital shortfall 
remaining on acquisition and restoration of the theatre a decade earlier) SO, it seems, 
felt confident enough to experiment with its artistic value output. Significant production 
innovations were suddenly introduced: 
Certai.n of our productions during the past season have been seen to be controversial by some of 
our strongest supporters in the audience, and this must make us all consider the direction of 
our artistic poliq. If opera, where so much of the best repertoire dates from the nineteenth 
century, is not to stagnate, then inevitab!J' the repertoire must include new ideas and new 
works. At the same time, if the s"(yle of opera or production does not attract audiences, the 
company will soon cease to flourish (SO ARA 1985). 
Specifically, there are two issues here. One : any alteration to the service offering (i.e. 
any alteration of artistic value via production or performance style innovations etc) will 
affect box office income (the outcome may be positive, negative, or neutral). Two : 
because of this potential impact on box office income, alteration of the service offering 
during times of particular financial difficulty is highly risky. 
For any theatre-owning company to survive in a climate of cash constraint, the first 
priority must be to maximize capacity utilization (as discussed above). It is imperative, 
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therefore, that change in the service offering is made only when the company is in a 
position to afford the risk. 
It has to be recognised that installed capacity limits the affordability of such 
experimentation because installed capacity creates a core audience (those who regularly 
attend the venue). The loyalty of a core audience is not to be gambled with. 
Indeed, to make a meaningful assessment of risk in this context demands knowledge: 
the company must have adequate knowledge of the demand preferences (the needs and 
wants) of its core audience. Without this knowledge, the expected impact of artistic 
experimentation or innovation on box office income cannot be easily judged. 
There is a very serious point here: one which is often overlooked. A company cannot 
bring in new audiences to an existing or regular venue without first increasing output. 
Unless there is an increase in output, any experimentation which does occur will merely 
bring about a substitution of new audiences for old. In this scenario, the company may 
claim to have developed a new audience, but total audience figures will remain the 
same, and, all things being equal, the impact on box office income will be neutral. 
7 : Adoption of a mass marketing approach to artistic value indicates management perception of the 
need to cater for the tastes of the compm!J 's installed capaciry audience 
There is clear evidence that SO management, pressured by the need to maximize 
utilisation of the company's installed capacity (the Theatre Royal), were forced to adopt 
a mass marketing approach to artistic value. Catering for as broad a range of tastes as 
possible was seen as the best way to keep the Theatre Royal audience on board, and 
thus avoid any further capacity utilisation problems: 
The Board keeps close!J in touch with the artistic poliry and direction of the company and have 
confidence in the artistic team. 1985 / 86 is the first season for some years for which the 
financial situation has aUowed reasonable artistic planning and should, I believe, provide an 
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interesting and varied repertoire with a mixture of styles and production which should provide 
a good balance of interest, both to those who like the traditional styles of opera, and those who 
are attracted to newer works, and innovative interpretations (SO ARA 1985). 
This mass marketing approach (i.e. catering for as broad a range of tastes as possible) in 
effect acts as a constraint on artistic freedom. Whilst the company may have wished to 
develop artistic strength in a particular direction (e.g. contemporary opera), a direction 
which might better exploit the existing strengths of its artistic team, it could not. This 
provides evidence, again, that in the face of a capacity utilisation problem, repertoire 
planning (i.e. artistic freedom) becomes a function of financial constraint which is 
internally imposed. 
8 : Failure of management control and lack of long-term strategy 
Evidence shows that since the late 1970s a boom and bust approach to management 
control has become established at SO. This indicates a failure of management control. 
Specifically, it suggests that management has failed to develop or follow any single, 
coherent long-term strategy for the company. 
A company showing boom and bust behaviour will typically follow a repeating cycle of 
crisis and recovery in the short- to medium-term. The distinguishing feature of the 
cycle is the non-sustainability of the recovery phase: limiting factors encountered during 
recovery inevitably trigger fresh collapse. 
Whilst the causal factors underlying such behaviour may be complex, it nevertheless 
indicates a preoccupation with short-term goals, and indeed, the instability resulting 
from boom and bust behaviour precludes any possibility of long-term strategic planning. 
The company can only break out of the cycle if the causal factors of the instability can 
be properly addressed. Significantly, whether or not these causal factors exist in the 
external environment (e.g. high cost of capital) or are internal to the company (e.g. 
failure of budgeting mechanisms) it is the responsibility of management to take control 
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of the situation and make the requisite changes to management style or company 
strategy where it is possible to do so. 
Often, boom and bust behaviour results from lack of proportional feedback control. 
Expansion occurs at a flat-out rate until bust is reached, when the reverse process 
(collapse and retrenchment) is engaged. Whilst this provides a good mechanism for the 
thermostat, for instance, when applied to an organisation, it produces instability. The 
question here is: what is the source of this feedback in the case of SO? 
Now the boom and bust behaviour of SO can be seen from Figure 7-4 (in conjunction 
with figure 7-3). From 1977 a period of bust (encompassing the crisis years of the early 
1980s) is terminated by emergency public funding in 1983 and 1984. During these years 
management's main priority is control of the accumulated deficit. 
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Figure 7-4: Relationship between turnover and accumulated deficit: Scottish Opera 
A boom phase begins in 1984 (immediately after rescue) as management relax and begin 
to let accumulated deficit grow anew. During this time experimentation with artistic value 
occurs, although in the absence of sufficient data, it is impossible to determine what 
effect, if any, this had on box office income and therefore management control. 
Another possible cause of difficulty is cost deferral or postponement e.g. wage rises 
(see discussion in chapter 6). Without further work, we can only speculate as to the 
cause(s) of the deepening accumulated deficit. This boom phase continues until the 
effects of the UK recession of the early 1990s are felt and a phase of bust begins from 
1991. 
The cycle repeats itself as rescue funding is received by SO (1992) and by 1994 a phase 
of boom begins as management again relaxes control of the company's accumulated 
deficit. 
The pattern which emerges, at SO, may be summarized more specifically as a cycle of 
crisis rescue and relaxation of control. The correlation between shifting levels or 
' ' 
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plateaux of turnover and accumulated deficit is interesting. Notice that turnover 
remains relatively stable during the boom and bust periods themselves, suggesting that 
there is inadequate monitoring (feedback) of the deficit situation itself (i.e. turnover 
itself is not the problem). In a well managed organisation, then, we would expect to see 
a deepening accumulated deficit trigger corrective action before collapse point is 
reached. 
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7 .2 Royal Opera House, Covent Garden 
Taxonomy plot data for ROH is presented in Appendix 7-3. Supporting financial data, 
as extracted from the published accounts is presented in Appendix 7-4. 
The ROH annual reports and accounts filed at Companies House, unlike those of SO, 
contain little in the way of qualitative data. The filing of detailed annual review data is 
optional, and in the case of ROH, has been carried out to a minimal degree. In order to 
interpret the taxonomy plot features, therefore, it is necessary to rely almost entirely on 
the mandatory financial statements themselves (i.e. income and expenditure account or 
statement of financial activity, balance sheet, and notes to the accounts). In the case of 
ROH this proves particularly problematic, as we shall see. 
TAXCN)M( PLOT: ROYPL.. OPERA HOUSE, COVENT GARl:EN [CORRECTED FOR AU.OWPBLE 
ACT1VllY] 





~[CONSTPM] I PEJRRMN:E(£000) 
1006 
Figure 7-J: Taxonomy plot: Royal Opera House, Covent Garden 
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1 : Afailure of accountability by ROH and ACE ~ovemment agent) suggests a concomitant failure 
in the subsitfy award process 
Significant and inexplicable variance exists in ROH performance data as produced by 
ROH and ACE respectively. This indicates a failure of accountability and suggests the 
existence of a fundamental flaw in the mechanism of public subsidy award for opera in 
the UK. 
Now, for the purposes of consistency, total performances data (where not stated in the 
published accounts) was collected for the companies in this study from calendar listing.; 
in Opera magazine (OC 1972-96). As indicated in the methodology section of this 
chapter, ROH output, corrected for allowable activity is taken as: all RO mainscale 
opera performances plus all RB performances given at Covent Garden. After 1992, 
however, RB performances at Covent Garden cease to be listed in the above calendar 
source. Thus, in order to correct for allowable activity after 1992, RB performance data 
was obtained directly from the Arts Council of England Statistics Unit and the Royal 
Opera House Archive Department in October 1998. 
The remit of ACE Statistics Unit is to gather performance data direct from client 
companies such as ROH, and to supply this data in reliable summary form to other 
internal departments for the purposes of public subsidy decision making (SC 1998a). It 
was not therefore expected that significant variance between these two sources (ACE 
and its client, ROH) should be found. 
However, the ACE Statistics Unit figures given in Table 7-1 do not in any way 
correspond with the figures given by ROH Archive Department. Clearly some of these 
figures, if not all, are unreliable: an important finding, suggesting that the funding of the 
powerhouse (ROH) is conducted by ACE on an ad hoc basis. The failure in terms of 
accountability is here without dispute. 
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VARIANCE IN REPORlED ACTIVITY : ROY AL BALLET 1993-97 
YEAR END 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
SOURCE 
ACE STATISTICS UNIT: 
T cial RB perfamances 118 107 100 109 111 
ROH ARCHIVE DEPARTMENT : 
T cial RB perf amances (a) 162 163 156 157 138 
Variance on ACE data 44 56 50 48 27 
T cial RB Covent Ga-den perf amances 128 102 108 116 94 
Variance on ACE data 10 -5 2 7 -17 
T cial RB mainscale tour perf amances 34 61 48 41 45 
T cial RB UK tour & schools performances 3 12 16 15 18 
Note (a) : Total comprises Covent Garden plus mainscale tour performances 
Tab/,e 7-1: Variance in reported activi!J: Royal Ballet 1993-97 
2 : Lack of appropriate record-keeping and poor response management by ROH and ACE indicates a 
mqjor failure of accountabili!J 
Lack of appropriate record-keeping by ROH, BRB (post-disaggregation) and ACE 
(government agent) means that no formal public record of SWRB /BRB performance 
output exists. This, together with poor response management (i.e. the management of 
response to enquiries from members of the general public or other third parties) 
indicates a lack of concern with accountability. This finding is explained as follows: 
In order to avoid distortion in the ROH taxonomy plot data (i.e. to further correct for 
allowable activity), performance data for SWRB and BRB (successor company to 
SWRB after 1990) was sought 
After an unsuccessful direct approach to ROH and BRB, the performance data was 
sought from ACE (Library, Statistics Unit, and Dance department) (SC 1998h, 
SC1998a, SC 1998i). This was likewise unsuccessful. Upon the recommendations of 
ACE, several other bodies were also approached: London Arts Board, Sadlers Wells 
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Theatre, and the Policy Studies Institute (SC 1998c, SC 1998d, SC 1998c respectively). 
In each case the outcome was unsuccessful: no performances data for SWRB and BRB 
was located. 
In short, this means that the contribution of SWRB and BRB (before disaggregation) to 
the output of ROH group cannot be established with certainty, except via archive 
search i.e. major primary research. Most importantly, it indicates that accountability has 
not been a primary concern to date, either at ROH, or at government level. Whilst we 
know that SWRB and BRB have received public subsidy, we do not have any formal, 
reliable public record of the corresponding output. 
Now, since we are dealing with data that is central to the calculation of public subsidy 
award, it is worth pausing to consider the implications of these findings in terms of 
accountability: 
1) ACE Library claimed a lack of space to hold data on individual client 
companies, such as ROH (SC 1998h). This suggests that ACE has little active 
interest in long-run studies of its client opera company operations; 
2) ROH Press Office confirmed that annual calendars (of performances) had 
not been made available to the general public via third party publications, and 
that the only annual calendars which did exist for the period were those 
provided in the inhouse season guides (which were distributed to subscription 
holders only) (SC 1998f). This suggests that ROH subscription holders do enjoy 
subsidy capture since advance listings data is not readily, if at all available to the 
wider public (see also chapter 6); 
3) ACE Dance Department claimed it could not supply the necessary 
SWRB /BRB performance data for two reasons. Firstly, only the last two years 
of client company data are kept locally on ACE premises, and access to relevant 
archives (stored off-site) requires special and prior request (SC 1998f). This 
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suggests again that subsidy decisions are made on the basis of short-run 
information. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, such detailed 
information is not usually kept by ACE since information concerning actual 
award amounts is the stated priority. This suggests that funding criteria are ad 
hoc; 
4) ROH Finance Department were unable to supply annual reviews (which it is 
not mandatory to file at Companies House, but which often contain 
performance data) since copies were not thought to be held by the Department 
(SC 1998g). Moreover, the Finance Department did not think in any case that it 
had the authority to send out such data. Whilst it was not thought probable, it 
was tentatively suggested that this might be an issue for the Publications 
Department. Significantly, at the time of enquiry (October 1998) the Head of 
Finance post appeared to remain unfilled, whilst the acting Head of Finance 
was, at the same time, absent on paternity leave; 
5) BRB Marketing Department thought the data might exist and that it might be 
found by asking around the company members (SC 1998b). This lack of formal 
archive procedures indicates a major failure of accountability. A follow-up 
enquiry was made to this source to check progress of the enquiry. Despite 
assurance that the matter was in hand, no further help was forthcoming. This 
indicates poor response management and suggests a culture of complacence 
(within BRB at least). 
It should be noted, that whilst the ROH Archive Department was closed during the 
period of research, RB performance data was eventually forthcoming from this source 
(via previous enquiries to the other ROH departments mentioned above). As we have 
seen, however, this data does not appear to be reliable (finding 1). This does not 
change the fact that SWRB/BRB performance data was not available and that there is 
therefore poor accountability. 
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3 : The powerhouse model is being implemented in weaker form and probab!J for economic -reasons 
In the context of the powerhouse model, the concept of the powerhouse itself implies an 
organisation in which opera forms the main performance activity in terms of 
percentage output i.e. a powerhouse of opera. 
At the start period of the parametric study (early 1970s) this concept of the powerhouse 
appears to hold. Indeed, ROH output figures seem to substantiate the concept, 
showing that, at Covent Garden, where both ballet and opera are performed, opera 
accounted for approximately two-thirds of total output (Figure 7-6). In the early 1970s 
opera certainly appears to form the dominant activity at ROH. 
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Figure 7-6: Opera performances as a proportion of total output: Rqyal Opera House 
However, by the end of the survey period (1996), while total ROH output has gone up, 
some 35 opera performances have been removed (equivalent to between 3 and 5 
productions). With opera now forming just over half total output (an average 56% 
during the 1990s) it becomes questionable whether ROH is still the same type of 
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company as it was in the early 1970s. Indeed, whilst the powerhouse model may have 
been retained, it has been permitted to diverge from the goal of driving quality through 
the subsidized opera sector, by losing the dominance of opera. This divergence appears 
to have taken place in the late 1970s (Figures 7-6 and Appendix 6-8), concurrently, 
though this may be coincidental, with a period of high inflation. 
It is important to monitor this trend in ROH output (Figure 7-6) to see whether the 
squeeze on opera continues or is reversed. One way of measuring the effect of the 
refurbished Covent Garden, for instance, would be to test for significant reversal of the 
trend. 
Since it is unlikely that the weakening of the powerhouse model that we have found has 
been carried out for artistic reasons (e.g. nowhere is it stated in the Director's Reports 
in the ROH financial statements that the principal activities of ROH have been 
changed in order to reduce the importance of opera), we must seek proof that it has 
been done for economic i.e. financial value reasons. 
4 : Evidence that the powerhouse is kept isolated from the environment via a particular and apparent!J 
reactive public funding process 
During the 1970s and 1980s ROH was so cushioned against the external environment 
that any losses (strictly, deficits) which may have occurred, appear to have been 
immediately absorbed by special means (see Figure 7-7). 
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MANAGEMENT CONTROL : ROYAL OPERA HOUSE [GROUP] 
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Figure 7-7: Management control: R.oyal Opera House, Covent Garden 
By comparing Figure 7-7 with Figure 7-3 (which shows equivalent data for SO) we can 
see that the plot of current and accumulated deficit data is relatively flat in the case of 
ROH (for data see Appendix 7-16). Superficial interpretation would suggest that ROH 
has been much more successful in meeting budget targets and in controlling the 
financial performance of its operation. However, such a conclusion would be grossly 
misleading. What we see in the case of ROH is an operation so cushioned against the 
environment that any losses (strictly, deficits) which do occur are immediately absorbed 
by special means. 
These special means, in the case of ROH, are hard to detect. Only in 1979, 1980, and 
1984 do below-the-line special deficit grants from public sources appear (see Appendix 
7-16). However, between 1979 and 1985, the income and expenditure accounts of 
ROH always balance to £0, an obviously artificial outcome suggesting that some 
component of funding was being used as a balance item to generate this result. 
Indeed, during these years, 1979-85, the ACGB Guarantee amount appears to operate as 
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a balance item specifically calculated to absorb any current deficit which may have 
occurred (see Appendix 7-16). It is therefore impossible for us to gauge the 
effectiveness of management control at ROH. More importantly, it leads us to question 
precisely on what basis subsidy was awarded to ROH during these years? 
5: The apparent stabiliry of ROH illustrates the potential unreliabiliry of the financial reporting 
system as a mechanism of accountabiliry 
The annual financial reports of charitable organisations (which includes organisations 
such as ROH) are generally relied upon as the prime mechanism by which insight into 
the activities of these organisations may be gained. 
However, because of the distorting effect of ACGB Guarantee funding, in particular, at 
ROH (discussed under finding 4 and demonstrated in Figure 7-7) it is difficult to gain a 
clear picture of ROH activities from the company's financial reports. Indeed, there is a 
major failure of transparency here, since insufficient information is presented in these 
reports to enable the user to discover the criteria by which the annual Guarantee sum 
was arrived at, and therefore, how it was justified. 
Following the recent final agreement of SORP2 (Statement of Recommended Practice 
Two: Accounting by Charities) and the issue of new accounting regulations as per the 
Charities Act 1993 (for discussion, see Williams and Palmer 1998) attention is now 
focussed on ensuring the future reliability of financial reporting as a mechanism of 
accountability. 
However, stricter and more detailed and consistent reporting will not, of itself, solve 
the underlying problem here, which is this: that the use of Guarantee funding by the 
ACGB (i.e. guarantee against losses) will tend to mask technical or financial inefficiency 
in the receiving organisation, particularly if conditions attached to the use of such 
underwriting activity are not apparent. 
S af!y LK Garden 248 
7. Long-mn behaviour o[individ11al UK opera companies [1976-95/ 
The issue, in terms of accountability is this: when is a loss a completely unforeseeable, 
unavoidable, and therefore justifiable loss; and when is it simply the result of poor 
internal control and poor risk assessment? In short, what price producer stability? 
At the very least, the provision of Guarantee funding is likely to produce a disincentive 
effect: there can be no real advantage to the opera company to improve financial 
efficiency if, in any case, its operational losses are to be absorbed by its public funders. 
Moreover, it appears that the Guarantee funding mechanism, which is retrospective in 
nature (i.e. funding completed activity) simply acts to fine-tune or top-up that core 
funding (ACGB General Gran~ which is awarded on the basis of planned activity, and 
which is received, at least in part, in advance of the year's production. This, in effect, is 
to remove the full responsibility for risk assessment from the opera company, signalling 
to management that, in fact, a margin of error in budgeting is not only acceptable, but 
is to be expected. Were the company to be awarded a once-off tranche of funding in 
advance of each season, with no possibility of additional assistance at the season's end, 
the situation would be wholly different. 
There do not appear to be any strong arguments against such a policy. Indeed, single-
tranche funding of this nature would not only introduce greater transparency (the total 
actual central government funding would be known with certainty and known in 
advance of production, thus permitting debate), but would impose greater financial 
constraint on company activities (promoting efficiency) and ultimately, accountability, 
since any failure on management's part to set and work within budget constraints 
would become manifestly clear. In the absence of evidence we can only infer that this 
policy is not adopted by ACGB because client companies are not perceived to possess 
the relevant management skill and financial discipline to match artistic goals and 
budgetary targets in a realistic way; in other words that they do not possess the requisite 
risk management skills. 
But if the opera company does not have the ability to assess the riskiness of its planned 
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season, then who does? The question is particularly pointed given the cultivated 
disinterest (the arm's length principle) with which the ACGB approaches the matter of 
client company expenditure. Whilst ACE monitors five main performance indicators of 
client activity (breakdown of income, total expenditure, audience levels, degree of 
innovation, and education outreach) no set criteria are monitored with respect to 
expenditure. Indeed, it is the experience of ACE that government is not general/y concerned 
with how the mon~ is spent, although DCMS [Department of Culture, Media and Sport] will 
occasional!J query the percentage overhead on an individual client (SC 1998a). 
There is a contradiction here. The ACGB cannot both maintain an arm's length 
approach to support (disengaging from decisions about how funds are spent in order to 
preserve the artistic freedom of the client) and effectively absolve the client of 
responsibility for poor risk assessment (by taking upon itself the responsibility to 
underwrite actual losses incurred). In this scenario there occurs a failure of means-end 
rationality which must inevitably compromise the public interest. Whereas the opera 
company possesses the means to assess risk (i.e. knowledge of market, expected box 
office performance and expenditure plans) it is not entrusted with the end of 
underwriting that risk; this is left to the ACGB, which, by virtue of its disengagement 
policy, undertakes to cover the risk, but without the means (interest in the expenditure 
plans of the client) by which to make an adequate assessment of that risk. Thus, the 
freedom which the opera company gains is the risk which the artistic value franchise 
must bear; and bear, since the process is not transparent, without possibility of redress. 
This is a cost-benefit relation heavily skewed in favour of the producer. 
6: Private patronage oJROH by individual Board members introduces subsicfy capture and distorts 
Board level representation 
Whilst the system of patronage of the arts by church, monarchy and aristocrat may be 
regarded as an historical phenomenon, elements of patronage, in its strictest sense, still 
persist in the current era. Distinction needs to be made here between the wealthy 
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private patron who supports the arts on a disinterested basis (e.g. via a trust fund which 
disburses funds to deserving causes with which the trustee(s) have no connection) and 
the wealthy patron who directs personal funds towards a charitable organisation in 
which he or she retains an active management or directorial interest. There is a 
profound difference. 
Examination of the composition of the ROH Board of Directors between 1990 and 
1996 (the end of our survey period) reveals a consistent thread of interested patronage of 
the type described above. Cross-comparison of the list of Board members with the list 
of other grants, sponsorship and donations, as presented in the relevant ROH financial 
reports, shows that two key individuals, from a Board membership of approximately 
15, may be identified as what we may term private patrons with di.rectorial interest. 
The Lord Sainsbury of Preston Candover (Chairman of the Board 1989-91) and Mrs 
Vivien Duffield CBE (member of the Board from 1990, and still a member at 1996), 
for instance, have both acted as patrons of ROH during the period 1990-96. Lord 
Sainsbury can be identified with The Jean Sainsbury Royal Opera House Fund, and 
Vivien Duffield with The Vivien Duffield Foundation, and through these respective 
funding vehicles each have contributed financially to specific projects, touring, or individual 
productions on an annual basis for most of this six year period (ROH ARA 1990-96). 
Specifically, the Vivien Duffield Foundation (of which Mrs Duffield is the principal 
trustee) does not issue information about its policies and does not seek applications, 
considering only those accompanied by a personal request from persons known to one 
of the five trustees; and the ROH is a regular beneficiary (Farrow and FitzHerbert 
1993). It is apparent, therefore, that the individual trustees of the Vivien Duffield 
Foundation do not consider it important to maintain a distance between themselves 
and beneficiary organisations. Indeed, personal motivation seems to be the key. 
Now whilst the Sainsbury Family Charitable Trusts (under which the Jean Sainsbury 
Trust is subsumed) are open to applications, financial reporting, at least in 1993, lacked 
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transparency: the value of grants given to individual organisations was not stated 
(Farrow and FitzHerbert 1993). This is a problem mirrored by the ROH financial 
reports themselves i.e. amounts given by individual sponsors and donors, where these 
are material, are usually stated in aggregated form. 
This kind of private patronage with directorial interest has serious consequences. It means 
that Board members function on a non-equal basis. For instance, in cases where Board 
members represent public funders (such as a Local Authority) the funding is not 
predicated on the individual and representation is made in the public interest. This is 
not true of the private individual who, effectively, represents his or her own interests as 
a private patron. In this instance, funding is predicated on the individual, and whilst the 
public funder representative can be replaced without detriment to the funding itself, 
replacement of the private patron may mean a corresponding loss of funds. 
Private patrons with directorial interest also enjoy a subtle form of subsidy capture. For 
instance, it is entirely possible for the private patron, who is also a Board member, to 
make his or her funding conditional on some aspect of policy, be it artistic or financial. 
This can occur for precisely the same reasons discussed above: that it is difficult to 
overrule an individual who is personally identified with a funding source. Thus, in this 
way, it is perfectly feasible for a powerful private patron to exert undue influence on, 
for instance, repertoire choice, choice of artistic personnel, production budgets, ticket 
prices; in sum, a whole range of artistic and financial value issues. Potentially, the private 
patron captures public subsidy once, when he or she influences how it is spent, and 
twice when he or she takes a seat in the auditorium as a member of the audience. 
' 
This kind of subsidy capture builds in inertia. Because it is difficult to remove the 
private patron from the Board without threatening the funding which that patron 
brings, a barrier to radical new financial or artistic departures is easily created. The 
longer the private patron remains on the Board, the more the status quo is preserved. 
We cannot expect the funder to fund what he or she does not like, or to fund anything 
which profoundly changes the company's artistic goals - moving them away from those 
S af!y LK Garden 252 
7. Lons-nm behavio11ro[individ11aL UK opera co111/w1ies [1976-95/ 
which the patron may have helped establish in the first instance. Indeed, a striking 
example of this type of problem is provided by the recent Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport Select Committee inquiry into the closure period plans of ROH: 
Lord Chadlington [chairman of the board] wrote to inform us that the Board had 
approved a plan which would inject up to £ 12 mtlli.on into the Royal Opera House over the 
closure period, subject to certain conditions; he reported that the Arts Council considered the 
plan to be 'robust~ On the other hand, we were concerned to learn from his letter that donors 
to the rescue package had 'made it clear that thf!Y are funding the Royal Opera House itself 
and were seeking 'reassurance and certain?) over which companies will pk[y' at Covent 
Garden. Such conditions to donations appear to preclude some of the options which Sir 
FJchard Eyre [then conducting a review oflyric theatre for the Secretary of State] 
has been asked to consider and which it cannot be mled out may be included in his reports 
[see Eyre (1998)]. These conditions therefore throw into uncertain!) a reli.ance on such 
donations if Sir FJchard Eyre's report is not to the Ii.king of the donors (DCMS SC1 
1997:IV). 
This makes artistic innovation problematic, Moreover, it suggests that concern about 
the potential influence of corporate sponsors on artistic policy is of significantly less 
consequence than the problem imposed by the continuing influence of the private 
patron, who acts from the position of special privilege afforded by membership of the 
Board of Directors. Whilst we have, for the sake of clarity, identified only two such 
private patrons, it is entirely possible that the problem is much wider. 
The ROH Trust, for instance, which has received funding from individuals, 
corporations and charitable organisations since 1974, and which is a vital force in 
maintaining ROH operations, is, from the point of view of ROH financial reports, an 
unknown quantity. To what extent the ROH Trust has been captured by private 
patrons on the ROH Board itself (i.e. to what extent its trustee names overlap with 
those of the ROH Board itself) is not apparent. In order to check, here, it would be 
necessary to consult an entirely separate set of financial reports (i.e. those for ROH 
Trust itself). Whilst we ought to be able to rely on the statements of directors' interests 
which must accompany the financial reports submitted to Companies House, 
submission of this data appears to be erratic (although the fault, equally, may lie with 
Companies House itself; for further discussion see WNO finding 2). 
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Furthermore, there is, in the 1996 financial report, the matter of an £8.2 million source 
of funds which is simply labelled: other donations. This is a clear failure of transparency: it 
is imperative, in the interests of the independence of ROH itself, that such other dllnors 
be properly identified. At the very least, the maximum individual donation should be 
stated as a guide to materiality. Otherwise the possibility cannot be ruled out that the 
opera company is not being used as a vehicle for political lobbying (i.e. the giving of 
generous private donations to national institutions in return for access to Members of 
Parliament). This is not an unreasonable assumption since politicians have, in the past, 
been represented on the Boards of UK subsidized opera companies e.g. The Rt Hon 
David Mellor QC MP (ENO, mid 1990s) and Paul Boateng MP (ENO, mid 1990s) (see 
Appendix 7-22). 
Overall, there is obvious threat, here, to the ideal of full and free participation in the 
artistic value franchise. 
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7.3 English National Opera 
Taxonomy plot data for ENO is presented in Appendix 7-5. Supporting financial data, 
as extracted from the published accounts is presented in Appendix 7-6. 
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Figure 7-8: Taxonomy plot: English National Opera 
1 : Failure to guard against risk which might threaten the viability of ENO indicates management 
incompetence 
a 
In 1984 EN 0 gave 25 performances in the USA. However, because: promises of financial 
support from this tour were not forthcoming ... a substantial part of the costs were not covered, giving rise 
to an exceptional deficit [on the tour] of £640,818 to which has been added interest of£ 48,800 
(ENO ARA 1985). In constant terms, this exceptional deficit amounts to some £1.04 
million, approximately 7% of 1984 turnover. Since risk of this significance merits 
special attention, the apparent failure to safeguard against default by funders (e.g. by 
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agreeing appropriate contract terms, or by insurance, or both) indicates management 
incompetence. 
The consequences of this incompetence can be seen in Figures 7-8 and 7-9 which show 
that the company entered a phase of apparent instability in the years immediately 
following the 1984 tour. In 1985, ENO had raised funds (by private appeal) to cover 
around 90% of the tour deficit (ENO ARA 1985). In addition, the Government had 
announced that £286,000 (in constant terms) was to be made available from The Office 
of Arts and Libraries (as special funding to address the tour deficit). 
However, these gains were offset by a major deficit on the year's activity (1985) of some 
£1.2 million (see Appendix 7-17). This meant a further deterioration of the company's 
finances. Moreover, ticket prices were raised 8% midway through 1985, whilst total 
output remained some twenty to thirty performances below pre-USA tour levels (see 
Appendix 7-5). These actions, whilst resulting in further intensification of ENO's 
operations (Figure 7-8) appear to have been driven by a dual need to increase income 
(via box office receipts), and to cut costs (via reduced output). 
Significantly, in 1986, it was reported that: 
Audience levels showed a significant increase on recent years despite an 8% increase in seat 
prices in August 1985. Helped by the increase in the nuJJJber of London performances (which 
was depressed in 1984 / 85 by the US tour) total box office receipts exceeded the previous year 
by JJJore than £1 JJJillion [current prices]. Catering and JJJerchandise sales, and sponsorship 
and donations incoJJJe also recorded a significant iJJJproveJJJent (ENO ARA 1986). 
Now, it is probable that ENO's decision to raise ticket prices in 1985 was prompted as 
much by factors in the external environment as it was by the financial consequences of 
its 1984 overseas tour. Figure 5-5 shows, for instance, that in the early Thatcher years 
(1979-85) UK government spending on recreational and cultural affairs had been 
subject to great volatility (by 1985 it had, in real terms, showed a fall over two 
consecutive years). At the same time, real disposable income was rising and consumer 
confidence was high (Figure 5-4). It was, in a sense, a logical time to try to increase box 
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office income. 
Nevertheless, the distraction afforded by the need to run a separate private appeal (to 
cover the overseas tour deficit) is likely to have contributed to the apparent instability 
of the post-tour period. The more management is preoccupied with firefighting in the 
short-term (i.e. maintaining the immediate viability of the company) the less it can 
concern itself with long-term planning and artistic objectives. 
Thus, by not safeguarding the funding for the 1984 USA tour, ENO management 
effectively gambled with the viability of the company. At the very least, it should have 
ensured that a negotiative instrument, such as a letter of credit, was included as part of 
the contract with its funders. Alternatively, insurance, by way of a Government backed 
Export Credit Guarantee might have been arranged. These types of safeguards, well 
developed in private sector practice, would have ensured that funds were made 
irrevocable. It is quite possible that ENO's tour funders were not prepared or able to 
accept contract terms involving a letter of credit. But even if this were the case, it 
simply adds force to the argument for not touring in the first place. 
What can we conclude from the actions of ENO management regarding the 1984 
overseas tour? Fundamentally, the decision to go ahead with the tour on an unsecured 
basis can be interpreted in one of three ways: 
1) ENO management may have felt that the artistic value benefits of undertaking 
the tour would outweigh the risk to the company's financial viability; and that 
the company would return the stronger and more artistically mature as the 
result of exposure to an overseas audience; that whatever the outcome, the 
artistic benefits would outweigh the financial costs. 
2) It is reasonable to suppose that ENO management simply did not entertain 
the possibility of failure; that they were unable to comprehend or properly 
evaluate the risk to which their actions would subject the company. 
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3) More damagingly, it is also feasible that ENO management did indeed 
recognise the risk of financial failure, but that a belief was held that the UK 
Government would provide a safety net and bail the company out in the event 
of such failure; that the cost of the company's failure (which would be a very 
public and embarrassing one) would be too high for Government to bear and 
that rescue funding would almost certainly be forthcoming. 
Ultimately, this leaves us with the central question: why do UK subsidized opera 
companies undertake overseas touring? What exactly are the benefits, and how do these 
outweigh the obvious costs to the UK taxpayer? 
2: Reliance upon ano1!Jmous donations threatens the independence of ENO as a charitable arts 
organisation 
In 1994 ENO received an anonymous donation of £1 million [current prices]: a 
donation which although directed towards the company's planned redevelopment of 
the London Coliseum (i.e. a capital expenditure project) was included in deferred 
income (ENO ARA 1994). This indicates a major failure of accountability and suggests 
that the independence of ENO as a charitable arts organisation may have been 
seriously compromised in the past. Indeed: 
Beside awareness of accounting treatment, it is important for the reader [of financial 
reports] to know the identiry of the grantors [patrons or donors], or at least those that 
are materia4 because usual!y the grantor [patron or donor] will seek to iefluence the poliry 
of the chariry. Such information therefore gives an indication of how independent the charity is 
(Williams and Palmer 1998:27 4). 
In the case of a subsidized opera company, there is, in addition to the question of 
independence, the question of subsidy capture. It seems unlikely that a donation of such 
obvious materialiry might be made in purely disinterested fashion, but we simply have no 
evidence to prove otherwise. In the absence of information about the donor's identity, 
we have no way of checking, independently, the motivation of the donor, nor whether 
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he or she had at the time, any connection with the company. Indeed, it is perfectly 
feasible that we may be looking at a case of private patronage with directorial interest, at a 
quid pro quo arrangement between an external donor and the Board of Directors (e.g. 
access to key personnel for the purposes of political lobbying or influencing a contract 
tendering process), or at a straight influencing of artistic policy. This last would allow 
the private donor to enjoy the subtle form of subsidy capture discussed under ROH 
findings 2b and 2c (chapter 6) i.e. the privilege of influencing how subsidy is spent as 
well as enjoyment of subsidized consumption of the end result. 
Now ENO might prove all these fears unfounded; it might well be able to refute these 
arguments. But this is not the point: a post-hoc defence is not equivalent to real 
openness and honesty, the prerequisites of accountability. 
The issue here is this: given the track record of ENO, can opera managements be 
trusted in the future? There are, for instance, other examples of anonymous funding of 
a material nature within the subsidized sector. The £8.2 million other donations received 
by ROH in 1996 has already been referred to (ROH finding 6), but in 1990 ENO 
received £115,000 [in constant terms] as donations for an overseas tour, some, or all of 
which (we are given only partial information) was received anonymously; and in 1982 
SO reported that, of its six principal benefactors, one was a major ano1!Jmous donor (SO 
ARA 1982). 
Note: anonymous donations are not necessarily a problem if the goals of the charitable 
organisation are specific and detailed. However, the principal activity of ENO as stated 
in the 1994 financial report is ambiguous: 
The principal activi!J of the company is to encourage the understanding and appreciation of the 
fyric art by producing and presentingpeiformances of opera in English of cultural value to the 
communi!J and introducing opera to new audiences andyoungpeople through educational and 
outreach programmes. (ENO ARA 1994). 
The ambiguity lies in the fact that cultural value appears to be self-defining in this context 
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since it does not imply an independent referent. In fact, the statement is meaningless 
because it sets out a goal which cannot be measured. 
Ultimately, the problem of anonymous donations and non-specific organisational goals 
is the problem of controlling sectional interests within the artistic value franchise. The 
underlying question is this: does unequal access to scarce resources (here, public subsidy 
and the chance to influence its use) necessarily produce an equitable outcome in terms 
of the public interest; and does it benefit artistic value (this is quite apart from the 
question of whether maximization of artistic value and maximization of the public 
interest are one and the same goal)? 
It could be argued that the ability to make large anonymous donations to publicly 
subsidized arts organisations is an arbitrary privilege (in the sense that the luck of 
wealth gives some individuals and groups greater potential control over the artistic value 
agenda than others). Moreover, in the absence of well defined organisational goals, we 
should ask not only what defines the public interest in this context, but who defines it? 
This is an important point, since the potential here is to allow one group's conception 
of the public interest to have priority over others in the franchise. 
Certainly, in the context of a democratic society, where there is committment of sorts 
to egalitarian ideals, departures from equality clearly require some degree of moral 
justification. 
3 : Failure of transparenry in the management of public source special revenue funding 
Two tranches of Incentive/Enhancement funding were reported in ENO financial 
statements in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First, in 1989 ENO reported the award of 
an ACGB Incentive Grant of £250,000 [current prices] which was to be spread over the 
three-year period 1989-91, and which was conditional on the meeting of certain 
financial criteria. Second, in 1991 the company reported a similar such award (ACGB 
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Enhancement Fundi,n~ of £600,000 [current prices] which was to be spread over the 
three-year period 1992-94 and which, again, was conditional on the meeting of certain 
financial criteria. The failure by ENO to treat these two tranches of additional public 
funding consistently, and separably, results in a failure of transparency. Principally, it is a 
failure of transparency because it cannot be established with certainty, from the ENO 
financial reports, whether the funding was received and whether the requisite financial 
performance conditions were fulfilled. 
In 1989 ENO reported the first of these Incentive/Enhancement awards: the award of an 
ACGB Incentive Grant of £250,000 (in current terms) receivable over three years (1989-
91) and conditional on the recording of an aggregate sustainable increase in non-grant income of 
at least £500,000 (ENO ARA 1989). Since this special revenue funding has been treated 
appropriately as a separable item, the receipt of the award is clearly visible in the 
company's financial reports for each of the three years (see Appendix 7-6). Moreover, it 
can be established from the financial reports that the grant award conditions appear to 
have been met as required: there is a particular reduction in the public income factor 
(the percentage of total income from public sources) between 1990 and 1992. 
However, further investigation suggests that the grant award conditions were met 
almost solely via ticket price increases and not, as might be expected, via increases in 
sponsorship and donations. Thus, although ENO achieved a public income factor of 
less than 50% for three consecutive years (1990-92) this outcome appears to have been 
achieved via two rises in ticket prices (rises reported as 14% during 1987 and 15% 
during 1988). These price rises are reflected in the 1989 year end results (see Appendix 
7-6). This suggests that the Incentive Grantwas made conditional on the basis of 
performance criteria which were almost bound to be fulfilled. 
Moreover, despite this box office boost to private income, and despite continued real 
rises in the ACGB general grant over these years, the company still managed to plunge 
into deepening accumulated deficit after 1989. Furthermore, this deficit trend was 
temporarily alleviated in 1992, it appears, with funds received for the purposes of 
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acquisition of the freehold of the company's home venue (The London Coliseum). 
Note, the acquisition price of £12.8 million (in current terms) was covered by grants 
from the ACGB (£10.8 million) and The Foundation for Sport and the Arts (£2 
million). Most of these funds were received before the year end 1992 and were treated 
as deferred income (a balance sheet item). Whilst this would not ordinarily affect the 
accumulated deficit (elimination of which was a criterion of the second funding tranche, 
discussed below) releases made from deferred income directly to the income and 
expenditure account would act to reduce any deficit which occurred. This is precisely 
the pattern of events we see in ENO financial reports from 1992. Though the value of 
these releases is quite small (approximately £250,000 in current terms in 1992, for 
instance) it does indicate the existence of a problem. Specifically, it shows that one 
public funding mechanism (here, a capital grant award) has been permitted to interfere 
with the award criteria of another (here, revenue funding in the form of enhancement 
funding). Such circularly is clearly unacceptable in terms of the public interest. 
Now, in 1991 the award of ACGB Enhancement Funding was reported along with a 
statement of the conditions upon which it was contingent: 
The Arts Coundl has offered a grant for the 1991/9 2 jinandal year which represents a total 
increase of 14. 6% on that for 1990 I 91. This grant includes [i.e. not reported as a 
separable, traceable item] £600,000 awarded from the new Enhancement Fund; in 
future years grants are expected to relate to this new base. Certain additional conditions are 
attached to this upgraded subsic!J, prindpal/y as a business plan that demonstrates a 
substantial income growth [earned, private income] and the elimination of the accumulated 
defldt within three years [i.e. by year end 1994], with one third eliminated in the 1991 /92 
finandalyear [i.e. year one] (ENO ARA 1991). 
As evidence presented in Table 7-2 and Figure 7-9 shows, whilst the company appeared 
to start well in terms of meeting these Enhancement Fund conditions (private sources of 
income increase by 10% in real terms between 1991 and 1992 alone) by 1994, at the 
end of the specified period, neither had private income shown a substantial increase, nor 
had the accumulated deficit been eliminated (see also Appendix 7-17 and ENO ARA 
1991-94). 
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In fact, by 1994 the company's position vis a vis these parameters (private income and 
accumulated deficit) was considerably worse. In real terms : private income had fallen 
by 10% and an accumulated deficit of £2.9 million in 1994 had been incurred despite a 
1992 starting position deficit of less than half that value (£1.4 million). We can see this 
from Table 7-2 and Figure 7-9: 
ACGB ENHANCEMENT FUND 1992-94: PERFORMANCE AGAINST AWARD CRITERIA 
' 92-94 -YEAR 1991 1992 1993 1994 ' 
CHANGE 
All data in constant terms ; Note 1 ,. 
INCOME COMPONENT 
-Private sources (total) (£) 9,790,500 10,757,000 10,485,000 9,660,000 ' -Change on year 10% -3% -8% ' -10% -Public sources (total) (£) 9,692,500 10,582,000 11,528,000 11,812,000 ' Change on year 9% 9% 2% - 12% ' ACCUMULATED DEFICIT -Accumulated surplus I deficit (£) -1,403,000 -2,901,600 l 107% 
Note 1 : Change in accumulated deficit measured on basis of opening position for 1992 (I.e. 1991 year end) 
and clsosing position for 1994. 
Sources: see Appendices 7-6 and 7-17 
Table 7-2: ENO peiformance against ACGB grant award criteria 
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Flgure 7-9: Management control: English National Opera 
Now because it is not treated as a separable item in the financial reports, it is not clear 
whether this Enhancement Funding was awarded for the second and third year of the 
three-year award period (its receipt is reported in the first year of the award, 1992, but 
no trace can be found thereafter). Even if we assume that the funding was withdrawn 
for 1993 and 1994, through failure to meet the stated award conditions, it is difficult to 
explain why ENO's public source income still showed a real increase of 12% over the 
period. Specifically, it is hard to explain why the ACGB general grant component alone 
accounts for this 12% increase. Clearly there is a failure of transparency and 
accountability. 
Indeed, it might be asked why the ACGB instituted this Enhancement Fund award if, as it 
appears, there was an intention to increase ENO's general subsidy in any case. 
Moreover, since we know that ACE keeps only two years of client records in its offices, 
archive data being kept off-site (see ROH finding 2) it raises the fundamental question 
as to how a three-year award such as the above Enhancement Funding award 1992-94 can 
possibly be monitored? There is, in fact, no evidence here to suggest that such 
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performance predicated awards are adequately monitored at all. 
The following conclusion from a survey of charity sector accounting practice in the mid 
1980s best sums the transparency problem faced by the reader of ENO financial 
reports 1989-94: 
The lack of a'!} standardisation of presentation means that it takes the user a long time to 
discover each piece of hiformation - or to reach the conclusion that it is not disclosed af!Ywhere 
(Bird 1986:49). 
Thus, whilst we cannot know the exact outcome at EN 0, we can infer the existence of 
a problem. In the following extract, for instance, Peacock (drawing on his experience as 
former chairman of the Scottish Arts Council) considers the problem of how to 
minimize the disincentive effects of subsidies (an issue we discussed in chapter 6): 
This is not easy to bring about, but one possibiliry is to tie the subsidy to the earning of the 
compaf!Y obtained from its sales or even from all sources of income in the private sector. In 
other words, the subsidy becomes a form of matching grant. This has been tried in the UK in 
the late 1980s in the Incentive Fu11di11g Scheme administered by ACGB as an ad hoc 
arrangement financed by earmarked funds provided by the the11 Minister for the Arts. !11 
folloJdng the prevailing practice of awarding subsidy on the basis of planned activities, it ran 
into the problem of the impracticabiliry of 'clawing back' the gra11ts to the extent that 
companies did not believe that the conditio11 that thry would have to repay grants if th'!) did 
not reach their agreed target would hold, particular!J if thry could claim that it would make 
them bankrupt! This would suggest that a?!J matchinggrant should be a reward [i.e. not an 
incentive] for a demonstrable effort to i11crease private sources of income (Peacock 
1994:182). 
S af!y LK Gorden 265 
7. Lon1.-nm behamour o[individuat UK opera companies [1976-9 5J 
7.4 Welsh National Opera 
Taxonomy plot data for WNO is presented in Appendix 7-7. Supporting financial data, 
as extracted from the published accounts is presented in Appendix 7-8. 
Note: WNO data can be plotted from 1979 only, since before that date, the company 
operated as WNOD ~elsh National Opera and Drama). This means that financial data 
pertaining to opera activity, alone, cannot be meaningfully extracted out from the 
published accounts up to this da~e. 
0 i 4.0 
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F-lgure 7-10: Taxonomy plot: WeLrh National Opera 
1 : Attempts by WNO management to link leveLr of public subsic!J with increases in financial ejficienry 
appear to fai4· however, because of the existence of pre-agreedfundingparities, a sector-wide effect is 
apparent 
Sally LK Garden 266 
7. Long-nm behavio11r o[individ11al UK opera companies [1976-95/ 
The 1990 financial report of WNO contains the following statement:· 
The need to secure an increase in public funding increases at the same rate as that for earned 
income remains the mqjor objective that it has been throughout the compa'!Y 's recent history 
(WNO ARA 1990). 
This is an income maximization argument, and although Figures 7-11 and 7-12 suggest 
that it has not produced individual benefits for WNO (we would expect to see a lag 
effect whereby growth in private sector income in one year would be followed in the 
next by growth in public subsidy), evidence points to a sector-wide effect. 
First, however, Figues 7-11and7-12 taken together, appear to substantiate the 
existence of pre-agreed funding parities, since the distribution of subsidy (excepting 
special deficit grants and other non-regular funding) can be seen to operate 
I 
independently of individual company improvements in financial efficiency (for data see 
Appendices 7-1 to 7-14). Indeed, the basis of distribution would appear to be static 
(note the SO 1991 data point in Figure 7-12 may reflect an element of unidentifiable 
exceptional public source income). 
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Figure 7-11 : Growth in real private source income : UK subsidized sector 
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P.i'gure 7-12: Growth in real public source income (less exceptional funding): UK subsidized sector 
Notwithstanding this, the underlying volatility of private source income patterns (Figure 
7-11) is likely to have an overall effect on the sector as a whole. Any increase in private 
source income (assuming no real fall in public subsidy) will increase the potential 
spending power of the individual opera company. In years of relative abundance of 
private source income, the amount spent on individual performances of opera may 
increase. This, in effect, increases the apparent cost of opera. 
Now, where it is assumed that a decline in financial value input results in a decline of 
artistic value standards, any reduction in private source income (during a recession, for 
instance) will pose a threat to artistic value standards, since real spend per performance is 
likely to drop. If artistic value standards are not to be allowed to decline, then it becomes 
incumbent upon government to save the company from artistic value decline, either 
immediately (by increasing its real grant), or in retrospect, by means of special deficit 
funding to cover the accumulated deficit which the company may have been forced to 
incur in its attempt to keep up previous year spending levels. There is indeed evidence 
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to suggest that maintenance of artistic value standards is predicated on previous years' 
financial value input in precisely this way. 
For instance, in 1994, Mathew Epstein, WNO's General Director resigned, reportedly 
unhappy with the funding outlook for the compa'!Y and frustrated in not being able to present more new 
productions and continue to develop [the company's] programme of work (WNO ARA 1994). It 
is perhaps not without significance that the company's effective spend per performance 
was in this year at its highest level during the survey period (see Appendix 7-7). The 
prospects for its continued growth, apparently, did not look good. 
Again, in 1995, it is reported that in order to balance income and expendiiure for the year, a 
number of productions, performances and overhead costs had to be cut back. The fall in income from the 
box office and co-productions [private source income] reflect this decline in activity. It was therefore 
an extreme!J difficult tradingyear which makes the financial result satisfactory. While the continuing 
lack of growth in grant income causes the compa1!Y great concern ... (WN 0 ARA 199 5). It has to 
be pointed out that the average real spend per performance in the 1990s (£90,000) was 
still 20% higher than in the 1980s (£71,000) suggesting an implicit intensification policy 
(i.e. that management wanted, and expected, to continue to spend more per 
performance). Note, Figure 7-12 shows that there was still real growth in the level of 
public subsidy available to WNO, but that its growth was not as fast as that of the 
previous year. The report of the WNO Board of Directors is therefore misleading in its 
use of the phrase: lack of growth in grant income. 
Thus, whilst the company's lever on public funding was, in effect, broken (private source 
income had fallen), the apparent desire of its management to speed the growth of grant 
income nonetheless remained intact. 
To a certain extent, attempts by WNO management to link the level of the company's 
subsidy award to increases in financial efficiency may explain the saw-tooth pattern of 
the taxonomy plot (Figure 7-10). Saw-tooth movement on the taxonomy plot typically 
suggests unsustainable growth. In WNO's case, this may be the result of all out 
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fundraising efforts which, because they may exhaust all potential private sector sources 
in the short-run, cannot be repeated in successive years. This may also explain (at least 
from 1990) the historical volatility in the company's accumulated deficit (Figure 7-13 
and Appendix 7-18). 
Overall, however, whilst the individual attempt by WNO to exert leverage on public 
funding levels appears to have failed, Figures 7-11 and 7-12, considered together, 
suggest that there may indeed be a sector-wide effect. Public funding has shown 
continued real growth since 198~ (Figure 7-12), although in a cohesive way which 
suggests, again, the existence of pre-agreed public funding parities (see chapter 6). SO, 
for instance, despite its poor private sector funding performance (Figure 7-11) has 
benefitted just as much (more so, in fact) than WNO itself. 
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Figure 7-13: Management control: Welsh National Opera 
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2 : Ambiguity in board level representation together with a non-transparent nomination process 
militates against accountability 
Evidence of ambiguity in board level representation at WNO serves to illustrate a wider 
problem within the UK subsidized sector as a whole: that non-transparency in the 
board nomination process militates against accountability, making it difficult to 
establish, in any independent way, the precise motivation of boards, and the rationale 
of their composition, with respect to defence of the public interest. 
During the financial year ending 1990, for instance, Mr Bernt HR Hudson-Davies CVO 
was appointed to the Board of Directors of WNO (WNO ARA 1990). The rationale 
for his nomination is obscure and it is therefore not certain whether Mr Hudson-
Davies was invited to join the Board as the representative of a public body or as a 
private individual. At the time of his appointment, Mr Hudson-Davies's other directorships 
included: the Welsh Arts Council, the Cardiff Bay Arts Trust (in formation), the Cardiff 
Bay Development Corporation, and the Welsh Development agency - all public bodies 
of key significance in the local economic infrastructure (see Appendix 7-22). 
If we assume that Mr Hudson-Davies was appointed to the Board as a public 
representative of the Welsh Arts Council, as seems feasible, then it needs to be asked 
what significance should be attached to his other public sector directorships? (We use the 
term directorship in its broadest sense, to include trusteeship, for instance). Does Mr 
Hudson-Davies (still a member of the board at the end of our survey period, 1996) 
represent a kind of public sector directorial package, i.e. representing all his interests at 
once, and on a basis of equal relevance? In which case, are there any limits here; are 
there any constraints on possible conflicts of interest? What is the value of such 
multiple representation and is it in the public interest that one individual should 
command a broad and, in effect, strategic influence over the distribution of public 
funds? If there are no constraints here, no visible checks and balances, then there is 
obvious threat to the independence of WNO as a charitable organisation, and indeed, 
to the public interest as a whole. 
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Equally, if Mr Hudson-Davies was appointed to the board as a private. individual, then 
by what means does Mr Hudson-Davies maintain a distance between his private and 
public interests? Certainly, in terms of accountability, there is a distinct lack of 
specificity with respect to the role of such individuals within the context of the opera 
company Board of Directors. 
The nature of this role ambiguity and the hidden rationale for Board member 
nomination also has potentially serious consequences for operation of the artistic value 
franchise itself. 
It is not clear, for instance, whether there is connection between Mr Hudson-Davies's 
membership of the Board in 1991 and the WAC deficit reversing grant of £842,000 (in 
constant terms) which was negotiated in that year, or with the £175,000 real increase in 
the WAC general grant which was likewise negotiated for the following year. Was Mr 
Hudson-Davies on the Board at this time as a non-voting observer for WAC or as a 
full member of the WNO Board with full voting rights? If the latter is true (as seems to 
be the case from the financial reports) is it morally justifiable for one individual to sit, as 
it were, on both sides of the negotiating table, that is: to act as a public representative 
of a grant-awarding body and as a public representative of a grant-receiving 
organisation? This seems to undermine any possibility of substantive accountability. It 
is a situation which appears to hinge on trust, but trust without transparency. 
Perhaps of more significance in terms of threat to the artistic value franchise, are the 
events surrounding the company's 1990 application to the Millennium Commission 
(which was for funds to build a permanent venue for WNO). Again, it must be asked: 
what was Mr Hudson-Davies's role? We note that although he had resigned from WAC 
in 1994, by 1995 he had become a member of the National Lottery Advisory Board for 
Wales (WNO ARA 1995). Now this does not sit comfortably with WNO's application 
(via the Cardiff Bay Opera House Trust) to the Millennium Commission, since the 
Millennium Commission itself overseas the disbursement of a portion of funds from 
the UK National Lottery. The ambiguity of the situation is compounded further by 
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events which follow the failure of the Millennium Commission application: 
Much time and effort was devoted l?J management during the year to supporting the Cardi.ff 
Bqy Opera House T mst in its efforts to secure fandi.ngf rom the Millennium Commission for 
a music theatre of international standard in Cardi.ff 1vhich would provide a much needed 
permanent home for the compa1!J. It 1vas a mqjor di.sappointment that the proposed scheme 
was turned down l?J the Commission and consequent/y had to be abandoned The compa1!J is 
now working with other interested bodi.es in Wales, including ... the CardiffBqy Development 
Corporation, with the aim of promoting an attractive scheme which will attract support 
(WNO ARA 1996). 
It would be impossible to say that there are no connections, here, between Mr 
Hudson-Davies's membership of the Board of WNO and his membership of the 
Cardiff Bay Development Corporation. The question is, what is the significance of this 
bi-lateral connection in terms of the public interest? What was Mr Hudson-Davies's 
role on the WNO board at the time, and who precisely did he represent? This problem 
is worth exploring 
Appendix 7-22 shows the results of a comparison of Board composition and Board 
member interests across all companies in the survey for one financial year (the year 
ending 1995). The comparison shows that the kind of bi-lateral board membership 
represented by Mr Hudson-Davies (i.e. his membership of both opera company board 
and potential funder board) is not uncommon. 
For instance, at ENO Mr Roger JL Bramble MA DL included amongst his other 
directorships the City of Westminster Trust and the City of Westminster Arts Council; 
the City of Westminster being a traditional funding source for ENO after the abolition 
of the GLC (Greater London Council) in the late 1980s (see Appendix 7-22). Again, 
public funders such as the City of Westminster Arts Council are entitled to send 
observers to client company board meeting, but observers are not equivalent to members 
with full voting rights. Mr Bramble certainly appears to have been appointed a full 
member in this latter sense (see ENO ARA 1995). 
Appendix 7-22 also shows that, at SO, Mrs Carol H0gel and Dr Christopher Masters, 
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members of Dunard Ltd and Christian Salvesen PLC, respectively, represent patrons with 
directorial interest (see ROH finding 6). Mrs H0gel was, for instance, still on the board of 
SO in 1997 when the significant support of the Dunard Fund was noted in the Chairman's 
Report (SO ARA 1997) although we do not know how significant or material that 
support was, nor the extent to which the Dunard Fund has supported SO in the past, 
since lists of sponsors and donors are not consistently provided in the company's 
financial reports. However, we do know, again from the Chairman's report, that in 
1996 the Dunard Fund was the principal sponsor of the company's production of Don 
Giovanni (SO ARA 1996). In the case of Christian Salvesen PLC, it cannot be 
ascertained from the financial reports what level of sponsorship, if any, was given 
during the period of membership of the board by Dr Masters (he was Vice-chairman of 
the board in 1997). We do know, however, that Christian Salvesen PLC has been an 
important SO sponsor in the past and that the company's chairman in 1989, Sir Gerald 
Elliot, was at the same time chairman of the board of directors of SO (Norton 
1989:140 and Percival 1989). 
A more serious problem, however, is bi-lateral board membership associated with the 
UK National Lottery. Two individuals, representing three subsidized sector opera 
companies stand as a case in point: at ROH, Mr Percy J Butler CBE was also (in 1995) 
a member of Camelot Group plc. At ENO and ON, George HH Lascelles, The Rt 
Hon the Earl of Harewood KBE, was a member of the Lottery Promotions Company. 
There is another issue here: aside from bi-lateral representation (which begs more 
questions about the role of board members than answers) there appears to be a strong 
element of multiple representation within the cultural sector as a whole. That is, 
representation on more than one major arts organisation by individual board members 
(see e.g. David Cohen, Mr Hudson-Davies, Appendix 7-22). It has to be asked whether 
it is in the public interest, and in the interest of the artistic value franchise, that the Earl 
of Harewood, for instance, should sit on the boards of ENO, ON, Opera da Camera, 
Opera Factory, the London Sinfonietta and the Leeds Festival, concurrently? One 
argument might be that access to an individual with such obvious special interest in the 
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arts, and in particular, opera, is beneficial to the opera companies concerned (the board 
membership portfolio of the individual here becoming a measure of the apparent 
public spiritedness and knowledge of the arts of the individual concerned). But it must 
be asked whether such apparent public spiritedness is a sufficient criterion here: in what 
way are individuals, such as the Earl of Harewood, particularly qualified to oversee the 
use of large tranches of public subsidy in the arts? Are there any controls here; and how 
might the apparent authority of such key individuals, upon whom so much influence is 
concentrated, be challenged? More damagingly, what effect does this concentration of 
influence have on the developm~nt of individual opera company strategies? Clearly, 
ENO and ON, for instance, cannot exist in true competition, since they share a key 
board member (Harewood as Chairman of one and Vice-Chairman of the other, 
despite disaggregation of ON in 1980). This may explain the homogeneity, the lack of 
differentiation which we have found within the UK subsidized sector (see chapter 6). 
Table 7-3 illustrates this point, showing the degree of multiple representation which 
existed within the opera sector, alone, in 1995. 
OTHER OPERA COMPANY 
BOARD MEMBER-STATED OCCUPATION BOARD DIRECTORSHIPS IN 1995 
The Rt Hon the Earl of Harewood KBE - Peer of the realm ENO Opera North 
Opera da Camera 
Opera Factory 
Dr J David Cohen - General medical practitioner ENO English Touring Opera 
Sir John Tooley - Arts consultant WNO Opera London 
Compton Verney Opera Project 
Friends of Covent Garden 
Mr Peter S Philips - Chartered accountant WNO City of Birmingham Touring Opera 
Source: See Appendix 7-22 
Tab/,e 7-3: Opera directorships held by UK subsidized sector board JJJeJJJbers (1995) 
Table 7-3 also begs another vital question, specifically: why the self-styled arts 
consultant should enjoy representation, indeed multiple representation, on opera 
company boards? Sir John Tooley, for instance (see Table 7-3), provides a prime 
example here. As a board member of over 10 major arts organisations, including 2 
opera companies (see Appendix 7-22) it has to be asked whether Sir John Tooley can 
legitimately be said to act in disinterested fashion, as a consultant. Consultancy, as a 
S aJ!y LK Garden 275 
7. Long.-rnn behaviour of individual UK opera companies [1976-9 5J 
business activity, is predicated on objective detachment (distance) of consultant from 
client. By definition (i.e. accepted practice) a consultant is able to give his or her 
professional services in an objective manner precisely because he or she is not involved 
with the client organisation. 
There is a very significant ethical question here. If Sir John Tooley gives his services as 
an arts consultant on a gratis basis, without formal contract (members of the board, as 
non-executive members of the management team, do not receive remuneration, other 
than expenses) then how can th~ public interest be properly safeguarded? As it is, the 
general public cannot know that the arts consultant is not merely representing his or 
her own professional interests and enjoying the benefits of a free platform for self-
promotion at the same time. It is a very serious point. 
There certainly seems to be need for greater transparency in the nomination process 
itself: at ENO, for instance, only five members of the eighteen-strong board form the 
nominations sub-committee (see Appendix 7-22), and the criteria for nomination are 
nowhere stated. In addition, there needs to be greater specificity regarding the roles of 
individual members. Most importantly, it needs to be demonstrated why concentration 
of membership around an apparently interlinked group of individuals (see Table 7-4) 
can benefit the artistic value franchise. What precisely is the vehicle of nomination that 
allows such in terlinkage to occur1? 
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DIRECTORSHIPS HELD IN COMMON IN 
BOARD MEMBER· STATED OCCUPATION BOARD 1995 
Robert Gavron CBE - Company chairman ROH National Gallery Publications Ltd 
Bamber Gascoigne - Author & broadcaster ROH National Gallery Publications Ltd 
The Rt Hon the Earl of Harewood KBE - Peer of the realm ENO[C] Harewood House Trading Ltd (etc) 
Sir Nicholas Goodison -Company director ENOM Harewood House Trust Ltd 
The Rt Hon the Earl of Harewood KBE - Peer of the realm ENO[C] London Sinfonietta, Opera Factory 
Dr J David Cohen - General medical practitioner ENO [ap] London Sinfonietta, Opera Factory 
Sir Donald Walters - Company director WNOM Development Board for Rural Wales 
Mrs Christine E Lewis - Retail consultant WNO Development Board for RIJ"al Wales 
Sir John Tooley - Arts consultant WNO Wigmore Hall 
Bernt Hudson-Davies CVO - Company director WNO Wigmore Hall Trust Ltd 
The Rt Hon the Earl of Harewood KBE - Peer of the realm ONM Sports Aid Foundation Ltd 
Cllr Bernhard P Atha - Chair Leeds Culture Services Committee ON Sports Aid Foundation Ltd 
Clive W Leach - Company director ON Yorkshire Enterprise Ltd 
John Gunnell - Member of Parliament ON Yorkshire Enterprise Ltd 
John A Graham - Chief executive ON Huddersfield Contemporary Music Festival Ltd 
Professor George Pratt - Professor of music ON Huddersfield Contemporary Music Festival Ltd 
[C =Chair, V =Vice-chair, ap =artistic policy sub-committee] Source : see Appendix 7-22 
T ab/,e 7-4 : Directorships held in coJJJJJJon by UK subsidized sector board JJJeJJJbers (19 9 5) 
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7 .5 Opera North 
Taxonomy plot data for ON is presented in Appendix 7-9. Supporting financial data, as 
extracted from the published accounts is presented in Appendix 7-10. 
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Figure 7-14: Taxononry plot: Opera North 
1 : ON appears to demonstrate greater jinandal e.fftdenry than SO, its equivalent in terms of size 
(turnover) 
Quantitative comparison of ON and SO suggests that ON, during the 1990s, has 
overtaken SO in terms of financial efficiency. Table 7-5 shows the results of this 
comparison. 
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PARAMETER PERIOD ON so DIFFERENTIAL 
SIZE 1982-84 £4.8m £6.5m .£1.7m 
[Real turnover] 1992-94 £7.6m £7.6m None 
OUTPUT 1982-84 111 104 +7 
[Mainscale performances in year] 1992-94 112 96 +16 
LABOUR INTENSITY 1982-84 1.34 2.20 -0.86 
[Employees per performance]* 1992-94 1.41 1.60 ·0.19 
FINANCIAL INTENSITY 1982-84 £43,000 £64,000 ·£21,000 
[Real turnover per performance] 1992-94 £68,000 £80,000 .£12,000 
*Note: each additional increment of labour intensity (1.00) represents one 
additional salary per performance (approximately £15,000-£25,000) 
Source: see Appendices 7-1 to 7-10 
Tab/,e 7-J : Change in comparative financial ejficienq of Opera North and Scottish Opera 
From Table 7-5 it can be seen that by the early 1990s, whilst equivalent in terms of size, 
ON was producing more opera for less financial input, or cost, than SO. 
What does this finding signify? Those who argue, for instance, that there exists a direct 
relationship between financial value input and artistic value output would be forced to 
conclude that ON's artistic value standards must, by default, be lower than those of SO, 
in the 1990s, because the company spends less per performance than SO. 
The comparison is an interesting one because the two companies share a similar remit: 
mainscale opera production with touring to local communities. It is legitimate to ask, 
therefore, whether audiences in Scotland enjoy a better artistic service than those 
served by ON in the north of England? 
If, for the sake of argument, we assume that there exists no demonstrable difference in 
the respective artistic standards of the two companies, then what is the rationale which 
permits SO to operate at a level of greater labour and financial intensity than ON? To 
see this, compare Figures 7-14 and 7-1. 
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We simply have insufficient data in the financial reports of ON and SO to take our 
analysis further (there is neither a consistent nor comparable breakdown of 
expenditure, for instance). We can only assume, in the absence of adequate data, that 
the differential, in terms of real spend per performance, between ON and SO is 
explained by SO's ownership of the Theatre Royal. Whilst other factors may be 
involved (e.g. possible differences in average remuneration levels), fixed asset structure 
(degree of establishment) represents the only significant difference in overhead 
structure between the two companies and may explain the apparent inefficiency of SO 
(see also SO finding 5). 
Now this is significant. If there exists no demonstrable difference in artistic value 
between ON and SO performances, then the rationale for funding this additional 
overhead at SO (the Theatre Royal), becomes questionable in the light of these results. 
The burden of theatre ownership is a burden which could equally well be borne by the 
private sector, for instance. If there is no demonstrable difference in artistic value 
between ON and SO, what is the value to the taxpayer and to the artistic value franchise 
as a whole, of the additional establishment cost at SO? 
Moreover, if ON were, like SO, to take the initiative (ibid SO ARA 1983) and undertake 
to purchase a theatre, would public subsidy for such initiative be justifiable? We would 
certainly require, in the interests of accountability and equity, that the benefits be 
demonstrated. There does, for instance, seem to be a difference between ON and SO 
in terms of stability. Whereas SO has experienced persistent problems in terms of 
control of its accumulated deficit (see Figure 7-3 and SO finding 5), ON exhibits a 
certain stability, albeit in deficit (see Figure 7-15 and Appendix 7-19). It would be a 
brave policy maker who permitted the ON model to gravitate towards that of SO. 
Perhaps the question is this: given the evidence regarding financial efficiency, why 
should SO retain ownership of a theatre when it has a touring remit similar to ON? 
Indeed, what is the connection between ownership of a theatre and artistic value? 
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Figure 7-JJ: Management control: Opera North 
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7.6 Glyndebourne Productions 
Taxonomy plot data for GP (which comprises G FO+GTO) is presented in Appendix 
7-11. Supporting financial data, as extracted from the published accounts is presented 
























TAXONOMY PLOT : GLYNDEBOURNE PROOUCllONS [GFO + GTO] 
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Figure 7-16: Taxonomy plot: G!J'ndebourne Productions 
1 : The stabiliry exhibited by GP through a decade of sustained expansion and intensijication indicates 
strong management control 
Over the decade 1981-91 (1991 being the last year before preparation for rebuilding of 
the home venue) GP expanded its output by one third, increased its real spend per 
performance by over 40% and yet remained stable. Returning a current surplus in 8 of 
the 10 years considered, management succeeded in maintaining a general reserve 
(equivalent to an accumulated surplus) of almost constant value over the period. This 
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indicates strong management control. 
Figures 7-16 and 7-17 demonstrate the strength of this control and the stability it has 
produced. The tightness of the taxonomy plot data up to 1991 (Figure 7-16) suggests an 
efficient operation and indicates the ability of management to set and work within 
budgetary targets. Intensification during this period is relatively slow and sustained, for 
instance, compared with ROH, ENO, WNO and SO, over the same period (Figures 7-
5, 7-8, 7-10, and 7-1 respectively). 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL: GLYNDEBOURNE PRODUCTIONS [GFo+GTO] 
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Figure 7-17 illustrates the stability of GP in terms of its trading record (for data see 
Appendix 7-20). The flatness of the general reserve curve shows that GP exhibits 
stability, and stability in surplus (compared with ON which appears to show stability in 
deficit, see Figure 7-15). 
The following table of comparison (fable 7-6) shows the results of this control in 
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terms of the key parameters: turnover, performances, and employees. 
PARAMETER 1982-86 1987-91 % CHANGE 
SIZE ON £5.0m £5.8m +16% 
[Real turnover] so £6.6m £7.2m +9% 
GP £5.4m £7.8m +44% 
OUTPUT ON 108 102 -6% 
[Mainscale performances in year] so 102 106 +4% 
GP 94 111 +18% 
LABOUR INTENSITY ON 1.4 1.48 +6% 
[Employees per performance]* so 2.13 1.84 -13% 
GP 1.32 1.33 +1% 
FINANCIAL INTENSITY ON £47,000 £58,000 +23% 
[Real turnover per performance] so £66,000 £68,000 +3% 
GP £57,000 £70,000 +23% 
* Note: each additional increment of labour intensity (1.00) represents one 
additional salary per performance (approximately £15,000-£25,000) 
Source: see Appendices 7-1 to 7-12 
Table 7-6: Intercompmry cofllj>arison of financial efftcienry 
Whilst in the early 1980s, GP, along with ON, was the smallest of the group of three 
companies in terms of real turnover, by the late 1980s it had become the largest 
(around 8% larger than its nearest neighbour, SO). Significantly, this had been achieved 
via a 44% increase in turnover in real terms (fuelled in the main by private source 
income), an increase far in excess of those achieved by the two subsidized sector 
companies, ON and SO (at 16% and 9% respectively). Whilst we cannot compute the 
public income factor for GP (due to insufficient data in the financial reports) we do 
know that in 1995, for instance, GTO was receiving only 30% of its total income via 
public funds, whilst GFO received none, the latter relying entirely on: box office 
income (70%), sponsorship and donations (4%), programmes, catering and 
merchandising (10%), and the support of the Glyndebourne Festival Society (16%) (GP 
ARA 1996). 
The strong funding basis of GP, however, is not a sufficient explanator of its stability. 
Looking again at Table 7-6, it is apparent that GP has consistently tied the level of the 
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company's output to that of its real spend per performance. In brief, GP has 
maintained the relative strength of its real spend per performance by controlling output 
(the number of mainscale opera performances each year). Taking the group of three 
companies as a whole, GP has achieved dominance in terms of real turnover per 
performance. In the early 1980s the company maintained its spend by working at a 
lower level of output than either ON or SO. By the late 1980s, however, GP had 
overtaken its subsidized sector counterparts in terms of output (an average 111 
performances per year between 1987-91). 
The same control appears to be true of labour intensity. Whilst GP added significantly 
to its staff between the early and the late 1980s (see Appendix 7-11), labour intensity 
remained relatively steady. This is in contrast to SO, which can be seen to have reduced 
its labour intensity by some 13% between the two periods (a factor which may be 
explained by overtrading, see SO finding 5). Only ON remains more steady in this 
respect. 
These results confirm the ability of GP management to pursue and direct the company 
towards long-term goals. It must be asked, however, why a largely private sector 
operation (as represented by GP) should have succeeded in maintaining a consistent 
and stable operation through a period in which its subsidized sector counterparts 
apparently could not? The comparison is all the more pointed given that GP, like SO, 
owns its home venue and operates with a board of only six members Qess than half the 
size of the ON and SO boards respectively; see Appendix 7-22). Whilst the relatively 
large board sizes of the subsidized sector companies may reflect the traditional view 
that, the broader the representation, the greater the defence of the public interest, these 
results suggests the possibility that smaller, more focussed boards result in greater 
financial efficiency, which, in the long-run, may better facilitate the creation of artisti.c 
value and therefore better safeguard the public interest. 
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8. SUMMARY 
The major finding of this study is that the real cost of opera in the UK subsidized 
sector (as measured by turnover) has been permitted to double since the 1970s. There 
is no evidence of any attempt by government or by individual sector members to 
constrain what was shown to be an uninterrupted rise in costs. Moreover, no single 
company exception to the rising trend was found. Driven primarily by ROH, the rise in 
real cost has also taken place within an environment of increasing financial constraint 
(notably the two oil shocks of the 1970s, significant real cuts in government 
expenditure during the Thatcher years, the recessions of the early 1980s and early 
1990s, and the ongoing programme of European Monetary Union). This fact, we 
argued, adds increasing importance to the opportunity costs associated with funding 
opera, and may lead to radical change in UK Government policy. Two outcomes are 
likely if the trend in rising costs is left unchecked: sudden withdrawal of support 
(effective privatisation), or fundamental redesign of the subsidy award process and 
opera infrastructure (adoption of alternative funding and operational models). 
We found that the powerhouse model, which saw its nascence in the industry 
nationalisation ethos of the mid-1940s, still persists in the current era. Evidence showed 
that within the UK subsidized sector a powerhouse driverfollower hierarchy, led by ROH 
and followed by ENO, WNO and SO respectively (with ON as late entrant) had 
remained unchanged across the survey period. Indeed, preservation of the hierarchy led 
us to conclude that public subsidy is awarded to sector members, in the current era, less 
on the basis of fl11ancial value need or of artistic value merit, and more on the basis of pre-
agreed funding parities. This was a key finding: that the powerhouse model appears to be 
sustained by the existence of pre-agreed public funding parities despite changes in 
individual company performance. From this we concluded that the UK Government, 
via its agent, the ACGB, has chiefly been concerned with issues of service provision and 
access (not artistic value per se), and that there is a belief amongst policy makers that 
externalities, the theoretical wider social benefits which may accrue from subsidization 
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of opera, are best delivered via a stable, if not static, infrastructure. Indeed, no single 
company has ever been permitted to challenge the powerhouse (ROH) in its position as 
effective driver of quality or artistic value within the sector. 
We argued that lack of innovation in the mechanism of delivery of the artform (static 
and heavily centralised opera infrastructure) means that there has been no substantive 
innovation in the artform itself. Indeed, the complete absence of breakout from the 
powerhouse hierarchy (we demonstrated the existence of an opera value shift in our 
taxonomy data) confirms that there has been no substantive artistic value innovation 
within the sector within the last decade at least. This, together with results which 
showed that the UK subsidized sector exhibited strong homogeneity, indicated 
continuity of the public service provision model, a characteristic of which is treatment of 
artistic value as an exogenous variable or given. Certainly, artistic value factors do not 
appear to influence the subsidy award to individual companies. 
We next demonstrated, within the context of the UK subsidized sector, the 
problematic nature of the interrelationship which exists between subsidy policy and 
individual company gains in financial efficiency. We argued that the apparent operation 
of pre-agreed public funding parities, together with reliance on accounting ratios as 
guides to subsidy award, act to perpetuate a central contradiction in the subsidy award 
system for opera in the UK. That is: because subsidy policy does not respond to 
changes in the financial efficiency of individual opera companies, those companies least 
in need of subsidy (i.e. those best able to maximize private source income) may be 
permitted to capture an increasing proportion of subsidy. In this context, we showed 
that by the end of the study period, ROH had increased its subsidy share, despite 
significant gains in financial efficiency. We showed that whilst this introduced inequity 
(subsidy capture by companies), attempts to relate subsidy award to changes in financial 
efficiency would result in a disincentive effect and possible collapse of the funding 
system altogether, since those companies best able to generate private source income 
would effectively be penalised for their financial efficiency gains. 
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We also showed that the apparent operation of pre-agreed funding parities tends to 
promote social exclusion (a narrowing of the artistic value franchise) as well as inequity in 
the distribution of subsidy (capture by audiences or audience groups). Exclusion, we 
argued, occurs where a company's audience becomes concentrated around those 
groups least sensitive to ticket price increases (higher income groups); and capture, 
where the company's subsidy share is maintained despite demonstrable strengthening in 
the buying-power of its audience. In this context, we showed that, despite evidence of a 
strengthening in the buying-power of its audience (ability to withstand real increases in 
ticket prices), ROH still received the same (if not marginally increased) subsidy share at 
the end of the study period as it did at the beginning. We concluded from this that 
although subsidy policy is designed, in principle, to maximize the key distributive and 
egalitarian goal of access for all (a consumer subsidy function), in practice, it may operate 
to promote access for the few because of the mechanism of its delivery (a producer subsidy 
form). 
Our study of the UK subsidized sector also revealed certain intrinsic impedimenta to 
full and free participation in the artistic value franchise (in addition to the problem of 
subsidy capture by audiences). Patronage, in its strictest sense (i.e. patronage which is 
not disinterested), was found to persist in the 1990s. The potential power of private 
patrons with directorial interest (i.e. those with board positions), and anonymous 
donors, was shown to mitigate against accountability, threatening the independence of 
individual opera companies as charitable arts organisations. We argued, that because of 
poor transparency in the reporting of private source income, the apparent public 
spiritedness of private patronage (and anonymous donation) does not preclude the 
possibility of patronage as a vehicle for personal advancement by private lobbyers and 
those with a special interest in gaining access to establishment circles. This, we argued, 
was not an unlikely outcome given the perceived role of opera companies as 
institutions of national importance, and findings which showed the extent of board 
membership within the sector by Members of Parliament, local authority officials and 
other public sector representatives. We also demonstrated that private patrons with 
directorial interest (i.e. those with board positions) enjoyed the possibility of 
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disproportionate control over the artistic value agenda by exercising conditions on the 
award of patronage. We described this potential control of the artistic value agenda, since 
it implied a proper() qualification, as a form of artocrary. 
Interested patronage within the UK subsidized sector was found to be a source of 
major inequity in the operation of the artistic value franchise since it permitted 
disproportionate control of the artistic value agenda. Direct evidence of the exercise of 
conditions upon artistic goals by patrons with directorial interest was found at ROH in 
the 1990s. It was concluded that such individuals could enjoy subsidy capture once, by 
exercising a potentially disproportionate control of the artistic value agenda, and twice, as 
opera consumers, by benefitting from subsidized access. The pattern of patronage with 
directorial interest which was apparent at ROH, also revealed a potential barrier to 
radical new artistic and financial departures since it promoted preservation of the status 
quo. Ultimately, the difficulty of removing or overruling board members directly 
associated with funding sources was seen as the natural outcome where a lack of 
adequate checks and balances was in place. It also meant that the opera community fear 
of the power of sponsors was of less significance than the power of internal or 
interested patrons. 
The chief traditional explanation of rising costs in the performing arts, the Baumol and 
Bowen thesis (the productivi.!J lag or cost disease model) was presented and discussed. 
Results from the parametric study showed, however, that the thesis was not a sufficient 
explanator of real cost rises in opera because it assumed a single and external causal 
factor Qabour cost pressure caused by inter-industry productivity differentials). From a 
study of ROH cost data, it was found that no single factor explains the overall rise in 
the real cost of opera, and, in addition, that intrinsic factors (active investment and/ or 
passive cost creep) were likely to account for a significant proportion of the cost rises 
examined. This issue was explored further and it was found that budgeting policy within 
ROH had remained static over the long-run, did not reflect expected variability in the 
growth of component cost categories (an outcome also posited by the Baumol and 
Bowen thesis) and therefore suggested a degree of immunity from the external 
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environment. We inferred from these results that some functions or departments 
within ROH must have experienced periods of feast relative to the famine of others; 
that there had been little active change in the pattern of investment (distribution of 
financial value input) at ROH, and that there therefore existed an inflationary process 
intrinsic to the international opera community itself. This we termed opera value inflation. 
We argued that opera value inflation is most probably imported into the UK from those 
countries in which opera receives more generous levels of public funding; that resultant 
purchasing power differentials qetween companies in the international opera market 
cause the price of various factors of production to rise. This occurs because those 
companies with the greatest purchasing power effectively become factor price setters 
within the international market as a whole. We argued, however, that the star system (the 
cultivation of a perceived elite of artists which results in a self-generating system of 
labour scarcity value) is not a sufficient explanator of opera value i?iflation since the 
international sourcing of factors of production influences the entire cost base of the 
individual opera company Oabour and non-labour costs). This, we argued, is caused by 
the existence of artistic value paradigms such as production styles. Using an example to 
illustrate our case, we argued that the scarcity value of the guest opera director (a labour 
input cost) coupled with the derived costs of the production style associated with the 
individual director (comprising many materials or non-labour costs), together acts to 
exert an inflationary effect on the purchasing company's total costs. To this extent, we 
argued that the star system, because it does not take account of the derived costs 
associated with artistic value paradigms, does not offer a sufficient explanation of opera 
value inflation. However, it could not be ruled out, because of non-separability and non-
transparency in the reporting of guest artist fees, that the total labour costs (full-time 
equivalent employees, guest artists and sub-contract labour) together, comprise a major 
contributory factor to the real rise in the cost of opera. 
Aggregate results from the UK subsidized sector also revealed the pursuit of economies 
of scale. These economies were achieved through management of the yearly production 
portfolio: specifically, a narrowing of the yearly production portfolio coupled with 
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extension of the average production run was discovered. This, we concluded, would 
produce economies by eliciting a reduction in total production cost and concurrent 
increase in production cost recovery. This appears to indicate response by individual 
subsidized sector companies to opera value ieflation. We argued that the cost of 
compliance with international artistic value paradigms (stylistic canons which, in effect, 
represent international quality standards), may force the pursuit of such economies. 
This occurs because control of the level of financial value investment required to meet a 
given international standard will tend to lie with those overseas companies which lead 
the international sector in terms. of factor purchasing power. 
A marked preference for investment in overhead (greater establishmen~ was found across 
all companies in the study. This, we argued, represents an investment in security, since 
investment in overhead (establishment) may offer the best defence against potential loss 
or erosion of subsidy. Indeed, the greater the investment in establishment (such as theatre 
ownership and full-time staff), the greater the potential cost, iri. terms of political 
embarrassment, of the company's failure. We contrasted this establishment model (high 
financial intensity, high labour intensity) with the production model Qow financial 
intensity, low labour intensity), showing that whilst the production model offered greater 
flexibility, there appeared to be no advantage, in the context of current subsidy policy, 
to its adoption. Whilst OR, in terms of our taxonomy data, illustrated the archetypal 
production company, all other companies in the sample, including GP, were seen, 
despite changes in the environment, to be moving towards greater establishment. In the 
case of GP, investment in establishment (rebuilding of the Glyndebourne opera house in 
the early 1990s) was thought to reflect a more considered, commercial rationale for 
intensification, since it was demonstrated that GP depended to only a relatively small 
extent upon public source income. It was noted that despite this major capital 
investment, GP still remained less established (intense) than the majority of companies in 
the UK subsidized sector. 
Results from the parametric study were also discussed on a per company basis, and a 
number of themes emerged. Special attention was given to SO in this analysis due to 
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the extended data-run (1962-96) which was available for this company. 
Results from SO reveal overexpansion of the company in the years immediately 
following incorporation (1962). Evidence showed that the primary goal of management 
in these years was establishment of the full-time presence of the company, and that the 
expansion which this necessitated had been driven faster than available internal 
resources would allow: a major failure of budgeting control was discovered. The 
rationale for this immediate expansion was discussed, and it was concluded that in the 
period of genesis of an opera company, investment by management in personal security 
(establishment of salaried positions) will tend to determine the choice of operational 
model adopted by the company, and therefore its future artistic value choices. Moreover, 
it is also possible that the company may have become too rapidly acculturated to public 
source income in the 1960s, and that this may have set the management culture which 
was to prevail thereafter: inadequate management control was shown to be a feature of 
the company's history. 
Results from SO also demonstrate that the fixed asset structure of an opera company 
can, in certain circumstances, effectively define its artistic value goals. The decision by SO 
management to purchase the Theatre Royal in 1974 was discussed in this light. Analysis 
of SO data showed that investment in installed capacity had introduced immediate 
constraint on repertoire planning. Furthermore, it was also concluded that investment 
in installed capacity ultimately constrains freedom to innovate, since it increases the 
riskiness of artistic experimentation. Evidence suggested that the potential negative 
outcomes of such experimentation Qoss of core audience and substitution of audience 
groups without net benefit in terms of total audience size) were, as a general rule, not 
properly considered by opera managements. Moreover, there was strong evidence to 
suggest that installed capacity at SO had promoted a centralising tendency in repertoire 
planning, that it had necessitated a mass marketing approach to maintain a balance of 
interest in programming, rather than a resource-based approach to allow the 
exploitation of company artistic strengths. Overall, evidence suggested that for the 
theatre-owning opera company, pressure to recover overhead associated with installed 
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capacity means that artistic value must, by necessity, become secondary to the pursuit of 
economies of scale (financial value issues). 
Overtrading and long-term disequilibrium were seen to be features of SO activity 
during the 1980s. This was shown to be the result of investment in fixed assets in the 
previous decade. Coping strategies were seen to include postponement or deferral of 
costs, which, whilst appropriate in the context of short-term firefighting, did not, it was 
argued, translate into an adequate long-term strategy. This was argued because the 
effects of cost deferral may promote financial instability. Certainly, results confirmed 
that repeated rescue funding had been a feature of SO's history. 
Overall, results from SO showed that internally generated financial constraints may be 
as significant to the opera company, if not more so, in terms of effect on artistic 
freedom, than those which originate from the external environment. The traditional 
argument put forward by the UK opera community, that lack of adequate public 
funding (an external factor) accounts for poor company financial efficiency, is not 
sufficient. Results from SO show that self-imposed capacity utilisation problems, failure 
to develop adequate budgeting and control mechanisms, lack of appropriate internal 
feedback, exposure to unqualified risk (random experimentation with repertoire mix), 
and short-termism (boom and bust behaviour) are all major contributory factors. 
Results from ROH and ENO revealed a lack of concern with the mechanisms of 
accountability. Poor record-keeping and poor response management by ROH (and 
ACE) meant that basic performance data pertaining to the activities of selected 
companies within the ROH group, could not be obtained. Moreover, where data was 
available, key sources (ROH and ACE) did not agree. This impeded research and added 
complexity to preparation of the data set used for the parametric study. This, together 
with inconsistent reporting of ACGB Incentive Funding, discovered in ENO financial 
reports (the primary mechanism of accountability for charitable organisations), 
demonstrated that subsidy award criteria appear to be neither adequately defined nor 
adequately monitored. 
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Subtle change in the basis of operation of the powerhouse (ROH) indicated the existence 
of policy creep. It was found that the contribution of opera to total output at Covent 
Garden (measured by number of performances per annum) had reduced over the 
period studied. No evidence was found to suggest that this was the result of active 
policy or of deliberate artistic or financial strategy. Indeed, it could not be explained 
from available evidence why this change to the powerhouse had been permitted. 
Specifically, it could not be explained in what way diminution of the role, and therefore 
apparent importance, of opera at ROH could be justified. This, we concluded, was 
particularly problematic given results which showed, first, that there had been 
continued real growth in the value of subsidy awarded to ROH and, second, that ROH 
had been permitted to accelerate away from its powerhouse followers in terms of financial 
intensity (effective spend per performance). 
The particular pattern of ACGB Guarantee funding observed in ROH financial reports, 
suggested that the powerhouse has been permitted to enjoy a strong degree of immunity 
from the external environment. It was not possible to judge the strength of 
management control (the ability to set and work within budgets) at ROH, since any 
current deficits which did occur, particularly in the 1980s, were seen to be immediately 
absorbed by special means. That these special means consisted, in the main, of ACGB 
Guarantee funding (a reactive funding mechanism) was seen to be problematic. 
Specifically, it could not be ascertained from the company financial reports what 
specific criteria governed the award of this special funding nor, therefore, the year to 
year basis of its justification. It was concluded that retrospective funding of this nature, 
where there is non-transparency, may result in the reward of poor management 
control, and, in the context of a rising trend in the real cost of opera, may result in the 
reward of repeated!J poor and increasingly poor management control. This was seen to be 
a major problem in terms of both accountability and subsidy policy design. 
Results from ENO revealed willingness on the part of management to embrace 
unqualified risk, and willingness, therefore, to risk the viability of the company. Failure 
to safeguard against the financial risk associated with a mid-1980s overseas tour was 
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seen to indicate management incompetence. This incompetence, it was demonstrated, 
resulted in short-term destabilisation of the company and could, it was argued, be 
interpreted as the outcome of a lack of skill in risk assessment. Equally, there was 
evidence to suggest that management's actions reflected not only a belief in the 
indefeasibility of its subsidy award, but a belief that any necessary rescue funding would 
be forthcoming by default. This, together with non-consistent and non-transparent 
treatment of ACGB Incentive Fundi,ng in ENO reports, suggested a strong degree of 
complacency within the subsidized sector, not least on the part of the ACGB as 
government agent. Moreover, it was argued that there existed no clear rationale for 
overseas touring, since the reduction in domestic supply which it had been shown to 
effect (in the case considered), logically resulted in a negative impact on access, the key 
distributive goal of arts policy. In the absence of demonstrable artistic value benefits, and 
other potential externalities, it was concluded that the case for overseas touring has yet 
to be properly articulated. 
Analysis of the composition of the boards of the sample companies also revealed the 
existence of unaddressed accountability problems. Bi-lateral and multiple board level 
representation was discovered to be a significant and problematic feature of the UK 
subsidized sector companies. Bi-lateral representation (concurrent membership of 
opera company board and potential public funder board) was seen to introduce role 
ambiguity, effectively prohibiting the possibility of substantive accountability, since it 
was not clear in what way such representation was shown to work in the public interest, 
without causing potential c01iflicts of interest. Multiple representation (concurrent 
membership of opera company board and more than one other major arts 
organisation) was seen to introduce concentration of influence in the artistic value 
franchise, as well as creating a barrier to company differentiation and substantive artistic 
innovation. Several individuals were seen to enjoy concurrent membership of more 
than one opera company within the UK subsidized sector itself. This, we argued, 
contributed to the homogeneity of the sector which we had earlier observed. Overall, 
we argued that there was a need for greater transparency in the board nomination 
process, as well as for greater specificity and qualification of board member roles. In its 
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existing form, the board nomination process is non-transparent and promotes self-
selecting representation, since boards only appoint those they can work with. 
Moreover, the process is fundamentally inequitous since board members are 
nominated, not elected, and therefore cannot be said, in any democratic sense, to 
represent the artistic value franchise. The existence of a non-transparent board 
nomination process and concentration of influence amongst non-elected, non-
executive management, far from widening public representation, it was argued, acted to 
narrow the artistic value franchise and permit control by an effective artocrary. 
The study revealed changes in the comparative financial efficiency of ON and SO, two 
subsidized sector companies which were similar in terms of size (turnover) and touring 
remit. It was concluded, in the absence of any other explanation, that the relative 
inefficiency exhibited by SO was the direct result of the company's ownership of 
installed capacity (the Theatre Royal). Furthermore, in the absence of demonstrable 
differences in artistic value between the two companies, it was argued that the investment 
made by SO, in installed capacity, represented an unnecessary burden on the taxpayer. 
Evidence suggested that there was a need to consider alternative operational models, 
and that private and alternative public forms of theatre ownership, in the context of 
opera provision, had not been properly considered. We concluded that the precise 
relationship between theatre ownership (by opera companies) and the creation of artistic 
value still remains to be demonstrated. 
Finally, there was strong evidence to suggest that the financial stability exhibited by GP 
was due to strong management control, and that reputed ease of access to private 
source funding was not a sufficient explanator of the company's ability to operate in 
surplus. The smaller, more focussed board of GP, in comparison with those of the 
subsidized sector companies, was also thought to be a contributory factor to the robust 
financial performance of the company. 
Overall, it is evident that in nearly twenty years opera as an artform in the UK has not 
evolved. Indeed, the fixed infrastructure which has been shown to prevail, precludes 
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real innovation, since new genres, and new definitions or concepts of what opera is, 
cannot properly emerge without the flux of competition and cross-fertilisation. Since 
the infrastructure is the vehicle by which the artform is delivered, if there is no change 
in the vehicle, there can be no real change and, therefore, substantive artistic innovation 
in the artform. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Contribution of the study 
Change is a feature of the political and economic environment in which opera currently 
exists; yet little formal work has been done to ensure adequate, informed debate across 
all those parties who have an interest in the artistic value and financial value issues posed by 
opera, and who, ultimately, determine the whole justificatory framework for the public 
funding of opera. That these parties are many and diverse is an added complication: 
musicologists, artists, arts administrators, cultural economists, public policy experts, 
politicians, the taxpaying public, and potentially all UK citizens (as rightful members of 
the artistic value franchise) need to be drawn into the debate. Moreover, whilst each 
party has tended to develop its own model of opera, as well as its own set of theories 
and schemas pertaining to value in opera, many of these models, theories and schemas 
conflict in terms of assumptions or aims, and most assume either a static environment 
or a static, non-evolving artform. 
This, then, was the problem identified and articulated by the current study: that there is 
need for a better understanding of the relationship between artistic value and financial 
value, and for meaningful and objective inter-party communication if opera is to adapt 
to, and indeed, survive ongoing change in the environment. 
The key contribution which this study makes is to show that artistic value and financial 
value are inseparable, and that this inseparability has implications of both a philosophical 
and practical nature for future subsidy policy design. Not least, the study reveals the 
extent to which structural or intrinsic factors play a role in the tendency of opera 
companies to fail in the short-term in response to acute environmental factors. 
In addition: the development and refinement of a transaction model of opera (which 
explains the nature of the relationship between artistic value and financial value and which 
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is testable against reality), the construction of an intensity taxonomy of opera, together 
with an innovative application of the methods and analytical tools of political economy 
also mark the contribution of this study to the terms of any future inter-party debate. 
Moreover, by using a specially constructed data set, which permitted long- and short-
run intercompany comparisons to be made on an equivalent basis, it is the first study of 
its kind to examine the behaviour of UK opera companies as economic actors. In this 
context, the study makes an important methodological contribution by recognising that 
the elaborate group structures which tend to be exhibited by full-time opera companies 
in the UK, are not incidental, but are integral to the creation of artistic value in the 
current era. 
Observations about the behaviour of financial value parameters were used to show the 
trend towards greater establishment within the UK opera sector. From this it was 
recognised that complex corporate units form the prevailing mode of delivery for 
publicly subsidized opera in the UK. This, therefore, is the first study of its kind to 
acknowledge that investment in overhead (establishmen~ cannot be treated as antecedent 
to the production of opera (i.e. cannot be disregarded in analysis), but must be 
considered as an intrinsic part of the transformation of raw financial and artistic value 
inputs into live performances of opera. No study of opera sector expenditures would 
fulfil the aims of this study to the same extent, since total expenditure would first have 
to be defined (a difficult, if not impossible task, given the use of reserves and net 
contribution accounting within the opera sector), and secondly, be treated on an 
equivalent basis. Even a strict study in direct costs (assuming that direct costs could be 
reliably and consistently identified) whilst potentially guaranteeing comparability, would 
not reveal the true underlying cost of opera; and it is the true underlying cost of opera 
which this study does reveal. 
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9.2 The political economy of opera in the current era 
Study of the UK subsidized sector as a whole revealed: an apparently ineluctable rise in 
costs, a culture of complacency, poor management control, immunity from the 
environment, and, in sum, a static infrastructure in the context of a changing 
environment. 
A significant feature of the curr~nt era is the maintenance of a po1verhouse opera 
company (ROH) whose role has neither been adequately defined, nor status actively 
challenged. Indeed, subsidy policy reflects a passive acceptance of the value of the 
powerhouse idea; a received wisdom that somehow the artform cannot flourish without 
the presence of an internationally recognized institution - a symbolic sector leader. It 
also indicates a passive acceptance that ROH must, therefore, represent all that is best 
in UK opera production, that it is an artistic value standard setter and driver of quality. 
Yet how can the value of this premiss be tested in the context of an exclusive artistic 
value franchise, and in conditions which preclude the political impetus for change? 
Change in an essential service such as healthcare, where desired ends or outcomes are 
clearly defined and understood by all, can be effected from the top: change, although 
imposed by bureaucratic process, can be accepted and valued as change for the better 
where ends are clearly formulated. But change in an artform, in the context of a 
democratic market economy, requires a wholly different approach. Change of this 
nature cannot be imposed through political interference, since if it is to have meaning, 
ends and outcomes must be generated by the artistic value franchise. 
However, equal exercise of the artistic value franchise, if it were possible, would be likely 
to generate diverse demands and competing agendas. Politically, therefore, it is easier 
for government to maintain the infrastructural status quo in the opera sector, and 
indeed, to tolerate an artocratic element in its governance, than to instigate restructuring: 
an action which would invite debate where none existed before. Indeed, infrastructural 
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stability in the subsidized opera sector is an attractive option for government, precisely 
because it minimizes political risk. 
Whilst effort has been made to improve and refine the existing infrastructure (by means 
of Incentive Funding, for instance) no change has been made to the root assumptions of 
subsidy policy. Subsidy is still delivered via grant-in-aid to an hierarchy of institutions; 
and there has been no attempt at wholesale reform. 
A corollary feature, here, is the passive acceptance by policy makers that overseas 
touring is inherently worthwhile, and that despite attendant risks, the decision to tour 
can usefully be devolved to the level of the individual company; usefully, because it 
effectively reinforces the artistic autonomy of the individual opera company. In this 
context, the arm's length principle of subsidy policy provides companies with a mandate 
to embrace unqualified risk. But the value to the taxpayers and to the attistic value 
franchise of company autonomy in this respect is not clear. Indeed, the timing of some 
overseas tours means that a reduction in domestic supply, which is a consumer 
disbenefit, may result. 
There are two counter arguments here: first, tl1at producers benefit from exposure to 
new audiences in alternative, overseas cultural arenas; and second, tl1at overseas touring 
is primarily concerned with the generation of externalities such as national prestige. If 
the first holds (producer benefits), then it must be demonstrated that these producer 
benefits are also passed on to UK consumers. If the second holds (generation of 
externalities), then it must be demonstrated that devolvement of overseas touring 
decisions can still be justified; that coincidence between producer interests and the 
public interest (i.e. the generation of externalities) can be expected. Certainly, there is 
need for more honest appraisal of tl1e arguments for and against overseas touring. 
Moreover, the existence of the new Assemblies in Wales and Scotland brings the 
political dimension of overseas touring to the forefront. In a post-devolution 
environment, new artistic value agendas can be expected to emerge; and in this process, 
the forms of externality to be sought via overseas touring will themselves transmute: 
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the question of national prestige will become the question of whose national prestige? 
Attempts at incentivisation, the rewarding of individual company gains in financial 
efficiency, have been seen to fail through lack of adequate checks and balances. The 
imposition of punitive controls (withdrawal of funding) when companies fail to meet 
requisite performance criteria, turns out to be impotent in the face of the moral 
obduracy exhibited by companies. The threat to make political capital out of complete 
failure of the enterprise is well understood by opera managements and provides the 
opera community with a moral .lever, whose force increases with every increment of 
investment in overhead. What we see here is the principle of reward transmogrified 
into the principle of right. Whereas the idea of incentivisation implies just deserts Gust 
reward for the provision of a service and the creation of artistic value) the threat of 
punitive political action in return (the threat by the company to make, in effect, a coup 
de theatre of its complete and very public financial failure), a resort to gesture politics, 
implies that for the opera community, public subsidy is the subject of a claim of right; 
that it owes no duty to government to prove its worth. This amounts to coercive action 
by producers. 
However, the difficulty of overcoming the disincentive effect of subsidy policy (i.e. the 
difficulty of rewarding gains in financial efficiency, of tying rewards to actual 
performance) seems to be a political rather than practical obstacle. There are, in other 
sectors of the economy, tried and tested alternatives to grant-in-aid as a form of 
government transfer. But whilst the institution of reform, in the context of opera might 
be both desirable and achievable, as a proposition, such radical change in the arts would 
complicate the domestic policy agenda to a degree unlikely to bring immediate benefits 
to government. The political landscape is cluttered with many more pressing issues 
such as healthcare and education, but as taxation revenues continue to be squeezed or 
subject to increasing accountability in their distribution, and the public sector continues 
to shrink, the conditions for radical reform in the arts will undoubtedly present 
themselves. 
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To be clear, the role of grant-in-aid, which is awarded to opera companies as 
institutions, not to producers with a specific artistic brief, has never been questioned, 
and no attempt has ever been made to reform this most fundamental element of the 
subsidy award process. But grant-in-aid as a policy instrument is one step removed 
from the funding of opera production itself: funding is currently predicated upon 
institutions, not activities. Whilst broad criteria may be set for the award of grant-in-aid, 
receipt of funds is not truly contingent upon performance. The opera company is at 
liberty to utilize funds more or less as it sees artistically fit. 
Goal drift is an inevitable outcome of such a malleable funding instrument, and public 
funders have little opportunity for redress where there is abject failure (i.e. poor 
management control). In accountability terms, grant-in-aid creates the conditions for 
poor administrative propriety. 
Moreover, there is no logical connection between the annual grant-in-aid award cycle 
and the planning cycle of producers (artistic labour may need to be contracted years 
ahead, necessitating long lead times for individual opera productions). This creates 
practical difficulties for producers. But most importantly, as the single main public 
funding vehicle in UK opera, grant-in-aid tends to create dependency. The moral 
imperative lies with producers, who bring to the negotiating table not a programme of 
activities, but the very viabiliry of the company. Funders are left with little room to 
manoeuvre and funding cannot be permitted to advance and retreat according to 
objective performance criteria. In the interests of political accountability (the 
responsiveness or merits of subsidy policy decisions) it is not the existence of the 
institution per se, but the delivery of output which ought to be the focus of subsidy 
policy. 
The distributive injustice which lies at the heart of current subsidy policy (subsidy 
capture by companies and audiences) whilst to some extent recognised, has been 
tolerated. Again, this is an outcome of reliance upon grant-in-aid as the main, and least 
politically risky, instrument of arts subsidy policy in the UK. Government appears to be 
SaUy LK Garden 303 
9. Conclllsions 
caught between two equally risky policy options: between adoption of a laisseZ:faire 
approach, which, it is argued, without enhancement of the tax efficiency of sponsorship 
and private donation, would invite the death of the artform in its current form (too 
much autonomy), and between a centralised system of control which would subvert 
artistic freedom and contravene the arm's length principle of subsidy award (too little 
autonomy). Whilst the former would be perceived as the abrogation, by government, of 
responsibility for the nation's culture, the latter would be seen as state interference of 
an unacceptable kind; entirely antipathetic to the creation of artistic value, which is 
perceived to be predicated upon the freedom or perceived autonomy of artists. 
It is a confused message, therefore, which is sent by the opera community to 
government: that although autonomy and artistic freedom are necessary conditions for 
the creation of artisti.c value, maximization of artistic value does not equate to complete 
autonomy (a message which appears to tum modernist aesthetics on its head). 
In its moral ambit, therefore, subsidy policy contains a major contradiction which 
benefits neither producers nor consumers of opera: an egalitarian ideal which produces 
unequal opportunity i.e. unequal access to scarce resources by companies and 
audiences. Current subsidy policy appears to function, nevertheless, because to change 
it is to invite greater political risk. 
Despite this, the study revealed several sources of inequity in the UK subsidized opera 
infrastructure which suggest that there is need for fundamental reform of policy. 
Disproportionate, factional control of the artistic value agenda, exercised by an effective 
artocrary, was shown to be a pervasive and problematic feature of the UK subsidized 
sector. The mechanisms permitting such control included: interested patronage and 
anonymous donation; appointment rather than election of board members to represent 
the public interest; bi-lateral and ambiguous representation with insufficient checks and 
balances against potential conflicts of interest; and multiple representation within the 
arts and within the opera sector itself. Overall, this was seen to allow concentration of 
influence, preservation of a status quo, and the creation of barriers to substantive 
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artistic innovation. 
Indeed, the concept of public service which underlies board level representation has 
served to promote social exclusion. The self-selecting nature of board representation, 
and the non-transparency of the board nomination process, has ensured that non-
executive powers and privileges continue to be entrusted to an unqualified, unelected, 
non-executive elite. By its very nature, non-paid public service implies a proper!] 
qualification - only those with independent means and sufficient time may hope to 
serve on the board of an opera company. Few professional musicians may be able to 
meet such criteria, and indeed very few are represented. Inevitably this propagates an 
exclusive status quo, and inhibits the introduction of radical financial and artistic 
departures, unorthodox ideas, and entry by talented individuals with new or alternative 
artistic agendas. In short, it has created the conditions for artistic inertia. There is, 
therefore, a failure on two counts: the failure of subsidy policy to encourage evolution 
of the artform, and failure of subsidy policy to promote full and free participation in 
the artistic value franchise; in fact, a failure to recognise that there should exist such a 
concept. 
However, it is not simply a question of introducing an electoral system for board level 
representation: this would be unworkable due to potentially low participation rates. 
Rather, there is need to reduce the overall level of representation: to understand it as a 
qualitative not quantitative concept (viz the relatively small, focussed board of GP). At 
present, representation is diffuse and insufficiently professionalised; yet we would not 
expect to run a hospital, a nuclear power station, or an education authority without 
adequate professional representation at board level. Why, then, do we tolerate such 
poor board level representation of professional musicians and professional arts 
administrators within the opera sector? The problem is largely attributable to the policy 
of mixing private and public funding, and as such is very much a contemporary 
problem. Indeed, how do we represent the public interest? 
Membership of the board of any major arts organisation carries significant cachet for 
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the arts consultant. Indeed, it presents a free and closed platform for ·self-promotion. 
Moreover, in terms of the independence of the arts organisations concerned, there is 
obvious compromise. The presence of the same consultant on more than one arts 
organisation mitigates against competition by making it hard if not impossible for the 
consultant to avoid conflicts of interest (between clients). Indeed, the more 
entrenched such individuals become within any one arts sector, the greater their 
personal and professional influence and the less their advice is likely to be challenged. 
The value of the consultant becomes self-fulfilling. Again, this suggests a potential 
homogenising force in terms of artistic value and financial value. Moreover, in the UK 
subsidized opera sector, where companies, as we have found, are not strongly 
differentiated and tend, because of the effects of a centralised funding infrastructure, to 
face the same types of operational problems (e.g. need to manage a private sector 
fundraising campaign) the knowledge and experience of the consultant tends to 
become formulaic. 
Weaknesses in administrative accountability, that is, in the extent and consistency of 
disclosure (concerning expenditure items, public and private source income, format 
changes, non-transparency regarding deferred income, and redesignation of reserves); 
sums to a poor track record and indicates complacency. Whilst there is evidence of 
adoption of new accounting standards (SORP2) and concern with issues of corporate 
governance by the end of the study period (mid-1990s), the value of revised reporting 
formats remains to be seen. It is difficult to say whether such improvements in 
reporting will solve the fundamental problem of inter-company comparability. There 
are remaining ambiguities (e.g. materiality of anonymous donations) which will need to 
be addressed by the Charities Commission and by professional bodies who deal with 
issues of accounting standards. In addition, many detailed issues pertaining to delivery 
of service have not been addressed. There is need, for instance, for an accepted 
definition of guest artist fees and associated costs (perquisites and travel). 
Substantial capital investment has been a feature of many European opera economies 
in recent years. In the subsidized sector in the UK, this has permitted the creation and 
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upgrading of transformational assets (theatres, including workshops, front of house 
facilities, stage equipment and other fixed assets) by means of special public funding. 
Whilst control of these new and refurbished transformational assets remains with 
individual companies (e.g. the London Coliseum with ENO, the new Covent Garden 
with ROH), there is no indication that the UK subsidized sector has any greater ability, 
today, to generate the revenue funds required to operate these assets, and to exact 
expected financial efficiency gains, than it has in the last twenty years. The skill and 
adequacy of opera managements with respect to property management has, it seems, 
never been questioned. For government, to some extent, capital investment in the UK 
opera infrastructure represents the postponement of a revenue funding problem of 
potentially major proportions. 
Moreover, evidence suggests that the opera community has become adept at investing 
in establishment (overhead) as a method of building security: the greater the value of the 
transformational assets, the greater the political capital that can be made out of their loss 
to the nation. There is an insidious circularity of logic here: the public is now 
underwriting company investment in security via the National Lottery Distribution 
Fund and other special private giving, and in so doing has effectively cast itself as an 
agent of company intensification and establishment. Co-opted in this way, the public now 
faces a loss of choice. This occurs because increasing establishment, in turn, further limits 
the scope for substantive artistic innovation: the greater the investment in 
infrastructure, the greater its fixity. This would be well were it justifiable, yet there is no 
evidence to suggest that such investment will bring an increase in financial efficiency 
and every reason to expect new financial crises in the future. 
Indeed, the implicit axiom of the opera community, that artistic value must never be 
compromised, and standards never willingly allowed to drop; that the maximization of 
artistic value output is synonymous with the maximization of financial value input, puts the 
sector on a road to intensification from which there is no return. Because the real cost 
of opera is continuing to increase in this way, the risk of failure likewise increases. 
Whilst a new venue may offer a wider range of non-performance income, increasingly 
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sophisticated financial instruments are required in its management (e;g. retailer franchise 
agreements, leases, debentures). This is no substitute for flexibility, that is, the ability to 
respond to short-term discontinuities in the environment such as for instance the 
' ' 
sudden reduction in international tourism which would result were a second Gulf War 
to occur. 
There is need for scalability; that is, for better modelling and control of the relationship 
between financial value input and artistic value output. But intensification introduces a risk 
multiplier which makes scalability increasingly problematic. By extrapolation (using the 
aggregate growth rate from Table 6-1), results from this study suggest that by the year 
2015, twenty years from the end of the study period, that the annual turnover of ROH 
will be £125 million in real terms, and that the establishment gap between ROH as 
powerhouse and SO, for instance, as follo11ler, will have widened. Whereas in the mid 1990s 
ROH was found to be around six times the size of SO (in terms of real turnover), by 
2015, it will be ten times the size of SO. In this scenario, it is difficult to see how the 
various companies of the UK subsidized sector may be meaningfully treated the same 
way i.e. as one sector. Indeed, if the powerhouse idea still pertains, if SO, in twenty years 
time, is still trying to track or follo11l ROH as powerhouse (in terms of spend per 
performance) there seems little option for the company but to cut its total annual 
number of productions and opt for a part-time existence. This would seem to be the 
future price of artistic value for the smaller companies. 
Equally, by extrapolation of the opera value ieflation index, which is currently running at 
5% per annum (see Figure 6-6), in twenty years time, the real cost of opera will have 
doubled. This means that a doubling of financial intensity (specifically, a doubling of 
working capital and, therefore, required returns) will be required in order to maintain 
current artistic value standards. Whilst the opera value ieflation index may be distorted by 
the presence of ROH, if ROH still commands powerhouse position in the future, these 
forecasts must be regarded as valid. In addition, even although it is possible that the 
new Covent Garden will substantially change the operational, and thus, cost basis of 
ROH (for some considerable time, until the new operation settles down) there is no 
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way of knowing whether ROH costs will ultimately increase, decrease~ or stay the same; 
so again, the forecast is valid. 
This drive towards greater establishment amounts to the intensification of risk. Moreover, 
the management of a wide portfolio of financial instruments (which, as we have shown, 
is implied here) is not the understood object of arts subsidy. The more an opera 
company invests in installed capacity, in transformational assets, the more it will have to 
develop the range of expertise of its finance department and perhaps employ specialists 
not directly connected with the .core business of producing opera. This is no substitute 
for strong management control, and in times of crisis, merely acts to compound the 
company's financial difficulties, not least by introducing tensions between those with 
potentially different objectives i.e. artists and management specialists. 
The justificational basis for such extensive capital investment in the opera sector has 
not, it seems, been properly examined. Although work has been done to examine the 
contribution of opera to tourism, employment, urban regeneration, national prestige 
and other social benefits, little work has been done to determine the value of the 
transformational assets to the creation of artistic value in the first instance. The link 
between benefits (externalities) and associated cost (financial efficiency effects) has not 
been made explicit, nor has it been demonstrated precisely what artistic value benefits 
may be wrought. It is often assumed that opera companies cannot function without 
suitable stage, pit and storage facilities. But there are alternative ways of providing these, 
other than by direct ownership. Property management is now a professional industry 
sector in its own right, for instance, and given the poor financial track record of 
subsidized sector opera companies, there is every argument for the separation of assets 
and production in the opera infrastructure (an issue which will be discussed later). 
In terms of the individual opera company, we have no means of identifying the causal 
factors of the cost rise in the sector i.e. of differentiating between active investment and 
passive cost creep. If the real rise in the cost of opera is the result of deliberate 
intensification (active investment) then what is the justification: is opera better today 
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than in the 1970s? If, on the contrary, the real rise in the cost of opera is the result of 
poor management control (passive cost creep) then, in opportunity costs terms, how 
can such inefficiency be justified? The traditional explanation of rising costs in the arts 
(the Baumol and Bowen thesis or productivity lag model) whilst not conclusively 
disproved, was shown to be inapplicable as a defence, since it does not explain the 
substantial capital investments made by the subsidized sector companies, nor does it 
allow for poor management control. Indeed the thesis assumes that the arts 
organisation (here, the opera company) is a technical efficiency maximizer. Evidence 
suggests that this assumption urgently needs testing. 
Whether active investment or passive cost creep (or both) is proved, either way, the 
real rise in the cost of opera does not provide a positive basis for future investment in 
the sector, since it implies that opera will continue to require an increasing real 
investment, ad infinitum. 
There are two ways in which the opera community can justify this inexorable financial 
demand. First, it can claim that artistic value standards are constantly rising in line with 
financial value input, a strategy with curiously Hegelian overtones which implies that the 
only upper limit on the level of financial investment is absolute artistic perfection. 
Second, it can claim that financial efficiency simply cannot be improved. However, the 
demand for increasing accountability, and in particular, financial probity, will make this 
argument, which we have already shown to be weak, wholly untenable. In the absence 
of proper artistic value and financial value feedback (from the artistic value franchise and 
from the appropriate mechanisms of financial accountability) the opera community will 
continue to draw resources from the environment, in an unlimited fashion, as long as 
resources are available. That is to say, current subsidy policy has permitted an 
accelerator effect here because of relative immunity from demand constraints 
(franchisee tastes and preferences) and resource constraints (public funder conditions 
and controls). 
But more and more, market mechanisms are being utilised in public policy to effect not 
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just consumer choice between limited or given options, but consumer control over the 
range of options on offer. 
Subsidy policy in the current era, driven by political and egalitarian aims, has produced 
choice between opera and other artforms, but not choice within the artform, opera, 
itself. Effectively, consumers have a choice between opera and ballet, between lyric 
theatre and dramatic theatre and so forth, but within opera itself, there is only one 
form, one paradigmatic vehicle: the establishment model opera company. Thus, whilst 
innovation by degree has been promoted within opera, substantive, qualitative artistic 
innovation has been effectively obstructed: opera still requires a stage and orchestra pit, 
and is still defined by an international repertory which, even when expanded via new 
commissions, must still utilise the given resources or infrastructure if it is to have any 
hope of being performed. By treating artistic value as an exogenous given, subsidy policy 
makers have constrained the evolutionary forces of the artform and denied it contact 
with the artistic value franchise. It is in the infrastructure in which the museum element of 
opera resides; stasis lies not in the style of its presentation, but in the vehicle of its 
delivery. 
Moreover since the opera community, itself, believes that the creation of artistic value is 
facilitated by establishment (ideally the ownership of, or prioritized access to, a theatre, 
workshops, storage and other physical assets), it acts conservatively to preserve and 
maximize the organisation, the establishment, at the expense of other aspects of its artistic 
activity (e.g. education and outreach work, which are considered corollary rather than 
core activities). There is, therefore, a trade-off between artistic value and personal 
security. The opera community, given the current infrastructure, cannot afford to be 
radical in terms of changing the form of opera; it cannot exploit unconventional venues 
or unconventional forces without the risk of being perceived not to need its existing 
assets. 
Within the opera community, then, maximization of artistic value takes precedence over 
financial value. money given by taxpayers for provision is diverted into establishment, 
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suggesting that the organisation, the existence of the company is more important than 
any remit placed on the community itself. No clear standards exist, and definition of 
adequate artistic value standards is left to producers. How can this be justified, since there 
are other ways of providing opera? Indeed, no other area of public life is treated with 
such careful disinterest and intellectual courtesy. Medical ethics debates are conducted 
in public via the media (and via health boards, trusts, and local committees), and in the 
judiciary, the general public is represented by randomly selected jurors. Yet in matters 
of art, the public is not deemed fit to shape ends and outcomes, but must respect a 
paternalistic system which sets out to educate its taste. Indeed, education and outreach 
programmes abound in the arts. If, as a society, we are prepared to accept public 
opinion in issues concerning genetic modification of organisms, a highly complex issue, 
why do barriers still exist to the acceptance of public opinion in art? Why is there still, 
in effect, taxation without representation in opera? 
Continually, these features resolve to the fact of government's unwillingness to 
consider itself capable of dealing directly with issues of artistic value. By disqualifying 
itself from artistic value judgement, it perpetuates an exclusive franchise. Artistic value 
judgement is left to experts (not to the general public) and therefore creates, by default, 
a partial interest within the artistic value franchise. In effect, the power and privilege of 
artistic value judgement is accorded to a special interest group. This leads to the curious 
anomaly of an artocrary generated by and within a purportedly egalitarian public policy. 
Yet there is equal claim to a need for greater professionalism in the management of the 
sector. The question is, how to draw upon professional expertise without distorting or 
narrowing the artistic value franchise, without destroying the potential for expression, 
which is, after all, the primary rationale of art? 
As long as justifications based on the perceived separability of artistic value and financial 
value are maintained, autonomy of purpose, claim of right creates a political barrier to 
analysis - it is not perceived to be legitimate to equate artistic value with issues of financial 
efficiency. Cost-benefit analysis in the context of artistic value is regarded as unthinkable 
philistinism. Moreover, artistic value judgement is portrayed as a form of moral 
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reasoning, and taste or preference as a form of moral committment. Taken a stage 
further with the application of an implicit property qualification i.e. knowledge as the 
expression of cognitive ability (qualifier) and opinion as cognitive deficiency 
( disqualifier) - a qualification promulg-ated, in effect, by Adorno and modernist aesthetic 
theory - artistic value is quickly established as an autonomous moral sphere. 
Moreover, appeals to the self-evident nature of artistic value creation, as a worthy end in 
itself, subvert the need for objective performance criteria. The worth of the live 
performance of opera as an acti:vity is deemed intrinsic by producers, in need of no 
active defence. But this is an argument in favour of autonomy (artistic value 
exceptionalism) and rests on the assumption of the separability of artistic value and 
ftnanci.al value i.e. the creation of an autonomous moral sphere for artistic value. 
Interestingly, in communitarianist terms, this can be understood as the exercise of right 
without responsibility. 
The opera community is also quick to invoke international comparison of public 
funding levels to make its case for greater subsidy. In so doing, it deflects attention 
from the real ftnanci.al value issues which plague it, and which are internal or intrinsic 
issues of management control. Clearly, the continued separation of artistic value and 
ftnanci.al value issues, in the minds of government policy makers and the opera 
community, is unsustainable; particularly so given the climate of increasing financial 
constraint which this study has identified. 
Placed in the context of major change in the UK environment, and in the context of an 
open economy, a wide range of factors in the environment now influence opera as an 
artform: the committment to control of inflation - causing slowing growth in public 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP (notwithstanding major discontinuities such as 
wars); the shifting of funding responsibility to the private sector; the trend towards 
capital rather than revenue funding of opera by government; the trend towards 
openness and accountability in the provision of public services; general volatility in 
global finance and trade; fiscal constrains generated by the ongoing programme of 
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Economic Monetary Union in Europe; and the adoption of a communitarianist 
perspective in the current administration. These factors together create a dynamic in 
which the opportunity costs of funding opera, a non-essential service, become 
highlighted to a greater extent than ever before. 
Overall, radical changes in domestic policy during the Thatcher years have changed the 
balance between the public and private sectors, and globalization of the world economy 
has constrained the tax policy choices of governments. Indeed, the increasing mobility 
of capital has already provoked tax cuts in a bid to compete for investment 
(government, like the opera sector in its private sector fundraising campaigns, must 
compete for financial value input). This has inevitable consequences, such as the 
continued squeeze on public finances as taxation revenues shrink or are redirected to 
meet more pressing goals. This also suggests the need for new forms of indirect 
taxation e.g. pollution tax; and in this climate, new forms of investment in opera may 
well be promoted (e.g. opera bonds). 
The traditional justificatory framework for the public funding of opera: the merit goods 
argument, which stresses the theoretical externalities produced by the opera sector 
(wider social benefits as the end to which opera is the means), and which makes the 
case for subsidized access, looks increasingly feeble as the contradictory goals which it 
promotes become apparent. Delivery of an egalitarian ideal (access for all) by means 
which involve unequal opportunity (factional control of the artistic value agenda via 
interested patronage and an unelected, self-selecting, non-executive management) 
creates a departure from the democratic ethos (broadly, equal votes for all) which tests 
severely our conceptions of social justice. 
Is it right to accord artistic value power and privileges to a small elite? Is it perhaps best 
for the public interest (a notoriously difficult concept to define) and for the creation 
and maximization of artistic value, that the artistic value agenda be controlled by an 
artocrary, by effectively authoritarian, and at the very least, paternalistic means? Even if 
this were so, if we thought that an egalitarian distribution failed to maximize aggregate 
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utility, for instance, an issue we shall debate later, the fact of subsidy capture, of 
intrinsic inequity in the current subsidy system has to be acknowledged. Whilst it is 
rational to encourage private funding (given constraints on public funding in general, 
and of the arts in particular) the outcome does not appear to be morally justifiable. The 
moral perspective requires the equal consideration of interests; it requires full and free 
participation in the artistic value franchise. The critical question is: does such impartiality, 
albeit ideal, guarantee maximization of artistic value; that is, does justice pay in artistic value 
terms? 
The commodification argument promulgated by Adorno, and by postmodernist theory 
provides an excuse to argue for the incompetency of the many - to argue for an 
exclusive artistic value franchise (implying a role for artistic fiat and coercion). But as we 
demonstrated, the commodification argument itself is deeply flawed and fails to explain 
reality. 
However, it must be noted that equality of access is not equivalent to artistic value 
enfranchisement. Current subsidy policy aims to promote access for all to a given set of 
artistic value outputs, it does not enfranchise individuals to determine what goes on in 
the transformation process itself i.e. to influence the outputs or choices on offer. 
Participation in the artistic value franchise means not just response to signals (a market 
forces argument), it implies that artistic value be treated as an endogenous variable. The 
relationship between the transaction (model) and the franchise is key here. 
Enfranchisement is about participation and influence over choices, not just 
consumption of given choices. Analogy may usefully be drawn here with the idea of the 
gen tlemens' club or the book club. The boundary conditions on the system define the 
degree of enfranchisement, that is, the degree of inclusion or exclusion. Gentlemen 
who are admitted as members of the gentlemen's club are fully enfranchised, they may 
participate in rule making and in all the powers and privileges of membership; ladies, 
whilst they may, perhaps, be invited to dinner, are excluded from the franchise. This is 
a simple model of exclusion, but the closer analogy is served by the idea of the book 
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club. Here, anyone may join and enjoy the principal privileges of membership; 
discounted books delivered by mail. However, the members of the club exercise no 
control over the choice of books on offer, and must choose from a given list each 
month or quarter. Failure to choose means forfeiture of benefits, the only option, if 
choices on offer do not appeal, is to forfeit membership. Opera season subscription 
members face much the same dilemma, as do all those outwith the artocrary which 
controls the artistic value agenda of the individual opera company. 
Finally, the key issue now is not the legitimacy of funding an artform such as opera, it is 
the legitimacy of funding an artform which has demonstrated a poor track record of 
management control and financial efficiency, which perpetuates a form of social 
exclusion, which has consistently permitted subsidy capture by companies and audience 
groups, and which regards the rationale for its funding, the creation of artistic value, as 
entirely self-evident. 
This, the legitimacy of funding an artform such as opera via public subsidy, is the 
primary question for the musicologist, whose main concern, if he or she is to take a 
view of the future, is to ensure flourishing of the artform. That this concern is bound 
to the question of human flourishing is the key reason for the musicologist's need for 
an adequate political economy of opera. Moreover, subsidy policy makers and cultural 
economists, by disqualifying themselves from making judgements about artistic value, 
effectively disqualify all others who do not have sufficient professional or artistic 
competence to make such judgements. That is to say, they disqualify the majority of the 
artistic value franchise and reinforce the power of an elite, an artocrary, to control the 
artistic value agenda. This amounts to the introduction of a property qualification 
(knowledge as property, where opinion is not equivalent to knowledge). 
Most importantly, however, whilst there is no force for radical change in the immediate 
environment, failure of one or more subsidized opera companies in the future, an 
outcome suggested by the results of this study, is likely to precipitate fundamental 
reform of UK subsidy policy. It is this prospect we now need to consider. 
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9.3 Future scenarios and enabling mechanisms 
Study of the political economy of opera, in the current era, suggests that subsidy policy 
will be subject either to incremental change, or wholesale reform, in the future. It is 
important, therefore, to consider two things: first, the political and philosophical 
backdrop to change or reform, and second, what enabling mechanisms are likely to 
underpin future subsidy policy? By discussing various enabling mechanisms for this 
reform, we show how more explicit linkage of artistic value and financial value issues 
should provide government with the legitimacy, the moral freedom, to diseng;age from 
the funding of opera. 
The two scenarios and two enabling mechanisms presented below do not develop 
mutually exclusive ideas but focus on different aspects and problems of the political 
economy of opera, and ask how they might be solved. 
Scenario one: democratic elitism, or preservation of the status quo 
Incremental change or refinement of subsidy policy, rather than wholesale reform, may 
well prove the pattern for the future. It is important to consider, therefore, what will 
happen if the existing infrastructure is left as it is, and grant-in-aid remains the primary 
mechanism for opera subsidy in the UK. 
Preservation of the status quo means acceptance of the role of power groups or 
factions as a knowledgeable, active force within the artistic value franchise. It means the 
acceptance of a democratic elitism which empowers an artocrary (an unelected, 
unqualified, non-executive management), giving it a moral mandate to exercise power in 
the name of artistic excellence and the public interest. Further, preservation of the 
status quo also means the continuation of the powerhouse hierarchy Oed by ROH), an 
infrastructural model which is, in itself, an expression of belief in the value of rule or 
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leadership by elite. 
Any decision to maintain or affirm the status quo is likely to encounter the type of 
arguments we present in the paragraphs below. In addition, there is likely to be 
challenge from alternative policy or enabling mechanisms (discussed later). For these 
reasons we have fundamental, theoretical and practical concerns with the status quo. 
These are discussed, in tum, below. 
Democratic elitism in the conte.xt of the arts relies upon a circularity for its justification. 
It relies upon the idea that the majority of individuals comprising the artistic value 
franchise either, are not interested in opera, or are passive consumers with poor artistic 
value taste and judgement. It argues for rule by elite on the grounds of apathy and 
incompetency of artistic value franchisees. But in this context, apathy is the inevitable 
outcome of the assumption of incompetency; artistic value apathy is the inevitable 
outcome of an exclusive franchise. As long as individuals may be deemed incompetent 
judges of artistic value (exclusion on grounds of inadequate artistic knowledge or 
aesthetic sensibility) franchisees can but remain demotivated; uninterested in an artform 
in which they possess little proprietorial interest. The majority of the artistic value 
franchise is therefore unlikely to exercise its franchise, not because it is culturally dull 
and indifferent, but because there seems little purpose, little likelihood of influence in 
doing so. Democratic elitsim thus relies upon the idea of voter ignorance and apathy to 
vindicate itself; it needs Adomo's passive consumers - his temple slaves are central to its 
construction. 
Fundamentally, however, democratic elitism in the context of the arts means accepting 
that the egalitarian premise of democracy is fallacious; that individuals possess listening 
and appreciation talents to a vastly unequal degree, and therefore, that there can never 
be a natural, workable artistic value franchise which is equaf!Y open to all. But, again, there 
is a fatal circularity here: if tastes and preferences are shaped by experience, if 
individuals learn to prefer music with which they are already familiar (e.g. a comic opera 
by Mozart may be more familiar and therefore more accessible to some, than a comic 
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opera by Britten), then tastes and preferences, and therefore, listening and appreciation 
talents, are a product of the market. This must be so, since music can have no hope of 
autonomous existence within a market economy. This means that unequal opportunity, 
for instance, unequal access to music education, unequal access to literature, and 
unequal access to all those prerequisites of art appreciation, must play a part in the 
formation of unequal listening and appreciation talents. In other words, there is no 
such thing as a natural inequality of artistic value judgement in the first instance. 
There is, therefore, no moral, political or economic justification for the denial of equal 
franchise which democratic elitism in the arts entails; nor is there justification for the 
tolerance, indeed, cultivation of a natural artocrary to look after the interests of those 
with lesser listening talents. To Adorno, familiarity is the vehicle by which tastes are 
shaped, but familiarity is a product of access and exposure to art, and in a money 
economy, access and exposure to art are not necessarily equally open to all (a fact 
which, ironically, provides the rationale for current subsidy policy). 
Inequality of artistic value judgement is not, then, a proposition about human nature, it is 
a proposition about democratic market society. Belief in inequality can be upheld only 
insofar as there exists a non-pluralistic view of artistic value, an intolerance of competing 
or alternative artistic value agendas, and a struggle for scarce resources. Indeed, in a truly 
pluralistic cultural environment, inequaliry of listening talents translates as diversify of 
taste: difference as threat becomes difference as a value in its own right. All that is 
required is a simple change of artistic and moral perspective. It needs to be recognized, 
therefore, that belief in inequality, in the context of artistic value judgement, is an entirely 
self-fulfilling concept. 
But what is the relationship between political and artistic goals here? Might democratic 
elitism be justified if it permitted maximization of artistic value? Would this justify the 
social injustice which it inevitably entails? On these grounds, what is the likely outcome 
if an active elite continues to make artistic value choices for the passive masses, and the 
current infrastructure, with its emphasis on intensification and establishment, remains 
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intact? 
When a company owns a theatre it cannot alter the service form (i.e. the form in which 
opera is delivered). It cannot change the fact that opera is traditionally performed in a 
theatre with an orchestra in a pit: the company cannot take to the streets. This kind of 
radical, substantive artistic innovation is simply not possible. Moreover, even slight 
differentiation of the service offering is constrained by the existence of installed 
capacity. There may, for instance, exist a significant audience for newer works and 
innovative interpretations (viz SO .!\RA 1985) but the need to bring the audience (which 
may be very widely dispersed) to a single location, such as Glasgow, in the case of SO, 
in order to maintain utilisation of the home venue, constrains the ability of the 
company to reach that audience so severely that it becomes an impossible strategy to 
follow. It means that the theatre-owning company must always effect a compromise 
between repertoire planning (which must be generalised) and the professional strengths 
of its artistic team (which may be specialised). In the face of such compromise it is very 
difficult to build a unique artistic identity: the drive is consistently towards 
homogeneity. The only identity which can readily be cultivated is the identity of the 
theatre itself. In this we come full circle: it may indeed be the theatre which defines the 
opera company and not its repertoire; a situation which would continue given 
preservation of the status quo. 
How far can artistic innovation go, then, given preservation of the current 
infrastructure? That is, how far can innovation go before a paradigm shift is required? 
Indeed, what is meant by artistic innovation, who is it aimed at, and why may we equate 
it with artistic value? 
Constrained by the burden of establishment, the only variable which can be changed by 
the establishment model opera company, is production style (e.g. Don Giovanni can be 
updated once to a 1920s setting, and again, to a 1950s setting, for instance). But this 
type of innovation by degree is only innovation to those who have seen previous or 
alternative productions. That is to say, the kind of innovation by degree which the 
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current infrastructure permits is aimed at existing, not new audiences. Over time, this 
means that the relative innovativeness of the individual opera company will only be 
perceived by an increasingly sophisticated and concentrated element of its total 
audience. Moreover, once audiences have seen an innovation of this sort, it ceases to be 
innovative - too many updated interpretations become passe. Also, other companies 
who choose to innovate in the same manner, run the risk of being perceived as 
derivative and weak, because identity and innovation are one and the same thing. Given 
preservation of the status quo, then, opera companies (at least in the subsidized sector) 
are only likely to become mor~ and more homogenised or undifferentiated. In which 
case, all will be equally vulnerable to loss of funding should government choose to 
rationalize the sector. 
In terms of public choice and flourishing of the artform, many artistic opportunities 
will simply not present themselves given continuation of the status quo. Consider, for 
instance, the idea of team built opera, a long-term concept built round a charismatic 
artistic director who possesses a strongly defined artistic aim and strong concept of the 
music forces required. Such a company might be built around a particular aspect of 
vocal style, for instance. But, given the current infrastructure and the public service 
provision ethos, it would be difficult to mount an authentic Verdi production, for 
instance, because singers cannot employ the nineteenth century bel canto techniques 
required without jeopardy to their existing careers. Singers willing and able to undertake 
this task would have to be employed on a full-time basis. Time would be required to 
cultivate the style (a slow but not necessarily expensive process if conducted within an 
alternative infrastructure). The emergence of this new identity would be a thing of 
interest in itself e.g. watching a Stanislavsky at work, or the emergence of a Ballet 
Russes. 
In addition to these theoretical concerns, there are a number of practical difficulties 
associated with preservation of the status quo. A practical analysis is offered below. 
Most importantly, failure of the opera infrastructure, assuming preservation of the 
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status quo, may take two forms: slow death via cumulative inefficiency (e.g. mounting 
financial inefficiencies across the subsidized sector as a whole) or precipitous failure 
(e.g. a major and terminal financial crisis in a single company). The logical response of 
government to either of these forms of failure might be to rationalize the sector by 
closure or by merger of companies. 
Universal financial intensification of the subsidized sector was revealed in the general 
findings section of this study. Failure of the infrastructure might occur, in the future, if 
this intensification is the resul4 even in part, of passive cost creep. Now, if the 
relationship between artistic value and financial value is linear, we would expect greater 
artistic value the more that is spent per performance. However, it might also be true that 
the same degree of artistic value is, today, simply being produced more inefficiently; that, 
contrary to the assumptions of the Baumol and Bowen thesis, opera companies are not 
technical efficiency maximizers, but technical inefficiency (redundancy) exploiters. 
Indeed, given the degree of labour intensification also revealed by this study, it is 
possible that artistic teams have, today, increasing time to develop and consider the 
production and interpretation of the work in hand. It is possible that companies within 
the subsidized sector are now unnecessarily labour intense. Every individual employed 
multiplies the number of work hours to produce one performance; and every work 
hour invested adds complexity to the task. Given this added time and complexity, it is 
quite possible that amongst staff and guest artists engaged in production, that this extra 
time is absorbed by swings between attempts to reach consensus and attempts to 
dictate direction. In short, it is possible that there now exists redundancy. Indeed, 
results suggest that scope for redesign of costumes or parts of sets, mid-way through 
rehearsals, is offered because management exerts insufficient control over budgeting. 
Directors and designers may now be able to regard the opera house as a place of work, 
and the production as a malleable objet d'art to be sculpted on the job. It is possible that 
there is too much room for spontaneity in the transformation process, and that not 
enough value is being placed on the role of constraint (i.e. that redundancy is exploited 
rather than eliminated). 
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Certainly, artistic goals appear to be left too diffuse and too open to manipulation 
(indulgence versus discipline in the transformation process), and opera companies may 
be bearing the cost of inefficiencies in the supply chain. A busy singer, for instance, 
who may finish learning the score whilst on the job presents a cost to the company 
(through longer rehearsals, extra rehearsals, and special coaching). Whilst this was not a 
study of the factors of production of opera, there is, nevertheless, an interesting 
hypothesis here: oversupply of singers may be a cause of inefficiency in the supply 
chain and an added cost to the opera company. In conditions of oversupply, insecurity 
of singers increases, young professionals take on every opportunity offered for fear of 
substitutability Qosing to new entrants); consequently singers' preparation time 
diminishes, and opera companies bear the cost of lost preparation time. There are two 
solutions here: government can either cut or control the supply of singers (by 
withdrawing the funding for a conservatoire or opera centre), or change the opera 
infrastructure in order to absorb more singers and in new ways. Supply chain 
inefficiencies, such as this, might become an issue (and a sensitive moral issue since 
lives and livelihoods are at stake), given preservation of the status quo. 
Because of apparent inflationary pressures on the cost of factors of production (the 
study identified opera value ieflation), preservation of the status quo also entails real rises 
in the level of public funding awarded to the subsidized sector. Nevertheless, the 
existence of opera value ieflation does not provide an argument for raising subsidy levels 
in the UK, or indeed in other countries, as might be argued. On the contrary, from the 
point of view of the taxpayer, it argues in favour of changing the UK opera 
infrastructure in such a way as to insulate it against such imported opera value ieflation. 
One way in which this might be achieved is by encouraging greater differentiation 
amongst opera companies and a stronger localisation of the artistic output (e.g. using 
native or UK-based artists). Although this cannot be done under the current 
infrastructure, it may provoke debate, particularly as the advent of the Euro makes 
international pricing more transparent. 
Now it might be argued that because the public funds directed towards opera take the 
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form of producer subsidies (awarded to individual opera companies for the purposes of 
providing an artistic service i.e. producing opera) that issues of subsidy capture by 
audiences (as opposed to organisations), as we found in the case of ROH, is null and 
void. But such are the ambiguities of policy in this area (i.e. is the aim of subsidy to 
maximize artistic value by supporting innovation or is it to increase public access to the 
artform as a given, or both?) that is its quite legitimate to couch our analysis of the 
allocative efficiency of subsidy in terms of consumption as well as production. This is 
perhaps one of the key questions of a political economy of opera: how to define 
efficiency and equity? 
Now it may be precisely because there is a lack of clear objectives in subsidy policy that 
a package of implied goals exist, some of which appear to be predicated on issues of 
equity and others on issues of efficiency. To open the arts to all, a mission statement 
objective of the ACGB (viz Peacock 1994) is clearly predicated on equity: the removal 
of barriers to access, the prevention of social exclusion. To promote excellence and encourage 
innovation (also ACGB objectives) suggest an altogether different end: value, or more 
specifically, artistic value. This suggests that excellence (high artistic value) is an end 
towards which artistic innovation is the means. Such means-end rationality, albeit 
implied, opens the way for measures of efficiency; an efficiency goal here must be, for 
instance, simple maximization of innovation: the more artistic innovation, the greater 
artistic value. But this does not sit comfortably with the grander goal of access. Given 
that tastes and preferences are not fixed, innovation may itself introduce barriers to 
access. Results from individual companies showed that SO had experienced just such 
difficulties in experimentation with its repertoire. Equally, choosing to prioritise the 
distribution of subsidy on the basis of equity (open and fair access) may mean reducing 
the cost of opera so as to increase provision (e.g. more touring) and thereby place a 
constraint on excellence since the ability of individual companies to compete for factor 
inputs (e.g. star conductors) may be reduced. 
It is likely that the strains of non-congruent policy goals will magnify as real investment 
continues to increase in the future. This may provoke pressure for change from within 
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the opera community itself. 
Public policy needs to define the beneficiary of subsidy more precisely: is it the 
producer or the consumer, or both? In recent years, much the same problem has 
dogged UK agriculture: do consumers and farmers benefit equally from the operation 
of government intervention in food production, or does one benefit at a cost to the 
other? This is now the subject of government review. 
In practice, opera subsidy is a~arded as a producer subsidy; yet in principle, it is 
awarded as a consumer subsidy. This situation benefits neither producers nor 
consumers, since neither producer nor consumer can be adequately rewarded or 
incentivised without apparent cost to the other. 
These, then, are the practical difficulties associated with preservation of the status quo. 
Scenario two: communitarianism, or third 1vqy opera 
There has been an increasing emphasis on the role of the voluntary or third sector 
under the current Blair administration in the UK. Given time, this emphasis, an 
outcome of communitarianist thinking, may be expected to make a radical impact on 
the opera infrastructure and on subsidy policy goals. 
The communitarianist perspective stresses devolvement of power to local communities 
within the state (disengagement of the state), the building of communities which are 
responsive to the needs of members (political accountability), and greater co-operation 
between private and public sectors (social entrepreneurship and public-private 
partnerships) as a way of curbing the role of private money and special interests within 
the state. 
Although communitarianism entails deference to universalisable moral principles (it 
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does not promulgate crude majoritarianism, and does not imply complete community 
autonomy) it is not clear what universal policy principles might need to be engaged in 
the case of opera. Complete community autonomy might result in the loss of the opera 
infrastructure, or in complete change of use. Constraint of some form would need to 
be placed on community activity, and policy criteria of an artistic, political or economic 
nature would need to be established, possibly by legislative means. 
In contradistinction to Adorne's idea of temple slaves, communitarianist principles permit 
the passive music consumers o.f modernist aesthetic theory to form themselves in to 
legitimate, active communities. If Adornian theory posits the existence of priesthood 
and slaves in the temple of art, then communitarianism accords equal status and 
political power to both. In the communitarianist scheme of things, all communities 
working within given policy criteria, no matter how these communities are composed, 
are enfranchised. This posits the existence of many competing artistic value agendas 
across many disparate kinds of community, some of which may have geographically 
dispersed memberships e.g. an Early opera club. 
An emphasis on communitarianist principles in public life may, in this way, lead to 
fragmentation of the opera infrastructure and to greater differentiation amongst opera 
producers. Devolvement of power to responsive communities should not only 
legitimise the pursuit of new and shared artistic value aspirations, but should prevent the 
imposition of artistic value agendas by factions within the franchise. Indeed, agendas will 
be constantly open to negotiation. 
There may be, nevertheless, considerable scope for inter-community rivalry of a 
cultural sort - the reinvigoration of local, regional and national identities through 
cultural competition. Communitarianist opera (i.e. opera produced by communities within 
the state) may become a vehicle of such societal change, and in this way, may impact 
the political and economic environment of which it is a part. Indeed, this is more likely 
to bring meaning to the term national company, and may give government the rationale 
for radical rationalisation of the opera infrastructure in England, closing and merging 
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companies in order to form a single and much strengthened English National Opera 
company to place alongside WNO and SO. 
Communitarianist arts policy may also foster greater participation in opera (greater 
exercise of the artistic value franchise) as well as a sense of ownership of the artform by 
artistic value franchisees. Communitarianism in strong form for instance would involve 
' ' 
micro-funding: the funding of a wide range of projects with the aim of extending 
participation in opera, rather than simple maximization of access to an existing offering. 
But the artistic value agenda of the individual company should no longer be controllable 
by an artocrary. Factions will emerge, but overall this may promote democratisation of 
the process of artistic value creation itself: each community defining and articulating what 
is expected of its arts organisation. Furthermore, communities may compete for funds. 
In the current era, voluntary effort within the opera company has generally been 
confined to ancillary tasks. But as the third sector comes, in the future, to be more 
highly valued for its contribution to the economy (an inevitable outcome given 
continued disengagement of the state), this will change. In the future, volunteers will 
probably become an integral part of the decision-making process, and therefore, the 
transformation process, of the opera company. 
Empowered in this way, volunteers can be expected to become key influencers of the 
artistic value agenda (the opera company or group serving the needs of the volunteers, 
and not the other way round). Given this new proprietorial interest, the community 
becomes, in effect, an artistic value polity, and may secede from the current 
infrastructure (by changing the operational basis and artistic aims of the company) in 
order to promote, more efficiently, the artistic interests of the community. 
Alignment with new social movements, whose significance lies in translating the 
public's changing values and issue interests into a political force, into the means by 
which to challenge established interests, is likely to occur. This is probable precisely 
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because new social movements, such as the many Green parties in Europe, are 
characterised by devolved, participatory decision structures (a feature compatible with 
communitarianist principles), and by expansion of the accepted modes of political 
action to include protests and direct action (a feature which suggests itself as a natural 
corollary to purposeful artistic expression). In this we might expect to see a 
revivification of agitprop opera, a continuation of the work of Brecht and Weill, perhaps 
around a contemporary issue e.g. environmental opera. 
Indeed, we might expect to see. something of th.is scenario even if the current opera 
infrastructure remains in place. We saw that EN 0, for instance, was charged with 
provision of opera of cultural value to the communiry (ibid EN 0 ARA 1990): this stated aim 
would be open to redefinition and radical reinterpretation given the empowerment of 
volunteers within the organisation. ROH, however, might remain relatively unchanged 
by drawing upon the values of its metropolitan hinterland. It might find a new role for 
itself in the provision of capital ci!J opera, and in preservation of the old values and 
traditions and standard classical repertoire of opera. However, ROH would need to 
cultivate its private and third sector support to an even greater degree than it currently 
does, in order to achieve this: virtual privatisation of the organisation would have to 
occur and ticket prices might well rise to reflect the new found independence of the 
company (its relative artistic and social autonomy). Inevitably, this would result in fresh 
distortion of the arti.sti.c value franchise by creating new persistent minorities in other 
parts of the UK. This would occur as those groups formerly served well by the current 
grant-in-aid system (e.g. Wagner lovers) found themselves unable to form communities 
of sufficient critical mass to win funding for local activities. Nevertheless, these 
persistent minorities could, given time, organize themselves on a national or even 
intranational basis to form, for instance, a travelling company, perhaps even contracted 
from Bayreuth itself. 
Significantly, communities might still fulfil the criterion of responsiveness (to members) 
whilst still exercising some form of property qualification over membership (see again 
section 1.1). Exclusivity would be an admissible feature (e.g. minimum donations to an 
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opera club, or knowledge as a prerequisite of membership to an opera acadel!!J)· 
Nevertheless, distributive justice might be maintained via competition between 
communities for public funds. Again, there are questions here for government in the 
matter of defining appropriate universal principles, of establishing the appropriate 
moral and political mise-en-scene for communitarianist arts policy. 
Whilst communitarianism apparently embraces the role of public-private partnerships, 
it is not clear in what way this is consistent with the communitarianist stress on the 
controlling of private money w:ithin the state. Indeed, the conflict of interests which 
results from private representation (private patrons with directorial interes~ is perhaps an 
issue for the Charities Commission. Whilst private funders of the arts would not be 
discouraged, the conflict between individual liberty and the public interest would still 
need to be addressed. A code of practice, for instance, recommending the separation of 
patron and directorial interest might be one option. Those individuals who might still 
wish to enjoy the privilege of special influence at board level, could, in these 
circumstances, best be advised to set up an entirely private sector arts organisation of 
their own. 
Perhaps the most damaging practical difficulty with the communitarianist perspective in 
the context of subsidy policy, is the question of community empowerment. Unless 
community agendas are genuinely devolved (i.e. constructed by members themselves) 
and not imposed or shaped by community intermediaries (e.g. Local Authority 
education or cultural services departments) who think they know what is best for 
communities, change will be cosmetic rather than coherent. Compromise on the issue 
of community empowerment will render communitarianist arts policy impotent: it will 
not enable substantive artistic innovation and it will not enable greater participation in 
the artistic value franchise. 
Enabling mechanisms: private seroice provision 
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Opera in the UK is currently supported via grant-in-aid and delivered by government as 
a form of public service. There are, however, alternative ways in which to deliver public 
services. Private senice provision i.e. the provision of opera by various forms of contract 
instrument between government and private sector, meets the political and economic 
objectives of public service (i.e. the generation of externalities and provision of access) 
just as well. In addition, private service provision enhances accountability and ensures the 
inclusiveness of the artistic value franchise. The two main features or requirements of 
private senice provision as an enabling mechanism are: 
1) Direct transaction between government and opera producer. The transaction between 
government and opera producer is effected without the need of intermediary 
agency. The trade of values which takes place in the transaction between 
government and opera producer therefore becomes explicit and transparent. As 
a result, success and failure, in both artistic value and financial value terms, are 
better defined. 
2) Separation of physical establishment and production. The separation of physical 
establishment and production yields flexibility and stimulates competition. By 
disassociating producers from venues it permits the multiple use of venues (thus 
increasing public choice). Separation may be achieved by fiat or by passive 
means: government may force the release of assets on an immediate or 
incremental basis, or it may simply await the collapse of a major subsidized 
sector company. 
Franchising and direct contracting represent two extremes of private service provision. As 
an enabling mechanism, private service provision gives government the freedom to manage 
the artistic value agenda across an infinite range from complete delegation of competency 
(franchise) to direct management (contract). These mechanisms (as two extreme forms 
of private service provision) are discussed below. 
Franchise modeL In the franchise model, venue management, rather than opera provision, 
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is predicated as a public service. Government first sets up a venue management service: 
a range of mechanisms are available here e.g. agency, or private company with assets in 
trust. The particular choice of instrument here allows government to place different 
restrictions on use of the venue infrastructure. It may, for instance, stipulate a balance 
of usage between commercial and artistic aims by setting out criteria in a parliamentary 
charter, or by issuing a tendered contract. It is important for government to establish 
the concept of usage (what activities are to occur), otherwise profit motives will ensure 
that the venue infrastructure is lost to more obviously viable and popular activities such 
as West End musicals. 
In the franchise model, then, opera companies are divested of their theatres, or the 
financial support for these (which amounts to the same). A range of opera production 
companies are then funded as franchise holders (i.e. delegated responsibility for 
management of the artistic value agenda) and given access to the infrastructure. There 
exists a range of ways in which this may be effected, but all options share one common 
feature: in each case, the company must provide a proposal, detailing its committment 
and what it will achieve. 
Franchising also has the virtue of breaking the annual funding cycle by awarding 
contracts for longer periods e.g three to seven years, for instance. Close analogy here 
may be drawn with Independent Television franchises, award of which is predicated on 
the fitness of proposers as well as proposals. The crux is: the opera production 
company must provide explicit definition of what it will achieve, and in tum, is given 
the appropriate planning horizon to achieve it in the knowledge that it will be reviewed 
or audited towards the end of the franchise period. It also provides an entry 
opportunity for competitive managements, who think they may be better able to fulfil 
the franchise conditions. Ultimately, the aim of government here is to have more 
proposals than franchises. 
Franchising is compatible with the general trend towards disengagement of the state. 
All government has to do is decide amongst the proposals received (an unmanaged 
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artistic value agenda); it does not have to provi.de the artistic value agenda. Contract terms 
and conditions may avoid direct management of the artistic value agenda, but will include 
the criteria for good conduct as well as the social and public service objectives to be 
met. Franchising thus marries financial efficiency criteria with the generation of 
externalities. 
The franchise model works by maintaining a spread of franchises in terms of scale, value, 
and bias. Franchises might include, for instance: an international standard franchise; 
national franchises and regional franchises; education franchises; touring franchises, and 
so forth. The bias and scale of contracts provides individual identity for opera 
producers: each franchise category is different. The role of government is to search for 
distinctiveness amongst proposers. Duplication of franchises is also possible, and may 
be useful to reflect geographical separation e.g. Both Glasgow and Manchester might 
win an education franchise on the basis of resource strength in this area. 
In the franchise model, there are only two players; no Arts Council. Government 
receives proposals directly from producers, and proposals, as well as government 
(funder) responses, are published. This permits transparency and opens the artisti.c value 
agenda to the influence of the artistic value franchise: franchisees may lobby their MPs, 
or, indeed, decide to set up their own opera production companies on the basis of the 
information thus available to them. 
Contract model In the contract model, government has the option to take control of the 
artisti.c value agenda. It may decide, for instance, to undertake the maximization of artisti.c 
value (effectively, the reverse of current subsidy policy aims). This can be done should 
the opera community be judged, or be found incompetent in terms of ability to meet 
agreed committments. Should this occur, government will move to institute a more 
detailed level of funding, using more fragmented, shorter and more specific funding 
instruments. 
Whereas delegation of competence is a feature of the.franchise model Oeaving the opera 
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producer, the franchisee, free to decide how to create artistic value), the move to more 
specific programmes, in effect, removes the assumption of competence. Also, because 
programmes are shorter and more specific, there will be many more contending 
proposers, but funding will now be limited to a single concept or programme leaving 
proposers fewer degrees of freedom. 
The contract model might require the institution of an artistic advisory board as overseer. 
The advisory board would set policy goals, and advisors, whilst drawn from the artistic 
community, would be obliged .to disqualify themselves from any potential conflict of 
interest e.g. involvement in sponsorship or patronage of proposing companies. A 
parliamentary charter might be used to set out the remit of the advisory board and 
thereby set, also, the expected range of representation and qualifications of its members 
(who, in addition would be appointed directly by government, and probably on a 
rotational basis). 
Specifically, the advisory board would be required to demarcate fundable concepts 
(areas for activity), set guidelines, as well as provide illustrative examples of what it 
wished to see achieved. This done, the advisory board would disengage from the 
funding award process until reviewing policy goals towards the end of the life of 
individual contracts. 
Moreover, whilst the advisory board would be responsible for setting general policy (i.e. 
setting the general funding criteria) it would not be responsible for the award of 
contracts). Audit and award of contracts might be made the responsibility of specially 
invited rapporteurs. The rapporteur system, much used in the context of European Union 
programmes, provides an established model here. Separation of goal setting and audit 
and awarding processes inhibits the propagation of artocratic interests. For instance, 
rapporteurs have contractual responsibility to reveal problems contained in proposals. If 
the rapporteur makes an objection, then the objection must be personally defended; the 
proposer becoming prosecutor. This opens debate and avoids partisanship. Again, 
there are rules for the selection and invitation of rapporteurs (so as to avoid potential 
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conflicts of interest), and an Audit Commission check would also be possible. The 
most important safeguard, however, is the fact that the artistic advisory board must 
report to Parliament to show that it has met the political objectives set out in its 
charter. 
In this way, the artistic value franchise has the opportunity to direct the advisory board's 
agenda by lobbying the appropriate arts or culture minister. The board may, in addition, 
be required to engage in a process of public and professional consultation. 
In this model, the public sector becomes an opera enabler, deciding upon the service it 
requires, with capital and management skills provided by the private sector. 
Nevertheless, the service retains its public characteristics. Moreover, incentives and 
penalties can be written into contracts. 
Here, the artistic value agenda is specified in detail (the deliverable is detailed). Ethical 
principles govern this process to limit the interest of the private partner within stated 
bounds. The opera community experiences major constraint on artistic freedom but 
gains through the ability to compete on a level playing field (note, contracting must be 
done in conjunction with separation of transformational assets and opera producers). 
The contract model, because it has the potential to split or fragment the artistic value 
agenda into many component areas, would also be expected to stimulate the emergence 
of a new type of infrastructure: an infrastructure of many opera troupes of varying size 
with distinct repertoires and performance styles (a feature which might lower the 
political cost to government of the failure of any one of them). 
Ultimately, change in the infrastructure permits challenge of the idea that opera is 
defined by the existence of an international or central repertory (a nineteenth century 
concept), by encouraging localisation and regional differentiation. In this respect 
opportunities for the generation of new externalities are presented. For instance, opera 
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as a vehicle for the expression of regional identity might not only attract overseas 
tourists, but stimulate domestic tourism also. Externalities might be defined by and 
within communities, allowing repatriation of externalities to specific communities. The 
concept of externalities is currently articulated in very abstract sense e.g. national 
prestige. However, through community devolvement these abstract externalities might 
become concrete realities e.g. regeneration of rural communities through renewed 
interest in church or village halls as meeting places. The possibility of local recruitment 
of chorus singers also echoes the artisan labour model of eighteenth century Italian 
opera. This would provide additional income for local communities (an externality in 
itself). 
Whilst there is stasis in the opera infrastructure now, the possibility of closer linkage of 
output and planning cycle offered by the private service provision mechanism should allow 
funding to advance and retreat. In addition, there is the advantage that delivery of 
output, not the establishment or institution should become the focus of subsidy policy. 
Examples of private service provision (which is project-based) include: European 
programmes such as Kaleidoscope, academic projects, commercial product 
development and marketing. Significantly, in each case funding is limited to specific 
objectives. There is also scope for use of an additionalifY clause in contracts i.e. 
proposers must state in what way funding will enable activities, by stating what activities 
will occur without funding. Private seroice provision requires a going concern which is truly, 
and not apparent!J, viable. 
The private service provision mechanism, in all its variant forms, permits multiple funding 
of producers and thereby removes the moral leverage which producers are currently 
able to exert on government. Under private service provision, producers cannot argue over 
viability but must demonstrate additionality i.e. what precisely the grant may enable in 
addition to existing activities. This implies a stable organisation and finite programmes. 
Moreover, although funding may still be on a rolling basis, it will be specific and 
measurable against outcomes stated in the initial proposal document. Private service 
provision is, therefore, a useful vehicle for innovation within the artform. 
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Most importantly, the publication of producer proposals in summary form not only 
creates transparency but offers the opportunity for consultation. Publication of 
proposals ensures that producers explain their objectives to a non-professional 
audience i.e. to the artistic value franchise. It also makes the transaction between 
government and opera producers transparent and testable. 
Enabling mechanisms: the national trust fund model 
There is a strong case for the separation of powers within the UK subsidized opera 
infrastructure. That is, for separation between ownership and productive use of 
transformational assets; the separation of theatre ownership and opera production 
itself. The exact value to the opera company of direct ownership of transformational 
assets in the transformation process has never been established in cost-benefit terms. 
There is, therefore, an argument for separation of goals (maximization of artistic value) 
from constraints (maintenance of financial value efficiency and the viability of 
transformational assets). The idea of a national trust fund for opera provides one 
vehicle by which this might be achieved. 
The concept has several virtues. Appointment of trustees on a rotational basis would 
prevent the establishment of a status quo; another artocrary. Moreover, appointees 
would be bound by strict rules of trusteeship. For instance, trustees cannot disburse the 
principal capital of the fund for which they are responsible; to do so would be to face 
immediate legal and personal penalty. 
The idea of a national trust fund for opera might also be expected to focus the public 
mind on opportunity cost issues, as well as on the competency or qualification of 
trustees. Moreover, the trust, as a funding vehicle, also permits variation and 
innovation. Goals may be set so that companies must compete for funds according to 
criteria set by the trust itself. A range of funding categories might be developed to 
cover formal innovation, tourism projects, education and outreach work and so forth. 
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This would prevent tokenism (e.g. token outreach activity which is a· necessary but not 
sufficient criterion of funding in present subsidy award). It would also allow start-up 
projects not only to compete directly with established opera companies such as ROH, 
but to compete on an equal basis. This would encourage specialisation and 
differentiation, allowing companies and groups to exploit specific artistic strengths, 
rather than be forced, as under the present system, to try to cater for a wide and 
potentially disparate range of tastes and preferences (this, we saw, was a problem for 
SO, in particular). 
Ultimately, the existence of a national trust fund for opera would change the market for 
factors of production in a radical way. It could be expected to break down the 
homogeneity of the current infrastructure: the greater the range of categories supported 
by the fund, the wider the variation in forms of delivery. To some extent, this would, in 
tum, erode the scarcity value of perceived elites (guest artists) and therefore act to 
counter opera value ieflation. Denomination of the fund in Euros would also enhance 
transparency of factor pricing in international sourcing. 
Finally, the setting up of a national trust fund for opera provides a politically interesting 
mechanism because it involves the complete disengagement of government from the 
process of managing artistic value - by making it the remit of the Charities Commission -
a truly third sector interest. 
The outcomes of change and enablement 
In time, as a result of infrastructural change, new forms and genres of opera could 
emerge such as childrens' opera, minority language and dialect opera as forms of 
regional volksopern, outdoor and street opera, and municipal opera, all of which are likely 
to challenge the current perception that opera is a classical music form and must be 
performed in a theatre with an orchestra in a pit. Cross-fertilisation between opera 
genres and, indeed, other artforms, might occur and would reflect community priorities 
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and local resources. 
Potentially, change in the infrastructure may afford the artistic value franchise a chance to 
draw on older, historical operational models e.g. troupes specialising in stage machinery 
and special effects (either with authentic or cutting-edge technology); troupes drawing 
on the commedia dell'arte tradition (with old and new stock characters, topical laz:d or 
visual gags with stronger differentiation between singers; some singers with very 
physical, acrobatic roles and others with static roles in which the emphasis on vocal 
delivery and bel canto becomes a defining feature); peripatetic troupes in the tradition 
of the seventeenth century French ballet de cour (a key feature of which was the ability to 
adapt to a wide range of venues both indoors and out); special import, project-based 
troupes e.g. a zarz!'ela troupe imported and contracted for a tour, rather than an 
isolated, festival visit; troupes specialising in new and existing semi-operas which might 
be defined under a category for indigenous forms (from Purcell to new commissions, thus 
reviving an old genre). Moreover, in this latter form, there is scope for community 
participation since in semi-opera, major characters speak and minor characters sing or 
dance (allowing local amateurs and young professionals a chance to participate). We 
might also expect to see local provision of stage machinery and costumes, and the 
organisation of special commissions for annual community events. Indeed, semi-opera 
has the potential to extend or open up the artistic value franchise in a dramatic way by 
offering franchisees the opportunity to become directly involved on stage (i.e. directly 
involved in the transformation process and artistic value agenda itself). 
These formal innovations, representing the kind of substantive artistic innovation 
which current subsidy policy obstructs, would have to be accepted as forms or genres 
in their own right; not merely tolerated by an artocrary which considered these deviant or 
bastardised forms excusable only as a means by which franchisees might be encouraged 
towards appreciation of the real thing i.e. as possessing instrumental value only. 
This type of model might also stimulate the re-emergence of impresarios as well as 
aristocratic and even artocratic patrons: opreneurs (working within the caveat of 
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contracts, the professional representation of artists, and agreements concerning 
remuneration rates and working conditions in order to limit the possibility of 
exploitation). There is also, here, the possibility of new career opportunities for young 
artists. Apprenticeships might be developed to give individuals multiple skills e.g. 
singers doubling as lighting crew in smaller troupes. 
Earlier, we found that the goal of distributive efficiency must necessarily supervene the 
goal of artistic value maximization in subsidy award. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, 
given current subsidy policy. A useful thought experiment here is to reverse the result. 
What would the outcome be if government set out to maximize the artistic value of 
opera (in an alternative infrastructure)? Firstly, the artistic value agenda (policy goals) 
would become identified with power factions within the artistic value franchise; an 
immediate narrowing of the franchise would occur, individual artforms would compete 
openly, and choice between artforms (as a justification for subsidy) would give way to 
new justifications for subsidy. 
In this scenario, the need to respond to the artistic value franchise would result in 
distortion: inequality of opportunity and access to financial resources would be required 
in order to promote equality of preferences. Each might be rewarded according to taste 
and preference, but there would not be equality of opportunity i.e. franchisees would 
not all see the same productions, genres, and companies; and not everyone would have 
the chance to see a production of Wagner's Ring. 
Overall, our point is this: without change in the infrastructure substantive artistic 
innovation cannot take place. Innovation is equated with artistic value, but as long as the 
current opera infrastructure prevails, the radical young composer cannot introduce 
fresh artistic departures. Put bluntly, he or she cannot score for twenty-one saxophones 
when orchestral salaries have to be paid, and when individual opera companies must 
look to the proper utilization of the transformational assets in which they have 
invested. Indeed, the young opera composer is hemmed in by financial value issues which 
have a fixity about them which is entirely unnecessary. 
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9.4 Summary 
In part this study has been made necessary by the lack of an adequate political economy 
of opera and the lack of adequate philosophical constructs to take opera successfully 
into the twenty-first century. In the theory chapters of the study we saw the need for a 
fresh theoretical approach which would allow the various parties with an interest in 
opera to find a common forum. Our findings, particularly vis a vis the operation of the 
powerhouse model, confirm the peed for such theory and underline it as a matter of some 
urgency. 
The persistence of a powerhouse hierarchy (an overhang from Keynesian demand 
management policies of the post-WWII period) and a public service provision ethos, 
confirms treatment of artistic value, by policy makers, as an exogenous given, and, by the 
opera community (in its complacency and lack of concern with accountability) as self-
evident. But artistic value, as we demonstrated, does not pre-exist its consumption. In 
the live performance of opera (which is delivery of a service) value is created by and 
within live performance: the production and consumption of artistic value is a 
simultaneity; the result of an aggregate transaction between audience and opera 
company. To treat artistic value as an exogenous given is to miss the mutability, the 
transient, perishable, and dynamic nature of artistic value; it is to fail to take account of 
the influence of partial interests in the artistic value agenda. 
Specifically this suggests that the provision of opera (as an artform with existing artistic 
value, which is determined by producers and which is self-evident) is more important to 
government than the creation and maximization of artistic value. This was a key finding: 
that the goal of distributive efficiency must necessarily supervene the goal of artistic value 
maximization in current subsidy policy. 
We have shown that modernist aesthetic theory, and that postmodernist thought 
(which takes its cue from the modernism of Adorno) is inapplicable to the current 
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environment and situation of opera. The effective denial of the inseparability ofjinancial 
value and artistic value which underlies the writings of Adorno (and those postmodernists 
who develop his ideas) provides a totally inadequate basis for analysis and for the 
successful evolution of opera as an artform. Ultimately, art has no autonomy (it is 
always a function of financial value in a money economy) and so cannot be meaningfully 
treated as existing or even as striving to exist in contradiction with its socio-economic 
environment. 
But the inadequacy of the philosophical constructs provided by modernist and 
postmodernist aesthetic theory exert a damage far beyond the boundaries of aesthetics. 
By propagating a cascade of distortions of the economic theory of Marx, the value of 
objective observation in the realm of political economy in the arts as a whole is 
effectively undermined. 
Taken as a whole, modernist and postmodernist aesthetic theory promotes and 
attempts to legitimize the discussion and treatment of artistic value as an independent 
realm (artistic value exceptionalism). This acts as a major obstacle to the development of 
a mature and practical political economy of the arts, inhibits, if not positively 
discourages interdisciplinary communication, and denies the opera community access to 
the tools by which means it might gain greater self-understanding. Ultimately, it denies 
the opera community the ability to empower itself and take an active part in controlling 
the arts policy agendas of the future. We cannot, for instance, begin to consider the 
artistic value benefits and disbenefits of alternative funding systems and opera 
infrastructures by turning to Adornian aphorism. We must conclude, therefore, that 
modernism and postmodernism have left us in the midst of a philosophical vacuum in 
which we have become disconnected from the utility of rational politico-economic 
enquiry in the arts. 
In this study, we have shown, however, that there is an infinite degree of control open 
to government in the management of artistic value. Given the appropriate enabling 
mechanism, it can chose to direct the artistic value agenda or disengage completely from 
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its definition. Moreover, where artistic value and financial value are explicitly linked in 
policy terms, government can chose to disengage entirely from the funding of opera, 
and do so without moral penalty. 
Artistic value in the current era, then, is the outcome of transactions between buyers and 
sellers; it is irrevocably a market concept. Arguments about the autonomy or illusory 
autonomy of art (viz modernism) merely distract us, therefore, from the central and 
more complex issue which is the nature of the relationship, in practice, between artistic 
value and financial value, it distra,cts us from scrutiny of the justifications for the public 
funding of opera. Most importantly, it distracts us from critical inter-party debate about 
the choice of infrastructure and appropriate operational models for opera, given our 
artistic and political aims: the maximization of artistic value and democratic delivery or 
social justice, respectively. Fostering a balance between those two aims, in the context 
of an environment of increasing financial constraint, is the considerable challenge 
which now faces those parties with an interest in the future of opera. The flourishing of 
art, and human flourishing are concerns which must now be considered as one. Indeed, 
these concerns are often considered as one and the same; as an identity. But until artistic 
value and financial value are treated as inseparable, until opera is properly reunited with 
the political and economic environment of which it is an integral part, the flourishing 
of art and human flourishing will forever remain two separate questions. 
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10. FUTURE WORK 
S tuc!J of opera costs and modelling of alternative iefrastmctures 
Many of the models pertaining to value in opera which currently exist in the 
environment, and which have been considered in this study, are now over thirty years 
old. Given the trend towards accountability and the pressure on government spending 
as two key factors in the environment in the late 1990s, and given the continued 
financial intensification of the opera sector in the UK, the political and economic 
fitness of these models, many of which are predicated on the assumption of a static 
environment, is now an issue. There is need, therefore, not simply to consider 
alternative infrastructural solutions, but to model in detail the options which exist; 
options which, if properly refined, may permit opera to flourish in the UK in the 
twenty-first century. 
Study of the changing cost structures of opera, and search for a standard framework for 
the analysis of opera costs, would prove a useful starting point. Such work, carried out 
in conjunction with specialists in accounting and accounting standards would establish 
much needed ground rules for the reporting of costs, thus permitting much more 
detailed study of company strategy (via inter-company comparisons) than is currently 
possible. Notwithstanding the recent developments in corporate governance and 
accounting standards mentioned in this study, such work would also benefit both opera 
producers and consumers by increasing, considerably, the transparency of opera sector 
financial reporting. 
The main work which needs to be done (the detailed modelling of alternative 
infrastructures) requires wide ranging skills. Characterisation of the type of options 
considered in this study (e.g. franchising, sub-contracting of design and production, 
maintenance of the status quo and complete withdrawal of government support) needs 
to be carried out at a detailed level. Firstly, it needs to be asked what objections to 
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change are likely to arise, and whether these originate from valid artistic issues or mere 
conservatism. The primary aim of such work would be to establish which option is 
likely to be the preferred alternative, and for what reason i.e. what value might be 
liberated, and in the long-run, what change in the nature of opera might occur? Such 
work would aim to provide some justification for the view that substantive artistic 
innovation would come about as the result of infrastructural change. Most importantly, 
this work would discover whether parties could agree about a suitable infrastructure for 
opera, and whether indeed, the questions of human flourishing (social justice aims) and 
the flourishing of art (maximization of artistic value) could meaningfully be considered as 
one? 
Since operas are traditionally months, even years in the making, work would also aim to 
establish what opportunities might realistically exist to exploit the service characteristics 
of the artform, especially its intangibility, perishability, and heterogeneity, via new opera 
forms. It might also be asked whether there was interest in giving new prominence to 
librettists, and in establishing new forms of relationship between singers and opera 
companies (e.g. emergence of singer-impresari). Work might also address what 
opportunity, and what interest, might exist for the exploitation of substitutability i.e. the 
adaptation of works to different environments and audiences, as an extension and 
revivification of a tradition which goes back to the roots of opera (e.g. Monteverdi's 
Oifeo, the large and essentially perishable nature of Vivaldi's opera oeuvre and Handel's re-
use and reworking of opera and oratorio arias for different contexts). A useful test case, 
here, might be to investigate current attitudes towards the idea of the aria de valise 
(suitcase aria, brought by singers and introduced to the work in hand) as an exploration 
of the issues of perishability and substitutability, together. Important work, here, would 
be to investigate the type of skills which would be required of composers and 
producers, and what level of interest there might be in such paradigmatic change in the 
artform. 
Qualitative primary research including interviews with key artistic and management 
personnel currently working in the opera sector, and quantitative research including 
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study of existing cost structures and budgeting practice, in order to establish the current 
pattern(s) of investment at company level, would be required. It needs to be asked, 
initially, what relationship exists between repertoire portfolio management, the 
constraints of installed capacity (and other investments in overhead) and a company's 
audience(s)? A wide range of expertise would be required for this task including 
specialists in economic modelling, public policy, business strategy and marketing, 
financial management and accounting, business law, and opera production. 
Investigation of investment rationale 
Further work might usefully aim to establish the opera community's rationale for 
financial intensification (increasing investment in overhead) which this study has 
shown. It would be useful to test whether explanation is presented predominantly in 
terms of financial value gains, artistic value gains, or some combination of both? Since any 
change in investment must have an impact on artistic value (be it positive, negative, or 
neutral) the primary aim of such work would be to establish first, whether the nature of 
the impact could be identified, and second, why, and by whom the realignment of 
investment was instigated. There is a key difference between passive or creeping change 
(in reaction to internal or external stimuli) and strategic change which is directed 
towards an explicit set of artistic value and .financial value goals. 
Theoretical development of the transaction model 
Utility of the transaction model as an analytical tool may be augmented by further 
description of the feedback mechanisms which it entails. Such work may be of 
particular importance where development of alternative infrastructural options for 
opera posits a pooling of expertise e.g. a franchise model with centralised marketing 
and fundraising functions as part of the venue management task of government. 
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Systems theory expertise would be required for this work, which would also need to be 
carried out with input from fundraising and arts management practitioners if it is to 
have valid practical application. Equally, once developed, the model might also provide 
a useful tool in the context of opera historiography e.g. modelling of the complex 
relationships between publishers, impresari, composers, patrons, box holders and other 
parties, in particular historical environments. 
S tutfy of suppfy chain inefficiencies . 
Study of supply-side inefficiencies associated with the training of singers and the careers 
of young professionals needs to be made. It needs to be asked whether oversupply of 
singers is a factor i.e. do opera companies bear the cost of overextended singers in a 
crowded market? It needs to be asked, also, whether there is sufficient differentiation in 
the supply-chain (i.e. specialisation of singers) and whether there is, here, a basis for 
future substantive artistic innovation. Moreover, an important question concerns the 
possibility of new and artistically interesting opportunities which might exist for singers, 
in the future, if the opera infrastructure is changed? 
Work could also be done, here, to examine the options open to government in its 
support of the supply-chain (training of singers). Drawing on recent work in this area 
(viz Towse 1993), a study of training outcomes would prove an invaluable aid to 
infrastructure design. A long-run tracking study of recent vocal studies graduates, 
recording the perception of success and failure by singers themselves, as well as the 
personal value, in terms of earnings, of their training, would be worthwhile. The views 
of conservatories themselves would also be sought. Since lives and livelihoods are at 
stake in the training of singers to professional standard, many important moral as well 
as artistic, economic and political issues would be raised by such study. 
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Opera infrastructures in the emerging democracies of East Asia 
A study of the relationships between emerging funding structures and issues of artistic 
value in the emerging democracies of South and South East Asia should provide an 
important area of future research. In these regions, state support of the arts is often 
viewed as a source of political and artistic disautonomy, whereas in the UK the reverse 
is true: private sector sponsorship is often held to be a source of political and artistic 
disautonomy. It may be interesting to observe the choices which various governments 
in South and South East Asia .make as regards public provision of opera i.e. what 
choices are made vis a vis the arts infrastructure and the desire to westernise and 
industrialise, during periods of fundamental change (this, in contradistinction to the 
UK, where opera has a long tradition, funding structures are less open to question and 
have themselves gained momentum). A similar study would be worthwhile in the 
context of Eastern Europe. In short, there is much to be learned about the perception 
of value by studying different transactional environments - different political economies 
of opera. 




1 We use the term, here, in its collective sense, to mean an electorate. But 
whereas electorate connotes not only right but procedure (the right to vote in 
elections),franchise connotes right, alone. The emphasis is on the moral right of 
individuals to express opinion, to make artistic value judgements which cannot be 
discounted by others, but must be treated with equal validity. The term is not 
meant to imply one individual, one vote, but one individual, one valid opinion. 
Ultimately, the concept is intended to represent the moral and equal right of all 
individuals (taxpayers and non-taxpayers) to make judgements about artistic value 
which is produced usihg public funds. This is what is intended by the phrase full 
and free participation in the artistic value franchise, which is used in this study. 
2 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
3 A key criterion of EMU membership is that public deficit be limited to 3% as a 
proportion of GDP, with potential fines should members exceed this limit. 
4 A singular problem for opera in Hungary, as in Eastern Europe as a whole, is 
the relative lack of audience purchasing power. It is difficult to drive greater 
efficiency through an arts infrastructure where there is need for heavy 
subsidisation of ticket prices. 
5 The Department of National Heritage, now the Department for Culture, 
Media, and Sport. 
6 Formerly the Department of National Heritage (DNH). 
7 Formerly the Arts Pairing Scheme. The scheme is run by Arts and Business, the 
former Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts (ABSA). 
8 Under National Lottery rules, arts organizations must find up to 25% 
partnership funding, for instance (see EBA c1997). 
9 It is important to be aware of the normative content of the term public interest in 
the context of political discourse - in the context of communitarianism, it 
certainly implies a residuum of paternalism. Generally, however, the term is 
used to distinguish between particular interests and the common interest of 
society as a whole (the sense in which we use it in this study). For a discussion 
of the history of the term see Gunn JA (1989). 
CHAPTER2 
1 Because in a money economy, all such inputs and outputs have costs (monetary 
or opportunity), they must also be considered to have value. We should be 
clear, however, that whilst we develop here a theory of the role, nature and 
determination of value (in the context of opera), we are not interested in 
developing a rigorous, parallel theory of price. The relationship between value 
and price is a separate, technical issue beyond the scope of this thesis. 
2 Outliers here are Opera North and the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden. 
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Opera North's public income factor (the percentage of total funds from public 
sources) ranges between 75% and 78% in the early 1980s, whilst the public 
income factor for the Royal Opera dips to between 30% and 37% in the early 
to mid 1990s. For data see Appendices 7-2 to 7-1 O. 
3 Whilst an accumulated deficit/ surplus is calculated on the balance sheet as total 
assets less total liabilities and is therefore correctly a measure of solvency in 
' ' ' 
practice a subsidized opera company with an historical accumulated deficit may 
still be considered solvent though it is technically insolvent. This is because 
insolvency is a matter of (professional) subjective judgement. A private sector 
company may appear insolvent on paper, but where the directors believe that 
future earnings will cover all liabilities, then the company may continue to trade 
and be treated as a going concern. The same directors will find themselves 
criminally liable should their belief that the company can meet its liabilities on 
demand be shown to be unjustifiable. However, because government rarely 
withdraws its annual subsidy to the major opera companies it supports, 
companies in the UK subsidized sector are rarely thought to be unable to pay 
their bills in the short- to medium-term, and are therefore rarely regarded as 
insolvent in practice. Potentially, however, any ruction with government over 
financial management which leads to possible disruption of the flow of subsidy 
can bring an opera company to the brink of insolvency. Recent examples 
include the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden during its pre-closure phase in 
the late 1990s, and Scottish Opera in 1999 /2000 in the aftermath of an 
ambitious production investment which resulted in disagreement with 
government over accounting procedures and cashflow management. 
4 Note, investment in assets tends to incur concomittant liabilities e.g. theatre 
acquisition may incur liability in the form of provision for replacement of 
fixtures and fittings. A real example is provided by Scottish Opera financial 
accounts, in which the restoration of the Theatre Royal (i.e. adding new fixtures 
and fittings) appears as an asset on the balance sheet. In accounting for this 
investment, the prudent course would be to take account of the fixed life of this 
asset (the restoration will suffer wear and tear and need replaced at some time). 
This might be done either by depreciating the asset, so that valuation will be 
true and fair in the event of disposal. Alternatively, a provision Oiability) could 
be made by creating a cash or paper asset. Since Scottish Opera has chosen to 
do neither, the accounts are qualified by the company's auditors to this extent 
i.e. that because the directors have chosen not to take depreciation on 
restoration of the Theatre Royal, and not to recognise associated liabilities, its 
reported value does not conform to the required condition of prudence (see 
e.g. report of the auditors in SO ARA 1994). 
5 Note, the most common, conventional measure of value-added is sales revenue 
less all bought-in materials and services, but since we are dealing primarily with 
the UK subsidized opera sector (a non-profit sector), the contribution of the 
sector to the economy in terms of wealth creation is not relevant. Our use of 
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the concept of value-added should also not be confused with the method 
sometimes adopted for government services, of measuring factor input costs as 
a proxy measure of value contributed to Gross Domestic Product. By value-
added in this study we mean changes to the degree of establishment of the 
opera company as measured by the total asset value stated on its balance sheet. 
6 The term reproducing is meant in the sense used in classical economics. 
Specifically, the viability condition of classical economics demands that some 
output be forgone for the purposes of maintaining production in the following 
period e.g. in a one sector corn economy, a proportion of seed must be saved if 
planting is to take place in the following year in such a way as to reproduce the 
surplus value yielded in the current. Likewise the opera company needs to 
produce and save some financial value (e.g. box office income) to survive from 
year to year. 
7 Note, although government represents the artistic value franchise, and the 
franchise can influence government policy, the process of representation and 
influence between government and franchise is external to the model. Political 
lobbying and arts advocacy are separate issues and franchise opinion in this way 
enters the model as the parameter, G. 
8 Franchisees have a right to an opinion about opera funding whether or not they 
are consumers of opera. All citizens are entitled to an opinion about National 
Health Service funding, for instance, whether or not they have current need of 
its services. 
9 Note, the transformation problem of Marxian economics is only a problem 
insofar as an objective theory of value is sought. The relationship between value 
and price is not our concern in this thesis. 
CHAPTER3 
1 Glyndebourne was home to the English Opera Group from 1946. Later 
entrants, to what is now the subsidized sector, include English National Opera 
North, founded 1975, which became Opera North in 1982, and Scottish Opera, 
founded 1962. 
2 In mechanical engineering the term driver is given to that part of a machine to 
which the effort is applied; the follower is that part which applies the final force 
to the resistance e.g. belt and pulley transmission where power is transmitted 
from a driver pulley by means of belting to a follower pulley. Epicyclic 
( differential) gears use this principle in a more complex fashion, allowing the 
relationship between driver and follower to vary (differential speed). 
3 ... this panel believes that as a general principle the nonprofit peiforming arts organization 
should not be expected to pqy their [sic] wqy at the box office. Indeed thry cannot do so and 
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still fu!fill their cultural mission (Rockefeller Panel Report cited in Salem 1973:65). 
4 The cost can be direct!y associated with the production of a cost unit (here, an 
individual performance) or with the activity associated with a cost centre (here, 
for instance, the performance but not rehearsal costs of the chorus; the latter 
forming a development of production cost which cannot direa!y be associated 
with a particular performance). 
5 The Task Force at 1997 included: Richard Branson (entrepreneur), David 
Putnam (film producer), Paul Smith (clothes designer), Gail Rebuck (publisher), 
Alan McGee (record company magnate) (DCMS 178/1997). 
6 Thomas Ades, opera composer and artistic director of the Aldeburgh Festival 
(1999). 
CHAPTER4 
1 Adorno is here quoting Marx from Das Kapital (see Marx 1887:77). 
2 Real, that is, in the context of the labour theory of value (value as a measure of 
labour expended). 
3 Adorno was of partly Jewish extraction. 
4 Music of the Schoenberg school (i.e. dodecaphonic composition). 
5 Over-the-counter pharmaceuticals. 
6 Performance at Adorno and Analysis conference, Royal Musical Association 
Society for Music Analysis and Critical Musicology, University of Bristol, 
February 1997, by Jane Manning (soprano) and David Mason (piano). 
Programme included Vier Ueder nach Gedichten von Stefan Georg Op? (1944). 
CHAPTER 7 
1 Whilst we have no evidence that problems or conflicts of interest do occur, 
such interlinkage reinforces the external view that board members belong to a 
self-electing and therefore self-perpetuating elite which, because it is not fully 
open to scrutiny, cannot legitimately claim to represent artistic value franchise 
interests other than from the point of view of a particular interest group or 
faction within the franchise. 
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Appendix 7-22: Opera board directors and other directorships 
[Year]= latest available data where an incomplete declaration has been given in the sample year.1995 
Name = Chairperson 
Name = Vice-chairperson 
ROYAL OPERA HOUSE, COVENT GARDEN : BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1995 
DIRECTOR OCCUPATION CURRENT DIRECTORSHIPS rROH YEAR 1994195) 
Sir Angus Duncan Director General Heritage Education Trust 
Aeneas Stirling Heritage of London Trust 
Samuel Courtauld Trust (trustee) 
Sir James Spooner Director Britel Fund Trustees Ltd 
Brite! Fund Nominees Ltd 
Brite! {MAM) Nominees Ltd 
The Folkestone Race Course 
Glanmoor Investments Ltd 
Cleveland Square Properties {London) Ltd 
Countryside Securities Ltd 
.Goldsmiths College Estates Ltd 
Pytchley House Estates Ltd 
Hemming Publishing Ltd 
Mabbiridge Ltd 
The Morgan Crucible Company pie 
ROH Pension Trust Ltd 
ROH Developments Ltd 
ROH Holdings Ltd 
ROH Management Ltd 
John Swire & Sons Ltd 
HJohn Swire & Sons Inc {USA) 
Swire Properties Ltd {Hong Kong) 
United States Cold Storage Inc {USA) 
Hermes Pension Management Ltd 
J Sainsbury pie 
New Telscheme Nominees Ltd 
Sir John (Derek) Birkin British Industrialist Barclays pie 
Carlton Communications pie 
CRA Ltd (Australia) 
The Merchants Trust pie 
Merck & CO Inc {USA) 
The RTZ Corporation pie 
Unilever olc 
Baroness Blackstone College Principal Institute for Public Policy Research 
of Stoke Architecture Foundation 
Newington Ditchley Foundation 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors & Princioals: UK Universities 
Percy {James) Butler Chartered Accountant Camelot Group pie 
CBE W adworth Co Ltd 
British Rail 
European Passenger Services 
Union Railwavs Ltd 
Vivien Louise Duffield Company Director Childrens Museum Eureka 
CSE 
Bamber Gascoiane Author & Broadcaster National Gallerv Publications Ltd 
Robert Gavron CSE Company Chairman The Folio Society Ltd 
Open College of the Arts (trustee) 
Paul Hamlyn Foundation {trustee) 
IPPR {trustee & treasurer) 
St Ives pie 
National Gallery {trustee) 
National Gallerv Publications Ltd 
Jeremv Israel Isaacs General Director Jeremv Isaacs Productions 
Christooher Lowe Headmaster None 
Lady Debqrah Millicent Artist & Sole Trader American Ballet Theatre 
MacMillan Creative Dance Artists Trust 
5 af!y LK Garden Appendt~'< 7-22 
Appendix 7-22: Opera board directors and other directorships (continued) 
Sir John Manduell College Principal Royal Northern College of Music (principal) 
CBE North West Arts Board 
Cheltenham Arts Festivals Ltd 
Associated Board - Royal Schools of Music Ltd 
Lake District Summer Music Ltd 
London International String Quartet Competition 
Purcell Tercentenary Trust 
Countess of Munster Trust 
Halle Concerts Society 
Universitv of Manchester (member of court) 
Sir Christopher (Kit) Company Director Aegis Group pie 
McMahon Angela Flowers Gallery pie 
Coutts Consulting Group pie 
Taylor Woodrow pie 
Magdalen College Companies 
Fl Grouo olc 
Andrew Tuckey Merchant Banker .Baring Capital Investors Ltd 
Dillon Read (Holding) Ltd 
Sanwa Financial Services Ltd 
TOTAL DIRECTORS= 14 rtakina account of appointments and resianationsl 
ENGLISH NATIONAL OPERA: BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1995 
DIRECTOR OCCUPATION CURRENT DIRECTORSHIPS [ENO YEAR 19941951 
The Rt Hon the Earl Peer of the Realm \ Historic Masters Ltd (Latest data = 1992) 
of Harewood KBE Company Director qpera North Ltd 
Opera da Camera Ltd 
Sports Aid Foundation Ltd 
Harewood House Trading Ltd 
Harewood Property Company Ltd 




Sir Nicholas Proctor Company Director Three Copthall Avenue Ltd [Latest data= 1994) 
Goodison British Steel pie 
Burlington Magazine Publication Ltd 
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Co 
Harewood House Trust Ltd 
The Industrial Society 
Samuel Courtauld Trust 
TSB Bank pie 
TSB Group pie 
TSB Hill Samuel Bank Holdina Comoanv olc 
Charles Edward Company Director NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd [Latest data= 1994) 
Alexander BICE Chileconsult Ltda 
BICE SA 
NC Chile SA 
Rothschild Italia SpA 
Rothschild Espana SA 
Rothschild Portugal 
The Five Arrows Chile Fund 
Richard Van Allen Opera Sinaer Declaration ommitted 
John William Baker Company Director The Electricity Association [Latest data= 1994) 
The London Business School 
SANE 
The Groundwork Foundation 
Raval Insurance pie 
John Robert Company Director SG Warburg & Co Ltd [Latest data= 1994) 
Sotheby Boas Chesterfield Properties pie 
The Securities & Futures Authority Ltd 
Donmar Warehouse Projects Ltd 
S af!y LK Gardm / lppendi.-..· 7-2 2 (cn11ti1111ed) 
Appendix 7-22: Opera board directors and other directorships (continued) 
Paul Boatena MP MP & Barrister at Law Citv in Schools JLatest data= 19941 
Sir Rodric Quentin Senior Adviser, None [Latest data= 1994) 
Braithwaite GCMG Moraan Grenfell Grouo 
Roger John Lawrence Company Chairman Blue Car Holidays Ltd [Latest data= 1994) 
Bramble MA DL Paris Travel Servie Ltd 
Swiss Travel Service Ltd 
London Tours & Travel Service Ltd 
Bridge Travel Service Ltd 
Amsterdam Travel Service Ltd 
Bankers Insurance Co Ltd 
W alkclose Ltd 
Tourauto Ltd 
Sun International (UK) Ltd 
Sun Air 
City of Westminster Trust 
Lord Dunleath 1964 Settlement 
Lord Hindlip's Childrens' Settlement 
·The Benesh Institute of Choreology Ltd 
London Festival Ballet Trust Ltd (now English Nat. Ballet) 
The Serpentine Gallery 
CIAR (Milan) 
Lyceum Theatre Dance House Project Co Ltd 
BOB Ltd 
Covent Garden Festival 
Citv of Westminster Arts Council 
Sir Anthony Brian Chairman UK Centre for Economic & Environmental Development 
Cleaver [Latest data = 1994) Business in the Community 
General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Co pie 
Association for Business Sponsorship of the Arts Ltd 
Smith & Nephew pie 
Loral ASIC General Cable 
Dr Johnson (David) General Medical Investment Surveys Ltd [Latest data= 1994) 
Cohen Practitioner London Sinfonietta 
English Touring Opera 
Opera Factory 
Friends of Enalish National Ooera 
Mrs Donatella Flick Comoanv Director roeclaration not locatedl 
Mrs M Robin Hambro Consultant None Jlatest declaration = 19931 
The Rt Hon David Member of Parliament Abela Holdings UK Ltd [Latest data= 19921 
Mellor QC MP 
Ronald H Peet CBE Retired The Heritage of London Trust Ltd [latest data= 1993) 
Amee pie 
Amee Executive Pensions Trustee Ltd 
Amee Staff Pensions Trustee Ltd 
New Scotland Insurance Group plc 
John Tusa Chairman London BBC MPM Trust 
News Radio Political Quarterly Publication Co 
Thomson Foundation 
Wiamore Trust 
Lord Arthur George Publisher Weidenfield & Nicholson Ltd 
Wiedenfeld [Latest data =1994) Global Asset Management Ltd 
South Bank Corporation 
Great Universal Stores Europe AG 
Orion Publishina Group 
Shaun Anthony Wood Communications Vanderbilt Racquet Club 
Woodward Consultant 
TOTAL DIRECTORS= 18 rtakina account of annointments and resianationsl 
WELSH NATIONAL OPERA: BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1995 
DIRECTOR OCCUPATION CURRENT DIRECTORSHIPS [WNO YEAR 1994195] 
The Rt Hon The Lord Company Director EOBC Ltd 
S af!y LK Garden Appendix 7-22 (conti1111ed) 
Appendix 7-22: Opera board directors and other directorships (continued) 
Davies of Llandidnam Developments Ltd 
Llandldnam Wales Millenium Centre 
Ms E Bennett - -
The Ladv Crickhowell - -
Councillor Frederick County Councillor Southern Tourist Board 
AJ Emery-Wallis New Theatre Royal Portsmouth Trustees Ltd 
DL FSA 
Ms JK Foster - -
Mr JRP Hammond - -
Mr Bernt HR Company Director The Wigmore Hall Trust Ltd 
Hudson Davies The Award Scheme Ltd 
cvo Cardiff Bay Arts Trust Ltd 
The Outward Bound Trust Ltd 
Outward Bound Human Resources Ltd 
Cardiff Bay Development Corporation 
Duke of Edinburgh's Award 
Duke of Edinburgh's International Foundation 
National Lotterv Advisorv Board for Wales 
Mr William E Husselby Company Chairman Arm Communications Ltd 
DL Cogent Elliot Group Ltd 
Cogent Elliot Investments Ltd 
Cogent Elliot Public Relations Ltd 
Cogent Services Ltd 
The Creative Company Ltd 
Drury Lane Services Ltd 
Drury Lane Studios Ltd 
Lobelia Investment Co Ltd 
Broadway Estates (Warwickshire) Ltd 
J & BH Investments 
PHO Comoass Ltd 
Sir Geoffrey lnkin - -
OBE DL 
Mr Richard T Johnson Solicitor Southmead Health Services NHS Trust 
Colston Collegiate School Governors Ltd 
The Little Ann Property Co Ltd 
Brandon Hire PLC 
Arnolfini Gallery Ltd 
Colston Research Societv 
Dr CG Jones - -
Dr RH Jones CVO - -
Mrs Christine E Lewis Retail Consultant Development Board for Rural Wales 
Health Promotion Wales 
BBC Broadcasting Council for Wales 
Committee of the National Trust for Wales 
Professor Anthonv Professor of Economics None 
PL Minford 
Mrs ME Moreland MBE Retired None 
Councillor HJ Moraan - -
Mr Peter S Phillips Chartered Accountant Aspinwall Co Ltd 
Aspinwall Asia Ltd 
CitV of Birminaham Tourina Ooera Ltd 
Dr A Robinson - -
Mr D Sandbach - -
Mr David J Seligman Solicitor St David Hall Trust Ltd 
Cardiff Old Librarv Trust Ltd 
Mr G Stanley Jones - -
CBE 
Sir John Tooley Arts Consultant Tooley International Ltd 
Almeida Theatre 
Compton Verney Opera Project 
Opera London 
South Bank 
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Appendix 7-22 : Opera board directors and other directorships (continued) 
Britten Estate 
Britten Pears Foundation 
Darlington Summer School 
Friends of Covent Garden 
Purcell Tercentenary Trust 
Wigmore Hall 
Walton Trust 
Performing Arts Labs 
Royal Ballet Governors 
Nolan Trust 
Mr RC Turton - -
Sir Donald Walters Company director Wales Council for Voluntary Action 
Reclear Residents Association ltd 
Institute of Welsh Affiars 
Day Break (Wales) ltd 
Llandough Hospital & Community NHS Trust 
University of Wales, Cardiff 
Institute of Materials Management 
Library Information Plan - Wales 
Howell's School, Cardiff 
Institute of Directors 
Development Board for Rural Wales 
British Council 
Mr DL Williams - -
The Lady Young of Director None 
Graffham 
TOTAL DIRECTORS = 24 ltakina account of aooointments and resianationsl 
SCOTTISH OPERA: BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1995 
DIRECTOR OCCUPATION CURRENT DIRECTORSHIPS ISO YEAR 19941951 
Sandy Orr Lawyer Caledonian Bank PLC (Latest data= 1993) 
Caledonian Brewing Co Ltd 
Edinburgh Assets Ltd 
Macdonald Motels Ltd 
Sir Robert Calderwood Lawyer I Local Govt. GEC Scotland Ltd [Latest data= 1993) 
Officer Strathclvde Buses Ltd 
Lady Jennifer Balfour Arts consultant Jamaica Street Ltd 
of Burleigh Link Housing Ltd 
ECAT Contemoorarv Music Ltd 
Lady Marion A Fraser Housewife Royal Scottish Academy [Latest data= 1993) 
Laurel Bank School 
Raval Glasaow Institute of Fine Art 
Steven F Hamilton CB Retired None rLatest data= 19921 
Carol Hagel Electrical & wholesale Queens Hall 
distribution Queens Hall Catering ltd 
Taylem 
Dunard ltd 
Newbury Investments UK 
Ian J Irvine Chartered accountant Glasgow Development Agency [Latest data = 1993) 
Raval Scottish National Orchestra Societv Ltd 
Richard Jarman General Driector 
Professor Gavin Lecturer I Professor None 
Mccrone 
Dr Christopher Masters Chief executive Christan Salvesen PLC 
British Assets Trust 
Scottish Widows 
Scottish Chamber Orchestra 
Youna Enterorise Scotland 
Marv Moreland None slated None 
Brian Nicolls Business consultant Scottish Council for Develooment & lndustrv 
Mary Picken - -
S aUy LK Garden 
A endix 7-22: 0 era board directors and other directorshi s continued 
Peter (Hugh LI?) 
Runciman CBE 
Company director 
TOTAL DIRECTORS= 14 
Colvilles Clugston Shanks Ltd [Latest data= 1993) 
Colvilles Clugston Shanks (Holdings) Ltd 
Clydesdale Excavating & Construction Co Ltd 
The Scottish National Trust PLC 
British Steel PLC 
The Scottish Eastern Investment Trust PLC 
ltakina account of aooointments and resianationsl 
OPERA NORTH : BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1995 
DIRECTOR OCCUPATION CURRENT DIRECTORSHIPS [ON YEAR 19941951 
Sir J Gordon Linacre Company president University of Leeds Foundation 
Harrogate Festival of the Arts & Sciences Ltd 
Reuters Founders Share Co Ltd 
Camelon TV Ltd 
George HH Lascelles, Peer of the Realm English National Opera 
The Earl of Historic Masters Ltd 
Harewood Sports Aid Foundation Ltd 
Countrywide Holidays Association 
Harewood House Trading Ltd 
Harewood Property Co Ltd 
Opera Factory 
Lotterv Promotions Co 
WN Adsetts roeclaration ommittedl roeclataion ommittedl 
Councillor Bernhard Chairman of Leeds Cult Red Ladder Theatre Co Ltd 
Peter Atha Services Committee Roberts Funeral Directors Ltd 
Leeds Funeral Service Ltd 
Armley & Wortley Funeral Services Ltd 
Leeds Grands Theatre Trust Co Ltd 
Leeds Theatre Trust 
Sports Aid Foundation (Yorks & Humberside) Ltd 
Sports Aid Foundation Ltd 
Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society 
Craft Centre & Design Gallery Ltd 
Yorkshire Dance Centre Ltd 
British Paralympics Association Ltd 
British Paralympics Enterprises Ltd 
CM Watson Ltd 
Yorkshire & Humberside Regional Arts Board 
The Leeds Funeral Advice Centre Ltd 
Northern Ballet Theatre 
West Yorkshire Playhouse (Enterprises Ltd) 
John Holt (Leeds) Ltd 
St James Hosoital Trust 
Michael Beverley Chartered accountant Ebor Homes Ltd 
Consort Homes Ltd 
Mathew PD Bullock Bank executive BZW Ltd 
BZW Debt Capital Markets Ltd 
Rosalind EJ Gilmore Director of regulation, Securities and Investments Board 
Llovds of London Moorfields Eve Hosoital Trust 
John A Graham Chief executive Trustee South African Advanced Education Project 
Calderdale & Kirklees Tee Ltd 
Batley Action Ltd 
West Central Halifax Ltd 
Yorkshire Youth & Music 
Huddersfield Contemoorarv Music Festival Ltd 
John Gunnell Member of Parliament Yorkshire Enterprise Ltd 
Yorkshire Fund Managers Ltd 
Capital Prime Properties pie 
Capital Prime Properties Plus pie 
Capital Prime Properties Plus 11 pie 
National Coal Mining Museum 
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Appendix 7-22: Opera board directors and other directorships (continued) 
Councillor CA Heinitz fDeclaration ommittedl Declaration ommitted 
Penelope J Hemmina Reaional Director CBI Yorkshire & Humberside Tourist Board 
Clive W Leach Director Training & Enterprise National Council 
Leeds Training & Enterprise Council Ltd 
Yorkshire Enterprise Ltd 
Yorkshire Fund Manaaers Ltd 
Sir Tom McDonald Chartered accountant None 
Ms Sallv C Neocosmos Universitv secretarv Colleaiate Prooerties C2) Ltd 
Professor George Pratt Professor of Music Huddersfield Contemporary Music Festival Ltd 
Trinitv Colleae of Music 
Geoffrey A Shindler Solicitor Circular Press Ltd 
HL Nominees Ltd 
Amos Nelson Ltd 
Halliwells 
Roach Packing Case & Timber Co ltd 
Peter N Sparling Solicitor 
Halliwell Landau Pension Trust Ltd 
Leeds Theatre Trust Ltd 
Leeds Grammar School (Builders) Ltd 
Homeowners Friendly Society Ltd 
Homeowners Pensions Ltd 
TOTAL DIRECTORS= 15 rtakina account of annointments and resianationsl 
GLYNDEBOURNE PRODUCTIONS [GFT+GTO]: BOARD OF DIRECTORS 1995 
DIRECTOR OCCUPATION Cl:JRRENT DIRECTORSHIPS [GP YEAR 19941951 
Sir George Christie Company Director John Christie Ltd 
NDCILtd 
East Sussex Electric ltd 
Hill, Norman & Beard Ltd 
Christie Management ltd 
Ringmer Motor Works Ltd 
George Stone Hastings Ltd 
Savoy Group pie 
Rothschild Trust Corporation 
Mr John C Botts Company Director Botts & Co Ltd 
Balmuir Holdings Ltd 
The First Ireland Investment Co pie 
Balmuir Nominees ltd 
Balmuir Properties Ltd 
Glyndebourne Arts Trust (trustee) 
Parkside Development Co Ltd 
Euromoney Publications pie 
Balmuir Property Co Ltd 
Woodbridge House (1994) Ltd 
Botts Capital Managers Ltd 
Asauith Court Holdinas Ltd 
Mr Auaustus J Christie Zooloaist & Film rsicl None 
Mr David J Davies Company Chairman Johnson Mattey pie 
Sketchley pie 
lmry Holdings Ltd 
Cookson Mattney Ceramics pie 
John Armit Wines ltd 
Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum 
The Hon Mrs Julian Company Director None 
Fane 
Mr Peter Baring Merchant Banker Runciman (Trustees) Ltd 
Glvndebourne Arts Trust 
TOTAL DIRECTORS = 6 rtakino account of aooointments and resionationsl 
Sources ROH ARA 1993-95, ENO ARA 1993-95, IVNO ARA 1993-95, SO 
ARA 1993-95, ON ARA 1993-95, GP ARA 1993-95. 
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